Special der NYT zur Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

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Handelsblatt Newsletter Finance: Nichts gesehen, gewusst, gesagt (8.4.10): In den USA werden aktuell reihenweise heiße Stühle aufgestellt, um die Schuldigen an der Finanzkrise zu finden. Alan Greenspan (li.), Ex-Chef der Fed, hat vor der zuständigen Kommission gestern auf unschuldig plädiert. Die Zentralbank habe beispielsweise schon 1999 vor den Gefahren der Subprime-Kredite – als Ausgangspunkt der Finanzkrise – gewarnt. Interne Dokumente belegen dagegen, dass die Fed zumindest bei der Kontrolle der Citigroup geschlampt hat. Warum fällt es Greenspan so schwer zu sagen: Ich lag falsch, kritisiert der Business Insider. Kurioses Detail am Rande der Anhörung: Mittendrin fiel der Strom aus, alles wurde düster. Schließlich wurde das Verhör abgebrochen – weil nicht genügend Licht ins Dunkel gebracht werden konnte. Lloyd Blankfein (re.), Chef von Goldman Sachs, und sein Vize Gary Cohn wehren sich vehement gegen Kritik an ihrem Verhalten während der Finanzkrise. Ihr Institut habe nicht gegen seine Kunden gewettet, heißt es in einem Brief an die Aktionäre. Die Financial Times meldet Zweifel an. New York Times » Business Insider » MarketWatch » Wall Street Journal » WSJ2 » CBS News » Financial Times » FT2 » Financial Times Deutschland » FTD2 »

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Die Arbeit des Pannels stockt. Siehe dazu Dealbook der NYT v. 6.4.10: Financial Crisis Inquiry Wrestles With Setbacks: The panel established by Congress to investigate the causes of the financial crisis has been hobbled by delays and internal disagreements and a lack of focus, according to interviews with a majority of its members and government officials briefed on its work.

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Am 13.1.10 fand die erste und spannend besetzte Runde der “Inquisition zur Finanzkrise” statt. Hier einige Links auf Meldungen:

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Scheppern wird es sicher noch einmal, wenn etwa der Ex-Lehman Boss Richard Fuld (hier eine Befragung kurz nach der Pleite von Lehman) in den Zeugenstand gerufen wird oder wieder einmal die Manager der großen Hedge Fonds (wie es 2008 lief hier).

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HB: Anhörung zur Finanzkrise: US-Bankchefs räumen Fehler ein

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WSJ: Panel Rips Wall Street Titans

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FTD: Anhörung in Washington Nebenankläger im Kreuzverhör

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NYT: Interactive: Highlights in Schrift, Wort und Bild

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NYT: Bankers Face Tough Questions at Hearing on Financial Crisis

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The Hill: Wall Street takes conciliatory tone

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Politico: Wall Street CEOs grilled on pay

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Time: The Curious Capitalist The Financial-Crisis Hearings Begin

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Spon: Wall-Street-Banker zeigen wenig Reue

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HB: Anhörung in Washington: Nebenankläger im Kreuzverhör

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Zeit: Banken: US-Großbanken: Wir sind nicht Schuld an Finanzkrise

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Live-Blogging v. 13.4. der NYT: 4 Top Bankers on Capitol Hill

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FTD: Aufarbeitung der Krise Auf den Spuren des großen Wall- Street-Anklägers

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Zum Start bitte unten den Button drücken. Ganz oben befinden sich die aktuellsten Meldungen. Wer möchte kann bis nach unten durchscrollen und die Schlagzeilen seit Mittwoch Abend nachverfolgen. Die Anzahl verfolgbarer Twitterer ist bei coveritlive leider beschränkt, so dass hier nur Tweets ausgewählter Medien und Blogs enthalten sind. So entfällt aber zumindest das twitterübliche Rauschen. Die Tweets enthalten in den meisten Fällen eine Short-URL auf eine ausführliche Meldung.

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Vorbericht aus dem Blick Log: In Washington beginnt die Inquisition zur Finanzkrise

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Ok, ok. inquiry darf man nicht mit Inquisition übersetzen, jedoch lädt der Wortstamm irgendwie dazu ein und der etymologische Stamm der Begriffe Inquisition und inquiry weist auf die sprachgenetische Herkunft vom lateinischen Begriff inquisitio hin. In jedem Fall startet heute im Logworth House Office Building in Washington die erste Anhörung der “Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission”. Das ist ein Untersuchungsausschuss, der die Ursachen der Finanzkrise aufdecken soll (Rechtsgrundlage ist der Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, der entsprechende Gesetzestext ist in SEC 5 dieses Dokuments nachzulesen.

