VOLUME 3: SEBTS PHD COMPREHENSIVE EXAM STUDY GUIDE (WWW.POLITICALETHICS.COM)

1. PAPER IDEAS

1.1. The Fatherhood of God and its relation to Ethics: An Ethic of Paternal Goodness and Gratitude

1.1.1. God's laws are given similar to the laws a Father gives a child: For their best interest. Our moral life is then (1) practical: in that the Father knows what behavior is best for his children, and (2) Worshipful: in that the engine driving being virtuous and moral is gratitude and love.

1.1.2. Push back against the hijacking of the Fatherhood of God by liberals (Harnack, etc)

1.1.2.1. Holifield. Theology in America: 206

1.1.2.2. Unitarians, Channing, and Fatherhood

1.1.3. This fits into substitutionary atonement as well.

1.2. Augustine on the State of Nature and the Social Contract

1.3. Comparing the American Revolution to the Latin American Revolutions, and the role of the Pulpit

1.3.1. THESIS, WHY CHRISTIANS REBEL: PATTERNS OF CHRISTIAN POLITICAL RADICALISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE (PURITANS, LIBERATION, THEOLOGY) http://search.proquest.com/pqdthss/docview/303319673/13CEF95411364D068C5/8?accountid=130758

1.4. A book like Ryken that does a systematic treatment of the Pulpit Patriots on different political issues of their day.

1.5. THESIS: I paper that takes O'Donovan's framework of what I call "overlookers" and "overreactors". These are two groups within contemporary evangelicalism that hold two opposing views to theology. o'Donovan's work sets out to address these two groups, as well as help Western civilization by apologetically presenting the undergirding ideas that aid them to understand the institutions and traditions they have inherited. This can be replicated in my own experience, especially within Southern Baptist circles. Furthermore, the same can be said of American experience, which speaks of a creator and aliienable rights without an understanding of these two. The Declaration of Independence thus provides the launching ground for an American Evangelical Southern Baptist (me) in engaging with political theology. In addition to the problem of the overlookers and overreactors, the declaration warrants an illuminating, apologetic, and beautiful political theology that aids America understand its institutions and traditions. The dissertation is organized in the following twofold division. First, it addresses the apathetic overlookers. To do this, it evaluates social theory across Christian history. It evaluates the classic political theorists and political theology of the patristics, Augustine, Aquinas, the medivals, Luther, Calvin, etc. It essentially arrives to the modernists like Hobbes and others, who begin to separate politics and theology. During this treatment, in addition to a survey of classic political theorists, it provides a case-study for how North America/The United States is an example where political theology can help enrich an understanding, and a preservation, of the American institutions and traditions. We can point out the positive of this experience, which I believe to be closer to O'Donovan's thesis than people assume. The next section addresses the liberationist overreactors. This picks up where the first section left off, and begins to evaluate the modern political theorists. It looks at Hobbes, Roussaeu, Rawls, etc. It essentially then arrives at the 20th century, which contains the failure of the Enlightenment political project, and the rebirth of political theology in Pannenberg, Moltmann, Gutierrez, Boff, etc. It then contains a case-study for South America and how it examples the negative influence of the overlooker liberation theology social gospel. It concludes with O'Donovan, and his evaluation of political theology, specifically his notion of place/space. It takes up his particular/universal criticism, and responds to it with a Baptist Political Theology that advances the notion of a Covenantal Constitutionalism. This argued that divine covenants are the foundation of Church, Family, and State, and that it also accounts for human/human/divine covenants that form the foundation of churches, families, and states. It can then return back tot hat declaration statement.

1.6. Death, Big Government, and the Pursuit of Entitlement (Liberals undermining of Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness [property])

1.7. History of the State, Family, and CHurch threefold. The three orders. Examine their presence in statements of faith like the Second London Baptist

1.8. History of the Church, State, and Family in Christianity.

1.9. Whereras O'Donovan wrote From Irenaeus to Grotius, I could write a book called from Locke to O'Donovan. In it I can do the same thing O'Donovan did, but with contemporary political theologians.

1.10. Interpretation of Romans 13 Across Different Thinkers in Political Theology

1.11. Speech Act and Political Theology

1.11.1. Bringing speech act to political theology, specifically in the role covenant has for explaining particularities

1.12. A Introduction. Terms. Research Method. Asks the question Why? General PhD Intro requirements. B Protestant Social Theory Uses Luther and O’Donovan’s social theory to introduce the wider issue. Big picture issues in political theology (act, representation, communication). Leads to an introduction of O’Donovan’s critical question/the problem of particularity and universality. C The Problem of Particularity and Universality Digs deeper into O’Donovans work in-light of the former big-picture treatment (treatment of O’Donovan’s corpus). Looks at his scriptural, historical, and ecclesiological insights. Extends them into baptistic directions. Alludes to concept of covenant as a potential corrective to errors in O’Donovan (O’Donovan presumes the logical priority of covenant over judgment, but doesn’t choose to treat covenant). D Covenant and Constitution Examines traditional Protestant Social Theory’s threefold orders in light of O’Donovan’s critical question, and the baptistic direction. Uses covenant as a concept that explains the particularity and universality of Church (and churches), Family (and families), and State (and states). The Baptistic ecclesiological perspective provides the launching point for the suggested corrective. Longest section of the work. Examines each of the three orders in light of Scripture and History. Attempts what Elazar did for political theory across the other two orders. An Appraisal of Covenant as an Ecclesial Idea In Scripture In History Contributions An Appraisal of Covenant as a Marital Idea In Scripture In History Contributions An Appraisal of Covenant as a Political Idea In Scripture In History Contributions C- Answers the Problem of Particularity and Universality given insights in D B- Proposes Covenantal Constitutionalism (synthesis) as a reworked social theory that synthesizes issues with Luther (thesis), and O’Donovan (antithesis). A- Examines the contemporary significance and implications of Covenantal Constitutionalism (akin to O’Donovan’s apologetic task, the need among Southern Baptist millennials not to be politically apathetic, wider implications for ethics and an ethical framework, etc). Asks the question What and How?

1.12.1. Attempts an answer at the problem of the individual and community

1.12.2. See Brunner's Man in Revolt. Themes of responsibility, freedom, individual, community, and love.

1.13. Paper Examining Natural Law vs. Positive Law vs. Covenantal Constitutions

1.13.1. Could there be a position that surveys natural law and positive law like I would organic and contract? The problems with natural law is that it seems so impersonal. The problem with positive law is that it seems hyper-personal-individualistic. Natural law brings to mind images of a platonic world of forms in whcih God is held account to. Positive law brings a world of voluntarism inline with Scotus and Turretin where God could ultimately break his law. One is impersonal, the other hyper-individualistic.

1.13.2. However, there is a third approach that is relational. The ground of law is relational. The problem is finding how law can both be objective//transcendent (what natural law pursues), and personal/immanent (what positive law pursues). I think the answer is found int he covenantal constitutional position. It mediates the two, by incorporating a relational bond between God and man. This is different from a contract, given God's role. The covenant establishes a real moral framework that creates a new particular. A man and woman become husband and wife, and the particular of the Goenaga family, is created when they marry in covenant. Perhaps covenantal constitutionalism is an alternative to the two, which also incorporate srengths and aspects of the two. It is "natural" in that God brings with it objective wider legal conditions based upon his nature. His objectivity is brought into the covenantal terms, regardless of which covenant he approaches. In addition, the covenanting invokes postiive aspects, in that new situations require unique covenantal terms. Perhaps God's cvovenanting with humanity has established the wider constitutional framewokr in which other covenants come before us. The strength of covenant is that it grounds legal and moral obligations on a relational and objective ource, which incorporates man's will.

1.14. "To the Christian People of the American Nation"

1.14.1. Parallels Luther's work in "To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation." However, we don't have a nobility to write to. So I must write to and plead and be on mission to the people, especially in our representative republic.

1.14.2. See Thielicke's problem of authority and Luther in Theological Ethics Vol 2 Pgs 8, 12)

1.15. The role that love plays in the covenant

1.16. Why Eternity is needed for perfection of the Kingdom of God. For the Christian community

1.16.1. Basically this explores the need of eternity to perfect. So, one of the reasons why the church and societies are not in perfection is because of the sinful effect of poor communication. Churches cannot be fully "gathered" and in "communion" because of the noetic effects of sin, and because we have not the time to fully and truly communicate. Eternity will allow for the time to perfectly understand eachother. As an illustrate, note marriages and friendships, and the time it takes to break down barriers

2. DISSERTATION: READINGS

2.1. Braaten, God in Public Life: Rehabilitating the 'Orders of Creation'

2.1.1. https://www.firstthings.com/article/1990/12/god-in-public-life-rehabilitating-the-orders-of-creation

2.2. Kuyper, Our Program

2.2.1. According to Kuyper the family—and not the individual or the village or the state—is the most basic and primary social unit. Kuyper illustrates this in Our Program, where he begins a discussion of the organic formation of the state—and a justification for its decentralization—by examining a society’s most basic unit. Kuyper writes, … if we descend still lower and go down to families, it is true even there that the village is composed of families and not that the families are cut from the village. The family was there first, and only then could the village take shape. Finally, if the village vanished there would still be families; but if the households were to disband the village too would come to an end. According to Kuyper, to also move past the family and prioritize the individual errs in the opposite direction, as this leads to a wrong he describes as “at odds with the givens of nature.” There are no individuals outside of the God-ordained and God-empowered familial institution and its twofold ordinances (marital relation and procreation). Therefore, Kuyper writes, “the basic unit for us is not the individual, as with the men of the Revolution, but the family.” Individuals belong to a family “… willy-nilly, by birth, by the fact that he exists. However weak that bond may be, everybody has a mother, and without that mother he would not exist.” The family, in its relations and its related parts, places man directly before God, in that both the individual and society depend on the God-ordained institution for its original and continued existence. The examination of Kuyper’s emphasis of family as the basic social unit reveals more than just the origins of the individual and the village. It reveals what Kuyper means by the sphere of society in distinction from the sphere of the state, and further the particular social sphere’s respective authority. Kuyper posits three questions to illustrate what this means for the nature of the state and society, asking, (1) Does the responsibility for good order in the family rest with the head of the family or with the head of the state…? (2) Did you receive the power to exercise authority in your household from the state, or do you have this power by the grace of God…? (3) Were you a father given authority over your children because they charged you with this by majority vote; or did you possess this authority independently of their consent, long before they could tell you their mind or inclination? Did they appoint you as father, and therefore also have the right to depose you as father…? Kuyper connects the obvious answers to these questions, with the insights from his treatment on family, to draw two important sphere-related conclusions. First, the sphere of the state may only act with authority in those areas not already being cared for by the smaller social spheres of life, but may sometimes act as a “temporary curator” in those areas where society’s life-spheres are attempting to abuse one-another or neglect their responsibilities. Second, the state must respect and nourish the life-sphere divisions derived from history and reality, and not some geographical measurement. In Lectures on Calvinism, Kuyper encapsulates the implications these conclusions have towards the development of his social theory of sphere sovereignty, where he writes, … in all these four spheres the State-government cannot impose its laws, but must reverence the innate law of life. God rules in these spheres, just as supremely and sovereignly through his chosen virtuosi, as He exercises dominion in the sphere of the State itself, through his chosen magistrates. In addition to the first two spheres of state and society, Kuyper posits a third in line with the traditional Protestant social theory: the church. His development of the ecclesial sphere is an extension of classical Calvinist ecclesiology, with an important critical distinction that departs from Calvin on the question of religious liberty. As with the social sphere, the state has a tendency to encroach upon the church’s sovereignty (and vice versa). To help define the Church’s spherical sovereignty, Kuyper again compares the sphere against the state. Kuyper argues that the role of the state is to suspend its own judgment “… and to consider the multiform complex of all these denominations as the totality of the manifestation of the Church of Christ on earth.” In the name of this religious liberty, Kuyper concludes that the ecclesial sphere has its own sovereignty: In Christ, they contented, the Church has her own King. Her position in the State is not assigned her by the permission of the Government, but jure divino. She has her own organization. She possesses her own office-bearers. And in a similar way she has her own gifts to distinguish truth from the lie. It is therefore her privilege, and not that of the State, to determine her own characteristics as the true Church, and to proclaim her own confession as the confession of the truth. In summary, Kuyper contrasts the sphere of the mechanical and unnatural state against the sphere of the organic and natural society, and the sphere of the invisible and visible church, to articulate his spherical social theory. This second major sphere which Kuyper calls society is birthed by and erected upon the family, and consists of additional particular life-spheres each of which maintain God-appointed sovereignty and shape based off their respective intellectual, aesthetical, technical, and domestic dominions. The state is to respect these natural boundaries, and ensure an environment where neither the state or the social sphere undermine each other, nor where the social sphere’s particular life-spheres ignore or abuse their responsibilities. Kuyper further emulates this method of revealing the character and boundaries of spherical dominion by contrasting the third major sphere of the church with that of the state. The comparison reveals that the church too maintains its own God-given sovereignty distinct from the other two spheres. In all, the revision is another modified example of the traditional Protestant social theory’s three-fold institutional emphasis, yet as masterfully appropriated by Kuyper within the Dutch Reformed tradition.

2.3. Kline, By Oath Consigned

2.3.1. https://meredithkline.com/klines-works/by-oath-consigned/

2.3.2. CHAPTER 1: OATH AND COVENANT

2.3.2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.3.2.1.1. CHAPTER THESIS: "It is the purpose of the present chapter to show that historical usage Justifies the meaning that necessarily attaches to the term “covenant” when applied in the comprehensive fashion just mentioned, and it will be the purpose of the second chapter to make proposals towards a more systematically coherent formulation of the theology of the covenant. Such a study might serve as an introduction to a general survey of the successive divine covenants of biblical history. Here, however, it will perform the more limited function of providing the necessary foundation fc~r an investigation of the covenant signs of circumcision and baptisrp." (14)

2.3.2.2. I. OLD TESTAMENT USAGE

2.3.2.2.1. Law Covenants vs. Covenants of Promise

2.3.2.2.2. COVENANT: "Every divine-human covenant in Scripture involves a sanction-sealed commitment to maintain a particular relationship or follow a stipulated course of action. In general, then, a covenant may be defined as a relationship under sanctions. The covenantal commitment is characteristically expressed by an oath sworn in the solemnities of covenant ratification.6 Both in the Bible and in extra-biblical documents concerned with covenant arrangements the swearing of the oath is frequently found in parallelistic explication of the idea of entering into the covenant relationship, or as a synonym for it." (16)

2.3.2.2.3. LAW COVENANTS & EXTRA-BIBLICAL INTERNATIONAL VASSAL TREATIES: "Further confirmation of the existence of a law type of covenant in antiquity and of the identification of the Mosaic and certain other biblical covenants as such law covenants is found in the extra-biblical international vassal treaties and the now familiar parallelism between them and these biblical covenants. " (20)

2.3.2.2.4. NEAR EASTERN VASSAL TREATIES: "The Near Eastern vassal treaties were instruments of empire administration. They were law covenants, declarations of the lordship of a great king imposing his authority upon a subject king and servant people. Normally they were ratified by an oath of the vassal, although in some cases the suzerain added his oath, without changing, it need hardly be said, the fundamental law character of the arrangement. To enter into the oath meant for the vassal to come under the dual sanctions of the covenant, the blessing and the curse. The lordship of the great king might be exercised in the form of protection or of destruction. As long as the vassal remained a faithful tributary he might expect to enjoy a relationship of friendship and peace with his suzerain and to receive whatever measure of protection the latter could provide. If, however, the vassal would assert his independence or transfer his allegiance to a new lord he would have to reckon with the vengeance threatened in the treaty against such infidelity and indeed invoked by the vassal himself in his oath of allegiance." (21)

2.3.2.3. II. NEW TESTAMENT USAGE

2.3.3. CHAPTER 2: LAW AND COVENANT

2.3.3.1. I. PRE-REDEMPTIVE COVENANT

2.3.3.1.1. COVENANT & GENESIS 1-2: "The mere absence of the word “covenant” from Genesis 1 and 2 does not hinder a systematic formulation of the material of these chapters in covenantal terms, just as the absence of the word “covenant” from the redemptive revelation in the latter part of Genesis 3 does not prevent systematic theology from analyzing that passage as the earliest disclosure of the “Covenant of Grace.” Obviously the reality denoted by a word may be found in biblical contexts from which that word is absent.2 So it is in the present case." (27-27)

2.3.3.2. II. THE PRIORITY OF LAW

2.3.3.2.1. "Once it has been determined that there is law covenant as well as promise covenant and that systematic theology must recognize that the pre-redemptive revelation of law falls within the boundaries of divine covenant administration, we may undertake the construction of a general definition of covenant for use in biblical and systematic theology. This definition must correspond in its formal structure to one of the actual types of arrangement historically called “covenant” and at the same time be serviceable as a unifying formula for the totality of divine-human relationship from creation to consummation. The problem here reduces to the question of the historical, theological, and formal qualifications of law covenant and promise covenant. Historical priority belongs incontestably to law covenant since pre-redemptive covenant administration was of course strictly law administration without the element of guaranteed, inevitable blessings. By the same token promise covenant is disqualified from the outset as a systematic definition of covenant because it is obviously not comprehensive enough to embrace the pre-redemptive covenantal revelation. It remains, however, to show that law constitutes the ground structure oL redemptive covenant administration and thus that a definition of covenant as generically law covenant would be applicable over the whole range of history as is necessary in a systematic theology of the covenant." (30-31)

2.3.3.2.2. REDEMPTIVE COVENANTS: "Redemptive covenant is simultaneously a promise administration of guaranteed blessings and a law administration of blessing dependent on obedience, with the latter foundational." (33)

2.3.3.2.3. COVENANT AS LAW ADMINISTRATION: "The conclusion may now be stated that a truly systematic formulation of the theology of the covenant will define covenant generically in the terms of law administration. For there was covenant administration in Eden without the feature of guaranteed promise (i.e., of inevitable and ultimate beatitude), hut the principle of inheritance by law has been at the foundation of covenant administration in every age of divine revelation. The Great King of the covenant is unchangeable in his holiness and justice. Merciful he may be according to his sovereign will; but all his works are in righteousness and truth. The satisfaction of the divine law underlies every administration of divine promise. A systematic definition of covenant in terms of law covenant will have the necessary formal as well as historical and theological qualifications. For law covenant with its duality of sanctions, curse threat as well as offer of blessing, will be formally comprehensive enough to accommodate promise covenant within its generic framework. " (34)

2.3.3.3. III. COVENANT AND KINGDOM

2.3.3.3.1. COVENANT, CONSTITUTION, AND LAW: "Congenial to Reformed theology surely is the centrality of God, the Great King of the covenant, in this definition. It is God’s lordship that is the core and constant of the covenant. That covenantal sovereignty of the Lord is manifested in his law, in his imposition of the stipulations of the law and in his infallible declarations respecting the certain execution of the law’s dual sanctions, promise and threat." (37)

2.3.3.3.2. COVENANT OF THE KINGDOM, COVENANT VS. CONTRACT, CONSECRATION: "If a general unifying term were desired it might then be Covenant of the Kingdom. For the two major divisions of the Covenant of the Kingdom our suggestions would be Covenant of Creation and Covenant of Redemption. Since the terms “creation” and “redemption” call attention to God’s position in relation to his covenant people as their Maker and Owner-Possessor, they effectively unfold the concept of God’s lordship. Moreover, these terms point to a fundamental distinguishing feature of each covenant in the distinctive kind of divine action by which each covenantal order was established. Inclusion of the idea of consecration in the definition reminds us that the concern of covenant is to establish a special relationship between two parties. At the same time, characterizing this relationship as one of consecration, the consecration of man to God, maintains the theocentric emphasis on the divine sovereignty and glory. It is this absolute sovereignty of God in the reciprocal relationship which, when recognized, prevents the legalistic distortion of the religious-covenantal bond into a mercantile qutd pro quo contract.8 The close association of consecration with law serves to distinguish this law as covenant law. For there is a difference between covenant law and a mere legal code. A law code like Hammurapi’s regulates the relationships of the law promulgator’s subjects to one another. Covenant law regulates the relationship of the covenant maker’s subjects to himself. Covenant law does, to be sure, deal with the mutual relations of the suzerain’s vassals but always as an aspect of their allegiance and obligations to the suzerain. The stipulations of the covenant sometimes begin with the declaration of this central and controlling demand for personal allegiance to the overlord; all other additional stipulations are so many specifications of the vassal’s primary allegiance. We may point up this fundamental difference between covenant stipulations and ordinary laws by the observation that Moses was note a lawgiver but a covenant mediator.9 He was not an Israelite Hammurapi but the agent through whom the Great King of heaven bound a people to himself in a relationship of service." (38-39)

2.3.3.3.3. COVENANT, CONSECRATION, AND THE TELOS OF THE PRAISE OF GOD: "The covenantal commandments revealed through Moses were first and last concerned with the duty of the covenant people to Yahweh their Lord, the duty to walk before him in perfect loyalty.’ The mention of consecration also suggests the important oath ritual of the ratification ceremony; it hints, too, at the climactic issue of the covenant in its final consummation to the praise of God."" (39)

2.3.4. CHAPTER 3: CIRCUMCISION: OATH-SIGN OF THE OLD COVENANT

2.3.4.1. I. MALEDICTION

2.3.4.2. II. CONSECRATION

2.3.5. CHAPTER 4: JOHN'S BAPTISMAL SIGN OF JUDGMENT

2.3.5.1. I. MESSENCER OF ULTIMATUM

2.3.5.2. II. SYMBOLIC WATER ORDEAL

2.3.6. CHAPTER 5: CHRISTIAN BAPTISM: OATH-SIGN OF THE NEW COVENANT

2.3.6.1. I. BAPTISM AS ORDEAL

2.3.6.2. II. NEW COVENANT JUDGMENT

2.3.7. CHAPTER 6: THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIRCUMCISION AND BAPTISM

2.3.7.1. I. VASSAL AUTHORITY IN COVENANT ADMINISTRATION

2.3.7.1.1. SUZERAIN-VASSAL COVENANTS AND AUTHORITY STRUCTURES: "The suzerain-vassal covenants were authority structures which brought outlying spheres of authority under the sanctioned control of an imperial power. The great king gave his treaty to a vassal who was himself also a king. In imposing his covenant the suzerain did not dissolve the royal authority of his vassal, as an empire builder would in the case of the territorial aiYrtexation of another kingdom as a province. Indeed, it was precisely in his status as a king that the vassal was addressed in the treaty. The dynastic succession within the vassal kingdom was sometimes a matter of explicit concern in the treaty stipulations. The historical prologue of the treaty might reflect on the fact that it was the suzerain’s efforts that had established the vassal king on his throne; more than that, the covenant itself was at times the very means of his doing so. It was then by swearing the vassal’s oath of allegiance that a throne aspirant became king or a king was re-established in his dominion over his people. There is even evidence that the treaty could be the means of enlarging a vassal king’s domain" (84-85)

2.3.7.1.2. VASSAL KINGS BRINGING THEIR KINGDOMS: "It is of course obvious from the whole purpose of these treaties that the vassal king in taking the ratificatory oath did so in his capacity as king and thus brought his kingdom with him into the relationship of allegiance to the suzerain. Moreover, from express statements in the treaties we know that the vassal king assumed responsibility for his sons and more remote descendants, consigning them with himself in his covenant oath. Consequently, these descendants are mentioned in the curses as objects of divine vengeance if the covenant sworn by the vassal king should be broken." (85)

2.3.7.2. II. CIRCUMCISION AND GENERATION

2.3.7.3. III. THE AUTHORITY PRINCIPLE AND BAPTISM

2.3.7.4. CONCLUSION

2.3.7.4.1. COVENANT & BAPITISM. BY OATH CONSIGNED: "Conclusions: The administration of baptism as the sign of demarcation of the congregation of the New Covenant takes account both of personal confession and of the confessor’s temporal authority. Just as there had to be an Abraham as the confessing nucleus of the Abrahamic covenant community marked by circumcision, so there had to be a nuclear company of disciples who confessed Christ as Lord for the establishment of the church of the New Covenant sealed by baptism. So, too, in the continuing mission of that church among new families and peoples, the administering of the sign of covenantal incorporation awaits the emergence of the confession of Christ’s lordship. But though the confession of faith has this primacy in the administration of baptism it is not the exclusive principle regulative of this rite. For the one who confesses Christ is required to fulfill his responsibility with respect to those whom God has placed under his parental (if not household) authority, exercising that authority to consecrate his charges with himself to the service of Christ. The basis for the baptism of the children of believers is thus simply their parents covenantal authority over them. For those who are baptized according to the secondary principle of authority as well as for those who are baptized according to the primary principle of confession, baptism is a sign of incorporation within the judicial sphere of Christ’s covenant lordship for a final verdict of blessing or curse. In the one case the reception of baptism is a matter of active commitment; in the other, of passive consecration. But in every instance, to be baptized is to be consigned by oath to the Lord of redemptive judgment." (103)

2.4. Douglass, R. Bruce, Joshua Mitchell (eds.), A Nation under God? Essays on the Future of Religion in American Public Life

2.4.1. 4. RECOVENANTING THE AMERICAN POLITY (Daniel J. Elazar)

2.4.1.1. A. THE COVENANTAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

2.4.1.2. B. COVENANT AND FEDERAL LIBERTY

2.4.1.2.1. "The evidence is overwhelming that the covenant principle translated into the larger political realm to produce modern popular government in the form of federal democracy." (69)

2.4.1.2.2. FEDERAL FROM FOEDUS: "The word federal is derived from foedus, the Latin word for covenant which, in turn, is the Vulgate's translation of the Hebrew word brit, meaning covenant." (69)

2.4.1.3. C. FEDERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS RIVALS

2.4.1.3.1. Jacobinism

2.4.1.4. D. COVENANT, COMPACT, CONTRACT

2.4.1.4.1. "Both covenants and their derivative, compacts, differ from contracts in that the first two are constitutional or public in character and the last is private. As such, covenantal or compactual obligation is relationship-oriented and broadly reciprocal while the reciprocity of contracts only follows the letter of the law or the agreement because contracts are task-oriented." (72)

2.4.1.4.2. "A covenant differs from a compact in that its morally binding dimension takes precedence over its legal dimension. In its heart of hearts, a covenant is an agreement in which a higher moral force--traditionally God--is a party, usually a direct party or a guarantor of a particular relationship, whereas when the term compact is used the moral force is internal to the pact itself." (72)

2.4.1.4.3. "Covenant is also related to constitutionalism. Normally a covenant precedes a constitution by establishing the people, public, or civil sociey that then proceeds to adopt a constitution of government for itself." (72)

2.4.1.4.4. Declaration of Independence served as national covenant. Elevated covenant to Federal level.

2.4.1.4.5. Northwest Ordinance of 1787

2.4.1.5. E. COVENANTAL THEORY VS. COVENANTAL PRACTICE

2.4.1.5.1. Covenantalist theory wiped out among intellectuals after they imported Jacobinism and Darwinism from Europe at the time of Lincoln.

2.4.1.6. F. THE DECLINE OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE

2.4.1.6.1. Increasingly marginilized and ritualized form of Covenantalism. Essentially replaced by a cultural "liberalism". The cultural collapses in 1960s, with a rise of paganism.

