1. Other Operational Limitations
1.1. ISR platforms cannot discriminate between retrograding GOAZE and assaulting AHA formations once AHA forces cross the border (due to similar equipment).
1.2. GOAZE and Georgia unable to secure LOC against SAPA/SPF disruption efforts during MNTF JRSOI and GOAZE building Combat Power along southern border.
1.3. Mountain climate will canalize MNTF movement (JRSOI) along a single axis of advance and existing improved roadways (MSR/ASR).
1.4. GOAZE targeting of SAPA cells in AZE is ineffective (zero continuity for MNTF to target SAPA)
1.5. IO / Public Affairs will not be capable of reporting collateral battle damage resulting from MNTF military operations as timely as the international media
1.6. MNTF requires GOAZE sustainment support to LOC ISO Ph3 Counter-attack
2. C2
2.1. Constraints
2.1.1. All C4 planning ISO Caspian Guard must include DISA and EUCOM C4 planners to ensure plans reflect the current situation.
2.1.2. All C4 planning ISO Caspian Guard must consider MNTF Caspian Information Operations (IO) and Defensive IO (D-IO) efforts by the IO Working Group.
2.1.3. MNFLCC G6 must coordinate all special C4 requirements for MNFLCC and subordinate commands based on JFC Commander’s estimate, intent, or CONOPS with JCCC and MNTF J6.
2.1.4. MNFLCC must coordinate any moves of satellite links between STEP gateways w/DISA thru JCCC.
2.1.5. Circuit planning must include switch type, area codes, trunk groups, capacity, and flood search vs deterministic routing.
2.1.6. Frequency requests supporting multiple pieces of equipment must be accompanied by a net description of some manner.
2.2. Restraints
2.2.1. MNFLCC and subordinate elements must not contract for C4 support without prior JCCC approval.
2.3. Operational Limitations
2.3.1. Mobilizing forces rapidly to combat insurgencies, destroy recruiting and funding efforts, and cells like the Ahurastan Business Network
3. Fires
3.1. [Air] 2 of 3 coalition airports have restrictions that hamper the responsiveness of coalition aircraft
3.2. [Air] Balance of operational tempo and CLV re-supply and crew rest, especially through PHII
3.3. [Nonlethal] Computer Network Attack requires approval by the USG/SECDEF
3.4. [Nonlethal] Protected facilities cannot be directly targeted
3.5. [Nonlethal] Targets effecting NGO / PVO facilities require MNTF CDR approval
3.6. [Nonlethal] MISO products and plans require MNTF CDR approval
3.7. [Lethal] FSCL is the Ahurastan-Azerbaijan border upon Ahurastan air or ground attack across border or in the event of a pre-emptive strike
3.8. [Lethal] IO / Public Affairs will not be capable of reporting collateral battle damage resulting from MNTF military operations as timely as the international media
3.9. [Lethal] Critical shortages exist in selected lines of artillery parts
3.10. [Lethal] AHA IDF platforms can outrange coalition IDF platforms
4. Maneuver
4.1. Operational Limitations
4.1.1. Civil Affairs
4.1.1.1. CA will not assume responsibility for IDPs; NGO’s and IOs are primary caregivers
4.1.1.2. Number of forces to control provide temporary crowd control
4.1.1.3. NGO/IO unable to maintain sustainability with an influx of IDP movement
4.1.1.4. NGO/IO unable to receive supplies and resources during combat operations
4.1.1.5. NGO/IO resupply will take two weeks upon termination of operations
4.1.1.6. NGO/IO cannot provide any transportation support to MNFLCC for CMO
4.1.1.7. Minimal host nation health assets
4.1.1.8. No US maintenance have been tasked to support CMO operations
4.1.1.9. Fields services cannot support the large number of IDPs in camps
4.1.2. JRSOI
4.1.2.1. Ports (APODs and SPODs) throughput capacity is dependent on the host nation.
4.1.2.2. Policy of non-interference with the local commerce may restrict use of throughput capacity of the ports
4.1.2.3. Batumi Airport is limited to daylight OPNs
4.1.2.4. Lack of sufficient road and rail infrastructure will limit efficiency of JRSOI OPNs.
4.1.2.5. Lack of railcars and locomotives will limit speed and capability to accomplish JRSOI OPNs.
4.1.3. Maneuver
4.1.3.1. All facilities recognized as protected by international treaty or the Geneva Conventions will not be targeted. All recognized NGO and PVO facilities will not be targeted unless approved by the MNTF Commander.
4.1.3.2. Reference MNTF Rules of Engagement
5. Sustainment
5.1. Constraints
5.1.1. None
5.2. Restraints
5.2.1. Must not use GLOCs in TUR and Iraq
5.3. Other Limitations
5.3.1. Distribution and transportation networks are very limited
5.3.2. Weather effects in rainy and cold season
5.3.3. Railway systems are considered outdated and unusable for sustainment operations.
5.3.4. Daily estimate of supply throughput based on ASCC sustainment footprint and sustainment forces available to II CORPS.
6. Intel
6.1. Constraints
6.2. Restraints
6.3. Other Limitations
6.3.1. Mountain climate will canalize MNTF movement (JRSOI) along a single axis of advance and existing improved roadways (MSR/ASR).
6.3.2. GOAZE and Georgia inability to secure LOC against SAPA/SPF Disruption efforts during MNTF JRSOI and GOAZE building Combat Power along southern border.
6.3.3. ISR platforms will not be able to discriminate between retrograding GOAZE and assaulting AHA formations once AHA forces cross the international border.
6.3.4. MNTF UAS platforms are restricted to the international border of GOAZE to deter AHA ADA capabilities.
6.3.5. GOAZE ineffective targeting of SAPA cells in AZE (Zero continuity for MNTF to Target SAPA)
6.3.6. MNTF will require GOAZE sustainment support to long LOC ISO counter-attack PH III.