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Die Webseite der Kommission ist mittlerweile online. Das Livebild gibt es hier für Windows Player (weitere unten). Die Stellungnahmen der “Zeugen” sind bereits vor Sitzungsbeginn auf dieser Seite verfügbar. Die tatsächlichen Stellungnahmen können davon natürlich abweichen. Einen Live-Blog gibt es von der New York Times.

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Die Gäste-, sorry, die Zeugenliste verspricht jedenfalls schon einmal einen interessanten Auftakt. Und anderem sind dabei Lloyd Blankfein (Chef von Goldman Sachs), Jamie Dimon (JPMorgan Chase), John J. Mack (Morgan Stanley) und Brian Moynihan (Bank of America). Die komplette Zeugenliste der ersten beiden Tage gibt es hier von der Huffington Post.

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Spannend wird es weniger, weil neue Erkenntnisse aus dem Kick- Off erwartet werden, sondern weil ich gespannt bin, wie die Bankchefs sich rhetorisch von ihren PR-Beratern haben vorbereiten lassen auf eine Veranstaltung, die in den US-Medien hohe Aufmerksamkeit erfährt. Bekanntlich stehen einige Institute unter erheblichen Druck, weil sie nicht wissen, wie sie die ihren Managern und Mitarbeitern versprochenen Bonuszahlungen einer immer noch empörten Öffentlichkeit gegenüber rechtfertigen sollen. Die hohen Bonusbeträge sind vor allem deswegen umstritten, weil die ihnen zugrunde liegenden hohen Erträge einiger Institute nicht den Leistungen des Managements oder der Mitarbeiter zugerechnet werden können. Erst die staatlichen Hilfen sowie die implizite Bestandsgarantie für systemrelevante Finanzinstitute haben die Rekonvaleszenz der Institute ermöglicht (siehe dazu auch die Videobeiträge auf dieser Seite und zahlreiche weitere Beiträge zur Bonusdebatte hier). Besonders in der Schusslinie wird hier Goldman Sachs stehen, die nach Presseberichten im Schnitt 595.000 Dollar an Bonus zahlen wollen.

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Spiegel Online bezeichnet diesen Ausschuss als “Aufklärungszirkus mit Top-Managern”. Ich halte diese Attribuierung für ungerechtfertigt, denn immerhin findet in den USA überhaupt eine parlamentarische Aufarbeitung der Ursachen der Finanzkrise statt. Laut der American Banking News soll der Ausschuss 22 verschiedene Themen im Zusammenhang mit der Finanzkrise klären (Details siehe unten in der Gesetzesgrundlage).

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Dem deutschen Parlament fehlt offenbar die Mut, die Ursachen der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise in ähnlicher Weise aufzuarbeiten. Böswillig könnte ich auch behaupten, die Parlamentarier erwarten aktuell keine politischen Vorteile durch einen solchen Untersuchungsausschuss. Dabei ist es allerhöchste Zeit angesichts der Milliardenrisiken, die die Steuerzahler tragen, die Ursachenanalyse nicht allein Medien und überforderten Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern (siehe zu der Überforderung diesen Beitrag von Olaf Storbeck) zu überlassen. Aber offenbar stimmt doch die These, dass nur dann Untersuchungsausschüsse gefordert werden, wenn der politische Gegner diskreditiert werden oder man sich selbst profilieren kann. Sehr durchsichtig und bedauerlich.

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Auch die weiteren Sitzungen des Ausschusses versprechen interessanten Anschauungsunterricht in Sachen Schuldzuweisung. Die Kommission hat nach Angaben von Spiegel Online “frühere Top-Manager der untergegangenen Investmenthäuser Lehman Brothers und Bear Stearns vorgeladen, Vertreter der Hypothekenbanken Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac, die tief in die Krise verstrickt waren, sowie Manager des Versicherungsgiganten AIG, dessen Fast-Kollaps beinahe die gesamte Weltfinanz mitgerissen hätte. Später sollen auch US-Finanzminister Timothy Geithner, Notenbankchef Ben Bernanke und Vorgänger Alan Greenspan die Zeugenbank drücken.”

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Wer vorab einmal sehen will, wie eine solche Veranstaltung ablaufen könnte, der kann sich diesen aufgezeichneten Webcast eines Hearings vom 11.2.2009 zum TARP ansehen. Drei der vier oben genannten Teilnehmer war schon damals dabei (alle Details sind hier nachzusehen und zu lesen, incl. eines umfangreichen Protokolls).