2.4.1.7. G. THE REASSERTION OF MONOTHEISTIC MORALITY

2.4.1.7.1. Rise from fundamentalist protestants

2.4.1.7.2. Reemergence of covenanting in the private sphere (promise keepers, etc)

2.4.1.7.3. Recognition of need of network of private or sociological transformations if public square to be reshaped.

2.4.1.8. H. RECOVENANTING IN A MULTI-CULTURAL WORLD

2.4.1.9. I. FEDERAL VS. NATURAL LIBERTY

2.4.1.9.1. "From the very first, New Age thinking has embraced natural liberty as true liberty, the liberty of everyone to do as he or she pleases on the erroneous premise 'as long as it doesn't hurt anyone else.'" (82)

2.4.1.10. J. RECOVENANTING FOR CIVIL COMMUNITY

2.4.1.10.1. SUM/THESIS: "To summarize, recovenanting is necessary so as to bring the moral teachings of monotheism back into the public square to define and shape the norms of civil society." (83)

2.4.1.10.2. "The challenge for our time is how to achieve community in an age in which freedom and individualism have become essential characteristics and are valued for their own sake." (84)

2.4.1.10.3. Covenant needs to be examined in three dimensions: "as a form of political conceptualization and mode of political expression, as a source of political ideology, and as a factor shaping political culture and behavior." (85)

2.4.1.11. K. RESTORING MODERATION BY ABANDONING THE EXTREMES

2.5. Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel, Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions

2.5.1. INTRODUCTION

2.5.1.1. I.

2.5.1.1.1. POLITICAL COVENANT: "Politically, a covenant involves a coming together (con-gregation) of basically equal humans who consent with one another through a morally binding pact supported by a transcendent power, establishing with the partners a new framework or setting them on the road to a new task that can only be dissolved by mutual agreement of all the parties to it." (1)

2.5.1.1.2. "The covenants of the Bible are the founding covenants of Western civilizations." (1)

2.5.1.1.3. Similar to modern constitutionalism in accepted limitations on the power of partie sin it.

2.5.1.1.4. COVENANT & CONSTITUTIONALISM: "This idea of limiting power is of first importance in the biblical worldview and for humanity as a whole since it helps explain why an omnipotent God does not excercise His omnipotence in the affairs of humans." (1-2)

2.5.1.1.5. COVENANT & REALISM: "Covenant as a theo-political concept is characterized by a very strong measure of realism." (2)

2.5.1.2. II.

2.5.1.2.1. TWO FACES OF POLITICS—POWER AND JUSTICE: "Politics has two faces. One is the face of power; the other is the face of justice. Politics, as the pursuit and origination of power, is concerned (in the words of Harold Lasswell) with 'who gets what, when and how.' However, politics is equally a matter of justice, or the determination of who should get what, when and how—and why. Power is the means by which people organize themselves and shape their environment in order to live. Justice offers the guidelines for using power in order to live well." (2)

2.5.1.2.2. IMPORTANCE OF POWER AND JUSTICE: "Politics cannot be understood without reference to both faces. Without understanding a polity's conception of justice, or who should have power, one cannot understand clearly why certain people or groups get certain rewards, at certain times, in certain ways. On the other hand, one cannot focus properly on the pursuit of justice without also understanding the realities of the distribution of power. Both elements are present in all political questions, mutually influencing each other." (3)

2.5.1.2.3. MORALITY AND POLITICS (REALPOLITICK): "The collapse of a shared moral understanding inevitably leads to a collapse of the rules of the game. We are witness to just such a collapse in many polities in our time, for precisely that reason, a collapse which has brought in its train the present crisis of humankind. It is in the discovery of a proper moral base or foundation, and its pursuit in such a way that recognizes the realities of power that is essential for a good politics. That is what the conceptual system rooted in covenant is all about. " (3)

2.5.1.2.4. COVENANT AND THE TWO FACES OF POLITICS: "Through covenant, the two faces of politics, power and justice, are linked to become effective both morally and operationally." (3)

2.5.1.2.5. THESIS: "In the course of this book, I will suggest that covenant is by far the best source for developing a proper moral understanding and proper moral path in politics, that it is, indeed, the way to achieve a general public commitment to the political institutions required for the good life and to emerge from the Machiavellian jungle as free, morally responsible people." (4)

2.5.1.3. III.

2.5.1.3.1. POLITICAL TRADITION: "First of all, it is a mode of thinking and body of thoughts shared by members of a particular body politic, especially those in any way involved in politics." (4)

2.5.1.3.2. POLITICAL VOCABULARY: (4)

2.5.1.3.3. "In sum, a tradition is a major integrative force within the body politic." (5)

2.5.1.3.4. PURPOSE: "This book is an exploration of the original covenant tradition, explicating its ideas through living examples of their application, examining the ways in which that idea and its derivatives penetrated and permeated, shaped, or gave rise to particular political systems, institutions, and behaviors." (5)

2.5.1.4. IV.

2.5.1.5. V.

2.5.1.5.1. Summary of all three books (9)

2.5.1.6. VI.

2.5.1.6.1. BIBLICAL ISRAEL AND WESTERN SOCIETY: "The record of that experience represents the oldest stratum in Western political thought and, since the record is derived very directly from the Israelites' experience, the latter is in itself an important factor in the development of Western political institutions." (12)

2.5.2. PART I--THE IDEA

2.5.2.1. 1. COVENANT AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT

2.5.2.1.1. A. COVENANT AND THE PURPOSE OF POLITICS

2.5.2.1.2. B. THE IDEA OF COVENANT

2.5.2.1.3. C. COVENANT, NATURAL LAW, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

2.5.2.1.4. D. COVENANT, COMPACT, AND CONTRACT

2.5.2.2. 2. COVENANT AND THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

2.5.2.2.1. A. THREE MODELS

2.5.2.2.2. B. BIBLICAL EXPRESSION OF THE THREE MODELS

2.5.2.2.3. C. COVENANTS AND NEW SOCIETIES

2.5.2.2.4. D. COVENANT AND THE FRONTIER

2.5.2.3. 3. BIBLICAL ORIGINS

2.5.2.3.1. A. BIBLICAL BEGINNINGS

2.5.2.3.2. B. READING THE BIBLE

2.5.2.3.3. C. THE BIBLE AS POLITICAL COMMENTARY

2.5.2.3.4. D. THE POLITICAL PURPOSE OF THE BIBLE

2.5.2.3.5. E. THE BIBLE AND THE COVENANT IDEA

2.5.2.3.6. F. COVENANT DYNAMICS: HEARKENING AND HESED

2.5.2.4. 4. THE BIBLE AND POLITICAL LIFE IN COVENANT

2.5.2.4.1. A. THE FEDERAL WAY OF COVENANT

2.5.2.4.2. B. THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF BIBLICAL COVENANTS

2.5.2.4.3. C. COVENANT AS THE FOUNDATION OF JUSTICE, OBLIGATIONS, AND RIGHTS

2.5.2.4.4. D. GOD'S FEDERAL UNIVERSE

2.5.3. PART II--TORAH: THE COVENANTAL TEACHING

2.5.3.1. 5. BERESHITH: THE COVENANTS OF CREATION

2.5.3.1.1. A. CREATION AS MAKING DISTINCTIONS

2.5.3.1.2. B. PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION AND RELATIONSHIP

2.5.3.1.3. C. HUMAN CHOICE DETERMINES HUMAN DESTINY

2.5.3.1.4. D. THE BIBLICAL ORGANIZATION OF TIME

2.5.3.1.5. E. THE BASIC FLAW IN HUMAN IMPULSES

2.5.3.1.6. F. THE NOAHIDE COVENANT: THE BIBLICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN POLITICAL ORDER

2.5.3.1.7. G. THE EMERGENCY OF PEOPLES, POLITIES, AND EMPIRES

2.5.3.1.8. H. CHALLENGING GOD: A BREACH OF THE COVENANT

2.5.3.1.9. I. BEGINNINGS OF THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT

2.5.3.2. 6. ABRAHAM AND HIS CHILDREN: MIGRATION AND COVENANT

2.5.3.2.1. A. MIGRATION AND THE FOUNDING OF A NEW NATION

2.5.3.2.2. B. EXCERCISING POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

2.5.3.2.3. C. BRIT BEN HABETARIM: THE COVENANT LAND AND PEOPLE

2.5.3.2.4. D. ABRAHAM AS PARTNER, GOD AS JUDGE

2.5.3.2.5. E. TERRITORY GAINED THROUGH COVENANT

2.5.3.2.6. F. THE AKEDAH

2.5.3.3. 7. FEDERAL VERSUS NATURAL MAN

2.5.3.3.1. A. JACOB AND ESAU: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

2.5.3.3.2. B. COVENANT OR CONTRACT?

2.5.3.3.3. C. JACOB BECOMES ISRAEL

2.5.3.3.4. D. HIEARCHY: THE CONTRAST WITH COVENANT

2.5.3.3.5. E. TWO EXCURSES: ESAU BECOMES EDOM; JUDAH AND TAMAR

2.5.3.3.6. F. THE TRIBES ARE FORMED

2.5.3.4. 8. FREEDOM AND COVENANT: EXODUS, SINAI, AND SEFER HABRIT

2.5.3.4.1. FOUR COVENANTAL EPISODES: "The bible offers a series of paradigmatic political covenants that have animated the covenantal perspective in politics since biblical times. We have already examined the first of those, the covenant with Noah, which defines the basic relationship between God and humankind, the charter of federal liberty for all humanity. We also reviewed the covenants with Abraham establishing God's intention to be found a specially covenanted people who will build a new society to set the pace for humanity as a whole. This new nation will ultimately be given a constitution in the form of the Torah, which combinses God-given hukkot, constitutionally binding but not explained, often ritual commandments, and mishpatim, civil and social laws, in part based on prio custom, and is anchored in a series of covenants of which these two are the first. The third paradigmatic covenant of the Bible is at Sinai. It establishes an edah prepared to receive a constitution. The fourth is on the plains of Moab, a covenant set within the constitution itself, adapting it to settled life in the land of Israel." (161

2.5.3.4.2. FOOTNOTE: Key words related to the covenasnt (161-162)

2.5.3.4.3. THis chapter moves from covenant terminology to constitutional terminology

2.5.3.4.4. A. SINAI: THE PARADIGMATIC CONSTITUTING COVENANT

2.5.3.5. 9. THE MOSAIC POLITY: WHAT ELSE HAPPENED AT SINAI?

2.5.3.5.1. A. THE COVENANT AND THE BOOK OF THE COVENANT

2.5.3.5.2. B. COMPLETING THE ACT OF COVENANTING

2.5.3.5.3. C. EXPLICATING THE COVENANTAL TEXT

2.5.3.5.4. D. NUMBERS: THE APPLICATION OF THE SINAI COVENANT

2.5.3.5.5. E. THE MOSAIC REGIME

2.5.3.6. 10. FROM COVENANT TO CONSTITUTION: DEUTORONOMY

2.5.3.6.1. In a sense the first four books of the Pentateuch served as the constitution of the Mosaic polity in its classic period. The addition of its fifth, Devarim or Deutoronomy, reflects the change in regime with the addition of the monarchy and all that went with it." (193)

2.5.3.6.2. DIVREI HABRIT: Words of the Covenant (29:8). "Indeed, the entire book is presented as a constitution that embodies and restates the original covenant. A parallel example of this device is to be found in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which begins with a restatement of the covenant/compact that forms the Massachusetts body politic and continues to present the fundamental law of the Commonwealth." (193)

2.5.3.6.3. A. CONFRONTING AN ANCIENT CONSTITUTION

2.5.3.6.4. B. WAS DEUTERONOMY ACTUALLY IN FORCE?

2.5.3.6.5. C. WHY WAS DEUTORONOMY NECESSARY?

2.5.3.6.6. D. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS OF DEUTORONOMY

2.5.3.6.7. E. CONCLUSION

2.5.4. PART III--THE CLASSIC BIBLICAL UTOPIA

2.5.4.1. 11. JOSHUA: GOD'S FEDERAL REPUBLIC

2.5.4.1.1. TORAH, NEVI'IM, KETUVIM: "Deutoronomy completes the Five Books of Moses--the Torah--Israel's basic covenants and constitution. The second section of the Hebrew Bible--Nevi-im, the Prophets--is, along with the historical books of Ketuvim--the Writings--an account of Israel's effort to apply the Torah as constitution under different circumstances at different times." (227)

2.5.4.1.2. A. THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN THE FORMER PROPHETS

2.5.4.1.3. B. THE MOSAIC COVENANTAL PARADIGM IN ACTION

2.5.4.1.4. C. THE FORMER PROPHETS AND THEIR UNDERLYING POLITICAL THEME

2.5.4.1.5. D. THE COVENANT IDEA AND PROPHETIC HISTORY

2.5.4.1.6. E. JOSHUA'S AUTHORITY IS ESTABLISHED IN THE KETER MALKHUT

2.5.4.2. 12. FOSTERING CIVIC VIRTUE

2.5.4.3. 13. JOSHUA'S FAREWELL ADDRESSES

2.5.4.4. 14. JUDGES: THE REALITY?

2.5.4.4.1. COVENANTING IN JUDGES: "Jephthah makes a pact with the elders of Gilead, the Israelites who assembled against Benjamin take oaths; gideon and even Abimelech are offered power as rulers by popular assemblies. The spirit of the age is summarized in the table of the trees told by Gideon's surviving son, Jotham" (289)

2.5.4.4.2. DECLINE OF CIVIC VIRTUE: "Overall, the book seems to be about the decline of civic virtue." (290)

2.5.4.4.3. REPUBLICAN VIRTUE IN THE BIBLE: "First of all, republican virtue, like all biblical virtue, begins with fear of the Lord as manifested by hearkening God's Torah. . . . Second, it involves public spiritedness. Third, it requires a respect for the Israelite constitution and its limitations. Fourth, it emphasizes courage in the pursuit of public purposes. Fifth, it demands faithfulness to the tradition. Sixth, it expects a sense of the equality of all Israelites and public behavior reflecting that sense." (291)

2.5.5. PART IV--THE ALTERNATE MODEL

2.5.5.1. 15. COVENANT AND KINGDOM: DEALING WITH FUNDAMENTAL REGIME CHANGE

2.5.5.2. 16. THE INSTITUTIONALIZED FEDERAL MONARCHY

2.5.5.2.1. IMPROTANCE OF IDEA IN WEST: "These biblical paradigms and case studies are intrinsically important for what they tell us about the deeper structure of the biblical text. They are at least equally important for their influence on subsequent political thought and behavior in the Western world. These are the paradigms and case studies that surface time and again in the literature of politics in the West to serve as the meat of political analysis. Prior to the age of empirical political research, they represent the closest thing to data used by students of and commentators on political affairs. In that context, the theory and practice of covenant naturally attracted attention as a vehicle for polity building, constitution making, and governance. Through the Bible, then, what was once a mere technical arrangement was transformed into a means for constituting new communities, and thereby, a seminal political idea, one that has had a signal influence on the history of human liberty." (335)

2.5.5.3. 17. COVENANT AS JUDGMENT, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT

2.5.5.3.1. HOW ISRAELITES GOVERNED THEMSELVES: "While our knowledge is limited in that sphere, what we do know suggests a system of communal democracy rooted in federal republicanism." (337)

2.5.5.3.2. COVENANT AND MORAL ORDER: "When the Patriarchs secure their water supply, they make ordinary covenants with their neighbors. David and Jonathan bind their friendship through an ordinary covenant. Marriage is an ordinary covenant, one in which the covenantal dimension is extremely important because, of all human relationships, the marriage bond is the least enforceable without the moral commitment. What is characteristic of all these ordinary convenants is the moral commitment involved in preserving the relationship that is established. The relationship is not simply a contract for mutual convenience. Both parties to it make the moral commitment that places them under judgment as to whether or not they keep their part of the bargain. Ordinary covenants enable people to do even simple things by guaranteeing them through the moral bond." (346)

2.5.5.3.3. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS FOR ISRAEL: (1) theocratic, federal, and republican (354-

2.5.5.4. 18. COVENANT AND POLITY IN BIBLICAL ISRAEL

2.5.6. PART V--THE POSTBIBLICAL TRADITION

2.5.6.1. 19. TALMUDIC CONSTITUTIONALISM

2.5.6.2. 20. MEDIEVAL COVENANT THEORY

2.5.6.2.1. A. THE BEGINNINGS OF SYSTEMATIC JEWISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

2.5.6.3. 21. COVENANT AND POLITY IN THE PREMODERN JEWISH EXPERIENCE

2.5.6.4. 22. THE COVENANT TRADITION IN MODERNITY

2.5.6.5. 23. THE COVENANT IDEA AND THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: A SUMMARY STATEMENT

2.6. Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant & Commonwealth, From Christian Separation through the Protestant Reformation

2.6.1. INTRODUCTION

2.6.1.1. COVENANT: "Politically, a covenant involves a coming together (con-gregation) of basically equal humans who consent with one another through a morally binding pact supported by a transcendent power, establishing with the partners a new framework or setting them on the road to a new task, and which can be dissolved only by mutual agreement of all the parties to it." (1)

2.6.1.2. A. COVENANT, COMPACT, AND CONTRACT

2.6.1.2.1. "Both covenants and compacts differ from contracts in that the first two are constitutional or public, and the last private in character." (1)

2.6.1.2.2. "A covenant differs from a compact in that its morally binding dimension takes precedence over its legal dimension." (2)

2.6.1.2.3. REALISM: "Covenant as a theo-political concept is characterized by a very strong measure of realism. This recognition of the need to limit the excercise of power is one example of this realism." (3-4)

2.6.1.3. II

2.6.1.4. III

2.6.1.4.1. Three types of sociopolitical arrangements: hiearchical, organic, and covenantal

2.6.1.5. IV

2.6.1.5.1. Four stages of the tradition

2.6.2. PART I--BEGINNINGS AND SEPARATIONS

2.6.2.1. 1. COVENANT TRADITIONS IN THE WEST

2.6.2.1.1. A. WEST ASIAN OATHS, CONTRACTS, AND TREATISES

2.6.2.1.2. B. THE HELLENIC-IONIAN LEAGUES

2.6.2.1.3. C. ROMAN FOEDERATII

2.6.2.1.4. D. THE SEPARATION OF THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS

2.6.2.1.5. E. THE CHURCH FATHERS

2.6.2.1.6. F. TOWARD HIERARCHY

2.6.2.2. 2. MEDIEVAL AND MODERN SEPARATIONS

2.6.2.2.1. A. INTERREGNUM: THE ORGANIC MODEL TAKES OVER

2.6.2.2.2. B. FELLOWSHIPS OF CHRISTIAN BELIEVERS

2.6.2.2.3. C. REFORMATION AND COVENANT REVIVAL: THE SECOND SEPARATION

2.6.2.2.4. D. SECULARIZATION: THE THIRD SEPARATION

2.6.2.2.5. E. FOUR POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.6.3. PART II--MEDIEVAL EXPRESSIONS OF OATH AND PACT

2.6.3.1. 3. FEUDALISM: COVENANTAL FRAUD, HERESY, OR SYNTHESIS?

2.6.3.1.1. A. A MIXTURE OF HIERARCHY AND CONTRACT

2.6.3.1.2. B. ITALY: FEUDALISM AND CITY REPUBLICS

2.6.3.1.3. C. FRANCE: THE EVER-HIERARCHICAL

2.6.3.1.4. D. THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

2.6.3.1.5. E. EUROPE TO THE EAST

2.6.3.2. 4. THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

2.6.3.2.1. A. THE GERMANS AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

2.6.3.2.2. B. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

2.6.3.2.3. C. TWO REFORM EFFORTS: THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT AND THE IMPERIAL DIET OF 1495

2.6.3.3. 5. OATHS AND COVENANTS IN THE MOUNTAINS AND LOWLANDS

2.6.3.3.1. A. COVENANTS IN THE MOUNTAINS

2.6.3.3.2. B. CONIURATIO HELVETICA

2.6.3.3.3. C. THE COVENANTAL BASIS OF SWISS FEDERALISM

2.6.3.3.4. D. WHAT MADE THE SWISS SPECIAL

2.6.3.3.5. E. THE LOW COUNTRIES

2.6.3.4. 6. OATHS AND SOCIETIES IN GREATER SCANDANAVIA

2.6.3.4.1. A. THE SCANDANAVIAN POLITY

2.6.3.4.2. B. CULTURAL CONTINUITIES

2.6.3.4.3. C. ICELAND: AN OATH-BOUND REPUBLIC

2.6.3.4.4. D. WHY DID THE SCANDANAVIAN COUNTRIES BECOME LUTHERAN?

2.6.3.4.5. E. CONCLUSION

2.6.3.5. 7. THE BRITISH ISLES: FRONTIER, WEST, AND BORDERLANDS

2.6.3.5.1. A. ENGLAND: PACTS AND FEUDS

2.6.3.5.2. B. WALES: PACTS AND TRIBES

2.6.3.5.3. C. SCOTLAND: PACTS TO COVENANTS

2.6.3.5.4. D. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF COVENANTAL CULTURE

2.6.3.5.5. E. THE SURVIVAL OF COVENANT

2.6.4. PART III--REFORMATION FEDERALISM

2.6.4.1. 8. FEDERAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE REFORMATION

2.6.4.1.1. INTRO

2.6.4.1.2. A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE REEMERGENCE OF COVENANT IDEAS

2.6.4.1.3. B. THE REFORMATION COMMUNITY

2.6.4.1.4. C. ZWINGLI VERSUS LUTHER

2.6.4.1.5. D. SWITZERLAND: THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF COVENANTAL THEO-POLITICS

2.6.4.1.6. E. ZURICH: ZWINGLI'S COVENANTAL COMMUNITY

2.6.4.2. 9. THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF FEDERALISM

2.6.4.2.1. A. THE TENETS OF FEDERAL THEOLOGY

2.6.4.2.2. B. THE CALVINIST DEVIATION

2.6.4.2.3. C. GENEVA BECOMES CALVIN'S REPUBLIC

2.6.4.2.4. D. THE TRIUMPH OF CALVINISM

2.6.4.2.5. E. COVENANT AND THE RADICAL WING OF THE REFORMATION

2.6.4.2.6. F. THE WIDER IMPACT OF THE REFORMED IDEA

2.6.4.3. 10. THE ABORTED SPREAD OF REFORMED FEDERALISM IN GERMANY AND FRANCE

2.6.4.3.1. A. GERMANY: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN COVENANTAL AND HIERARCHICAL WORLD VIEWS

2.6.4.3.2. B. ENTER ROMANTIC NATIONALISM

2.6.4.3.3. C. FRANCE: HUGUENOTS AND RESISTANCE TO TYRANTS

2.6.4.3.4. D. THE HUGUENOT DIASPORA

2.6.4.4. 11. THE NETHERLANDS: THE COVENANT AND THE UNITED PROVINCES

2.6.4.4.1. A. THE COVENANTAL ROOTS OF THE REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN

2.6.4.4.2. B. INDEPENDENCE AND FEDERALISM

2.6.4.4.3. C. THE HEYDAY AND DECLINE OF THE UNITED PROVINCES

2.6.4.4.4. D. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS

2.6.4.4.5. E. THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF DUTCH COVENANTALISM

2.6.5. PART IV--PURITANS AND COVENANTERS

2.6.5.1. 12. ENGLISH PURITANISM

2.6.5.1.1. A. THE ESSENCE OF PURITAN COVENANTALISM

2.6.5.1.2. B. THE MARROW OF PURATIN DIVINITY

2.6.5.1.3. C. BACK TO THE BIBLE

2.6.5.1.4. D. THE PURITAN EDIFICE OF REFORMATION

2.6.5.1.5. E. THE FOUR COVENANTS

2.6.5.2. 13. THE PURITANS, THE CIVIL WAR, AND BEYOND

2.6.5.2.1. A. VICTORY: THE POLITICAL COVENANT DIMINISHED

2.6.5.2.2. B. LIBERAL PURITANISM: JOHN MILTON

2.6.5.2.3. C. FROM PURITAN TO WHIGGISM

2.6.5.2.4. D. THE ABANDONMENT OF COVENANT

2.6.5.3. 14. THE REFORMATION OF COVENANTED SCOTLAND

2.6.5.3.1. A. FEDERAL THEOLOGY AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

2.6.5.3.2. B. JOHN KNOX AND THE COVENANT

2.6.5.3.3. C. THE REFORMATION IN SCOTLAND

2.6.5.3.4. D. THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY STRUGGLE FOR COVENANT AND INDEPENDENCE

2.6.5.3.5. E. THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT

2.6.5.3.6. F. THE RESTORATION AND REPRESSION OF COVENANTERS

2.6.5.4. 15. SCOTLAND AND COVENANT AFTER UNION: A CASE STUDY

2.6.5.4.1. A. FROM COVENANTAL COMMUNITY TO SCHISMATIC KIRKS

2.6.5.4.2. B. UNIVERSAL EDUCATION IN A COVENANTAL COMMUNITY

2.6.5.4.3. C. THE SCOTTISH DIASPORA SPREAD COVENANTALISM

2.6.5.4.4. D. KIRK AND CHAMBERS: THE TWIN PILLARS OF SCOTTISH AUTONOMY

2.6.5.4.5. E. COVENANT IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND

2.6.6. PART V--THE SURVIVAL AND REVIVAL OF COVENANT

2.6.6.1. "Althusius, who lives at the very end of the century of Reformation, on the threshold of the trnasition to the modern epoch, synthesized the best of Reformation thought as applied to the organization of the body politic in the spirit of covenant, liberty, equality, and community." (311)

2.6.6.2. 16. A PROPER COVENANTAL COMMONWEALTH

2.6.6.2.1. A. THE MULTIFACETED COVENANT: THE COVENANTAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATIONS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND LIBERTY

2.6.6.2.2. B. THE RES PUBLICA OF ALTHUSIUS

2.6.6.2.3. C. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OR THE RULES OF ORDER

2.6.6.2.4. D. POLITY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

2.6.6.2.5. E. A SUMMING UP

2.6.7. CONCLUSION--COVENANTAL SPACE IN A HIERARCHICAL WORLD

2.6.7.1. A. THE SOURCES OF COVENANT: CULTURE, FRONTIER, BORDERLANDS

2.6.7.2. B. THE CONCRETIZATION OF COVENANTAL BEHAVIOR: THE BIBLICAL IDEA AND THE LIMITS OF BARBARISM

2.6.7.3. C. THE USES OF COVENANT: PRESERVING AND FOSTERING LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

2.7. Elazar, Daniel J. Covenant & Constitution, The Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracy

2.7.1. INTRODUCTION

2.7.1.1. A. THE NEW WORLD EXPERIENCE

2.7.1.1.1. "Here we must remind ourselves of the three forms from which all polities are derived and through which all are organized: hierarchical, organic, or covenantal--as The Federalist put it in Federalist #1: force, accident, or reflection and choice." (1-2)

2.7.1.2. B. THE NEW WORLD EXPERIENCE

2.7.1.2.1. PURPOSE OF THE WORK: "This, then, is our story in this volume--how certain parts of the New World were settled by those who brought the covenant tradition with them, how that tradition was reinforced by the settler's New World experiences in founding new societies, and, with all the flaws in that experience, how those settlers pioneered the development of modenr democracy or, more appropriately, modern democratic republicanism, or, still more accurately, modern federal democratic republicanism, r, still more accurately, modern federal democratic republicanism, using 'federal' not only in its later governmental sense of federalism but in its original political sense of covenantal." (5)

2.7.1.3. C. COVENANT, COMPACT, CONTRACT

2.7.2. PART I: THE UNITED STATES: AN ALMOST COVENANTED POLITY

2.7.2.1. 1. THE COVENANT AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING

2.7.2.1.1. A. AMERICA'S COVENANTAL VOCATION

2.7.2.1.2. B. THE PURITANS: COVENANT COMES TO THE NEW WORLD

2.7.2.1.3. C. COVENANTS AND OTHER BONDS

2.7.2.1.4. D. THE AMERICAN COLONIAL EXPERIMENTS WITH COVENANTS AND CONSTITUTIONS

2.7.2.1.5. E. THE COVENANT IDEA AND LIBERTY: A SUMMARY STATEMENT

2.7.2.2. 2. THE REVOLUTION AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

2.7.2.2.1. INTRO:

2.7.2.2.2. 1. THE PREAMBLE, OR STATEMENT OF WHO IS DOING THE COVENANTING

2.7.2.2.3. 2. A PROLOGUE TO ESTABLISH THE SETTING, OR GROUNDING OF THE COVENANT

2.7.2.3. 3. CONSTITUTIONS AS COVENANTS

2.7.2.3.1. 1. FROM COVENANT TO CONSTITUTION

2.7.2.3.2. 2. THE STATES AND THE NATION; A SECOND SHIFT IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

2.7.2.3.3. 3. TWO TRADITIONS: THE 1787 CONSITUTION COMPARED

2.7.3. PART II: THE UNITED STATES: THE COVENANT CHALLENGED

2.7.3.1. 4. COVENANT AND CONTENDING PRINCIPLES IN THE EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES

2.7.3.2. 5. SLAVERY AND SECESSION: COVENANT VERSUS COMPACT

2.7.3.3. 6. COVENANT AND THE CHALLENGES OF HUMAN NATURE

2.7.3.4. 7. THE SUM OF COVENANTAL EXPRESSIONS

2.7.4. PART III: THE COVENANT ON THE GREAT FRONTIER

2.7.4.1. 8. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: FALSE AND REAL FRONTIERS

2.7.4.2. 9. THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE AND THE ASIAN COAST

2.7.4.3. 10. COVENANT AS A THEO-POLITICAL TRADITION: A SUMMARY STATEMENT

3. CONFERENCE: LIBERTY & DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

3.1. SESSION 1: TENSIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING

3.1.1. SESSION NOTES

3.1.1.1. "Day of Deliverance" Adams on July 2nd. Refrencing continental congress resolutions brought before conference and approved. Lee's resolutons. "These united colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent states. Absolved from all allegiance to the State of Great britain."

3.1.1.2. July 2nd Continental Conference voted its approval to its resolutions. On july 4th, after some editing, it approved the Declaration. July 2nd approval of Lee's resolutions and 4th approval of the Declaration document. Several colonies declared independence by this point. Some colonies already passed constitutions. Declaration a mopping up operation. Even smaller units of authority were doing the same thing. Smaller spheres of sovereignty declaring independence. They declared independence as well. Towns, counties, even church congregations joined in declaring independence. Declaration one of many declarations. Colonies now free and independent states. Adams wished to commerate and revere spirit of independence. Liberty. 8 generations of colonial experience and a shared tradition of british tradition of rights.

3.1.1.3. In 2006 Bradley Thomson published an article entitled "Creed and Culture." Is the Declaration represent a national creed or is it a reflection of a national culture. If it is a creed, a mission statement, what is the basis of that creed? What are the doctrines, the things people will cling to over the enterprise. Those who see it as creed, the basis is rooted in the idea of natural rights. Value of human being is intrinsic. Not rooted in politics. Because we are created beings, we have certain liberties because of that humanity. Don't need government to give it to us. Politics can be used as a means to protect those things, but those things dont create those rights.

3.1.1.3.1. Creedal document

3.1.1.4. On the other hands, they look at it as a exposition of a common culture rooted in specific British traditions. Both legal and political. Americans believed on certain types of political institutions. 1700s went about . John Adams is the author of the world's longest running constitution. What these legal institutions involved is a the British tradition. For those who esposed a cultural continuity they insists that Americans in general followed these out. One way to read the Declaration is reading it as a common law document.

3.1.1.4.1. Common law brief.

3.1.1.5. When Brad thomson finished, he summarized that it wasn't totally a creed or a reflection of a common culture. It is an exposition of both. How is it either, how is it both? Professor says it is neither. It is a practical document that summarizes as best as possible all of the colonies concern and issues with the British government. At its heart, merely a statement of its independence.

3.1.1.5.1. In effect colonial America is all about failure.

3.1.1.5.2. History of colonial America is one failure after another.

3.1.1.5.3. Every colony setup by British or other created by some idealized vision of order.

3.1.1.5.4. Each colonial group had its own vision of what that new society ought to be like when they arrive. Some had to make a decision really fast. Pilgrims and the Mayflower Compact.

3.1.1.5.5. Some defined it literally. As a religious creed. Particularly a protestant creed. New England Puritans, New England Pilgrims, and other dissenting groups. Quakers in Penn, East Jersey, etc. Roman Catholics in Maryland. Established a vision of order established in a religious creed.

3.1.1.5.6. No society setup on better foundations than Georgia.

3.1.1.5.7. Another basing their decisions on cultural considerations. Assuming people living in that colony going to follow certain cultural pattern.

3.1.1.6. By the 1720s colonies settled down in a balance. Some are going to have bicammeral colonial assembly. Some powerful governors, some not. Effectively self-governing. Pledge allegiance to king and partliament, but they pay them very little attention. At this time the colonies prosper.

3.1.1.7. Why did we go from that kind of accepted piece to a situation in 75 and 76 that the colonists and british shooting at each other. Two things happened. (1) French and Indian war. Significant conflict between Colonists and British. British abd British North Americans. Between those people and their indian allies. Betwene indian tribes and other indian tribes. Deep seated political conflcit between two political parties (whigs and Tories). Conflicts between empires and indian nations bring all this to a head. At times colonists refused to might.

3.1.1.8. Crown then comes to try and clean up everything into uniformity.

3.1.1.9. Rights rights rights. Then war breaks out.

3.1.1.10. Object of declaration: not to say anything new, but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject to confirm their assent. To justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to set. Not yet copy from any previous document. To demonstrate the American mind. All its authority rests on the sentiment of the day.

3.1.1.11. Character of America is no one institution, idea, family, etc, would become Supreme. No economic system would become supreme. That sovereignty would not exist in name only. When the people are sovereign no one really is.

3.1.2. OUTLINE

3.1.3. SUMMARY

3.1.4. CRITIQUE

3.1.5. KEY TERMS

3.1.6. QUOTES

3.1.7. QUESTIONS

3.2. SESSION 2: ENGLISH SOURCES OF COLONIAL LIBERTY

3.2.1. SESSION NOTES

3.2.1.1. Three rules: (1) Raise your

3.2.2. Magna Carta (1215)

3.2.2.1. OUTLINE

3.2.2.1.1. GOD, LIBERTIES, FREE CHURCH: 1. "In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs forever that the English church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate;" (1.)

3.2.2.1.2. FREE ELECTIONS, UNCONSTRAINED WILL: "which is apparent from this that the freedom of elections, which is reckoned most important and very essential to the English church, we, of our pure and unconstrained will, did grant, and di by our charter confirm and did obtain ratitifaction of the same from our lord, Pope Innocent III" (1.)

3.2.2.1.3. LIBERTIES OF FREEDOM: "We have also granted to all freedom of our kingdom, for us and our heirs for eevr, all the underwritten liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs for ever." (1.)

3.2.2.1.4. NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: "No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom," (3.)

3.2.2.1.5. HABEUS CORPUS, TRIAL BY JURY: "39. No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in anyway destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." (6)

3.2.2.1.6. RIGHT, JUSTICE: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." (6)

3.2.2.1.7. FREE:, LIBERTIES, RIGHTS "63. Wherefore it is our will, and we firmly enjoin, that the English Church be free, and that the men in our kingdom have and hold all aforesaid liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peacably, freely and quietly, fully and wholly, for themselves and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all respects and in all places for ever, as it aforesaid." (10)

3.2.2.1.8. OATH: "An oath, moreover, has been taken, as well on our part as on the part of the barons, that all these conditions aforesaid shall be kept in good faith and without evil intent." (10)

3.2.2.2. SUMMARY

3.2.2.2.1. (Latin: “Great Charter”) Document guaranteeing English political liberties, drafted at Runnymede, a meadow by the Thames, and signed by King John in 1215 under pressure from his rebellious barons. Resentful of the king's high taxes and aware of his waning power, the barons were encouraged by the archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, to demand a solemn grant of their rights. Among the charter's provisions were clauses providing for a free church, reforming law and justice, and controlling the behavior of royal officials. It was reissued with alterations in 1216, 1217, and 1225. Though it reflects the feudal order rather than democracy, the Magna Carta is traditionally regarded as the foundation of British constitutionalism. King John became king in 1199 and inherited a country at war with France. In 1215 he was forced by the powerful barons of England to sign Magna Carta, the Great Charter, which forced John to obey the law, treat freemen fairly, not charge unfair taxes, and not interfere with the church.

3.2.2.2.2. It is generally recognized now, however, that the charter definitely did show the viability of opposition to excessive use of royal power and that this constitutes its chief significance

3.2.2.3. CRITIQUE

3.2.2.4. KEY TERMS

3.2.2.4.1. NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: "12. No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom," (3.)

3.2.2.4.2. HABEUS CORPUS, TRIAL BY JURY: "39. No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in anyway destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." (6)

3.2.2.4.3. RIGHT, JUSTICE: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." (6)

3.2.2.4.4. FREE CHURCH: 1. "In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs forever that the English church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate;" (1.)

3.2.2.5. QUOTES

3.2.2.5.1. “We are heirs to a tradition given voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta, which … confined executive power by ‘the law of the land’” (David Souter). Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

3.2.2.6. QUESTIONS

3.2.2.6.1. What are the sources of the rights and priviledges granted in the Magna Carta?

3.2.2.6.2. Are these documents based on an ideal, or are they essentially utilitarian in that they propose specific remedies to specified evils?

3.2.2.6.3. What is the nature of the King's power in these documents?

3.2.2.6.4. Why would a monarch limit his power in the ways enumerated in these documents?

3.2.2.6.5. How important is this charter?

3.2.3. Charter of Liberties of Henry I, (1100)

3.2.3.1. OUTLINE

3.2.3.1.1. GOD, FREE CHURCH: 1. "and because the kingdom had been oppressed by unjust exactions, I, through fear of god and the love which I have toward you all, in the first place make the holy church of God free, so that i will neither sell nor put you to farm,"

3.2.3.2. SUMMARY

3.2.3.2.1. This charter, grnated by Henry when he ascended the throne, is important in two ways. First, Henry formally bound himself to the laws, setting the stage for the rule of law that parliaments and parliamentarians of later ages would cry for. Second, it reads almost exactly like the Magna Carta, and served as a model for the Great Charter in 1215.

3.2.3.3. CRITIQUE

3.2.3.4. KEY TERMS

3.2.3.5. QUOTES

3.2.3.6. QUESTIONS

3.2.4. Hooker, Richard. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594)

3.2.4.1. Book I Ch 10 (87-99)

3.2.4.2. OUTLINE

3.2.4.2.1. ORIGINS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: X. "But forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others. This was the cause of men's uniting themselves at the first in politic Societies, which societies could not be without Government, nor Government without a distinct kind of Law from that which hath been already declared."

3.2.4.2.2. LAW OF THE COMMONWEAL, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC SOCIETY, ORIGINS, SOCIAL CONTRACT: "Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living together." (X.1., pg 2)

3.2.4.2.3. CIVIL LAW: "Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of nature;" (X.1. pg 2)

3.2.4.2.4. CONTRACT: X.4. "To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing unto composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto; that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquility, and happy estate of the rest might be procured. . . finally they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, annd according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, inasmuch as every man is towards himself and them whom he greatly affecteth partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon: without which consent there were no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another;" (3)

3.2.4.2.5. CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: X.4. "nevertheless for manifestation of this their right, and men's more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary." (3)

3.2.4.2.6. FAMILIES AND CONSENT OF GOVERNED: X.4. "To fathers within their private families Nature hath given a supreme power; for which cause we see throughout the world even from the foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own houses. Howbeit over a whole grand multitude having no such dependency upon any one, and consisting of so many families as every politic society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful power, but by the consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of fathers their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawful; or, if lawful, then either granted or consented from God, unto whom all the world is subjectl." (3)

3.2.4.2.7. FROM RULER TO LAW: X.5. "At first when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be that nothing was then further thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule; till by experience they found this for all parts very incovenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. They contrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duties beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them." (4)

3.2.4.2.8. NATURAL AND POSITIVE LAW: X.6. "In laws, that which is natural bindeth unviersally, that which is positive not so." (5)

3.2.4.2.9. LAW: X.7. "Laws do not only teach what is good, but they enjoin it, they have in them a certain constraining force." (5)

3.2.4.2.10. POWER OF LAW, GOD, NATURAL LAW: X.8. "Howbeit laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them, but from that power which doth give them the strength of laws. That which we spake before concerning the power of government must here be applied unto the power of making laws whereby to govern; which power God hath over all: and by the natural law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth to excercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny." (5)

3.2.4.2.11. LEGITIMACY OF LAWS: X.8. "Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. But approbation not only they give who personally declare their assent by voice sign or act, but also when others do it in their names by right originally at the least derived from them." (5)

3.2.4.2.12. INVISIBLE ASSENT: X.8.

3.2.4.2.13. MIXEDLY AND MERELY HUMAN LAW: X.10 "generally all laws human, which are made for the ordering of politic societies, be either such as establish some duty whereunto all men by the law of reason did before stand bound; or else such as make that a duty now which before was none." (7)

3.2.4.2.14. LAW OF NATIONS: X.12. "there is a third kind of law which toucheth all such several bodies politic, so far forth as one of them hath public commerce with another. And this third is the law of Nations."

3.2.4.2.15. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAW: X.13. "Hereupon hath grown in every of these three kinds that distinction between Primary and Secondary laws; the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved nature. Primary laws of nations are such as concern embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of foreigners and strangers, such as serve for commodious traffick, and the like. Secondary laws in the same kind are such as this present unquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with; I mean laws of arms, which yet are much better known than kept." (9)

3.2.4.3. SUMMARY

3.2.4.4. CRITIQUE

3.2.4.5. KEY TERMS

3.2.4.6. QUOTES

3.2.4.7. QUESTIONS

3.2.5. Frohnen, Bruce. The American Republic: Primary Sources. Petition of Right (1628)

3.2.5.1. Section 3 (98-100), "Petition of Right"

3.2.5.2. OUTLINE

3.2.5.2.1. 1628

3.2.5.3. SUMMARY

3.2.5.3.1. The unpopular foreign wars waged by England's Charles I had led his Parliament to refuse to grant him increased tax monies. Charles had responded by forcing wealthy subjects to lend money to his government, quartering his troops in private homes, and arbitrarily arresting and imprisoning important figures who publicly opposed his policies. In response, Parliament, led by the famous lawyer Sir Edward Coke, drafted and sent to the king the petition of Right. In this document, Parliament sets forth its view that long-standing law and custom established its right to consent to all taxes, and the right of the people to be free from arbitrary imprisonment, the forced quartering of soldiers, and partial law during time of peace. In return for Charles's assent to this Petition, Parliament granted him increased subsidies."

3.2.5.4. CRITIQUE

3.2.5.5. KEY TERMS

3.2.5.6. QUOTES

3.2.5.7. QUESTIONS

3.2.6. OUTLINE

3.2.7. SUMMARY

3.2.8. CRITIQUE

3.2.9. KEY TERMS

3.2.10. QUOTES

3.2.11. QUESTIONS

3.2.11.1. What are the sources of the rights and priviledges granted in the Magna Carta?

3.2.11.2. Are these documents based on an ideal, or are they essentially utilitarian in that they propose specific remedies to specified evils?

3.2.11.3. What is the nature of the King's power in these documents?

3.2.11.4. Why would a monarch limit his power in the ways enumerated in these documents?

3.3. SESSION 3: COLONIAL ORIGINS OF PROTEST

3.3.1. SESSION NOTES

3.3.2. Lutz, Donald S. Colonial Origins of the American Constitution

3.3.2.1. "The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 1647" (95-135)

3.3.2.1.1. OUTLINE

3.3.2.1.2. SUMMARY

3.3.2.1.3. CRITIQUE

3.3.2.1.4. KEY TERMS

3.3.2.1.5. QUOTES

3.3.2.1.6. QUESTIONS

3.3.2.2. "Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania in America, May 5, 1682" (271-286)

3.3.2.2.1. OUTLINE

3.3.2.2.2. SUMMARY

3.3.2.2.3. CRITIQUE

3.3.2.2.4. KEY TERMS

3.3.2.2.5. QUOTES

3.3.2.2.6. QUESTIONS

3.3.2.3. "Laws Enacted by the First General Assembly of Virginia, August 2-4, 1619" (327-335)

3.3.2.3.1. OUTLINE

3.3.2.3.2. SUMMARY

3.3.2.3.3. CRITIQUE

3.3.2.3.4. KEY TERMS

3.3.2.3.5. QUOTES

3.3.2.3.6. QUESTIONS

3.3.3. OUTLINE

3.3.4. SUMMARY

3.3.5. CRITIQUE

3.3.6. KEY TERMS

3.3.7. QUOTES

3.3.8. QUESTIONS

3.3.8.1. How do these colonial charters and corporate statements of political rights understand the concept of "rights" and the sources of these rights?

3.3.8.2. How are they incorporating and building the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the English common law tradition?

3.3.8.3. How do these documents portray the colonists' understanding of their rights and liberties?

3.3.8.4. Are communities central to the English colonists' understanding of their liberties and rights?

3.4. SESSION 4: THE MOVEMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE

3.4.1. SESSION NOTES

3.4.2. The American Republic

3.4.2.1. Section 3, Defending the Charters, "Resolutions of the Virginia House of Burgesses, Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress" (117-118)

3.4.2.1.1. OUTLINE

3.4.2.1.2. SUMMARY

3.4.2.1.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.2.1.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.2.1.5. QUOTES

3.4.2.1.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.2.2. Section 4, The War for Independence, "Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress" (154-156)

3.4.2.2.1. OUTLINE

3.4.2.2.2. SUMMARY

3.4.2.2.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.2.2.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.2.2.5. QUOTES

3.4.2.2.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.3. Peterson, Merrill (ed). Writings of Thomas Jefferson

3.4.3.1. "Summary View of the Rights of British America" (103-112)

3.4.3.1.1. OUTLINE

3.4.3.1.2. SUMMARY

3.4.3.1.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.3.1.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.3.1.5. QUOTES

3.4.3.1.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.3.2. "Resolution of Congress on Lord North's Conciliatory Proposal" (331-335)

3.4.3.2.1. OUTLINE

3.4.3.2.2. SUMMARY

3.4.3.2.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.3.2.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.3.2.5. QUOTES

3.4.3.2.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.4. Political Sermons of the American Founding Era

3.4.4.1. Volume 1, Number 17, John Witherspoon's "The Dominion of Providence Over the Passions of Men" (533-558)

3.4.4.1.1. OUTLINE

3.4.4.1.2. SUMMARY

3.4.4.1.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.4.1.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.4.1.5. QUOTES

3.4.4.1.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.4.2. Volume 1, Number 12, Samuel Sherwood's "Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers" (394-407)

3.4.4.2.1. OUTLINE

3.4.4.2.2. SUMMARY

3.4.4.2.3. CRITIQUE

3.4.4.2.4. KEY TERMS

3.4.4.2.5. QUOTES

3.4.4.2.6. QUESTIONS

3.4.5. OUTLINE

3.4.6. SUMMARY

3.4.7. CRITIQUE

3.4.8. KEY TERMS

3.4.9. QUOTES

3.4.10. QUESTIONS

3.4.10.1. How are the colonists both appealing to and separating from the English constitutional tradition in these documents?

3.4.10.2. What themes emerge in these readings regarding the colonists appeals for liberty and claims of offenses?

3.4.10.3. How central are the governments of the separate colonies to an understanding of individual, social, and political liberty in these documents?

3.5. SESSION 5: THE COMMON LAW TRADITION AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

3.5.1. SESSION NOTES

3.5.2. OUTLINE

3.5.3. SUMMARY

3.5.4. CRITIQUE

3.5.5. KEY TERMS

3.5.6. QUOTES

3.5.7. QUESTIONS

3.6. SESSION 6: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

3.6.1. SESSION NOTES

3.6.2. Maier, Pauline. American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence

3.6.2.1. Appendix B, "Local Resolutions on Independence" (226-234)

3.6.2.1.1. Buckingham County, Virginia

3.6.2.1.2. Cheraws District, South Carolina

3.6.2.1.3. Charles County, Maryland

3.6.2.1.4. Natick, Massachusetts

3.6.2.1.5. Topsfield, Massachusetts

3.6.2.2. Appendix C, "The Declaration of Independence: The Jefferson Draft with Congress' Editorial Changes" (235-242)

3.6.2.2.1. "appealing to the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our inclinations," and "with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence."

3.6.2.3. OUTLINE

3.6.2.4. SUMMARY

3.6.2.4.1. Currently reading some resolutions passed by counties that guided their representatives to support independence at the second continental congress. Afterwards, I read Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence with Congress' editorial changes. Interesting to see Congress' editorial additions towards the end of the document of phrases originally absent in Jefferson's draft: "appealing to the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our inclinations," and "with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence." Given the environment of political correctness and religious hostility, I doubt if we were to attempt to pass a contemporary version of the Declaration, our chosen representatives could successfully offer such additions, and would have probably recommended Jefferson strike out the phrase "endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights" (Jefferson's original contribution, which was turned into "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights").

3.6.2.5. CRITIQUE

3.6.2.6. KEY TERMS

3.6.2.7. QUOTES

3.6.2.8. QUESTIONS

3.6.3. Carey, George W. (Ed.). The Federalist

3.6.3.1. "The Declaration of Independence" (495-499)

3.6.3.2. OUTLINE

3.6.3.3. SUMMARY

3.6.3.4. CRITIQUE

3.6.3.5. KEY TERMS

3.6.3.6. QUOTES

3.6.3.7. QUESTIONS

3.6.4. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson

3.6.4.1. Volume 1, "The Virginia Constitution as Adopted by the Convention, June 29, 1776" (377-379)

3.6.4.2. OUTLINE

3.6.4.3. SUMMARY

3.6.4.4. CRITIQUE

3.6.4.5. KEY TERMS

3.6.4.6. QUOTES

3.6.4.7. QUESTIONS

3.6.5. Preambles to the Constitutions of Pennsylvania, Vermont, and South Carolina

3.6.5.1. OUTLINE

3.6.5.1.1. Pennsylvania

3.6.5.1.2. Vermont

3.6.5.1.3. South Carolina

3.6.5.2. SUMMARY

3.6.5.3. CRITIQUE

3.6.5.4. KEY TERMS

3.6.5.5. QUOTES

3.6.5.6. QUESTIONS

3.6.6. OUTLINE

3.6.7. SUMMARY

3.6.8. CRITIQUE

3.6.9. KEY TERMS

3.6.10. QUOTES

3.6.11. QUESTIONS

3.6.11.1. Where do the Declaration of Independence and its central claims about individual and political liberty fit within the overall tradition of Anglo-American liberty?

3.6.11.2. Is the Declaration making a claim regarding the natural rights of man as those of liberty and equality?

3.6.11.3. How might we understand and articulate an alternative claim in the document?

3.6.11.4. Do individuals possess liberty preternaturally, or must there be an extant political community for liberty to be realizable?

3.7. SESSION 7: THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING

3.7.1. SESSION NOTES

3.7.2. Jensen, Merrill (ed.). The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution

3.7.2.1. Volume II, William Findley's "Speech on December 1, 1787" (445-448)

3.7.2.2. OUTLINE

3.7.2.3. SUMMARY

3.7.2.4. CRITIQUE

3.7.2.5. KEY TERMS

3.7.2.6. QUOTES

3.7.2.7. QUESTIONS

3.7.3. Hall, Kermit J and Mark David Hall (ed.). The Collected Works of James Wilson

3.7.3.1. Volume I, "Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention" (213-221)

3.7.3.2. OUTLINE

3.7.3.3. SUMMARY

3.7.3.4. CRITIQUE

3.7.3.5. KEY TERMS

3.7.3.6. QUOTES

3.7.3.7. QUESTIONS

3.7.4. Lence, Ross M. (ed.). Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun

3.7.4.1. "Speech on the Oregon Bill" (565-570)

3.7.4.2. OUTLINE

3.7.4.3. SUMMARY

3.7.4.4. CRITIQUE

3.7.4.5. KEY TERMS

3.7.4.6. QUOTES

3.7.4.7. QUESTIONS

3.7.5. Lincoln, Abraham. Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield Illinois

3.7.5.1. OUTLINE

3.7.5.2. SUMMARY

3.7.5.3. CRITIQUE

3.7.5.4. KEY TERMS

3.7.5.5. QUOTES

3.7.5.6. QUESTIONS

3.7.6. Lincoln, Abraham. Gettysburg Address

3.7.6.1. OUTLINE

3.7.6.2. SUMMARY

3.7.6.3. CRITIQUE

3.7.6.4. KEY TERMS

3.7.6.5. QUOTES

3.7.6.6. QUESTIONS

3.7.7. OUTLINE

3.7.8. SUMMARY

3.7.9. CRITIQUE

3.7.10. KEY TERMS

3.7.11. QUOTES

3.7.12. QUESTIONS

3.7.12.1. Where is the locus of the debate in these selections?

3.7.12.2. How is the Declaration of Independence figuring into these larger debates about the nature of the American union and American identity?

3.7.12.3. How should we understand the divergent views among William Findley, James Wilson, John Calhoun, and Abraham Lincoln regarding individual liberty and its grounding in the Declaration of Independence?