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Wie der Economist die Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission zur Weltwirtschaftskrise (Pecora Commission) der 30er Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts bewertet, kann hier nachgelesen werden. An den Pecora-Ausschuss erinnert Markus Gärtner in seinem Blog:

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“Pecora war gefürchtet, ein Mann der es verstand, aus der Untersuchung ein nationales Drama zu machen, lange bevor in jedem US-Haushalt ein Fernseher stand. Pecoras Arbeit förderte genügend Material zutage, um dutzendweise Verurteilungen, Gefängnisstrafen zu erzwingen und – in der Konsequenz – auch zum New Deal mit dem Glass-Steagall-Act (Trennung von Investment- und Geschäftsbanken) und der Gründung der Securities and Exchange Commission.”

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Diesmal bestehen erhebliche Zweifel, dass die Ergebnisse des Ausschusses so weit wie in den 30er Jahren führen. Die Finanzhäuser werden gut vorbereitet in die Befragungen gehen. Und angesichts des anhaltenden Streits unter Fachleuten über die tatsächlichen Ursachen der Finanzkrise, ist kaum mit nennenswerten Konsequenzen zu rechnen.

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Dennoch, 40 bis 50 Fachleute sind laut CNN mit den Untersuchungen beauftragt. Das zur Verfügung stehende Budget ist mit 8 Mill US$ Mio US$ höher als die 9/11-Untersuchung. Und mittlerweile dürfte klar sein, dass man angesichts der bislang erfolglosen Versuche, eine neue Finanzordnung zu etablieren (siehe dazu diese Artikelübersicht), zumindest ein öffentlichkeitswirksames Spektakel braucht, um als Regierung nicht komplett dem Vorwurf der Handlungsunfähigkeit ausgesetzt zu sein.

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Links zur Liveübertragung ab

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Ab 15.00 Uhr MEZ (9.00 Uhr Eastern) C-SPAN2:

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Stream via Flash Windows Real

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Weitere Livestream sind möglich über CNNLive und über die Website der Kommission.

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Links zu der archivierten Aufzeichnung werden nach Beendigung und bei Verfügbarkeit in diesen Artikel eingefügt.

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Das Programm gem. FCIC Webseite

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First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Day 1: January 13, 2010

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Panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives

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Panel 2: Financial Market Participants

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Panel 3: Financial Crisis Impacts on the Economy

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Vorberichterstattung zum US-Finanzkrisenausschuss

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Spon: Aufklärungszirkus mit Top-Managern

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MG: Was bringt die am Mittwoch beginnende parlamentarische Aufarbeitung des Finanzdesasters? (11.1.10)

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Reuters: US-Regierung verschärft Kurs gegen Bankenbranche

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Dealbook: What the Financial Crisis Commission Should Ask

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NYT: For Bankers, Saying ‘Sorry’ Has Its Perils

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NYT: Wall St. Pay Is a Focus of Many in Washington

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HP: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: A User’s Guide

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WSJ: Here’s Your Chance To Grill Blankfein, Dimon, And Other Wall Street CEOs

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BI: 10 Questions A Financial Inquiry Commission MUST Ask

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NYT: The Other Plot to Wreck America

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Zero Hedge: Ten Questions For The Bankers

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Time: Hearings to Begin on Causes of Financial Crisis

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Big Picture: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

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Gisnap: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Sets Sights On Bankers

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Bloomberg: Dimon, Blankfein, Mack Among First to Testify at Crisis Panel

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Webeite eines Mitglieds der Kommission: KeithHennessey.com mit 20 questions for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

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Gesetzliche Grundlage

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SEC. 5. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION.

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(a) Establishment of Commission.--There is established in the

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legislative branch the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (in this

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section referred to as the ``Commission\"\") to examine the causes,

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domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the

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United States.

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(b) Composition of the Commission.--

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(1) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10

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members, of whom--

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(A) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority

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leader of the Senate, in consultation with relevant

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Committees;

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(B) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of

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the House of Representatives, in consultation with

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relevant Committees;

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1625]]

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(C) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority

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leader of the Senate, in consultation with relevant

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Committees; and

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(D) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority

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leader of the House of Representatives, in consultation

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with relevant Committees.

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(2) Qualifications; limitation.--

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(A) In general.--It is the sense of the Congress

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that individuals appointed to the Commission should be

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prominent United States citizens with national

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recognition and significant depth of experience in such

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fields as banking, regulation of markets, taxation,

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finance, economics, consumer protection, and housing.

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(B) Limitation.--No person who is a member of

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Congress or an officer or employee of the Federal

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Government or any State or local government may serve as

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a member of the Commission.