3.8. SESSION 8: A MODERN DEBATE

3.8.1. SESSION NOTES

3.8.2. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, VIII, June 1975

3.8.2.1. Jaffa, Henry. "Equality as a Conservative Principle" (471-505)

3.8.2.2. OUTLINE

3.8.2.3. SUMMARY

3.8.2.4. CRITIQUE

3.8.2.5. KEY TERMS

3.8.2.6. QUOTES

3.8.2.7. QUESTIONS

3.8.3. Modern Age, Winter 1976

3.8.3.1. Bradford, M. E. "The Heresy of Equality: Bradford Replies to Jaffa" (52-77)

3.8.3.2. OUTLINE

3.8.3.3. SUMMARY

3.8.3.4. CRITIQUE

3.8.3.5. KEY TERMS

3.8.3.6. QUOTES

3.8.3.7. QUESTIONS

3.8.4. OUTLINE

3.8.5. SUMMARY

3.8.6. CRITIQUE

3.8.7. KEY TERMS

3.8.8. QUOTES

3.8.9. QUESTIONS

4. QUESTION I: OUTLINE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.1. I. INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.1.1. A. INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.1.1.1. 1. Metaethics (Why)

4.1.1.2. 2. Normative Ethics (What)

4.1.1.3. 3. Applied Ethics (Commands->Context)

4.1.1.4. 4. Descriptive Ethics (Observation)

4.1.2. B. INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY

4.1.3. C. INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY

4.2. II. PART I: APPROACHES TO THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.1. A. TROELTSCH (THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES)

4.2.1.1. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS OF METHOD

4.2.1.1.1. THESIS: "This, then, is the question: What is the basis of the social teaching of the churches? From the point of view of their essential nature in principle what is their attitude towards the modern social problem? And what should be their attitude?" (24)

4.2.1.1.2. OBJECTIVE: "My object will be to pave the way for the understanding of the social doctrines of the Gospel, of the Early Church, of the Middle Ages, of the post-Reformation confessions, right down to the reformation of the new situation in the modern world, in which the old theories no longer suffice, and where, therefore, new theories must be constructed, composed of old and new elements, conciously or unconciously, whether so avowed or not." (25)

4.2.1.1.3. SOCIAL: "In the current sense, the idea of the 'Social' means a definite, clearly defined section of the general sociological phenomena--that is, the sociological relations which are not regulated by the state, nor by political interest, save in so far as they are indirectly influenced by them." (28)

4.2.1.1.4. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM: “The ‘social problem’, therefore, really consists in the relation between the political community and these sociological phenomena, which, although they are essentially non-political, are yet of outstanding importance from the polemical point of view.” (28)

4.2.1.1.5. LABOUR VIEW OF SOCIETY: "By 'Society' modern science means, and rightly, primarily the social relationships which result from the economic phenomena. That is to say, it is the Society composed of all who labour, who are divided into various classes and professional groups according to the work they do, which produces and exchanges goods, a Society organized upon the basis of the economic needs of existence, with all its manifold complications." (30)

4.2.1.1.6. The attitude of the religious ethic to the main social organizations of the State, the Family, and Economics within this fundamental theory (31)

4.2.1.1.7. HOW CHURCH SOCIAL DOCTRINE ARRISES--STATE, SOCIETY, CHURCH, FAMILY: "Thus it is an actual fact of history that from the beginning all the social doctrines of Christianity have been likewise doctrines both of the State and of Society. At the same time, owing to the emphasis of Christian thought upon personality, the Family is always regarded as the basis both of the State and of Society, and is thus bound up with all Christian social doctrine. Once more, therefore, the conception of the 'Social' widens out, since in the development of a religious doctrine of fellowship the Family, the State, and the economic order of Society are combined as closely related sociological formations. They do not exhaust the meaning of society in general, but they are the great objects which the religious structure of Society must seek to assimilate, whereas it can leave the other elements to look after themslves." (32)

4.2.1.1.8. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM DEFINED: "If we admit that the State and Society, together with innumerable other forces, are still the main formative powers of civiliation, then the ultimate problem may be stated thus: How can the Church harmonize with these main forces in such a way that together they will form a unity of civilization?" (32)

4.2.1.1.9. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT SOCIAL DOCTRINES: "This is the point at which there still remains to-day the characteristic difference between the Catholic and Protestant social doctrines; the Catholic church still demands, even at the present day, dominion over the State, in order to be able to solve the social problem on ecclesiastical lines; the Protestant churches, with their freedom from the State, are uncertain in their aim; sometimes their aim seems to be a Christian State, and sometimes it is that of a purely ecclesiastical social activity exercised alongside of the State. On the other hand, at the present time, to a great extent the State is inclined to look upon the churches as free associations representing private interests, and thus to regard them as part of that 'Society' from which the State is differentiated." (33)

4.2.1.1.10. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THIS SURVEY--THE SOCIAL PROBLEM; THE CHURCH IN RELATION TO THE STATE, THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND ITS DIVISIONS, AND THE FAMILY: “In the first place we shall have to inquire into the intrinsic sociological idea of Christianity, and its structure and organization. This will always be found to contain an ideal of a universal fundamental theory of human relationships in general, which will extend far beyond the borders of the actual religious community or Church. The problem then will be how far this fundamental theory will be able to penetrate into actual conditions and influence them; in what way also it will feel the reflex influence of these conditions, and to what extent in such a situation an inner life unity can be, or is, actually created. We shall then have to ask, further: What is the relation between this sociological structure and the ‘Social’? That is the State, the economic order with its division of labour, and the family?” (34)

4.2.1.2. CHAPTER 1: THE FOUNDATIONS IN THE EARLY CHURCH

4.2.1.2.1. 1. THE GOSPEL

4.2.1.2.2. 2. PAUL

4.2.1.2.3. 3. EARLY CATHOLICISM

4.2.1.3. CHAPTER 2: MEDIAEVAL CATHOLICISM

4.2.1.3.1. 1. THE PROBLEM

4.2.1.3.2. 2. EARLY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS AS THE BASIS OF THE MEDIEVAL UNITY OF CIVILIZATION

4.2.1.3.3. 3. THE TERRITORIAL CHURCH PERIOD OF THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

4.2.1.3.4. 4. THE REACTION IN FABOUR OF THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND THE CATHOLIC UNITY OF CIVILIZATION

4.2.1.3.5. 5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ASCETICISM IN THE SYSTEM OF MEDIAEVAL LIFE

4.2.1.3.6. 6. RELATIVE APPROXIMATION OF THE ACTUAL FORMS OF SOCIAL LIFE TO THE ECCLESIASTICAL IDEAL

4.2.1.3.7. 7. THE ILLUMINATION OF THE THEORY OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL UNITY OF CIVILIZATION BY THE THOMIST ETHIC

4.2.1.3.8. 8. MEDIAEVAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THOMISM

4.2.1.3.9. 9. ABSOLUTE LAW OF GOD AND NATURE, AND THE SECTS

4.2.1.4. CHAPTER 3: PROTESTANTISM

4.2.1.4.1. 1. THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF PROTESTANTISM

4.2.1.4.2. 2. LUTHERANISM

4.2.1.4.3. 3. CALVINISM

4.2.1.4.4. 4. THE SECT-TYPE AND MUSTICISM WITHIN PROTESTANTISM

4.2.1.4.5. CONCLUSION

4.2.2. B. BEACH AND NIEBUHR (CHRISTIAN ETHICS: SOURCES)

4.2.2.1. I. INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL ETHICS

4.2.2.2. II. ETHICS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH

4.2.2.2.1. A. THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD

4.2.2.2.2. B. TIGHTENING THE LINES

4.2.2.2.3. C. THE QUALITIES OF THE CHRISTIAN'S LIFE

4.2.2.2.4. D. SOURCES

4.2.2.3. III. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

4.2.2.3.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.3.2. B. CLEMENT'S INTELLECTUAL TASK

4.2.2.3.3. C. THE TWO LEVELS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

4.2.2.3.4. D. THE GREEK AND THE CHRISTIAN IN CLEMENT

4.2.2.3.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.4. IV. ST. AUGUSTINE

4.2.2.4.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.4.2. B. THE PRODIGAL PILGRIMAGE

4.2.2.4.3. C. THE DRAMA OF CREATION, THE FALL, AND SALVATION

4.2.2.4.4. D. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

4.2.2.4.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.5. V. ETHICS OF MONASTICISM

4.2.2.5.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.5.2. B. THE MONASTIC DISCIPLINE

4.2.2.5.3. C. THE MONK'S RELATION TO THE WORLD

4.2.2.5.4. D. THE PROBLEM OF THE MONASTIC WAY

4.2.2.5.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.6. VI. ETHICS OF MYSTICISM

4.2.2.6.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.6.2. B. MYSTICISM AND MONASTICISM

4.2.2.6.3. C. THE MYSTIC'S SOCIAL CONCERN

4.2.2.6.4. D. CHRISTIAN DETACHMENT

4.2.2.6.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.7. VII. THOMAS AQUINAS AND SCHOLASTICISM

4.2.2.7.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.7.2. B. THE THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

4.2.2.7.3. C. THE ROLE OF REASON

4.2.2.7.4. D. THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

4.2.2.7.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.8. VIII. MARTIN LUTHER

4.2.2.8.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.8.2. B. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

4.2.2.8.3. C. SOURCES

4.2.2.9. IX. JOHN CALVIN

4.2.2.9.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.9.2. B. THE ENCOUNTER OF GOD AND MAN

4.2.2.9.3. C. SOURCES

4.2.2.10. X. ETHICS OF PURITANISM AND QUAKERISM

4.2.2.10.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.10.2. B. A GODLY, RIGHTEOUS, AND SOBER LIFE

4.2.2.10.3. C. VOCATION AND ECONOMIC ETHICS

4.2.2.10.4. D. THE QUAKERS

4.2.2.10.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.11. XI. JOSEPH BUTLER AND ANGLICAN RATIONALISM

4.2.2.11.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.11.2. B. HUMAN NATURE THE BASIS OF MORALITY

4.2.2.11.3. C. THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.2.11.4. D. SOURCES

4.2.2.12. XII. JOHN WESLEY

4.2.2.12.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.12.2. B. THE THEOLOGY OF THE REVIVAL

4.2.2.12.3. C. CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

4.2.2.12.4. D. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL SALVATION

4.2.2.12.5. E. SOURCES

4.2.2.13. XIII. JONATHAN EDWARDS

4.2.2.13.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.13.2. B. THE GREAT AWAKENING

4.2.2.13.3. C. CHRISTIAN MORALITY

4.2.2.13.4. D. SOURCES

4.2.2.14. XIV. SOREN KIERKEGAARD

4.2.2.14.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.14.2. B. THE RELIGIOUS VOCATION OF AUTHORSHIP

4.2.2.14.3. C. BECOMING A CHRISTIAN IN CHRISTENDOM

4.2.2.14.4. D. SOURCES

4.2.2.15. XV. WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH

4.2.2.15.1. A. INTRODUCTION

4.2.2.15.2. B. THE NEW AND THE OLD IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD IDEAL

4.2.2.15.3. C. RAUSCHENBUSCH, A PROPHET FOR AMERICA

4.2.2.15.4. D. SOURCES

4.2.3. C. WOGAMAN (CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION)

4.2.3.1. INTRODUCTION

4.2.3.1.1. “Such complexities mean that sorting out the history of Christian moral though cannot be reduced to the technical exegesis of the work of a few key figures” (xi).

4.2.3.2. PART I THE LEGACIES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.3.2.1. 1. THE BIBLICAL LEGACY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.3.2.2. 2. PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACIES

4.2.3.3. PART II THE ETHICS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

4.2.3.3.1. 3. THE FORMATIVE YEARS

4.2.3.3.2. 4. SEMINAL THINKERS AND TRANSITIONS

4.2.3.3.3. 5. THE MORAL VISION OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

4.2.3.4. PART III MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY

4.2.3.4.1. 6. MONASTIC AND MYSTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

4.2.3.4.2. 7. THE CONFESSIONAL

4.2.3.4.3. 8. THE THOMISTIC SYNTHESIS

4.2.3.4.4. 9. LATE MEDIEVAL FORERUNNERS

4.2.3.5. PART IV THE ERA OF REFORMATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT

4.2.3.5.1. 10. THE REFORMERS: LUTHER AND CALVIN

4.2.3.5.2. 11. CATHOLIC HUMANISM AND COUNTER-REFORMATION

4.2.3.5.3. 12. THE RADICAL REFORMATION

4.2.3.6. PART V EIGHTEENTH- AND NINTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM AND EVANGELICALISM

4.2.3.6.1. 13. RATIONALISM AND REVIVAL IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

4.2.3.6.2. 14. NINTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.3.6.3. 15. NINETEENTH-CENTURY SLAVERY AND FEMINIST CONTROVERSIES

4.2.3.7. PART VI CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

4.2.3.7.1. 16. THE SOCIAL GOSPEL MOVEMENT

4.2.3.7.2. 17. THE SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS

4.2.3.7.3. 18. FORMATIVE CHRISTIAN MORAL THINKERS

4.2.3.7.4. 19. THE VATICAN II WATERSHED

4.2.3.7.5. 20. LIBERATION THEOLOGY

4.2.3.7.6. 21. ECUMENICAL SOCIAL ETHICS

4.2.3.8. PART VII CHRISTIAN ETHICS TOWARD THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

4.2.3.8.1. 22. CONFLICTING TENDENCIES

4.2.3.8.2. 23. CAN CHRISTIAN ETHICS FIND A CREATIVE CENTER?

4.2.4. D. WHITE (CHRISTIAN ETHICS: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT)

4.2.4.1. 1. INTO A PAGAN CONTEXT

4.2.4.2. 2. MORAL APOLOGETICS

4.2.4.3. 3. UNPRECEDENTED PROBLEMS

4.2.4.4. 4. ASCETICISM: MONASTICISM: MYSTICISM

4.2.4.5. 5. AUGUSTINE: CHRISTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

4.2.4.6. 6. ABELARD: ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

4.2.4.7. 7. AQUINAS: MORAL THEOLOGY

4.2.4.8. 8. ERASMUS: CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

4.2.4.9. 9. LUTHER: CONSERVATIVE REFORMED MORALITY

4.2.4.10. 10. CALVIN: RADICAL REFORMED MORALITY

4.2.4.11. 11. CONSERVATION AND CHANGE

4.2.4.12. 12. THE INNER LIGHT: CONSCIENCE AND REASON

4.2.4.13. 13. THE INNER LIGHT: THE SPIRIT

4.2.4.14. 14. THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN ACTION

4.2.4.15. 15. CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THEORY

4.2.4.16. 16. EXTRANEOUS INFLUENCES

4.2.4.17. 17. HERITAGE -- THRESHOLD OF DEBATE

4.2.4.18. 18. THE CHRISTIAN NORM

4.2.4.18.1.                                      1.     The Imitation of Christ Norm: “So, at the end, we are brought back to the one constant, the one unvarying compass bearing, of Christian morality amid all the changes and adjusgments, the development and diversity, of twenty centuries: the imitation of Christ.” (369)

4.2.4.18.2.                                      1.     The Imitation of Christ Norm: “Christian ethics is not Christianity, nor the Christian moral life the whole of Christian discipleship. The gospel and the moral ideal are separable in thought, not in experience. But when, with whatever qualifications, and only for the sake of study, the separation is made, the ultimate word to be spoken about Christian ethics is – the imitation of Christ. ‘He predestined us to be conformed to the image of his Son . . . We are changed into the same image . . . We shall be like him” – in that vision, promise and hope, lies the central unchanging continuity of Christian ethics” (378).

4.2.5. E. HUEBNER (AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS)

4.2.5.1. PREFACE

4.2.5.1.1. PURPOSE: "This book should be seen as an attempt to renarrate the understanding of Christian practice, paying attention to the story of Christian life and thought and to how contemporary Christian ethicists give expression to it." (xiv)

4.2.5.1.2. OUTLINE: "It attempts to do this in four sections: first, the history of ethics. This series of chapters describes the vast sociocultural entanglements of the Christian understanding of life. It focuses on the major epochs from Greek thought to the nineteenth century. It is of necessity a general survey and does not pretend to be comprehensive. . . . Second, we will take a brief side-glance and ask how ethics has been understood by the academic disciplines that claim it by analyzing what four disciplines of study--philosophy, sociology, psychology, and theology--have said about the nature of ethics." "The last set of chapters (the bulk of the book) focuses on specific theologians who have had significant impact in framing the terms of contemporary ethical discourse." (xiv)

4.2.5.1.3. FOURFOLD DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER -- PERSON ORIENTED; HISTORICAL; CRITICAL; CANADIAN: "In summary, the book has a fourfold, distinctive character. First, its person-oriented focus. It does not present Christian ethics by abstractly discussing disembodied social issues like abortion and euthanasia or ethical theories like utilitarianism or situation ethics. Instead, it invites readers into real lives-- lives which are just as multifaceted and filled with ambiguities and questions (perhaps even more so) as their own. Second, although the approach is person-oriented, this book also takes history and other disciplines seriously. The story of ethics demands such an approach, as Christian ethics is largely unintelligible without narrating the language of the tradition. Third, it approaches the matter of criticism in a distinctive way, in that authorities other than the author of this book offer the critical engagement. Almost half the book is a critical response to the formulations of the mainline tradition. Fourth, this volume includes a specific Canadian contribution to the discussion of ethics, one not found in textbooks written by American authors, namely, chapters on J.S. Woodsworth, who embodies a radical, christocentric faith as a Canadian Member of Parliament; and George P. Grant, whose criticisms of Western society has a uniquely Canadian bent." (xiv)

4.2.5.1.4. ECCLESIAL: "I pray the reader may become convinced that ethics has less to do with doing the right thing and more to do with joining the right group through which to engage the world--the church." (xv)

4.2.5.2. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS CHRISTIAN ETHICS?

4.2.5.2.1. ANTI-POLEMICAL: “to view Christian ethics as the social embodiment of Christian convictions within individuals, communities, and traditions. It is a theology book which claims that every theology is a sociology” (1)

4.2.5.3. PART 1 RENARRATING CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

4.2.5.3.1. 1. GREEK ETHICS

4.2.5.3.2. 2. BIBLICAL ETHICS

4.2.5.3.3. 3. EARLY CHURCH ETHICS

4.2.5.3.4. 4. MEDIEVAL CHURCH ETHICS I

4.2.5.3.5. 5. MEDIEVAL CHURCH ETHICS II

4.2.5.3.6. 6. RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION ETHICS

4.2.5.3.7. 7. ENLIGHTENMENT ETHICS

4.2.5.3.8. 8. POST-ENLIGHTENMENT ETHICS

4.2.5.3.9. EXCURSUS PART I

4.2.5.4. PART II A DISCIPLINED INTERLUDE

4.2.5.4.1. 9. PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

4.2.5.4.2. 10. SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

4.2.5.4.3. 11. PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS

4.2.5.4.4. 12. THEOLOGY AND ETHICS

4.2.5.4.5. EXCURSUS PART II

4.2.5.5. PART III SELECTED TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN ETHICISTS

4.2.5.5.1. SECTION A: EARLY RESPONSES TO THE NINTEENTH CENTURY

4.2.5.5.2. SECTION B: FORMATIVE, CONTEMPORARY, CHRISTIAN ETHICISTS

4.2.5.6. PART IV CRITICAL RESPONSES TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN ETHICS

4.2.5.6.1. SECTION A: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHERS

4.2.5.6.2. SECTION B: LIBERATION THEOLOGIANS

4.2.5.6.3. SECTION C: REMINIST THEOLOGIANS

4.2.5.6.4. SECTION D: PEACE THEOLOGIANS

4.2.5.7. CONCLUSION: ON PUTTING CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN ITS PLACE

4.2.6. F. HEMBACH (HISTORY, FIGURES, AND MOVEMENTS. AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS)

4.2.6.1. I. ETHICS OF THE EARLY CHURCH (70-300)

4.2.6.1.1. The Didache (circa 100) (4)

4.2.6.1.2. The Epistle of Barnabus (circa 100) (5)

4.2.6.1.3. The Epistle to Diognetus (circa 130)

4.2.6.1.4. Justin Martyr (100-165) (6)

4.2.6.1.5. Irenaeus of Lyons (130-202) (6)

4.2.6.1.6. Clement of Alexandria (150-215) (7)

4.2.6.1.7. Tertullian of Carthage (155-220) (8)

4.2.6.1.8. Origen of Alexandria (182-254) (9)

4.2.6.1.9. Basil the Great (330-379) (11)

4.2.6.1.10. John Chrysostom (347-407) (12)

4.2.6.1.11. Ambrose (340-397) (12)

4.2.6.1.12. Jerome (347-419) (14)

4.2.6.2. II. ETHICS OF AUGUSTINE (354-430) (14)

4.2.6.2.1. Beach & Niebuhr, Christian Ethics, pp. 100-139

4.2.6.2.2. Forell, History of Christian Ethics, pp. 154-180

4.2.6.2.3. White, Christian Ethics, pp. 93-113

4.2.6.2.4. Long, Survey of Christian Ethics, pp. 129-131, 175-180

4.2.6.2.5. Wogaman, Christian Ethics: Historical Introduction, pp. 51-60

4.2.6.2.6. Huebner, Introduction: History, pp. 62-75

4.2.6.2.7. Childress & Macquarrie, Westminster Dictionary, pp. 46-49, 456-457

4.2.6.2.8. Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary, pp. 121-124, 398, 904

4.2.6.2.9. Atkinson, et al, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, pp. 177-178

4.2.6.3. III. ETHICS OF MEDIEVAL MONASTICISM (300-1500) (28)

4.2.6.3.1. Basil the Great (c. 330-379) (30)

4.2.6.3.2. Benedict of Nursia (c. 480-547 (30))

4.2.6.3.3. Saint Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) (31)

4.2.6.3.4. Thomas a Kempis (c. 1379-1471) (32)

4.2.6.4. IV. ETHICS OF MEDIEVAL MYSTICISM (1000-1300) (32)

4.2.6.4.1. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) (33)

4.2.6.4.2. Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1328) (34)

4.2.6.5. V. ETHICS OF THE MEDIEVAL PAPACY (500-1500) (35)

4.2.6.5.1. Pope Gelasius I (unknown-496) (37)

4.2.6.5.2. Pope Gregory I (540-604) (37)

4.2.6.5.3. Pope Gregory VII (1020-1085)

4.2.6.5.4. Pope Urban II (1042-1099) (40)

4.2.6.5.5. Pope Boniface VIII (1235-1303) (44)

4.2.6.6. VI. ETHICS OF MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTICISM (1050-1350) (44)

4.2.6.6.1. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) (45)

4.2.6.6.2. Peter Abelard (1079-1142) (46)

4.2.6.6.3. Peter Lombard (c 1100-1160) (48)

4.2.6.6.4. Albert the Great/Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) (49)

4.2.6.6.5. John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)

4.3. III. PART II: HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

4.3.1. A. ANCIENT

4.3.1.1. 1. Sophists

4.3.1.2. 2. Epicurus

4.3.1.3. 3. Socrates

4.3.1.4. 4. Plato

4.3.1.5. 5. Aristotle

4.3.1.6. 6. Stoicism

4.3.2. B. MIDDLE

4.3.2.1. 1. Scholasticism (Natural Law)

4.3.3. C. MODERN

4.3.3.1. 1. Rationalist Response (Descartes)

4.3.3.2. 2. Empiricist Response (Hobbes)

4.3.3.3. 3. Skeptic Response (Hume)

4.3.3.4. 4. Kantian Response (Immanuel Kant)

4.3.3.5. 5. Utilitarian Response (Bentham; John Stuart Mill)

4.3.3.6. 6. Historicist & Ideological Response (Hegel; Karl Marx)

4.3.4. D. POST-MODERN

4.3.4.1. 1. Nihilistic Response (Nietzsche)

4.3.4.2. 2. Existential Response (Sarte)

4.3.4.3. 3. Post-Modern Response (Husserl; Heidegger; Wittgenstein; Derrida; Foucault; Rorty)

4.4. IV. PART III: HISTORY OF MORAL THEOLOGY

4.4.1. A. ANCIENT

4.4.1.1. 1. Scripture (OT; NT; Evangelical)

4.4.1.2. 2. The Early Church Fathers (Didache; Martyr; St. Clement of Rome)

4.4.1.3. 3. The Later Church Fathers (Alexandrians; Tertullian; Ambrose)

4.4.2. B. MIDDLE

4.4.2.1. 1. Augustine

4.4.2.2. 2. Monasticism (Benedict of Nursia; Saint Francis of Assisi)

4.4.2.3. 3. Mysticism (Bernard of Clairvaux; Meister Ekhart)

4.4.2.4. 4. Scholasticism (Aquinas)

4.4.2.5. 5. Reformers (Luther, Calvin, Hooker)

4.4.2.6. 6. Anti-Reformers (Trent)

4.4.2.7. 7. Radicals (Schleitheim Confessions)

4.4.3. C. MODERN

4.4.3.1. 1. Puritan Response (Owen, Edwards)

4.4.3.2. 2. Roman Catholic Response (Vatican I)

4.4.3.3. 3. Social Gospel Response (Rauschenbusch)

4.4.3.4. 4. Neo-Orthodox Response (Barth; Bonhoeffer; Niebuhr)

4.4.4. D. POST-MODERN

4.4.4.1. 1. Situationalist Response (Fletcher)

4.4.4.2. 2. Liberationalist Response (Gutierrez; Cone; Ruether)

4.4.4.3. 3. Roman Catholic Response (Vatican II; Rahner; Ratzinger)

4.4.4.4. 4. Reformed Response (Van Til; Murray)

4.4.4.5. 5. Evangelical Response (Henry; Lewis)

4.5. V. CONCLUSION

4.5.1. A. WHAT CAN WE TAKE AWAY FROM EACH OF THE FOUR STAGES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN CONSTRUCTING A MORAL THEOLOGY THAT NOW ADDRESSES POST-MODERNITY?

5. QUESTION II: OUTLINE OF A PARTICULAR ETHICAL FIELD: POLITICAL ETHICS

5.1. I. INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ETHICS

5.1.1. A. INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ETHICS

5.1.2. B. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

5.1.3. C. INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ETHICS

5.2. II. PART I: APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ETHICS

5.2.1. A. STRAUSS (HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY)

5.2.1.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.1.1.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.1.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.1.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.1.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.1.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.1.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.2. I. THUCYDIDES (460-400 BC)

5.2.1.2.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.2.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.2.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.2.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.2.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.2.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.3. II. PLATO (427-347 BC)

5.2.1.3.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.3.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.3.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.3.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.3.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.3.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.4. III. XENOPHON (430-354 BC)

5.2.1.4.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.4.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.4.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.4.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.4.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.4.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.5. IV. ARISTOTLE (384-322 BC)

5.2.1.5.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.5.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.5.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.5.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.5.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.5.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.6. V. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (106-43 BC)

5.2.1.6.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.6.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.6.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.6.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.6.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.6.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.7. VI. ST. AUGUSTINE (354-430)

5.2.1.7.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.7.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.7.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.7.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.7.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.7.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.8. VII. ALFARABI (870-950)

5.2.1.8.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.8.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.8.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.8.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.8.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.8.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.9. VII. MOSES MAIMONIDES (1135-1204)

5.2.1.9.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.9.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.9.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.9.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.9.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.9.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.10. VIII. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274)

5.2.1.10.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.10.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.10.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.10.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.10.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.10.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.11. IX. MARSILIUS OF PADUA (1275-1342)

5.2.1.11.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.11.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.11.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.11.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.11.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.11.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.12. X. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI (1469-1527)

5.2.1.12.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.12.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.12.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.12.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.12.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.12.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.13. XI. MARTIN LUTHER (1483-1546) AND JOHN CALVIN (1509-1564)

5.2.1.13.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.13.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.13.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.13.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.13.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.13.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.14. XII. RICHARD HOOKER (1553-1600)

5.2.1.14.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.14.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.14.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.14.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.14.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.14.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.15. XIII. FRANCIS BACON (1561-1626)

5.2.1.15.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.15.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.15.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.15.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.15.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.15.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.16. XIV. HUGO GROTIUS (1583-1645)

5.2.1.16.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.16.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.16.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.16.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.16.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.16.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.17. XV. THOMAS HOBBES (1588-1679)

5.2.1.17.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.17.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.17.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.17.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.17.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.17.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.18. XVI. RENE DECARTES (1596-1650)

5.2.1.18.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.18.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.18.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.18.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.18.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.18.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.19. XVII. JOHN MILTON (1608-1674)

5.2.1.19.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.19.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.19.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.19.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.19.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.19.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.20. XVIII. BENEDICT SPINOZA (1632-1677)

5.2.1.20.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.20.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.20.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.20.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.20.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.20.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.21. XIX. JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704)

5.2.1.21.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.21.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.21.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.21.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.21.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.21.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.22. XX. MONTESQUIEU (1689-1755)

5.2.1.22.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.22.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.22.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.22.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.22.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.22.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.23. XXI. DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

5.2.1.23.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.23.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.23.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.23.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.23.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.23.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.24. XXII. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778)

5.2.1.24.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.24.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.24.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.24.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.24.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.24.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.25. XXIII. IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

5.2.1.25.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.25.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.25.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.25.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.25.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.25.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.26. XXIV. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1723-1780)

5.2.1.26.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.26.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.26.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.26.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.26.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.26.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.27. XXV. ADAM SMITH (1723-1790)

5.2.1.27.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.27.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.27.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.27.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.27.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.27.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.28. XXVI. THE FEDERALIST (1787-1788)

5.2.1.28.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.28.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.28.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.28.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.28.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.28.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.29. XXVII. THOMAS PAINE (1737-1809)

5.2.1.29.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.29.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.29.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.29.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.29.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.29.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.30. XXVIII. EDMUND BURKE (1729-1797)

5.2.1.30.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.30.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.30.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.30.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.30.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.30.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.31. XXIX. JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832) AND JAMES MILL (1773-1836)

5.2.1.31.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.31.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.31.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.31.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.31.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.31.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.32. XXX. GEORG W. F. HEGEL

5.2.1.32.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.32.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.32.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.32.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.32.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.32.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.33. XXXI. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

5.2.1.33.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.33.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.33.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.33.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.33.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.33.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.34. XXXII. JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)

5.2.1.34.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.34.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.34.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.34.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.34.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.34.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.35. XXXIII. KARL MARX (1818-1883)

5.2.1.35.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.35.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.35.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.35.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.35.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.35.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.36. XXXIV. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)

5.2.1.36.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.36.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.36.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.36.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.36.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.36.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.37. XXXV. JOHN DEWEY (1859-1952)

5.2.1.37.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.37.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.37.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.37.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.37.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.37.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.38. XXXVI. EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938)

5.2.1.38.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.38.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.38.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.38.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.38.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.38.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.39. XXXVII. MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1889-1976)

5.2.1.39.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.39.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.39.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.39.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.39.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.39.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.1.40. XXXVIII. LEO STRAUSS AND THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

5.2.1.40.1. OUTLINE

5.2.1.40.2. SUMMARY

5.2.1.40.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.1.40.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.1.40.5. QUOTES

5.2.1.40.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.2. B. REGAN (THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS)

5.2.2.1. OUTLINE

5.2.2.1.1. I. THE HUMAN PERSON AND MORAL NORMS

5.2.2.1.2. II. THE HUMAN PERSON AND ORGANIZED SOCIETY

5.2.2.1.3. III. POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND JUSTICE

5.2.2.1.4. IV. MORAL GOOD AND CIVIC GOOD

5.2.2.1.5. V. THE JUSTICE OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS

5.2.2.1.6. VI. THE JUSTICE OF CONVENTIONAL WAR

5.2.2.1.7. VII. THE JUSTICE OF NUCLEAR WAR

5.2.2.1.8. VIII. THE JUSTICE OF MILITARY SUPPORT OR INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONARY WARS

5.2.2.2. SUMMARY

5.2.2.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.2.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.2.5. QUOTES

5.2.2.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.3. C. WILHELMSEN (CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY)

5.2.3.1. OUTLINE

5.2.3.1.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.3.1.2. I. THE LIMITS OF NATURAL LAW

5.2.3.1.3. II. CICERO AND THE POLITICS OF THE PUBLIC ORTHODOXY

5.2.3.1.4. III. THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL POWER AND THE FORCES OF DARKNESS

5.2.3.1.5. IV. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE AND THE ENGLISH TRADITION

5.2.3.1.6. V. DONOSO CORTÉS AND THE MEANING OF POLITICAL POWER

5.2.3.1.7. VI. THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

5.2.3.1.8. VII. ERIC VOEGELIN AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

5.2.3.1.9. VIII. JAFFA, THE SCHOOL OF STRAUSS, AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

5.2.3.2. SUMMARY

5.2.3.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.3.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.3.5. QUOTES

5.2.3.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.4. D. GAEDE (POLITICS AND ETHICS)

5.2.4.1. OUTLINE

5.2.4.1.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.4.1.2. I. MACHIAVELLI: "TO OPEN A NEW ROUTE"

5.2.4.1.3. II. MARTIN LUTHER: "RENDER UNTO CAESAR"

5.2.4.1.4. III. THOMAS HOBBES: "THE CHILDREN OF PRIDE"

5.2.4.1.5. IV. JOHN LOCKE: "NOT TO KNOW ALL THINGS"

5.2.4.1.6. V. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: "WE MUST KNOW ENOUGH"

5.2.4.1.7. VI. ADAM SMITH: "THE INVISIBLE HAND"

5.2.4.1.8. VII. EDMUND BURKE: "REVERENCE FOR HISTORY"

5.2.4.1.9. VIII. KARL MARX: "A REALL HUMAN MORALITY"

5.2.4.1.10. IX. REINHOLD NIEBUHR: "POWER . . . AND LOVE"

5.2.4.1.11. X. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A HUMANISTIC POLITICAL ETHIC

5.2.4.2. SUMMARY

5.2.4.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.4.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.4.5. QUOTES

5.2.4.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.5. E. LEFEVER (ETHICS AND WORLD POLITICS: FOUR VIEWS [LEFEVER, SCHLESINGER JR., RAMSEY, HATFIELD])

5.2.5.1. OUTLINE

5.2.5.1.1. I. MORALITY VERSUS MORALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY (ERNEST W. LEFEVER)

5.2.5.1.2. II. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND MORAL ABSOLUTES (ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.)

5.2.5.1.3. III. FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY (PAUL RAMSEY)

5.2.5.1.4. IV. VIETNAM AND AMERICAN VALUES (MARK O. HATFIELD)

5.2.5.2. SUMMARY

5.2.5.3. CRITIQUE

5.2.5.4. KEY TERMS

5.2.5.5. QUOTES

5.2.5.6. QUESTIONS

5.2.6. F. O’DONOVAN & O’DONOVAN (FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS)

5.2.6.1. PART 1: THE PATRISTIC AGE

5.2.6.1.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.6.1.2. IRENAEUS OF LYONS

5.2.6.1.3. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

5.2.6.1.4. ORIGEN

5.2.6.1.5. LACTANTIUS

5.2.6.1.6. EUSEBIUS

5.2.6.1.7. AMBROSE OF MILAN

5.2.6.1.8. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM (349-407 AD)

5.2.6.1.9. AUGUSTINE (356-430)

5.2.6.2. PART 2: LATE ANTIQUITY AND ROMANO-GERMANIC CHRISTIAN KINGSHIP

5.2.6.2.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.6.2.2. GELASIUS I (POPE 492-496)

5.2.6.2.3. AGAPETOS (FL. 530)

5.2.6.2.4. JUSTINIAN (482-565)

5.2.6.2.5. GREGORY I (CA. 540-604)

5.2.6.2.6. ISIDORE OF SEVILLE (CA. 560-636)

5.2.6.2.7. JOHN OF DAMASCUS (CA. 670-CA. 750)

5.2.6.2.8. JONAS OF ORLEANS (CA 780-842/43)

5.2.6.2.9. SEDULIUS SCOTTUS (FL. 840-860)

5.2.6.2.10. THE DONATION OF CONSTANTINE

5.2.6.3. PART 3: THE STRUGGLE OVER EMPIRE AND THE INTEGRATION OF ARISTOTLE

5.2.6.3.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.6.3.2. GREGORY VII

5.2.6.3.3. NORMAN ANONYMOUS (FL. CA 1100)

5.2.6.3.4. HONORIUS AUGUSTODUNESIS (CA. 1080/90-CA. 1156)

5.2.6.3.5. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX (1090-1153)

5.2.6.3.6. JOHN OF SALISBURY (1115/20-1180)

5.2.6.3.7. RUFINUS THE CANONIST (FL. 1150-CA. 1191)

5.2.6.3.8. NIKEPHOROS BLEMMYDES (1197-1272)

5.2.6.3.9. BONAVENTURE (1217-74)

5.2.6.3.10. THOMAS AQUINAS

5.2.6.3.11. GILES OF ROME (CA. 1243-1316)

5.2.6.3.12. JAMES OF VITERBO (D. 1308)

5.2.6.4. PART 4: POLITICAL COMMUNITY, SPIRITUAL CHURCH, INDIVIDUAL RIGHT, AND DOMINIUM

5.2.6.4.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.6.4.2. JOHN OF PARIS (CA. 1250-1306)

5.2.6.4.3. DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265-1321)

5.2.6.4.4. MARSILIUS OF PADUA (1275/80-1342/43)

5.2.6.4.5. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (1285?-1347)

5.2.6.4.6. NICOLAS CABASILAS (CA. 1322-CA. 1392)

5.2.6.4.7. JOHN WYCLIF (CA. 1330-84)

5.2.6.4.8. ANTONIOS IV (PATRIARCH 1389-97)

5.2.6.4.9. JEAN GERSON (1363-1429)

5.2.6.4.10. JOHN FORTESCUE (CA. 1395-CA. 1477)

5.2.6.4.11. NICHOLAS OF KUES (1401-64)

5.2.6.5. PART 5: RENNAISSANCE, REFORMATION, AND RADICALISM: SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF LEGAL THEORY

5.2.6.5.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2.6.5.2. THOMAS MORE (1478-1535)

5.2.6.5.3. DESIDERIUS ERASMUS

5.2.6.5.4. MARTIN LUTHER

5.2.6.5.5. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA

5.2.6.5.6. THE SCHLEITHEIM ARTICLES

5.2.6.5.7. HANS HERGOT (D. 1527)

5.2.6.5.8. STEPHEN GARDINER (1497-1555)

5.2.6.5.9. PHILIPP MELANCHTHON (1497-1560)

5.2.6.5.10. JOHN CALVIN

5.2.6.5.11. JOHN KNOX (1505-72)

5.2.6.5.12. JOHN PONET (CA. 1514-56)

5.2.6.5.13. THOMAS CARTWRIGHT (1535-1603)

5.2.6.5.14. VINDICIAE, CONTRA TYRANNOS (1579)

5.2.6.5.15. FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1548-1617)

5.2.6.5.16. RICHARD HOOKER

5.2.6.5.17. JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS (1557-1638)

5.2.6.5.18. WILLIAM PERKINS (1558-1602)

5.2.6.5.19. THE CONVOCATION BOOK (1606)

5.2.6.5.20. HUGO GROTIUS

5.3. III. PART II: HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

5.3.1. A. ANCIENT

5.3.1.1. 1. Thucydides

5.3.1.2. 2. Socrates

5.3.1.3. 3. Plato

5.3.1.4. 4. Xenophon

5.3.1.5. 5. Aristotle

5.3.1.6. 6. Cicero

5.3.2. B. MIDDLE

5.3.2.1. 1. Augustine

5.3.2.2. 2. Aquinas

5.3.3. C. MODERN

5.3.3.1. 1. Machiavelli

5.3.3.2. 2. Social Contract Response (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau)

5.3.3.3. 3. Liberal Response (Smith)

5.3.3.4. 4. Conservative Response (Burke)

5.3.3.5. 5. Utilitarian Response (Mill)

5.3.3.6. 6. Historicist & Ideological Response (Hegel & Marx)

5.3.4. D. POST-MODERN

5.3.4.1. 1. Nihilistic Response (Nietzsche)

5.3.4.2. 2. Post-Modern Response (Husserl; Heidegger)

5.4. IV. PART III: HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY

5.4.1. A. ANCIENT

5.4.1.1. 1. Scripture

5.4.1.2. 2. The Church Fathers

5.4.2. B. MIDDLE

5.4.2.1. 1. Augustine

5.4.2.1.1. Augustine. City of God

5.4.2.2. 2. Aquinas

5.4.2.2.1. Aquinas. On Law, Morality, and Politics

5.4.2.3. 3. Erasmus

5.4.2.3.1. Erasmus. Education of a Christian Prince

5.4.2.4. 4. Luther

5.4.2.5. 5. Calvin

5.4.2.6. 6. Hooker

5.4.2.6.1. Hooker. Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity

5.4.2.7. 7. Baxter

5.4.2.7.1. Baxter. Holy Commonwealth

5.4.2.7.2. Baxter. Christian Directory

5.4.3. C. MODERN

5.4.3.1. 1. Carl Schmitt

5.4.3.2. 2. Neo-Orthodox Perspective (Barth, Bonhoeffer)

5.4.3.2.1. Barth. Community, State, and Church

5.4.3.2.2. Bonhoeffer. Ethics

5.4.3.3. 3. Liberationist Response (Moltmann)

5.4.3.3.1. Moltmann. On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics

5.4.3.4. 4. Roman Catholic Response (Catholic Social Teachings)

5.4.3.5. 5. Lutheran Response (Thielicke)

5.4.3.5.1. Thielicke. Theological Ethics -- Politics

5.4.3.6. 6. Anabaptist Response (Yoder)

5.4.3.6.1. Yoder. The Politics of Jesus

5.4.3.7. 7. Reformed Response (Kuyper)

5.4.3.7.1. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism

5.4.3.8. 8. Realism Response (Niebuhr)

5.4.3.8.1. Niebuhr. The Structure of Nations and Empires

5.4.4. D. POST-MODERN

5.4.4.1. 1. Ecumenical Response (Neuhaus)

5.4.4.1.1. Neuhaus. The Naked Public Square

5.4.4.2. 2. Roman Catholic Response (Ratzinger)

5.4.4.3. 3. Evangelical Response (Schaeffer; Moore; Pippert; O’Donovan)

5.4.4.3.1. Schaeffer. A Christian Manifesto

5.4.4.3.2. Moore. The Kingdom of Christ

5.4.4.3.3. Pippert. The Hand of the Mighty

5.5. V. CONCLUSION

5.5.1. A. WHAT CAN WE TAKE AWAY FROM EACH OF THE FOUR STAGES OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN CONSTRUCTING A POLITICAL THEOLOGY THAT NOW ADDRESSES POST-MODERNITY?

5.5.1.1. 1. Outward & External Domain (Luther, Calvin, Barth, Thielicke)

5.5.1.2. 2. Peace & service to Church

5.5.1.3. 3. Bestial State

5.5.1.4. 4. Family

6. QUESTION III: OUTLINE OF A PARTICULAR THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE: INDIVIDUAL & COMMUNITY

6.1. I. INTRODUCTION TO INDIVIDUAL & COMMUNITY

6.1.1. Strauss evidence of individual vs. community

6.1.1.1. THUS, THE INDIVIDUAL: "He points, however, to what is his chief concern by explicitly applying the Athenian argument to men in private, or to individuals, something that no other speaker in RThucydides ever does. In other words, he is the only speaker who clearly indicates that the primacy of the good is in fact the primacy of the individual's good, as distinct from that of the city. Just as there is nothing greater, i.e., more important, than the good, there is nothing more important to the individual than what is good, or bad, for himself." (30-31)

6.1.1.2. SOCRATES REPUBLIC, JUSTICE AS CONVENTION AND TEMPORAL REWARD: Glaukon attempts to attach what justice is. Restates Thrasymachos thesis.

6.1.1.2.1. Argues what is just is in the legal code/convention, but that convention emerges out of nature.

6.1.1.2.2. Argues why a just man, soldier who dies painfully and no one knows, is chiefly betetr than unjust man who is the perfect artisan.

6.1.1.2.3. Adeimantos notes this is difference from traditional emphasis of divine rewards.

6.1.1.2.4. "Adeimantos' long speech differs from Glaukon's because it brings out the fact that if justice is to be choiceworthy for its own sake, it must be easy or pleasant. (42)

6.1.1.2.5. CR: INDIVIDUAL

6.2. II. PART I: DOCTRINE OF INDIVIDUAL & COMMUNITY – MORAL THEOLOGICAL APPRAISAL

6.2.1. A. BARTH (DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION)

6.2.1.1. Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation

6.2.1.2. PART 1: THE WORK OF GOD THE RECONCILER

6.2.1.2.1. 1. GOD WITH US

6.2.1.2.2. 2. THE COVENANT AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF RECONCILIATION

6.2.1.2.3. 3. THE FULFILLMENT OF THE BROKEN COVENANT

6.2.1.3. PART 2: THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION (SURVEY)

6.2.1.3.1. DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION: "The content of the doctrine of reconciliation is the knowledge of Jesus Christ who is (1) very God, that is, the God who humbles Himself, and therefore the reconciling God, (2) very man, that is, man exalted and therefore reconciled by God, and (3) in the unity of the two the guarantor and witness of our atonement." (95)

6.2.1.3.2. KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST: "This threefold knowledge of Jesus Christ includes the knowledge of the sin of man: (1) his pride, (2) his sloth and (3) his falsehood--the knowledge of the event in which reconciliation is made: (1) his justification, (2) his sanctification and (3) his calling--and the knowledge of the work of the Holy Spirit in (1) the gathering, (2) the upbuilding and (3) the sending of the community, and of the being of Christians in Jesus Christ (1) in faith, (2) in love and (3) in hope." (95)

6.2.1.3.3. 1. THE GRACE OF GOD IN JESUS CHRIST

6.2.1.3.4. 2. THE BEING OF MAN IN JESUS CHRIST

6.2.1.3.5. 3. JESUS CHRIST THE MEDIATOR

6.2.1.3.6. 4. THE THREE FORMS OF THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION

6.2.2. B. BRUNNER (MAN IN REVOLT)

6.2.2.1. Brunner, Man in Revolt.

6.2.2.2. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF MAN

6.2.2.2.1. CHAPTER I. THE RIDDLE OF MAN

6.2.2.2.2. CHAPTER II. MAN'S OWN VIEW OF HIS SIGNIFICANCE

6.2.2.2.3. CHAPTER III. THE VARIETY OF THE VIEWS OF MAN

6.2.2.3. MAIN SECTION I: FOUNDATIONS

6.2.2.3.1. CHAPTER IV. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF MAN

6.2.2.3.2. CHAPTER V. THE ORIGIN: THE IMAGO DEI

6.2.2.3.3. CHAPTER VI. THE CONTRADICTION: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IMAGE OF GOD

6.2.2.3.4. CHAPTER VII. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ORIGIN AND THE CONTRADICTION IN MAN: MAN AS HE ACTUALLY IS

6.2.2.3.5. CHAPTER VIII. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, AND THE RETROSPECTIVE QUESTION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCE

6.2.2.4. MAIN SECTION II: DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEME

6.2.2.4.1. CHAPTER IX. THE UNITY OF PERSONALITY AND ITS DECAY

6.2.2.4.2. CHAPTER X. THE HUMAN SPIRIT AND THE HUMAN REASON

6.2.2.4.3. CHAPTER XI. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

6.2.2.4.4. CHAPTER XII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY

6.2.2.4.5. CHAPTER XIII. CHARACTER AND VARIETIES OF CHARACTER

6.2.2.4.6. CHAPTER XIV. INIDIVIDUALITY AND HUMANITY

6.2.2.4.7. CHAPTER XV. MAN AND WOMAN

6.2.2.4.8. CHAPTER XVI. SOUL AND BODY

6.2.2.4.9. CHAPTER XVII. THE GROWTH OF MAN AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION

6.2.2.4.10. CHAPTER XVIII. MAN IN THE COSMOS

6.2.2.4.11. CHAPTER XIX. MAN IN HISTORY

6.2.2.4.12. CHAPTER XX. MAN IN HIS EARTHLY LIFE; AND DEATH

6.2.2.5. EPILOGUE: THE REMOVAL OF THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN MAN AS HE ACTUALLY IS, AND MAN AS HE IS INTENDED TO BE

6.2.2.5.1. FAITH: Faith is reason subject to the rule of God, reason as perception, the return to obedience, to the Word of God, and trust in the grace of God which is 'sufficient,' that is, that in it all life is included and guaranteed." (480-481)

6.2.3. C. BONHOEFFER (LIFE TOGETHER)

6.2.3.1. Bonhoeffer, Life Together.

6.2.3.2. INTRODUCTION

6.2.3.3. I. COMMUNITY

6.2.3.3.1. THROUGH AND IN CHRIST

6.2.3.3.2. NOT AN IDEAL BUT A DIVINE REALITY

6.2.3.3.3. A SPIRITUAL NOT A HUMAN REALITY

6.2.3.4. II. THE DAY WITH OTHERS

6.2.3.4.1. THE DAY'S BEGINNING

6.2.3.4.2. THE SECRET OF THE PSALTER

6.2.3.5. III. THE DAY ALONE

6.2.3.6. IV. MINISTRY

6.2.3.7. V. CONFESSIONS AND COMMUNION

6.2.4. D. PANNENBERG (ETHICS)

6.2.4.1. Pannenberg, Ethics

6.2.4.2. 1. SOCIETY AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

6.2.4.2.1. STARTING POINT: "According to the Gospel of John, Jesus answered Pilates question, 'Are you the King of the Jews?' by saying, 'My kingship is not of this world' (John 18:33, 36). This saying has been the starting point of a long series of attempts to define the relationship of the Christian faith to society and to state. Christ's statement gave occasion, and apparently also authorization, for regarding this relationship as one of opposition." (7)

6.2.4.2.2. INWARD NATURE: "This emphasis on the inward nature of the Kingdom of God and Christ, based on the Augustinian tradition, can be reduced to the common point of view that religion and faith are only an inner concern and therefore are not to be concerned with politics." (7)

6.2.4.2.3. NON POLITICAL POLITICAL KINGDOM: "This political Kingdom of God, however, became present in Jesus in a remarkably unpolitical manner. It did not bring about a reform or a revolution in the relationships of society, but it raised the question of the attitude of the individual toward God's future, the coming of God's rule." (11)

6.2.4.2.4. INDIVIDUAL: "For and through the individual who already commits himself fully to God's future, God's rule has become present." (11)

6.2.4.2.5. RESPECT OF THE INDIVIDUAL: "This is the basis for the respect accorded to the individual in the Christian religion and also for the distinctive position of the church toward the state. Both of these assume that human destiny is a political destiny that has not been realized in definitive form and that cannot be so realized through political action, through changes in the social order." (11)

6.2.4.2.6. THE CHURCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: "The church, through its proclamation and by the fellowship of its worship, imparts even now to the individual the gift of participation in future salvation, the presence of the Kingdom of God, which has never attained definitive form in the political order, even though the expectation of God's sovereign rule has political content." (11)

6.2.4.2.7. HUMAN DESTINY: "The realization of humand estiny would mean the realization in society of the destiny of all individuals. This is ultimately unattainable by human political action, because human alienation from the true nature of mankind does not depend only on external relationships; it also has an internal basis in each individual through that 'missing of the mark' which Christian doctrine calls sin." (12)

6.2.4.2.8. HUMAN DESTINY, POLITICS, GOD: "Thus human destiny has not been definitively attained in political terms and cannot be attained through political action. This does not alter the fact that human destiny is in fact political, that is, it can be attained only if society includes all individuals and is for all individuals. And this is possible only where the unity of individuals is based not on human authority but on the authority of God." (12)

6.2.4.2.9. RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (15)

6.2.4.2.10. CIVIL RELIGION (15)

6.2.4.2.11. DANGER RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY: "The self-deception contained in the thesis of the religious neutrality of the state is especially dangerous for the community of states based on the ideals of freedom and tolerance, which arose in the realm influenced by Christianity." (16)

6.2.4.2.12. DANGER TO WESTERN POLITICS: "The ideals of the modern constitutional state, of human rights, and especially of freedom are clearly dependent on the Christian faith, as Hegel saw with particular clarity." (16)

6.2.4.2.13. POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RELIGION: "Thus a political order based on freedom is neglecting the foundations of its existence if it understands its own nature in superficial terms of a separation of state and religion." (16)

6.2.4.2.14. TOTALITARIANISM: "When this happens the time is ripe for new forms of ideological totalitarianism. The destruction of the ultimately religious foundations of political order in the moral conciousness is then followed by its political collapse, it's degeneration to manifestations of impotence and abuse, which finally could lend the appearance of plausibility to call for its overthrow." (17)

6.2.4.2.15. CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, PLURALISM: "Today Christianity can present its claim to universal truth in a manner that makes sense only if it includes the element of pluralism in its own conciousness of truth and in the oneness of its institutional form, instead of presenting it through more or less homogenneous interest groups within society." (18)

6.2.4.2.16. RELIGIOUS REMINDER, CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE: "First of all, this means that modern democracy, as it has developed from its beginnings in England and America, must be reminded of its own religious origins." (20) "In so doing, the Christian faith will, secondly, make a contribution to democratic society by revealing the danger that the secular state will collapse if it forgets the conditions of its pluralistic nature. These conditions involve a basic concept of justice that is ultimately derived from religious convictions, as they developed and were transmitted in Christianity." (20) "In the third place, the contribution of Christianity to the preservation of a free society will involve especially the protection of the basic values of freedom and equality against distortions that could reduce them to absurdititues." (21)

6.2.4.2.17. :

6.2.4.3. 9. THE FUTURE AND THE UNITY OF MANKIND

6.2.4.3.1. I.

6.2.4.3.2. II.

6.2.4.3.3. III.

6.2.4.3.4. IV.

6.2.4.3.5. V.

6.2.4.3.6. VI.

6.2.4.3.7. VII.

6.3. III. PART II: DOCTRINE OF INDIVIDUAL & COMMUNITY – POLITICAL THEOLOGICAL APPRAISAL

6.3.1. A. NIEBUHR (MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY)

6.3.1.1. Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man & Immoral Society

6.3.1.2. INTRODUCTION BY LANGDON B. GILKEY

6.3.1.3. PREFACE TO THE 1960 EDITION

6.3.1.3.1. THESIS: "The central thesis was, and is, that the Liberal Movement both religious and secular seemed to be unconcious of the basic difference between the morality of individuals and the morality of collectives, whether races, classes or nations. This difference ought not to make for a moral cynicism, that is, the belief that the collective must simply follow its own interests. But if the difference is real, as I think it is, it refutes many still prevalent moralistic approaches to the political order." (xxiii)

6.3.1.4. INTRODUCTION

6.3.1.4.1. THESIS: "The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarassing." (xxv)

6.3.1.4.2. OPPONENTS: "Inasfar as this treatise has a polemic interest it is directed against the moralists, both religious and secular, who imagine that the egoism of individuals is being progressively checked by the development of rationality or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill and that nothing but the continuance of this process is necessary to establish social harmony between all the human societies and collectives." (xxv-xxvi)

6.3.1.4.3. WHAT THEY LACK: "What is lacking among all these moralists, whether religious or rational, is an understanding of the brutal character of the behavior of all human collectives, as the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all inter-group relations. Failure to recognize the stubborn resistance of group egoism to all moral and inclusive social objectives inevitably involves them in unrealistic and confused political thought." (xxx)

6.3.1.4.4. PURPOSE: "The following pages are devoted to the task of analysing the moral resources and limitations of human nature, of tracing their consequences and cumulative effect in the life of human groups and of weighing political strategies in the light of the ascertained facts." (xxxii)

6.3.1.5. I. MAN AND SOCIETY: THE ART OF LIVING TOGETHER

6.3.1.5.1. BEGINS WITH LONG INFANCY: "the long infancy of the child created the basis for an organic social group in the earliest period of human history." (2)

6.3.1.5.2. SOCIETY & COERCION: "All social co-operation of a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion." (3) "Ultimately, unity within an organised social group, or within a federation of such groups, is created by the ability of a dominant group to impose its will. Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises." (4)

6.3.1.5.3. SOCIAL INEQUALITY: "Our interest at the moment is to record that any kind of significant social power develops social inequality." (7-8)

6.3.1.5.4. INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE: "As individuals, men believe that they ought to love and serve each other and establish justice between each other. As racial, economic and national groups they take for themselves, whatever their power can command." (9)

6.3.1.5.5. POWER DESTROYS: "All through history one may observe the tendency of power to destroy its very raison d'être." (11)

6.3.1.5.6. Analysis of economic models (Feudal, etc)

6.3.1.5.7. REALISM: "His [man's] concern for some centuries to come is not the creation of an ideal society in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent to prevent his common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster." (22)

6.3.1.6. II. THE RATIONAL RESOURCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR SOCIAL LIVING

6.3.1.6.1. "Man is the only creature which is fully self-conscious. His reason endows him with a capacity for self-transcendence." (25)