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(3) Chairperson; vice chairperson.--

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(A) In general.--Subject to the requirements of

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subparagraph (B), the Chairperson of the Commission

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shall be selected jointly by the Majority Leader of the

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Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,

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and the Vice Chairperson shall be selected jointly by

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the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority

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Leader of the House of Representatives.

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(B) Political party affiliation.- -The Chairperson

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and Vice Chairperson of the Commission may not be from

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the same political party.

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(4) Meetings, quorum; vacancies.--

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(A) Meetings.--

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(i) Initial meeting.--The initial meeting of

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the Commission shall be as soon as possible after

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a quorum of members have been appointed.

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(ii) Subsequent meetings.-- After the initial

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meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall

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meet upon the call of the Chairperson or a

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majority of its members.

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(B) Quorum.--6 members of the Commission shall

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constitute a quorum.

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(C) Vacancies.--Any vacancy on the Commission

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shall--

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(i) not affect the powers of the Commission;

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and

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(ii) be filled in the same manner in which the

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original appointment was made.

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(c) Functions of the Commission.--The functions of the Commission

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are--

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(1) to examine the causes of the current financial and

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economic crisis in the United States, specifically the role of--

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(A) fraud and abuse in the financial sector,

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including fraud and abuse towards consumers in the

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mortgage sector;

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(B) Federal and State financial regulators,

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including the extent to which they enforced, or failed

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to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory

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requirements;

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(C) the global imbalance of savings, international

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capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various

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governments;

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(D) monetary policy and the availability and terms

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of credit;

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1626]]

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(E) accounting practices, including, mark-to-market

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and fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheet

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vehicles;

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(F) tax treatment of financial products and

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investments;

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(G) capital requirements and regulations on leverage

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and liquidity, including the capital structures of

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regulated and non-regulated financial entities;

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(H) credit rating agencies in the financial system,

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including, reliance on credit ratings by financial

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institutions and Federal financial regulators, the use

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of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the use

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of credit ratings in the securitization markets;

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(I) lending practices and securitization, including

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the originate-to-distribute model for extending credit

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and transferring risk;

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(J) affiliations between insured depository

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institutions and securities, insurance, and other types

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of nonbanking companies;

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(K) the concept that certain institutions are ``too-

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big-to-fail\"\" and its impact on market expectations;

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(L) corporate governance, including the impact of

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company conversions from partnerships to corporations;

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(M) compensation structures;

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(N) changes in compensation for employees of

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financial companies, as compared to compensation for

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others with similar skill sets in the labor market;

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(O) the legal and regulatory structure of the United

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States housing market;

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(P) derivatives and unregulated financial products

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and practices, including credit default swaps;

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(Q) short-selling;

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(R) financial institution reliance on numerical

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models, including risk models and credit ratings;

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(S) the legal and regulatory structure governing

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financial institutions, including the extent to which

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the structure creates the opportunity for financial

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institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage;

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(T) the legal and regulatory structure governing

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investor and mortgagor protection;

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(U) financial institutions and government-sponsored

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enterprises; and

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(V) the quality of due diligence undertaken by

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financial institutions;

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(2) to examine the causes of the collapse of each major

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financial institution that failed (including institutions that

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were acquired to prevent their failure) or was likely to have

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failed if not for the receipt of exceptional Government

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assistance from the Secretary of the Treasury during the period

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beginning in August 2007 through April 2009;

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(3) to submit a report under subsection (h);

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(4) to refer to the Attorney General of the United States

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and any appropriate State attorney general any person that the

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Commission finds may have violated the laws of the United States

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in relation to such crisis; and

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1627]]

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(5) to build upon the work of other entities, and avoid

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unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the record of the

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Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate,

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the Committee on Financial Services of the House of

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Representatives, other congressional committees, the Government

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Accountability Office, other legislative panels, and any other

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department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office,

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independent establishment, or instrumentality of the United

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States (to the fullest extent permitted by law) with respect to

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the current financial and economic crisis.

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(d) Powers of the Commission.--

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(1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission may, for purposes

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of carrying out this section--

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(A) hold hearings, sit and act at times and places,

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take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths;

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and

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(B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the

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attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production

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of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers,

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and documents.

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(2) Subpoenas.--

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(A) Service.--Subpoenas issued under paragraph

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(1)(B) may be served by any person designated by the

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Commission.

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(B) Enforcement.--

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(i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or

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failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph

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(1)(B), the United States district court for the

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judicial district in which the subpoenaed person

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resides, is served, or may be found, or where the

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subpoena is returnable, may issue an order

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requiring such person to appear at any designated

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place to testify or to produce documentary or

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other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of

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the court may be punished by the court as a

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contempt of that court.