6.3.1.6.2. IMPULSE: "it is obvious that man not only shares a gregarious impulse with the lower creatures but that a specific impulse of pity bids him fly to aid of stricken members of his community." (26)

6.3.1.6.3. REASON, IMPULSE, LIFE: "Reason, inasfar as it is able to survey the whole field of life, analyses the various forces in their relation to each other and, gauging their consequences in terms of the total welfare, it inevitably places the stamp of its approval upon those impulse which affirm life in its most inclusive terms." (27)

6.3.1.6.4. REASON AND MORALITY: "But the reasonable man is bound to judge his actions, in some degree, in terms of the total necessities of a social situation. Thus reason tends to check selfish impulses and to grant the satisfaction of legitimate impulses in others." (29)

6.3.1.6.5. REASON AND ORDER: "Reason ultimately makes for social as well as for internal order." (30

6.3.1.6.6. MEN AND POWER: "Whenever men hold unequal power in society, they will strive to maintain it. They will use whatever means are most convenient to that end and will seek to justify them by the most plausible arguments they are able to devise." (34)

6.3.1.6.7. MEN, IMPULSE, REASON: "Men will never be wholly reasonable, and the proportion of reason to impulse becomes increasingly negative when we proceed from the life of individuals to that of social groups, among whom a common mind and purpose is always more or less inchoate and transitory, and who depend therefore upon a common impulse to bind them together." (35)

6.3.1.6.8. WILL-TO-POWER

6.3.1.6.9. OBLIGATION TOWARDS THE GOOD: "But it is important to point out that men do possess, among other moral resources, a sense of obligation toward the good, as their mind conceives it. . . . It is a principle of action which requires the individual to act according to whatever judgments of good and evil he is able to form." (37)

6.3.1.6.10. Self-conciousness fruit fo reason. Self-conciousness increases urge to preserve and extend life (41)

6.3.1.6.11. WILL-TO-LIVE AND WILL-TO-POWER: "Once the effort to gain significance beyond himself has succeeded, man fights for his social eminence and increased significance with the same fervor and with the same sense of justification, with which he fights for his life." (42)

6.3.1.6.12. WILL-TO-POWER AND CAUSES: "Even when the individual is prompted to give himself in devotion to a cause or community, the will-to-power remains." (56)

6.3.1.6.13. GROUP SELFISHNESS: "The larger the group the more certainly will it express itself selfishly in the total human community." (48)

6.3.1.7. III. THE RELIGIOUS RESOURCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR SOCIAL LIVING

6.3.1.7.1. RELIGION: "Essentially religion is a sense of the absolute." (52)

6.3.1.7.2. RELIGION, PERSONALITY, AND HOLINESS: "In religion all the higher moral obligations, which are lost in abstractions on the historic level, are felt as obligations toward the supreme person. Thus both the personality and the holiness of God provide the religious man with a reinforcement of his moral will and a restraint upon his will-to-power." (54)

6.3.1.7.3. RELIGION & ASCETICISM (55-57)

6.3.1.7.4. LOVE: "A rational ethic aims at justice, and a religious ethic makes love the ideal." (57)

6.3.1.7.5. RELIGIOUS SENSE OF THE ABSOLUTE: "The religious sense of the absolute qualifies the will-to-live and the will-to-power by bringing them under subjection to an absolute will, and by imparting transcendent value to other human beings, whose life and needs thus achieve a higher claim upon the self." (63)

6.3.1.7.6. Dangers of religious sense at the social level (exp: conquistadors)

6.3.1.7.7. Danger of religion "to obscure the shades and shadows of moral life, by painting only the contrast between the white radiance of divine holiness and the darkness of the world, remains a permanent characteristic of the religious life." (69)

6.3.1.7.8. BENEFIT OF BENEVOLENT IMPULSE TO SOCIETY (73-74). Main contribution of Religion to society?: "The weaknesses of the spirit of love in solving larger and more complex problems become increasingly apparent as one proceeds from ordinary relations between individuals to the life of social groups. If nations and other social groups find it difficult to approximate the principles of justice, as we have previously noted, they are naturally even less capable of achieving the principle of love, which demands more than justice." (74-75)

6.3.1.7.9. Problem of religion: Defeatism or Sentimentalism

6.3.1.7.10. SUM: "Religion, in short, faces many perils to the right and to the left in becoming an instrument and inspiration of social justice. Every genuine passion for social justice will always contain the idea of justice with the ideal of love. It will prevent the idea of justice, which is a politico-ethical ideal, from becoming a purely political one, with the ethical element washed out." (80-81)

6.3.1.7.11. CONCLUSION: "Yet the full force of religious faith will never be available for the building of a just society, because its highest visions are those which proceed from the insights of a sensitive individual conscience." (81)

6.3.1.8. IV. THE MORALITY OF NATIONS

6.3.1.8.1. NATIONS: "Nations are territorial societies, the cohesive power of which is supplied by the sentiment of nationality and the authority of the state." (83)

6.3.1.8.2. SELFISHNESS OF NATIONS (84)

6.3.1.8.3. NATIONAL WILL, EMOTIONS< SELF-INTEREST: "It is moreover, much more remote from the will of the nation than in private individuals; for the government expresses the national will, and that will is moved by the emotions of the populace and the prudential self-interest of dominant economic classes." (88)

6.3.1.8.4. NATION & FORCE: "The necessity of using force in the establishment of unity in a national community, and the inevitable selfish exploitation of the instruments of coercion by the groups who wield them, adds to the selfishness of nations." (89)

6.3.1.8.5. NATION & HYPOCRISY: "Perhaps the most significant moral characteristic of a nation is its hypocrisy." (95)

6.3.1.8.6. HYPOCRISY AND SENTIMENTALITY: "The dishonesty of nations is a necessity of political policy if the nation is to gain the full benefit of its double claim upon the loyalty and devotion of the individual, as his own special and unique community and as a community which embodies universal values and ideals." (95)

6.3.1.8.7. Examples in British and American history (exp: Mr. McKinley and the Philippines occupation)

6.3.1.8.8. BEST TO BE EXPECTED OF NATIONS: "Perhaps the best that can be expected of nations is that they should justify their hypocrisies by a slight measure of real international achievement, and learn how to do justice to wider interests than their own, while they pursue their own." (108)

6.3.1.8.9. CATASTROPHE: "Since the class character of national governments is a primary, though not the only cause of their greed, present international anarchy may continue until the fear of catastrophe amends, or catasthrope itself destroys, the present social system and builds more co-operative national societies." (111)

6.3.1.8.10. CLASS CONFLICT: "The sharpening of class antaganisms within each modern industrial nation is increasingly destroying national unity and imperilling international comity as well." (112)

6.3.1.9. V. THE ETHICAL ATTITUDES OF PRIVILEGED CLASSES

6.3.1.9.1. INEQUALITIES: "What is important for our consideration is that inequalities of social privilege develop in every society, and that these inequalities become the basis of class divisions and class solidarity." (114)

6.3.1.9.2. CLASS ETHICAL OUTLOOK & ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES: "Whatever may be the degree of the self-conciousness of classes, the social and ethical outlook of members of given classes is invariably colored, if not determined, by the unique economic circumstances which each class has as a common possession." (116)

6.3.1.9.3. SELF-DECEPTION & HYPOCRISY: "The moral arttitudes of dominant and priviledged groups are characterised by universal self-deception and hypocrisy." (117)

6.3.1.9.4. HYPOCRISY & INTELLECTUAL SUPERIORITY: "The most common form of hypocrisy among the privileged classes is to assume that their privileges are the just payments with which society rewards specially useful or meritorious functions." (117)

6.3.1.9.5. HYPOCRISY & MORAL SUPERIORITY: "Thus the rising middle classes of the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries regarded their superior advantages over the world of labor as the just rewards of a diligent and righteous life." (123)

6.3.1.9.6. CLASS INTERESTS: "The prejudices, hypocrisies and dishonesties of priviledged and ruling classes are less determined by class loyalty than similar national attitudes are the consequence of loyalty to the nation. . . . The group egoism of a priviledged class is therefore more precisely the sum and aggregate of individual egoisms than is the case in national selfishness, which is sometimes compounded of the unselfish loyalties of individuals." (140)

6.3.1.9.7. CLASS PRETENSIONS: "While some of the pretensions of privileged classes are consciously dishonest, most of them arise from the fact that the criteria of reason, religion and culture, to which the class appeals in defense of its position in society are themselves the product of, or at least colored by, the partial experience and perspective of that class." (140-141)

6.3.1.9.8. CLASS & EGOISM: "David Hume declared that the maxim that egoism is, though not the exclusive, yet the predominant inclination of human nature, might not be true in fact, but that it was true in politics." (141)

6.3.1.9.9. MORAL SUASION NOT SOLUTION: "It must be taken for granted therefore that the injustices in society, which arise from class privileges, will not be abolished purely by moral suasion." (141)

6.3.1.10. VI. THE ETHICAL ATTITUDES OF THE PROLETARIAN CLASS

6.3.1.10.1. Lesser versus More Favored Proletarian determines how/what they support.

6.3.1.10.2. MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY: "it is a fact that Marxian socialism is a true enough interpretation of what the industrial worker feels about society and history, to have become the accepted social and political philosophy of all self-concious and politically intelligent industrial workers." (144)

6.3.1.10.3. MORAL CYNICISM & UNQUALIFIED EQUALITARIAN SOCIAL IDEALISM: "If we analyse the attitudes of the politicall self-concious worker in ethical terms, their most striking sharacteristic is probably the combination of moral cynicism and unqualified equalitarian social idealism which they betray." (144)

6.3.1.10.4. CLASS LOYALTY: "Whether class loyalty becomes for him the sole loyalty or only the primary one, whether he conceives the class in such absolute terms that he is able to cut through all of the complexities of social life with a vigorous and potent oversimplification, that again depends upon the degree to which society has cast him out." (152)

6.3.1.10.5. SOCIAL IDEALISM: "The moral cynicism of the worker, which expresses itself in discounting all moral pretensions of bourgeois culture and politics and in disavowing the means of moral suasion, or even political pressure, as adequate for the creation of a new society, is paradoxically relieved by the incompromising character of his socio-ethical ideal." (159)

6.3.1.10.6. MARXIAN'S CHIEF ETHICAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL LIFE: "We have seen how inevitably special privilege is associated with power, and how the ownership of the means of production is the significant power in modern society. The clear recognition of that fact is the greatest ethical contribution which Marxian thought has made to the problem of social life." (163)

6.3.1.10.7. SOCIETY NEEDS GREATER EQUALITY: "Society needs greater equality, not only to advance but to survive; and the basis of inequality is the disproportion of power in society. In the recognition of the goal of equal justice and in the analysis of the roots of present injustice the proletarian sees truly." (167)

6.3.1.10.8. CRITICAL QUESTION: "The question which confronts society is, how it can eliminate social injustice by methods which offer some fair opportunity of abolishing what is evil in our present society, without destroying what is worth preserving in it, and without running the risk of those abolished." (167)

6.3.1.11. VII. JUSTICE THROUGH REVOLUTION

6.3.1.11.1. VIOLENCE & REVOLUTION: "The assumption that violence and revolution are intrinsically immoral rests upon two errors." (171)

6.3.1.11.2. "It is well to note that even in the comparatively simple problems of individual relationships there is no moral value which may be regarded as absolute. It may, in a given instant, have to be sacrifices to some other vale." (174)

6.3.1.11.3. MORALITY OF PROLETARIAN & MIDDLE CLASS: "The differences between proletarian and middle-class morality are on the whole differences between men who regard themselves as primarily individuals and those who feel themselves primarily members of a social group." (176)

6.3.1.11.4. "If a season of violence can establish a just social system and can create the possibilities of its preservation, there is no purely ethical ground upon which violence and revolution can be ruled out." (179)

6.3.1.11.5. "The real question is: what are the political possibilities of establishing justice through violence?" (180)

6.3.1.11.6. Marx's quasi-millenial theory of inevitable revolution.

6.3.1.11.7. ABSOLUTISM: "Absolutism, in both religious and political idealism, is a splendid incentive to heroic action, but a dangerous guide in immediate and concrete situations. In religion it permits absurdities and in politics cruelties, which fail to achieve justifying consequences because the inertia of human nature remains a nemesis to the absolute ideal." (199)

6.3.1.11.8. ABSOLUTISM AND VIOLENCE: "And, since coercion is an invariable instrument of their policy, absolutism transmutes this instrument into unbearable tyrannies and cuelties. The fanaticism which in the individual may appear in the guide of a harmless or pathetic vagary, when expressed in political policy, shuts the gates of mercy on mankind." (199)

6.3.1.12. VIII. JUSTICE THROUGH POLITICAL FORCE

6.3.1.12.1. Division of working class into favored or less favored ==> Revolutionary or Parlimentary strategy.

6.3.1.12.2. PARLIMENTARY STRATEGY: Trade unions source of voting strength. Undermined by legislation from dominant group. Weakened in economic options (can be starved or replaced).

6.3.1.12.3. WEAKNESS OF PARLIMENTARY STRATEGY: "It is not at all certain that political society can fully transform industrial society by an increased pressure in the direction of equality." (209)

6.3.1.12.4. WEAKNESS OF RADICAL AND EVOLUTONARY SOCIALISM: "If these conclusions are valid we would be forced to the further conviction that there is no single political force which can break through and completely reorganise the present unstable equalibrium of forces in modern society. If such a conclusion should be correct (always with the reservaton that another war might completely change the picture), it would become necessary to abandon the hope of achieving a rational equalitarian social goal, and be content with the expectation of its gradual approximation." (219)

6.3.1.12.5. NON-VIOLENT PREFERRED: "If it is the fate of modern society thus to approach a gradual aoproximation of a rational social ideal by the progressive adjustment and readjustment of power to power, and interest to interest, a non-violent type of political coercion is clearly preferable to a violent one." (219-220)

6.3.1.12.6. Psychological problem of evolutionary socialism when it settles. Robbed of religious fervor (220)

6.3.1.12.7. CONCLUSION: "The contrasting virtues and vices of revolutionary and evolutionary socialism are such that no purely rational moral choice is possible between them. Whatever judgments are made depend partly upon personal inclination; whether one prefers the partial preservation of traditional injustices or the risk of creating new iniquities by the attempt to abolish old ones completely." (230)

6.3.1.13. IX. THE PRESEVATION OF MORAL VALUES IN POLITICS

6.3.1.13.1. Political Realism

6.3.1.13.2. POLITICAL MORALIST: "This unhappy consequence of a too consistence political realism would seem to justify the interposition of the counsels of the moralists. He seeks peace by the extension of reason and conscience. He affirms that the only lasting peace is one which proceeds from a rational and voluntary adjustment of interest to interest and right to right. He believes that such an adjustment is possible only through a rational check upon self-interest and a rational comprehension of the interests of others." (232-233)

6.3.1.13.3. POLITICAL MORALITY: "An adequate political morality must do justice to the insights of both the moralists and political realists." (233)

6.3.1.13.4. RATIONAL SOCIETY & CONFLICT: "A rational society will probably place a greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes for which coercion is used than upon the elimination of coercion and conflict." (234)

6.3.1.13.5. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF SOCIETY: "The conclusion which has been forced upon us again and again in these pages is that equality, or to be a little more qualified, that equal justice is the most rational ultimate objective for society." (234)

6.3.1.13.6. VIOLENT VS. NONVIOLENT COERCION: "The chief distinction in the problem of coercion, usually made by moralists, is that between violent and non-violent coercion." (34)

6.3.1.13.7. Moral suasion, violence, nonviolent coercion.

6.3.1.13.8. "If the mind and the spirit of man does not attempt the impossible, if it does not seek to conquer or to eliminate nature but tries only to make the forces of nature the servants of the human spirit and the instruments of the moral ideal, a progressively higher justice and more stable peace can be achieved." (256)

6.3.1.14. X. CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY

6.3.1.14.1. REALISTIC ANALYSIS - CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS: "A realistic analysis of the problem of human society reveals a constant and seemingly inrreconcilable conflict between the needs of society and the imperatives of a sensitive conscience." (257)

6.3.1.14.2. PREVIOUS CHAPTER: Efforts to harmonize the two focus. "It was revealed that the highest moral insights and achievements of the individual conscience are both relevant and necessary to the life of society." (257)

6.3.1.14.3. JUSTICE: "Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into something less than justice. It must be saved by something which is more than justice." (258)

6.3.1.14.4. RELIGIOUS MORALITY: Internal perspective usually cultivated by religion.

6.3.1.14.5. POLITICAL MORALITY: External perspective, politics, political morality, views collective rather than individual men. The antithesis of religious morality.

6.3.1.14.6. RATIONAL MORALITY: Intermediary positive between the two. Tends towards utilitarianism.

6.3.1.14.7. Niebuhr discussing the disinterestedness of religious morality in public life.

6.3.1.14.8. Problem of disinterestedness and Italian fascism versus socialism, or a recent example of ISIS in N. Iraq. (268-269)

6.3.1.14.9. Niebuhr's work feels dated. In the end of your paper, try to update his method, by speaking of checks and balances, federalism, and the crisis in N. iraq. He says things with such a secular tone. Much of what he has said can be said theologically, and much of what he is saying has already been said by theologians prior (O'Donovan's from Irenaeus to Grotious)

6.3.1.14.10. DUAL MORALS: "Whenever religious idealism brings forth its purest fruits and places the strongest check upon selfish desire it results in policies which, from the political perspective, are quite impossible. . . .It would therefore seem better to accept a frank dualism in morals than to attempt a harmony between the two methods which threaten the effectiveness of both." (270-271)

6.3.2. B. NIEBUHR (MAN’S NATURE AND HIS COMMUNITIES)

6.3.2.1. Niebuhr. Man's Nature and His Communities

6.3.2.2. INTRODUCTION: CHANGING PERSONALITIES

6.3.2.2.1. PURPOSE: "This volume of essays on various aspects of man's individual and social existence is intended to serve two purposes: namely, to summarize, and to revise previously held opinions." (15) "These revisions are of two kinds. On the one hand, they gradually change from a purely Protestant viewpoint to an increasing sympathy for the two other great traditions of Western culture, Jewish and Catholic. They also embody increasingly the author's insights of the secular disciplines and reflect the author's increasing enthusiasm for the virtues of an open society which allows freedom to all religious tradition," (16) "On the other hand they give an historical (not, I hope, too autobiographical) account of the tortuous path of the author's mind in adjusting the original protestant heritage of individualism and perfectionism through a world depression and two world wars to the present realities of a highly technical and collective culture, facing the perils of a nuclear age." (16)

6.3.2.2.2. MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: "Its thesis was the obvious one, that collective self-regard of class, race, and nation is more stubborn and persistent than the egoism of individuals. This point seemed important, since secular and religious idealists hoped to change the social situation by beguiling the egoism of individuals, either by adequate education or by pious benevolence." (22)

6.3.2.2.3. THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: "sought to describe the biblical-Hebraic description of the human situation, particularly in the symbols of 'the image of God in man' and man as 'sinner.'" (23)

6.3.2.3. MAN'S NATURE AND HIS COMMUNITIES (A CRITICAL SURVEY OF IDEALIST AND REALIST POLITICAL THEORIES)

6.3.2.3.1. MAN IS SOCIAL AND RATIONAL CREATURE: "Man is both a social and a rational creature. He shares his social character with some animals who live in herds and with insects who exist in hives. The fact that all animals are not social reveals man's greater dependence on the community. His rational character is, of course, uniquely human. He is able to break the tight social ahrmonies of nature, to project ends beyond the limits of natural impulse." (30)

6.3.2.3.2. CREATURE OF HISTORY: "This freedom over natural impulse makes man, who is undoubtedly a creature of nature, into a creator of, and agent in, history. Human communities therefore are subject to endless variations and expansions, while animal communities are nonhistorical in the ageless identity of the form and substance of their social existence." (30-31)

6.3.2.3.3. REALISM: "Realists emphasize the disruptive effect of human freedom on the community." (31)

6.3.2.3.4. IDEALISM: "The idealists, on the other hand, regard man's rational freedom primarily in terms of its creative capacity to extend the limits of man's social sense and to bring order out of the confusion of his impulses and out of the chaos of his conflicting social ambitions, and to give preference to his 'moral' or social sense over his self-regard." (31)

6.3.2.3.5. CHRISTIAN REALISM: "In principle, the Christian faith holds that human nature contains both self-regarding and social impulses that the former is stronger than the latter. This assumption is the basis of Christian realism." (39)

6.3.2.3.6. SURVEY OF IDEALISM AND REALISM IN THINKERS: Augustine, Catholic, Luther, Locke, etc

6.3.2.3.7. "The increased power of collective self-interest compared with individual self-interest has been an unsolved problem ever since the Christian realists, Augustine and Luther, relegated the ethic of the interpersonal relations of the family to the heavenly or spiritual realm, and solved the problem of collective relations and harmony by a rigorous 'realistic' program of political coercion for the sake of communal harmony." (63-64)

6.3.2.3.8. NATION AND IMPULSE POWER: "The power impulse of the nation is, in fact, so strong, and its sense of a higher loyalty so weak, that only an irrelevant idealism would speculate about the possibility of the nation subordinating its national interest to that of an overarching culture." (76)

6.3.2.3.9. CONCLUSION: "This final ironic culmination of the dreams of the ages for the fulfillment of a universal community, consonant with the obvious universality of the human spirit, reveals the whole scope of the relation of human nature, with its finite and indeterminate dimensions of human freedom, to the organization of human communities. They are always more limited than the projects of human imagination. They reveal that, while man may be universal as free spirit, he is always parochial and tribal in the achievement of organized community. Thus we are witnessing a final revelation of the incongruity of human existence." (83)

6.3.2.4. MAN'S TRIBALISM AS ONE SOURCE OF HIS INHUMANITY

6.3.2.4.1. TRIBAL CRUELTY: "the chief source of man's inhumanity to man seems to be the tribal limits of his sense of obligation to other men." (84)

6.3.2.4.2. MARKS OF TRIBALISM: "The distinguishing marks of tribalism may consist of common racial origins, or language, or religion and culture, or class." (85)

6.3.2.4.3. NATIONAL INTERESTED USED FOR JUSTICE: "Needless to say, none of these national concerns can be defined as purely 'moral.' But we should have come at last to the conclusion that the paradox of man's tribal and universal nature must exhibit, and be solved by, the most diverse resources in his nature." (105)

6.3.2.5. MAN'S SELFHOOD IN ITS SELF-SEEKING AND SELF-GIVING

6.3.2.5.1. SELF-SEEKING AND SELF-GIVING: "Human freedom makes for a unique and dialectical relation of the individual to the community. On the one hand, it transmutes nature's instinct for survival into a variety of forms of self-realization, including vanity, the will-to-power and the desire for a full selfhood, which must include always relations to neighbors and communities. on the other hand, the freedom of the self gives man an infinite variety of relationships with his community, from social dependence to social creativity. Thus man's selfhood is involved in an intricate relation of self-seeking and self-giving." (106)

6.3.2.5.2. PARADOX: "consistent self-seeking is self-defeating; but self-giving is impossible to the self without resources furnished by the community, in the first instance, the family." (109)

6.3.2.5.3. EVANGELICALISM, SLAVERY, INDIVIDUALISM: "But there were specific weaknesses i Evangelicalism which contributed to its failure on the issue of slavery. Among them were its individualism and its perfectionism. Both of them were the fruits of an undue distinction between 'saving grace' and 'common grace.' For this distinction exalts individual experience above social experience and thus obscures the social factors which redeem the individual from undue self-concern on the one hand, and those factors on the other hand which prevent him from regarding his own life critically." (123)

6.3.2.5.4. LAW OF LOVE: "If these analyses are at all correct, they point to the fact that the law of love is indeed the basis of all moral life, that it can not be obeyed by a simple act of the will because the power of self-concern is too great, and that the forces which draw the self from its undue self-concern are usually forces of 'common grace' in the sense that they represent all forms of social security or responsibility or pressure which prompt the self to bethink itself of its social essence and to realize itself by not trying too desperately for self-realization" (125)

6.3.2.5.5. SAVING AND COMMON GRACE: "But all these complexities also reveal that the distinction between saving and common grace has been too much emphasized by the religious communities. This emphasis has obscured the true situation of the human self, has made for religious self-righteousness, for a merticulous rather than generous moral ethos, and has prevented any truth about love, grace, and law from being generally understood or practiced." (125)

6.3.3. C. MARTY (THE ONE AND THE MANY)

6.3.3.1. Marty. The One and the Many

6.3.3.2. THE ONE

6.3.3.2.1. 1. RESTORING THE BODY POLITIC

6.3.3.2.2. 2. POSSESSING OUR COMMON STORIES

6.3.3.2.3. 3. ONE PEOPLE, ONE STORY

6.3.3.2.4. 4. FORCING ONE STORY ON THE MANY

6.3.3.3. THE MANY

6.3.3.3.1. 5. PLURAL POSSESSORS, SINGLE INTENTIONS

6.3.3.3.2. 6. THE EXCLUSIVISTS' STORIES

6.3.3.3.3. 7. ASSOCIATION OVER COMMUNITY

6.3.3.4. THE ONE AND THE MANY

6.3.3.4.1. 8. ARGUMENT, CONVERSATION, AND STORY

6.3.3.4.2. 9. STORIED PLACES, WHERE HEALING CAN BEGIN

6.3.3.4.3. 10. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH

6.3.3.4.4. 11. COHESIVE SENTIMENT

6.3.4. D. NOVAK (FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD)

6.3.4.1. Novak. Free Persons and the Common Good

6.3.4.2. INTRODUCTIONS: INTERWEAVING TWO TRADITIONS

6.3.4.2.1. PROBLEM: "There is considerable confusion these days in almost all camps, from libertarian to socialist, concerning how to define such basic notions as person, community, individual, collective, association, state, private, public." (2)

6.3.4.2.2. AMERICAN ECONOMY: "The economic order of the United States tested a proposition; viz., whether an economy may raise the common good of all through granting unparalleled economic liberties to free persons." (7)

6.3.4.2.3. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMON GOOD: "Nonetheless, Maritain himself observed, without working out the implications, that, beneath the ideology of individualism, there is operating in liberal societies, chief among them the United States, an implicit theory of the common good." (8)

6.3.4.2.4. GOAL: "The liberal society has found an imperfect, certainly not utopian, way that works in practice, whose theory has not yet been made fully explicit. Were its requirements to be made exp;licit, the added clarity might help us to improve our daily practice, and thus to take further steps toward achieving a fuller common good." (16)

6.3.4.3. CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

6.3.4.3.1. 1. CAN A PLURALIST SOCIETY HAVE A COMMON GOOD?

6.3.4.3.2. 2. ARISTOTLE

6.3.4.3.3. 3. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: ENTER THE PERSON

6.3.4.3.4. 4. WHEN PERSONAL GOOD AND COMMUNAL GOOD AS ONE

6.3.4.3.5. 5. PHILOSOPHY LEADS TO INSTITUTIONS

6.3.4.3.6. 6. THE LIBERAL SOCIETY OR SOCIALISM

6.3.4.4. CHAPTER TWO: THE NEW ORDER OF THE AGES

6.3.4.4.1. 1. PRIVATE RIGHT AND PUBLIC HAPPINESS

6.3.4.4.2. 2. THE FEDERALIST: THE CREATIVE USES OF SELF-INTEREST AND FACTION

6.3.4.4.3. 3. TOCQUEVILLE: "SELF-INTEREST RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD"

6.3.4.4.4. 4. THE PRINCIPLE OF LOWLINESS

6.3.4.5. CHAPTER THREE: ORDER UNPLANNED

6.3.4.5.1. 1. COMMON GOOD AS PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

6.3.4.5.2. 2. BEYOND THE COMMON GOOD OF THE TRIBE

6.3.4.5.3. 3. THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

6.3.4.5.4. 4. ACHIEVING (NOT INTENDING) THE COMMON GOOD)

6.3.4.5.5. 5. AN ORDER COMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM

6.3.4.5.6. 6. FROM FREEDOM OF IDEAS TO ECONOMIC MARKETS

6.3.4.5.7. 7. ORDER UNPLANNED, MAXIMIZING PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

6.3.4.5.8. 8. THREE OTHER VIRTUES REQUIRED BY MARKETS

6.3.4.5.9. 9. SAVING TIME, RAISING UP THE POOR

6.3.4.6. CHAPTER FOUR: BEYOND ECONOMICS, BEYOND POLITICS

6.3.4.6.1. 1. THE COMMON GOOD AS BENCHMARK

6.3.4.6.2. 2. THE THREE LIBERATIONS OF LIBERALISM

6.3.4.6.3. 3. PROJECTS STILL INCOMPLETE

6.3.4.6.4. 4. NOT BY POLITICS ALONE

6.3.4.6.5. 5. THE BENCHMARKS OF PROGRESS

6.3.4.7. CHAPTER FIVE: THE MARRIAGE OF TWO TRADITIONS

6.3.4.7.1. 1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES

6.3.4.7.2. 2. THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS

6.3.4.7.3. 3. THE LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN

6.3.4.7.4. 4. THE LIBERAL COMMUNITY

6.3.4.7.5. 5. CONCLUSION

6.4. IV. PART III: DOCTRINE OF INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY – COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSE

6.4.1. A. HOLLINGER (INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL ETHICS)

6.4.1.1. Hollinger, Individualism and Social Ethics

6.4.1.2. INTRODUCTION

6.4.1.2.1. THESIS: "It attempts to analyze the social thought of contemporary Evangelicalism relative to an alleged individualistic orientation" (1)

6.4.1.2.2. OUTLINE: "There are three major parts of the book: historical background, the case study, and evaluation. The historical section begins with a chapter on American individualism that attempts to define the concept and delineate its historical manifestations. . . . Chapter two, 'The History and Nature of Evangelicalism,' describes the movement under analysis. Evangelicalism is defined historically, theologically, and sociologically." (5) "The heart of this work is part two, the case study. Here the raw data from Christianity Today is synthesized and analyzed in order to determine the extent to which an individualistic social philosophy is reflected. Four main areas, each constituting a separate chapter, are explored; Evangelicals and Personal Versus Social Ethics, Evangelicals and Social Change, Evangelicals and Economic Thought, and Evangelicals and Political Thought." (5-6) "The third part of the book is evaluative. A socological analysis of the findings is followed by a theological critque of Evangelical social ethics in relation to American individusalism." (6)

6.4.1.2.3. CONCLUSION: "One conclusion that emerges in the following pages is that contemporary mainstream Evangelicalism has indeed reflected an individualistic social philosophy." (6) "A second, and evaluative, conclusion which emerges is that the individualism of mainstream Evangelicalism is rooted far more in sociological and historical factors than in Biblical theology." (6) "The Bible contains, rather, a theology of community, and it is on this theological foundation which Evangelicalism must build its prescriptive statements to the world." (6)

6.4.1.3. PART ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

6.4.1.3.1. CHAPTER 1. AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM

6.4.1.3.2. CHAPTER 2. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF EVANGELICALISM

6.4.1.4. PART TWO: CASE STUDY

6.4.1.4.1. CHAPTER 3. EVANGELICALS AND PERSONAL VERSUS SOCIAL ETHICS

6.4.1.4.2. CHAPTER 4. EVANGELICALS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

6.4.1.4.3. CHAPTER 5. EVANGELICALS AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT

6.4.1.4.4. CHAPTER 6: EVANGELICALS AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

6.4.1.5. PART THREE: EVALUATION

6.4.1.5.1. CHAPTER 7: A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

6.4.1.5.2. CHAPTER 8: A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

6.4.2. B. HELLERMAN (WHEN THE CHURCH WAS A FAMILY)

6.4.2.1. Hellerman; When the Church Was a Family

6.4.2.2. OUTLINE

6.4.2.2.1. INTRODUCTION

6.4.2.2.2. 1. THE GROUP COMES FIRST

6.4.2.2.3. 2. FAMILY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT WORLD

6.4.2.2.4. 3. JESUS' NEW GROUP

6.4.2.2.5. 4. THE CHURCHES OF PAUL

6.4.2.2.6. 5. THE CHURCH OF THE ROMAN WORLD

6.4.2.2.7. 6. SALVATION AS A COMMUNITY-CREATING EVENT

6.4.2.2.8. 7. LIFE TOGETHER IN THE FAMILY OF GOD

6.4.2.2.9. 8. DECISION MAKING IN THE FAMILY OF GOD

6.4.2.2.10. 9. LEADERSHIP IN THE FAMILY OF GOD

6.4.2.2.11. CONCLUSION

6.4.2.3. SUMMARY

6.4.2.3.1. This work parts noticeably from the style and intentions of the former readings. Whereas Hammett and Allison’s works set about developing a systematic approach to ecclesiology, Hellerman is more concerned with tackling one issue in specific. This issue pertains to imagery envisioned when the church is references as a family. Hellerman makes some strong, if not personally challenging, arguments as it relates to ways my contemporaries and me envision a hierarchy of family. In brief, Hellerman’s thesis is that the traditional hierarchy of priorities that position God, then family, then church, then others would be foreign to the near-eastern culture of the New Testamental era. Rather, Hellerman argues that the hierarchy should actually begin with God’s family and then proceed to one’s blood relations. This conclusion is especially hard-hitting among modern American evangelicals, not only for attaching at our assumed individualism, but nearer towards our coveted domestic family structure.

6.4.2.3.2. Hellerman makes this argument throughout his nine chapters. In the first chapter, Hellerman argues that the people of the New Testament adopted a “strong-group society” which advances a “collectivist view of reality” that argued the values of the group outweighed the value of the individual (Hellerman 14). Although this is foreign to contemporary American evangelicals (and thus an added reason for Hellerman writing the work), it is seen in Eastern cultures such as Japan whose work for a human being actually means “between people” (Hellerman 20). Between chapters 2 and 3, Hellerman advances these arguments by establishing three principles: (1) in the NT world the group took priority over the individual, (2) “a person’s most important group was his blood family”, and (3) “the closest family bond was not the bond of marriage. It was the bond between siblings” (Hellerman 50). Chapter 4 then discusses a reversal of the traditional arrangement of priorities to argue that God’s family comes first before blood families and others, as based upon the evidence promoted in prior chapters. Hellerman also points to the usage of the word Brother within the writings of Paul’s letters to show he wasn’t in contrast with this perspective, but actually advanced it.

6.4.2.3.3. Hellerman then proceeds to solidify his argument by pointing to the examples of the early church, which agreements not only amongst church fathers such as Cyprian and Tertullian, but amongst pagan adversaries like Julian (Allison 106). Hellerman then concludes the work in chapters 6-9, which treat the topics of salvation as a community-creating event (pointing to the exegetical evidence that a person ins’t saved for a personal relationship with God but saved into a community, Hellerman 124), the significance that this perspective has on viewing our lives as a familial community together, and how this informs how we live as individuals and leaders within these communities. While his treatise is convicting, I do wonder whether there is a grave assumption made regarding an acceptance of a cultural environment as prescriptive versus descriptive.

6.4.2.4. CRITICAL ANALYSIS

6.4.2.5. KEY TERMS

6.4.2.6. QUOTES

6.4.2.6.1. "The New Testament picture of the church as a family flies in the face of our individalistic cultural orientation." (7)

6.4.2.7. QUESTIONS

6.4.3. C. LINTS, HORTON, AND TALBOT (PERSONAL IDENTITY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE)

6.4.3.1. Lints, Horton, Tablot, Personal Identity in Theological Perspective

6.4.3.2. INTRODUCTION

6.4.3.2.1. THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN CONTEXT

6.4.3.3. SECTION I: SETTING THE CONTEXT

6.4.3.3.1. BIBLICAL HUMANISM: THE PATRISTIC CONVICTIONS (WILKEN)

6.4.3.3.2. HOMO THEOLOGICUS: ASPECTS OF A LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF MAN (WEINRICH)

6.4.3.3.3. POST-REFORMATION REFORMED ANTHROPOLOGY (HORTON)

6.4.3.3.4. THE SOCIAL GOD AND THE RELATIONAL SELF: TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE IMAGO DEI IN THE POSTMODERN CONTEXT (GRENZ)

6.4.3.4. SECTION II; SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES

6.4.3.4.1. NONREPRODUCTIVE PHYSICALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES (MURPHY)

6.4.3.4.2. ANTHROPOLOGY, SEXUALITY, AND SEXUAL ETHICS: THE CHALLENGES OF PSYCHOLOGY (JONES, YARHOUSE)

6.4.3.5. SECTION III: SUGGESTIVE PROPOSALS

6.4.3.5.1. PERSONAL BODIES: A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROPOSAL (KELSEY)

6.4.3.5.2. LEARNING FROM THE RUINED IMAGE: MORAL ANTHROPOLOGY AFTER THE FALL (TALBOT)

6.4.3.5.3. IMAGE AND OFFICE: HUMAN PERSONHOOD AND THE COVENANT (HORTON)

6.4.3.5.4. IMAGING AND IDOLATRY: THE SOCIALITY OF PERSONHOOD IN THE CANON (LINTS)

6.4.4. D. GRENZ (THEOLOGY FOR THE COMMUNITY OF GOD)

6.4.4.1. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God

6.4.4.2. PREFACE

6.4.4.2.1. PURPOSE: "But my goal is to consider our faith within the context of God's central program for creation, namely, the establishment of community. I believe this understood of the divine purpose offers a fruitful point of departure for theological discussion, because it lies at the heart of both the biblical vision and the longings of humankind as we move into the emerging postmodern era." (xxxi)

6.4.4.3. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE AND TASK OF THEOLOGY

6.4.4.3.1. THE THEOLOGICAL TASK

6.4.4.3.2. THEOLOGICAL METHOD

6.4.4.4. PART 1 THEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

6.4.4.4.1. 1. THE GOD WHO IS

6.4.4.4.2. 2. THE TRIUNE GOD

6.4.4.4.3. 3. THE RELATIONAL GOD

6.4.4.4.4. 4. THE CREATOR GOD

6.4.4.5. PART 2 ANTHROPOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITY

6.4.4.5.1. 5. THE HUMAN IDENTITY AND OUR ORIGIN IN GOD

6.4.4.5.2. 6. OUR NATURE AS PERSONS DESTINED FOR COMMUNITY

6.4.4.5.3. 7. SIN: THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY

6.4.4.5.4. 8. OUR SPIRITUAL CO-CREATURES

6.4.4.6. PART 3 CHRISTOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST

6.4.4.6.1. INTEGRATIVE PRINCIPLE OF THEOLOGY: "The establishment of community as the overarching purpose of God forms the integrative motif or ordering principle for systematic theology." (243)

6.4.4.6.2. COMMUNITY AND TRINITY: "The Christian understanding of God as the Trinity sets forth God as the foundation for establishing the eschatological community. God is throughout eternity the community of the Father, Son, and Spirit. In history, therefore, the triune God is at work seeking to bring creation into participation in this eternal fellowship." (243)

6.4.4.6.3. COMMUNITY AND CREATION: "the doctrine of creation presents the triune God at work in bringing the world into existence and shaping the universe in accordance with the divine eternal purposes. This doctrine sets the context for discussing God's activity in bringing about reconciliation--community--within the creation which is the product of his hand." (244)

6.4.4.6.4. COMMUNITY AND ANTHROPOLOGY: "Understood in this manner, anthropology is the explication of the nature of humankind as the object of the divine action in bringing about community." (244)

6.4.4.6.5. COMMUNITY AND HAMARTIOLOGY: "Although created for community, because of the fall humans are estranged from themselves, from each other, from their environment, and--most tragically of all--from God." (244)

6.4.4.6.6. COMMUNITY AND CHRISTOLOGY: "In Christology we reflect on the role of Jesus of Nazareth--whom Christians acknowledge as the Christ--in the reconciling, community-building work of the triune God." (244)

6.4.4.6.7. 9. THE FELLOWSHIP OF JESUS THE CHRIST WITH GOD

6.4.4.6.8. 10. THE FELLOWSHIP OF JESUS THE CHRIST WITH HUMANKIND

6.4.4.6.9. 11. THE FELLOWSHIP OF DEITY AND HUMANITY IN JESUS

6.4.4.6.10. 12. THE MISSION OF JESUS

6.4.4.7. PART 4 PNEUMATOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

6.4.4.7.1. 13. THE IDENTITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

6.4.4.7.2. 14. THE SPIRIT AND THE SCRIPTURES

6.4.4.7.3. 15. THE DYNAMIC OF CONVERSION

6.4.4.7.4. 16. INDIVIDUAL SALVATION: THE WIDER PERSPECTIVE

6.4.4.8. PART 5 ECCLESIOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

6.4.4.8.1. 17. THE CHURCH--THE ESCHATOLOGICAL COVENANT COMMUNITY

6.4.4.8.2. 18. THE MINISTRY OF THE COMMUNITY

6.4.4.8.3. 19. COMMUNITY ACTS OF COMMITMENT

6.4.4.8.4. 20. THE ORGANIZATION FOR COMMUNITY LIFE

6.4.4.9. PART 6 ESCHATOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF LAST THINGS

6.4.4.9.1. 21. THE CONSUMATION OF PERSONAL EXISTENCE

6.4.4.9.2. 22. THE CONSUMMATION OF HISTORY

6.4.4.9.3. 23. THE CONSUMMATION OF GOD'S COSMIC PROGRAM

6.4.4.9.4. 24. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ESCHATOLOGY

6.5. V. CONCLUSION: A COVENANTAL-CONSTITUTIONAL APPRAISAL OF THE INDI-VIDUAL & COMMUNITY

7. QUESTION IV: OUTLINE OF A PARTICULAR CHRISTIAN ETHICIST: OLIVER O’DONOVAN

7.1. I. INTRODUCTION TO OLIVER O’DONOVAN

7.2. II. PART I: OLIVER O’DONOVAN – MAJOR WORKS IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY

7.2.1. A. O’DONOVAN (RESURRECTION AND THE MORAL ORDER)

7.2.1.1. O'Donovan, Oliver. Resurrection and Moral Order.

7.2.1.2. INTRODUCTION

7.2.1.2.1. 1. THE GOSPEL AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

7.2.1.3. PART I: THE OBJECTIVE REALITY

7.2.1.3.1. 2. CREATED ORDER

7.2.1.3.2. 3. ESCHATOLOGY AND HISTORY

7.2.1.3.3. 4. KNOWLEDGE IN CHRIST

7.2.1.4. PART II: THE SUBJECTIVE REALITY

7.2.1.4.1. 5. FREEDOM AND REALITY

7.2.1.4.2. 6. AUTHORITY

7.2.1.4.3. 7. THE AUTHORITY OF CHRIST

7.2.1.4.4. 8. THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH AND THE BELIEVER

7.2.1.5. PART III; THE FORM OF THE MORAL LIFE

7.2.1.5.1. 9. THE MORAL FIELD

7.2.1.5.2. 10. THE MORAL SUBJECT

7.2.1.5.3. 11. THE DOUBLE ASPECT OF THE MORAL LIFE

7.2.1.5.4. 12. THE END OF THE MORAL LIFE

7.2.2. B. O’DONOVAN (THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS)

7.2.2.1. O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations

7.2.2.2. PROLOGUE

7.2.2.3. I. BEYOND SUSPICION

7.2.2.3.1. A. ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE PRACTICE OF SUSPICION

7.2.2.3.2. B. POLITICAL CONCEPTS

7.2.2.3.3. C. ISRAEL AND THE READING OF THE SCRIPTURES

7.2.2.4. II. THE REVELATION OF GOD'S KINGSHIP

7.2.2.4.1. A. 'YHWH REIGNS'

7.2.2.4.2. B. THE MEDIATORS

7.2.2.4.3. C. 'KINGS OVER THE WHOLE EARTH'

7.2.2.4.4. D. THE INDIVIDUAL

7.2.2.5. III. DUAL AUTHORITY AND THE FULFILLING OF THE TIME

7.2.2.5.1. A. DUAL AUTHORITY

7.2.2.5.2. B. THE FULFILLING OF THE TIME

7.2.2.6. IV. THE TRIUMPH OF THE KINGDOM

7.2.2.6.1. A. THE REPRESENTATIVE

7.2.2.6.2. B. THE MOMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE ACT

7.2.2.6.3. C. THE SUBJECTION OF THE NATIONS

7.2.2.7. V. THE CHURCH

7.2.2.7.1. A. THE AUTHORISATION OF THE CHURCH

7.2.2.7.2. B. MOMENTS OF RECAPITULATION

7.2.2.8. VI. THE OBEDIENCE OF RULERS

7.2.2.8.1. A. CHRISTENDOM: THE DOCTRINE OF THE TWO

7.2.2.8.2. B. MISSION OR COERCION?

7.2.2.8.3. C. THE LEGACY OF CHRISTENDOM

7.2.2.9. VII. THE REDEMPTION OF SOCIETY

7.2.2.9.1. A. THE END OF CHRISTENDOM

7.2.2.9.2. B. LIBERAL SOCIETY

7.2.2.9.3. C. MODERNITY AND MENACE

7.2.2.10. EPILOGUE

7.2.2.10.1. CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY GOAL: "If the Christian community has as its eternal goal, the goal of its pillgrimage, the disclosure of the church as city, it has as its intermediate goal, the goal of its mission, the discovery og the city's secret destiny through the prism of the church." (286)

7.2.3. C. O’DONOVAN (WAYS OF JUDGMENT)

7.2.3.1. O'Donovan, The Ways of Judgment

7.2.3.2. INTRODUCTION

7.2.3.2.1. THE DESIRE OF NATIONS: "I outlined what I called a 'political theology,' the purpose of which was to show how the political concepts wrapped up in Jewish and Christian speech about God's redemption of the world still had political force, generating expectations for political life that found one type of expression, though not the only possible one, in the political ideals of 'Christendom,' the European civilization that bridged the gap from late antiquity to early modernity, from which our modern political ideals have spring." (ix)

7.2.3.2.2. OUTLINE: "In other ways the two books have a certain parallelism, both beginning with an examination of the political act, the act of judgment, and only then proceeding to the institutions of judgment in the political community. The second section of this work explores the shape of these institutions, and the third section takes up, as a theme for which the groundwork was laid in the first book, the formal opposition between political institutions and the church." (x)

7.2.3.2.3. POLITICAL THOUGHT: "Political thought is, in its broadest view, a train of practical reasoning about practical reason, a reflection on how, by whom, when, and in what order decisions are to be made by human beings on human action." (xi)

7.2.3.2.4. APOLOGETIC GOAL: "Christian political thought has also acquired a secondary value in the circumstances of our time, which may, however, be no less important: it has an apologetic force when addressed to a world where the intelligibility of political institutions and traditions is seriously threatened." (xii)

7.2.3.2.5. POLITICAL ETHICS AS FORCE OF APOLOGETIC: "ethics has by its nature the force of an apologetic, not merely because the existence of a community reflecting systematically out of Christian belief upon the challenges of living in love is 'attractive,' as children playing an innocent game may be attractive, but because it is interpretative. It gives us reason to believe that our lives are not, after all, merely thrown together, but are susceptible of a coordinated social meaning, even a beauty, such as St. Paul called a taxis." (xv)

7.2.3.3. PART I: THE POLITICAL ACT: JUDGMENT

7.2.3.3.1. 1. THE ACT OF JUDGMENT

7.2.3.3.2. 2. IMPERFECTABILITY

7.2.3.3.3. 3. JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

7.2.3.3.4. 4. POLITICAL JUDGMENT

7.2.3.3.5. 5. FREEDOM AND ITS LOSS

7.2.3.3.6. 6. MERCY

7.2.3.3.7. 7. PUNISHMENT

7.2.3.4. PART II: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: REPRESENTATION

7.2.3.4.1. 8. POLITICAL AUTHORITY

7.2.3.4.2. 9. REPRESENTATION

7.2.3.4.3. 10. LEGITIMACY

7.2.3.4.4. 11. THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

7.2.3.4.5. 12. INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENT

7.2.3.5. PART III: LIFE BEYOND JUDGMENT: COMMUNICATION

7.2.3.5.1. 13. JUDGE NOT!

7.2.3.5.2. 14. COMMUNICATION

7.2.3.5.3. 15. HOUSEHOLD AND CITY

7.2.3.5.4. 16. THE LONGEST PART

7.2.4. D. O’DONOVAN & O’DONOVAN (FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS)

7.2.5. E. O’DONOVAN & O’DONOVAN (BONDS OF IMPERFECTION)

7.2.5.1. O'Donovans, Bonds of Imperfection

7.2.5.2. INTRODUCTION

7.2.5.2.1. PART 1 ESSAYS

7.2.5.2.2. PART 2 ESSAYS

7.2.5.2.3. "To demonstrate the true ground of repentance and hope, and so of the genuine freedom of political action, has been the constructive thrust of our forays into the theo-political tradition. This ground is the Christ who has come in Jesus, and who will come again to judge both the living and the dead." (22)

7.2.5.3. PART 1: MOMENTS IN THE THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TRADITION

7.2.5.3.1. "HISTORY AND POLITICS IN THE BOOK OF REVELATION" (O'DONOVAN)

7.2.5.3.2. "THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CITY OF GOD 19" (OLIVER)

7.2.5.3.3. "CHRISTIAN PLATONISM AND NON-PROPRIETARY COMMUNITY" (JOAN)

7.2.5.3.4. "THE THEOLOGICAL ECONOMICS OF MEDIEVAL USURY THEORY" (JOAN)

7.2.5.3.5. "THE CHRISTIAN PEDAGOGY AND ETHICS OF ERASMUS" (JOAN)

7.2.5.3.6. "THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE OF PROTO-MODERN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT" (JOAN)

7.2.5.3.7. "THE JUSTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS IN GROTIUS" (OLIVER)

7.2.5.4. PART 2: CONTEMPORARY THEMES: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, THE NATION-STATE, LOCALITIES, AND INTERNATIONALISM

7.2.5.4.1. "GOVERNMENT AS JUDGMENT" (OLIVER)

7.2.5.4.2. "SUBSIDIARITY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE" (JOAN)

7.2.5.4.3. "KARL BARTH AND PAUL RAMSEY'S 'USES OF POWER'" (OLIVER)

7.2.5.4.4. "NATION, STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WESTERN BIBLICAL TRADITION" (JOAN)

7.2.5.4.5. "THE LOSS OF A SENSE OF PLACE" (OLIVER)

7.3. III. PART II: OLIVER O’DONOVAN – MAJOR WORKS IN MORAL THEOLOGY

7.3.1. A. O’DONOVAN (TRANSSEXUALISM & CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE)

7.3.1.1. O'Donovan, Transexualism and Christian Marriage

7.3.1.2. INTRODUCTION

7.3.1.3. 1. 'THIS MAN AND THIS WOMAN'

7.3.1.3.1. "The question whether a postoperative transsexual can be a partner in marriage resolves itself into two related questions: Will such a marriage be a union of a man and a woman? and, Does it matter that it should be?" (6)

7.3.1.3.2. CHRISTIAN VIEW: "the either-or of biological maleness and femaleness to which the human race is bound is not a meaningless or oppressive condition of nature; it is the good gift of God, because it gives rise to possibilities of relationship in which the polarities of masculine and feminine, more subtly nuanced than the biological differentiation, can play a decisive part." (7)'

7.3.1.3.3. MARRIAGE: "At the centre of our social existence, ordering and freeing our relationships, even for those who do not themselves immediately participate in that centre, is the ordered structure of marriage, a union of man and woman, open in principle to procreation, generative of lifelong fidelity and trust." (7)

7.3.1.4. 2. THESIS: RESPECTING BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY

7.3.1.4.1. CORBETT v. CORBETT: Things that determine sex: Absence or presence of Y chromosone, male gonads, possession of male or female geniltalia. Social or psychological criteria cannot set these aside. (8)

7.3.1.4.2. "Sexual status in marriage cannot be determined by purely social criteria, since the biological opposition of the sexes is essential to it as an institution." (9)

7.3.1.4.3. 1ST THESIS: "The first thesis is observed in the decision to isolate the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital, criteria, and to treat them on their own apart from the fourth set of criteria which the judge noted, the psychological, and the fifth, about whcih he had some doubt, the secondary sexual characteristics." (8)

7.3.1.4.4. 2ND THESIS: "Sexual status in marriage cannot be determined by purely social criteria, since the biological opposition of the sexes is essential to it as an institution." (9)

7.3.1.4.5. 3RD THESIS: "The third thesis is that someone's biological sex must be judged by his given sexual morphology. Anyone who has undergone an operation for the removal of gonads and remodelling of geniltalia will have an ambiguous bodily sex then; but that is art and not nature, and cannot affect a decision as to whether his biological sex was ambiguous as given." (9)

7.3.1.4.6. ESSENCE OF CORBETT ARGUMENT: "Sexual self-conciousness as a psychological phenomenon, marriage as a social phenomenon, neither of them can claim independence of the sexual identity conferred biologically when that identity is not of itself doubtful; nor can that identity be modified by surgical artifice." (9)

7.3.1.4.7. FIRST OBJECTION--PSYCHOLOGICAL: "One is to object to the first thesis, and to claim that the transexual's self-conciousness must be given greater weight in determining his sexual identity." (9)

7.3.1.4.8. SECOND OBJECTION--SOCIAL: "The other is to object to the second thesis, and to claim that marriage should be treated like other social relations as a sphere in which sexual status is conferred by recognition." (9)

7.3.1.5. 3. ANTITHESIS (I): THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE

7.3.1.5.1. MONEY'S POSITION: Transsexual condition is 'intersex' and surgery is a 'reassignment.'

7.3.1.5.2. THREE DIEAS: "the body is an accident that has befallen the real me; the real me has a true sex, male or female; and I know immediately what that sex is without needing anyone to tell me." (10)

7.3.1.5.3. 'Nevertheless, we msut bear in mind that behind out question lies a far greater one, not about the acceptance of the transsexual but about the acceptance of the surgeon, not whether the patient has this or that sex, but whether this or that sex was given to him by the doctor, not whether this sex is his sex, but whether it has become so. The claim, which is secondary to the specific cause but primary to the general issue, is no less than this: that human sexuality is an artefact, and that artefactual sexuality is real sexuality." (14)

7.3.1.5.4. "To have a male body is to have a body structurally ordered to loving union with a female body, and vice versa." (16)

7.3.1.5.5. "Whatever the surgeon may be able to do, and whatever he may yet learn to do, he cannot make self out of not-self. He cannot turn an artefact into a human being's body. The transsexual can never say with justice: 'These organs are my bodily being, and their sex is my sex.'" (16)

7.3.1.6. 4. ANTITHESIS (II): THE SOCIAL CASE

7.3.1.6.1. "There will be a 'public doctrine' or 'useful myth' on transexualism, known by the scientifically candid to be incorrect, but politically necessary to sustain.

7.3.2. B. O’DONOVAN (PEACE AND WAR: A DEBATE ABOUT PACIFISM)

7.3.2.1. O'Donovan, Peace and War: A Debate about Pacificism

7.3.2.2. 1. CRITICISMS OF THE 'JUST WAR' THEORY BY RONALD SIDER

7.3.2.2.1. FOUR QUESTIONS

7.3.2.2.2. 1. Have the criteria been effectively applied?