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(ii) Additional enforcement.--

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Sections <<NOTE: Applicability.>> 102 through 104

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of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2

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U.S.C. 192 through 194) shall apply in the case of

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any failure of any witness to comply with any

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subpoena or to testify when summoned under the

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authority of this section.

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(iii) Issuance.--A subpoena may be issued

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under this subsection only--

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(I) by the agreement of the

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Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson; or

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(II) by the affirmative vote of a

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majority of the Commission, including an

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affirmative vote of at least one member

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appointed under subparagraph (C) or (D)

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of subsection (b)(1), a majority being

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present.

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(3) Contracting.--The Commission may enter into contracts to

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enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this

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section.

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(4) Information from federal agencies and other entities.--

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(A) In general.--The Commission may secure directly

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from any department, agency, bureau, board, commission,

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1628]]

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office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of

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the United States any information related to any inquiry

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of the Commission conducted under this section,

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including information of a confidential nature (which

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the Commission shall maintain in a secure manner). Each

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such department, agency, bureau, board, commission,

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office, independent establishment, or instrumentality

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shall furnish such information directly to the

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Commission upon request.

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(B) Other entities.--It is the sense of the Congress

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that the Commission should seek testimony or information

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from principals and other representatives of government

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agencies and private entities that were significant

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participants in the United States and global financial

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and housing markets during the time period examined by

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the Commission.

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(5) Administrative support services.-- Upon the request of

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the Commission--

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(A) the Administrator of General Services shall

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provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the

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administrative support services necessary for the

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Commission to carry out its responsibilities under this

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Act; and

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(B) other Federal departments and agencies may

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provide to the Commission any administrative support

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services as may be determined by the head of such

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department or agency to be advisable and authorized by

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law.

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(6) Donations of goods and services.-- The Commission may

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accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or

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property.

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(7) Postal services.--The Commission may use the United

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States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as

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departments and agencies of the United States.

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(8) Powers of subcommittees, members, and agents.--Any

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subcommittee, member, or agent of the Commission may, if

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authorized by the Commission, take any action which the

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Commission is authorized to take by this section.

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(e) Staff of the Commission.--

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(1) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who

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shall be appointed by the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson,

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acting jointly.

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(2) Staff.--The Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson may

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jointly appoint additional personnel, as may be necessary, to

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enable the Commission to carry out its functions.

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(3) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The

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Director and staff of the Commission may be appointed without

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regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,

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governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be

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paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and

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subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to

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classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no

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rate of pay fixed under this paragraph may exceed the equivalent

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of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive

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Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. Any

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individual appointed under paragraph (1) or (2) shall be treated

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as an employee for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87,

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89, 89A, 89B, and 90 of that title.

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(4) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be

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detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1629]]

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the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights,

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status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without

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interruption.

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(5) Consultant services.--The Commission is authorized to

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procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance

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with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates

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not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position

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at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of

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title 5, United States Code.

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(f) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--

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(1) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be

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compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the

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annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of

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the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United

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States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in

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the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

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(2) Travel expenses.--While away from their homes or regular

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places of business in the performance of services for the

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Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel

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expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same

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manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government

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service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5,

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United States Code.

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(g) Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The Federal

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Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the

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Commission.

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(h) Report of the Commission; Appearance Before and Consultations

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With Congress.--

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(1) Report.--On December 15, 2010, the Commission shall

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submit to the President and to the Congress a report containing

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the findings and conclusions of the Commission on the causes of

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the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.

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(2) Institution-specific reports authorized.--At the

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discretion of the chairperson of the Commission, the report

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under paragraph (1) may include reports or specific findings on

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any financial institution examined by the Commission under

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subsection (c)(2).

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(3) Appearance before the congress.--

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The <<NOTE: Deadline.>> chairperson of the Commission shall, not

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later than 120 days after the date of submission of the final

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reports under paragraph (1), appear before the Committee on

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Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the

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Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives

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regarding such reports and the findings of the Commission.

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(4) Consultations with the congress.-- The Commission shall

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consult with the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban

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Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Financial Services of

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the House of Representatives, and other relevant committees of

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the Congress, for purposes of informing the Congress on the work

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of the Commission.

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(i) Termination of Commission.--

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(1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of

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this section, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which

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the final report is submitted under subsection (h).

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(2) Administrative activities before termination.--The

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Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph

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[[Page 123 STAT. 1630]]

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(1) for the purpose of concluding the activities of the

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Commission, including providing testimony to committees of the

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Congress concerning reports of the Commission and disseminating

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the final report submitted under subsection (h).

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(j) Authorization of Appropriation.--There is authorized to be

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appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury such sums as are necessary

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to cover the costs of the Commission.

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