7.3.2.2.3. 2. No internal ecclesiastical mechanisms for applying the Just War criteria

7.3.2.2.4. 3. The Church in the first three centuries

7.3.2.2.5. 4. The evidence of the New Testament

7.3.2.2.6. The public and private role of persons

7.3.2.3. 2. RESPONSE BY OLIVER O'DONOVAN

7.3.2.3.1. Introduction

7.3.2.3.2. The theory applied

7.3.2.3.3. Who decides?

7.3.2.3.4. The witness of the early church

7.3.2.3.5. The Teaching of Jesus

7.3.2.3.6. LEthal and Non-lethal coercion

7.3.2.4. 3. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

7.3.2.4.1. CHairman's Summary prior to Questions

7.3.2.5. 4. REPLYING TO THE DEBATE

7.3.2.5.1. ODONOVAN--TOO LITTLE INFORMATION: "I think the issue essentially comes to this. Every decision about justice has always to be made with too little information." (24)

7.3.2.5.2. ODONOVAN: "This seems to me to be at the heart of an understanding of politics. There are decisions like this which you cannot postpone or put off, and where you cannot give anyone the benefit of the doubt without refusing it to another person." (24)

7.3.3. C. O’DONOVAN (JUST WAR REVISITED)

7.3.3.1. O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited

7.3.3.2. 1. JUST WAR REVISITED

7.3.3.2.1. 1. ANTOGONISTIC PRAXIS AND EVANGELICAL COUNTER-PRAXIS

7.3.3.2.2. 2. AUTHORITY

7.3.3.2.3. 3. DISCRIMINATION

7.3.3.2.4. 4. DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTION

7.3.3.3. 2. COUNTER-INSURGENCY WAR

7.3.3.4. 3. IMMORTAL WEAPONS

7.3.3.4.1. OBJECTIONS TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF WEAPONS: "Objections raised against particular types of weapon can broadly be classified as three: (i) their operational design implies the unjust conduct of war; (ii) the destruction they effect is on too great a scale, (iii) their methods are inhumane or cruel." (79)

7.3.3.5. 4. WAR BY OTHER MEANS

7.3.3.6. 5. CAN WAR CRIMES TRIALS BE MORALLY SATISFYING

7.3.3.6.1. "They never questioned the right to such exercises of post bellum jurisdiction, but they inclined to discourage them and to limit their scope. Their reasons can be summarised as three." (109)

7.3.3.6.2. "Let us emnarl upon our sketch, asking five questions: who should administer these tribunals? What kinds of cases should they hear? Who should be charged in them? What sanctions should they command? And when should cases be brought to trial?" (115)

7.3.3.7. 6. AFTERWORD: WITHOUT AUTHORITY

7.3.3.7.1. "My own approach to this question I have laid out above: all actually justified resorts to war combine, in some measure, all the three traditional causes: defence, reparation and punishment. To what I now ask the following observation: to the extent that one takes international authority seriously, one treats the penal cause as the presenting cause. The decisive point in the crystallising of cause for war is that international authority must be vindicated. But this does not mean that international authority may command a war to vindicate itself without substantial underlying causes of other kinds." (134)

7.3.4. D. O’DONOVAN (BEGOTTEN OR MADE?)

7.3.4.1. O'Donovan, Begotten or Made?

7.3.4.2. 1. MEDICINE AND THE LIBERAL REVOLUTION

7.3.4.2.1. BEGETTING: 'In this book we have to speak of 'begetting'--not the eternal begetting of the godhead, but the temporal begetting of one creature by another. We have to consider the position f this human 'begetting' in a culture which has been overwhelmed by 'making'--that is to say, in a technological culture." (2)

7.3.4.2.2. TECHNOLOGY: "Technology derives its social significance from the fact that by it man has discovered new freedoms from necesity." (6)

7.3.4.2.3. LIBERA REVOLUTION: "As in our title we speak of a 'liberal revolution', which is to say, a revolution which has at the centre of its concern the maintenance and extension of freedoms, understood in the modern and misleading sense as the abolition of limits which constrain and direct us." (6)

7.3.4.2.4. MEDICINE FOR UNHEALTHY AND HEALTHY: "But not until recently (and this fact more than anything else bears witness to the importance of Christian influence upon medical practice) has society ventured to think that medical technique ought to be used to overcome not only the necessities of disease but also necessities of health (such as pregnancy)." (6)

7.3.4.2.5. CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO LIBERAL REVOLUTION: "Christians should at this juncture confess their faith in the natural otder as the good creation of God." (12). "Secondly, Christians should at this juncture confess their faith in the providence of God as the ruling power of history." (13) "Thirdly, Christian should at this juncture confess their faith in the transcendent ground of human brotherhood." (13) "Fourthly, Christians should at this juncture confess their faith in the Word, which was from the beginning with God and without which nothing came to be, the Word which was made flesh for us in the person of Jesus." (13)

7.3.4.3. 2. SEX BY ARTIFICE

7.3.4.3.1. "We are asking about our human 'begetting', that is to say, our capacity to give existence to another human being, not by making him the end of a project of our will, but by imparting to him our own being, so that he is formed by what we are and not by what we intend. And we are asking what must become of our begetting in a revolutionary climate of thought in which 'making' is the conceptual matrix by which we understand all human activity." (15)

7.3.4.3.2. CHRISTIAN THINKING ON MALE-FEMALE RELATIONSHIP: "Christian thinkers have said, in the first place, that the connection is good for the man-woman relationship, which is protected from debasement and loss of mutuality by the fact that it is fruitful for procreation." (16) "Christian teachers have said, in the second place, that the true character of procreation is secured by its belonging to the man-woman relationship." (17) "From these two complementary perspectives (the former more Catholic and the second more Protestant) Christian thinkers in the West have argued that the procreative and relational aspects of marriage strengthen one another, and that each is threatened by the loss of the other." (17)

7.3.4.3.3. ARTIFICIAL SEX: "In the first place, the development of these surgical techniques encourages us to take the step in thought of conceiving sexual differentiation itself as artificial." (19) "In the second place, the artificializing of sexual differentiation helps to locate sexual relationships within the sphere of play." (19)

7.3.4.3.4. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CASE APPROACHES: "One answer says that it resolves an ambiguity of sexual differentiation in which the gender identity is discrepant with the biological elements of sexual identity." (22) "The other answer is that the surgery creates a framework of pretence with which the patient will find it easier to live, and that this is done as a form not of cure but of case-management." (22)

7.3.4.3.5. 1. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE

7.3.4.3.6. 2. THE SOCIAL CASE

7.3.4.3.7. CHRISTIAN RESPONSE: "The sex into which we have been born (assuming that it is physiologically unambiguous) is given to us to be welcomed as a gift of God." (28) "When God made mankind male and female, to exist alongside each other and for each other, he gave a form that human sexuality should take and a good to which it should aspire." (29) "None of us should see our sexuality as a mere self-expression, and forget that we can express ourselves sexually only because we particilate in this generic form and aspire to this generic good." (29)

7.3.4.4. 3. PROCREATION BY DONOR

7.3.4.4.1. "the major part of this chapter will be given to matters which are common to ovum donation and semen donation" (31)

7.3.4.4.2. "What distinguishes gamete-donation from other forms of compensation for infertility, in vitro fertilization with embryo replacement, for example, is the involvement of the third party, a personal representative, to take the place at a crucial point of one of the partners in begetting." (32)

7.3.4.4.3. Adoption model (35)

7.3.4.4.4. "My argument, then, is that when we narrow our concern for the exclusiveness of marriage to the area of sexual relations, leaving a wide-open field for third-party intervention in procreation, we have taken a fundamental and decisive step towards 'making' our children." (39-40)

7.3.4.4.5. "That suggestion aside, I must reach the conclusion that the only basis for a successful defence of gamete-donation is the outright denial that the donor is in any way personally present through his genetic contribution." (43)

7.3.4.4.6. "What in vitro techniques have apparently done is to divide the female role in procreation into two: the contribution of the ovum and the pregnancy." (45)

7.3.4.5. 4. AND WHO IS A PERSON

7.3.4.5.1. Experiments on embryos.

7.3.4.5.2. HUMAN SELF-TRANSCENDENCE: "In a scientific culture it is by making things the object of experimental knowledge that we assert our transcendence over them." (62)

7.3.4.5.3. "The embryo is humanity in a form that is especially open to our pinning it down as scientific object and distancing ourselves from it in transcendent knowledge. What makes this so suitable is that it is, we believe, undifferentiated humanity, in which spirit has not yet risen out of matter, personality has not yet emerged from its biological substrate." (64)

7.3.4.5.4. "The practice of producing embryos by ICF with the intention of exploiting their special status for use in research is the clearest possible demonstration of the principle that when we start making human beings we necessarily stop loving them; that that which is made rather than begotten becomes something that we have at our disposal, not someone with whom we can engage in brotherly fellowship." (65)

7.3.4.5.5. CHRISTIAN RESPONSE: "It is not humane for us to attempt to alienate ourselves from ourselves and become other than ourselves. God calls us through resurrection of Jesus Christ (which was a vindication of man's physical being, not merely of spiritual transcendence) to become precisely what he made us to be. " (66)

7.3.4.5.6. KNOWLEDGE THROUGH BROTHERLY LOVE: "To know one another as persons we must adopt a different mode of knowledge which is based on brotherly love." (66)

7.3.4.6. 5. IN A GLASS DARKLY

7.3.4.6.1. "Yet this observation, while making the practice of multple replacement intelligible, does so in a way that rather strengthens than mitigates the force of the case against it; for it is precisely the integration of human fertilization into the general demands of an administrative system that more than anything else confirms its status as an act of 'making' rather than of 'begetting'." (73)

7.3.4.6.2. "We pointed out in Chapter 1 that the primary characteristic of a technological society is not the things it may do with the aid of machines, but the way it thinks of everything it does as a kind of mechanical production. Once begetting is acknowledged to be under the laws of time and motion efficiency, then its absoption into the world of productive technique is complete. The laws of operation cease to be the laws of natural procreation, aided discreetly by technical assistance; they become the laws of production, which swallow up all that is natural into their own world of artifice. That is why I think there is a great deal of symbolic importance in resisting multiple replacement of embyros." (73)

7.3.4.6.3. "I argued [in the Transexualism chapter] that when procreation is not bound to the relational union established by the sexual bond, it becomes a chosen 'project' of the couple rather than a natural development of their common life. Sexual relationship, correspondingly, loses the seriousness which belongs to it because of our common need for a generation of children, and degenerates into merely a form of play." (74)

7.3.5. E. O’DONOVAN (COMMON OBJECTS OF LOVE)

7.3.5.1. O'Donovan, Common Objects of Love

7.3.5.2. PREFACE

7.3.5.3. 1. OBJECTS OF LOVE

7.3.5.3.1. KNOWLEDGE, LOVE, GOD: "Knowledge, which participates in the eternal Word of God, is consubstantial and coeternal with the Love that is God's eternal Spirit. All knowledge, then, has an affective aspect, just as all love has a cognitive aspect. Our experience of knowing is that of discerning good and welcoming it as good." (11)

7.3.5.3.2. LOVE: "The term which the Augustinian tradition expressed the idea of an originally committed attention is 'love'." (15) a. “an attitudinal disposition which gives rise to various actions without being wholly accounted for by and any of them. The object of love is not an act of our own, but simply – to use an Augustinian phrase again – the ‘enjoyment’ of its object; and ‘enjoyment’ is not the name of something we do, but of a relaton in which we stand. In enjoyment, the object is simply ‘there for us,’ which is what makes the difference between enjoyment and ‘use,’ where the object is put to the service of some project. Love, whatever actions it gives rise to, is contemplative in itself, rejoicing in the fact that its object is there, not wanting to do anything ‘with’ it.” (16)

7.3.5.3.3. MORAL REFLECTION--A COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISE: "What we engage in when we discuss public policy, or when we discuss decisions made in past generations, is not deliberation at all, but what we have called 'moral reflection.'" (17) "The new factor introduced into the analysis of moral reasoning is this: from its reflective roots to its deliberative fruits moral reasonin gis a shared and collective enterprise, not a private and individual one. loving, like knowing, is something we do only with others." (19)

7.3.5.3.4. O'DONOVAN'S GOAL: “want simply to explore the idea that moral reflection, the identification of objects of love, as effect in organized community. " (21)

7.3.5.3.5. SECULAR SOCIETY: “Secular community has no ground of its own on which it may simply exist apart. It is either opened up to its fulfillment in God’s love, or it is shut down, as its purchase on reality drains relentlessly away” (24).

7.3.5.3.6. SECOND LECTURE'S GOAL: "My aim now is to explroe how community in general, and political society in particular, arise out of the love of good things, still taking as my guide Augustine's definition of a people as 'a gathered multitude of rational beings united by agreeing to share the things they love'" (25).

7.3.5.3.7. PROXIMATY AND NEIGHBOR: "It was not one who chose his neighbor, but one who found his neighbor on the road he traveled. The Good Samaritan exemplifies a kind of uncluttered common sense about community relations. He reacted to the simple fact of proximity." (44)

7.3.5.4. 2. AGREEMENT TO SHARE

7.3.5.5. 3. A MULTITUDE OF RELATIONAL BEINGS UNITED

7.3.5.6. Oliver O’Donovan,Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002): An important component of O’Donovan’s political theology and wider political program is the eschatological positioning of authority and theology. On area where the ramifications of this conviction is seen is in a Christian conception of the secularity of political Society. In O’Donovan’sCommon Objects of Love, 24, O’Donovan writes: “The Christian conception of the "secularity" of political society arose directly out of this Jewish wrestling with unfulfilled promise . . . Secularity is irreducibly an eschatological notion; it requires an eschatological faith to sustain it, a belief in a disclosure that is ‘not yet’” “Secularity is a stance of patience in the face of plurality.”

7.4. IV. PART III: OLIVER O’DONOVAN – MAJOR ARTICLES

7.4.1. A. O’DONOVAN (“COMMUNITY REPENTANCE?”)

7.4.1.1. COVENANT: "Anyone who is eager and ready to make a fresh start on being British in 1997, should, perhaps, start at this point, by looking for a better one. To do that means going back to the covenant, to the terms of social life given us under God when he gave us, in his creative generosity, to be parents and children." (9)

7.4.1.2. "The solidarity of children ith their parents is, perhaps, the condition for any morally self-aware community." (1)

7.4.1.3. COMMUNITY: "Morally, we must say, no journey a community heads off on will lead anywhere worthwhile unless it its direction is set in reference to the fundamental principles of the community's life. They have constantly to be rediscovered, worked back to, dug out from under the debris of communal habit and routine." (2)

7.4.2. B. O’DONOVAN (“POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE BOOK OF REVELATION?”

7.4.2.1. O'Donovan, "Political Thought of the Book of Revelation"

7.4.2.2. CRITICISM: "Criticism is the form of political engagement which emerges as normative within the apocalyptic perspective. Criticism has the advantage, as its proponents see it, of illuminating the course of history by the word of God, yet without pretending to master history or even exploit its supposed neutrality, but pointing to the mystery of the ultimate triumph of the divine word as the object of its hope." (67)

7.4.2.3. CRITICISM AND JOHN OF PATMOS: "The issue between the two approaches can be brought down to this: Is criticism a valid engagement with the public realm, and is any other engagement realistically possible? It is not surprising that where the claims of criticism against cooperation are advanced most strongly, John of Patmos is deemed to be politically significant." (67-68)

7.4.2.4. I.

7.4.2.4.1. "We begin from the question which the prophet articulates decisively at the beginning of his apocalypse proper: why and how does history impugn the excellence of creation?" (71)

7.4.2.4.2. "the prophet poses his problem: how can the created order which declares the beauty and splendour of its Creator, be the subject of a world-history, the events of which are directionless and contradictory?" (71)

7.4.2.4.3. FREEDOM: "What place, then, is allowed for freedom in this presentation of historical necessity as divine justice?" (76)

7.4.2.4.4. "Creation is vindicated in two ways, we conclude: by the immanent judgment of God worked out in the course of historical necessity, and by the overcoming of necessity by the power of the believer's true speech." (77)

7.4.2.5. II.

7.4.2.5.1. TOTALITARIANISM: "is the assumption of all independent authority, natural or spiritual, the authority of the parent, of the teacher, of the priest, of the artist, into one authority of the state." (81)

7.4.2.5.2. "The mutual exclusiveness of the separation of good and evil begins to assume a shape within history. Those who do not worship the beast are thrust out from the market, which (for the first century as for the nineteenth) is the place of morally neutral polital relations, the place of commerce without commitment. The closure of the market on ideological lines is a sign of the separation of the communities." (82)

7.4.2.6. III.

7.4.2.6.1. TWO IMAGES FOR EMPIRE: "After the reign of the beast from the sea and the false prophet, who represent the Messianic pretensions of empire in the Messianic age, we meet in chapter 17, in the first of three major concluding visions of judgment and triumph, the Great Whore." (82)

7.4.2.6.2. EMPIRE: "Empire is not simply an extensive form of unified rule, but one which drains the integrity from all other powers and elaves them improperly dependent and impotent." (87)

7.4.2.6.3. "The collapse of empire, then, reveals the operation of divine providence, and the future collapse of this Messianic empire will be a revelation of the final rule of God's Messiah over history. The disclosure of the mystery of evil was always at the service of divine providence for the overcoming of evil." (88)

7.4.2.7. IV.

7.4.2.7.1. ROOT OF TRUE SOCIAL ORDER & JUSTICE: "The root of any true social order, in which human beings relate to God and to each other lovingly, is the revelation of the conspicuous justice of God. We cannot comprehend how we are to live together until we know that God has shown us his judgments. For the good of social order is founded upon a judgment (dikaioma), a declarative act which establishes righteousness (dikaiosune)." (89)

7.4.2.7.2. "A right ordering of society is realised when mankind in Christ participates in the exercise of the Messiah's authority" (90)

7.4.2.7.3. WRITE!: "But in the sovereign decision of God to constitute history, there is implied a decision that history should make him declare himself so in order to make that declaration heard." (94)

7.4.2.7.4. TRUE SPEECH AS HEART OF POLITICS: "On that self-communication [In the beginning wss the word...], mediated to us by prophetic speech, the holy city if founded. At the heart of politics is true speech, divine speech, entering into conflict with the false orders of history, the guarantor of the only true order that the universe can ever attain." (94)

7.4.3. C. O’DONOVAN (“GOVERNMENT AS JUDGMENT”)

7.4.3.1. O'Donovan, "Government as Judgment"

7.4.3.2. INTRODUCTION

7.4.3.2.1. POLITICAL PROBLEM OF COHERENCE: "You cannot champion 'democracy and human rights' without quite quickly having to decide which takes precedence between them; and since either of those terms, and not just one of them, may from time to time be used as a cloak for self-interest and tyranny, there is no universally correct answer. That is the underlying problem of coherence in contemporary Western ideology." (36)

7.4.3.2.2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION: "My interest here, however, lies not with that prob- lem, but with one deriving from it, a constitutional problem about the judicial review of legislation, "leg- islation by courts" as it is often alleged to be, which in the service of human or civil rights deprives law- making of democratic accountability. " (36)

7.4.3.2.3. LOCKE AND MONTESQUIE APPROACHES (36)

7.4.3.2.4. CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO SEPARATION: "Christian thinkers, moreover, have their own rea- sons for not being content with this approach. They have a long theological tradition, partly forgotten, in which judicial and legislative activities are related quite differently. They, at least, should ask whether the root of the problem lies not in recent neglect of early-modern theory, but in early-modern neglect of the yet earlier Christian understanding. " (37)

7.4.3.2.5. THESIS: "What the Christian tradition maintained, and the early modern thinkers denied, was a primacy of the act of judgment. " (37)

7.4.3.3. I.

7.4.3.3.1. "According to Paul, then, the reign of Christ in heaven left civil authorities with exactly one task: that of judging between innocent and guilty. " (37)

7.4.3.3.2. PAUL ON GOVERNMENT AS JUDGMENT: "Paul's conception stripped government of its representative, identity-conferring functions, and said nothing about law. He conceded, as it were, the least possible function that would ac- count for its place within God's plan." (37)

7.4.3.3.3. EARLY CHURCH -- GOD AS LAW-GIVER: "In later centuries it was Latin-speaking Western Christendom that adhered most radically to Paul's conception. "Jurisdiction" was the term that came to define that ever-fascinating and difficult relation be- tween church and state. Courts were the central locus of government, for church and for kingdom." (37)

7.4.3.3.4. HIGH MIDDLE AGES -- INTRODUCED LAWMAKER MODE: "hat this is not at all the situation among the thinkers of the high Middle Ages is due to two influences, of whom Justinian himself, at a remove, was one. Because of his codification of civil law, Jus- tinian came to be seen as a model for the Christian lawmaker, and the description of human govern- ment came to include lawmaking as a dimension. " (37)

7.4.3.3.5. CONSTITUTIONALISM: " God, who is the author and vindicator of all law. The tradition of "constitutionalism" which arose from Marsilius' new departure understood the founding legislative act as a response to a divinely given law of nature defining the possibilities of polit- ical society." (38)

7.4.3.3.6. 1700S CHANGE: "The sovereign arbitrariness of God's creative decree was taken into the human act of founding a society, so that it looked rather like a cre- ation ex nihilo, presupposing no prior law, no pre- existing social rationality, a new beginning, not merely relatively and politically, but absolutely and metaphysically. Legislation thereby became the foundation of a social rationality." (38)

7.4.3.3.7. PROBLEM: "Our crisis, however, also attests that we have not in fact succeeded in breaking with the early- modern concept of positively legislated government. Neither we nor our courts have proved capable of forming a clear idea of what it is to recognize a claim of natural right without erecting the courts as counter-legislature, an equal and opposite imitation, and so precipitating the crisis over sovereignty called, in these pages at least, "the judicial usurpa- tion of politics."" (38)

7.4.3.4. II.

7.4.3.4.1. CENTRALITY OF THE COURT: "In this case, the court is the central paradigm of government—all government, in all its branches." (39)

7.4.3.4.2. MOMENTS OF GOVERNMENT: " In the unfolding of the different moments of human government, the judicial moment comes first, the administrative moment second, the legisla- tive third. " (40)

7.4.3.4.3. CORRECTION OF LEGAL TRADITION: "But when the authority of courts is undermined be- cause they operate on principles repugnant to the community's conscience or because their orders are impossible to implement, the responsibility for correcting their law lies with the Head of Govern- ment. The legal tradition needs correction. " (40)

7.4.3.4.4. "Among the radical constitu- tionalists of the later sixteenth century, parliament (the estates or the diets in other European traditions) underwent a change of status: what used to be a body that represented popular concerns to government be- came a branch of government. " (41)

7.4.3.5. III.

7.4.3.5.1. ESSENCE OF COURT'S TASK: "o the respective roles of courts and leg- islators. The essence of the courts' task, in the first place, is to apply statute law intelligently in the light of natural law; to make good moral and social sense of a body of legislation that may sometimes have been incoherently or inconsiderately compiled." (43)

7.4.3.5.2. " But here we must recall the main point of our analysis: the problem arose in the first place because populist constitutional doctrine asserted an idola- trously inflated conception of legislative power. Making so much of positive legislation cheapened it, and created a general contempt for legislative process—too much law was made too fast and too carelessly. Law, as Montesquieu feared, turned into a form of executive action, as parties competed at elec- tions with their rival legislative programs, which they promised to ram through within one parliamen- tary term (or, even worse, within the first hundred days of it)." (43-44)

7.4.3.5.3. PROPOSED SOLUTION: "What our democracies most need is not judicial review of laws after the event, but a high standard of preparatory scrutiny before laws are entered in the statute book." (44)

7.4.4. D. O’DONOVAN (“LAW, MODERATION AND FORGIVENESS”)

7.4.4.1. O'Donovan, "Law, Moderation and Forgiveness"

7.4.4.2. JUDGMENT AND JUSTICE: "The practice of recognising the evildoer and defining our social relations in opposition to the evil done is what we call 'judgment', and the virtue that governs it is 'justice'." (626-627)

7.4.4.3. WRONG VS. HARM: "Wrong cannot be purely personal; it is distinguished from mere 'harm' precisely by the fact that it is a breach of social order which creates liability for punishment." (628)

7.4.4.4. JUDGMENT & FORGIVENESS ARE RESPONSIVE: "We must grant the basic premiss of the contrary argument without hesitation. Judgment and forgiveness cannot be forward-looking acts, like 'initiating', 'enabling', 'pursuing'. They are, by definition, responsive." (628)

7.4.4.4.1. "To punish is to address the past; but it is to address the past with some definite aspiration for the future." (628)

7.4.4.5. Questions both looking at justice as exclusively backward or forward looking.

7.4.4.6. MOMENT OF SELF-CRITICISM: "Christian moral teaching has proposed that the moment of self-criticism is not confined to the practice of legislation, but must be present even in the routine administration of justice." (633)

7.4.4.6.1. "It takes form as a constant duty to temper justice with mercy, a practice of justice characterised as 'moderation." (633)

7.4.4.7. THE POINT OF PURCHASE: "The point of purchase becomes clear, I think, if we remember that judgment is a social practice with its own context and conditions. The possibility of forgiveness arises when judgment reflects upon the conditions of its own performance. In judging we can take cognisance not only of what was done and who did it, but of ourselves who now recognise it, and of the means by which it has come to our recognition. The act of public recognition itself is publicly recognised. Forgiveness corrects the established pattern of justice as the pattern of justice corrects itself by attending to itself and passing judgment on itself." (629-630)

7.4.4.8. FORGIVENESS: "The practice of forgiveness within public life, then, arises from a discontuinuity in the judicial regime, a reflective self-transcendence evoked by the recognition that judgment is imperfect. " (631)

7.4.4.9. CONCLUSION: "The original act of generosity is his alone, beyond replication. But that should not lead us to discount the partial and conditional reflections of it that we may from time to time be given to show." (636)

7.5. V. PART IV: OLIVER O’DONOVAN – MAJOR CRITICISMS

7.5.1. A. MCILLROY (A TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF LAW)

7.5.1.1. McIllroy, David. A Trinitarian Theology of Law

7.5.1.2. PREFACE

7.5.1.2.1. THESIS: "Through the interaction of my own thought with that of Jürgen Moltmann, Oliver O'Donovan and Thomas Aquinas, I seek to demonstrate that the understanding of the place of human law and the role of human justice in God's purposes which I have developed in my first book is not only canonically supported but also justifiable in terms of a systematic theology which gives full weight to the Christian vision of the triune God."

7.5.1.3. CHAPTER 1 THE NECESSITY OF A TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF LAW

7.5.1.3.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.1.3.2. LAW

7.5.1.3.3. THE DERIVATION AND THE ROLE OF THE TRINITY IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY

7.5.1.3.4. THE PROBLEM OF THE TRINITY IN THE WESTERN THEOLOGY OF LAW

7.5.1.4. CHAPTER 2 THE SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM OF JÜRGEN MOLTMANN

7.5.1.5. CHAPTER 3 OLIVER O'DONOVAN: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE ASCENDED CHRIST

7.5.1.5.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.1.5.2. TRINITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS IN O'DONOVAN'S ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY

7.5.1.5.3. LAW AND THE TRINITY IN O'DONOVAN'S THOUGHT

7.5.1.5.4. CONCLUSION

7.5.1.6. CHAPTER 4 THOMAS AQUINAS'S THEOLOGY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AS THE NEW LAW

7.5.1.7. CHAPTER 5 HUMAN LAW IN RELATION TO THE WORK OF THE SON AND THE SPIRIT

7.5.1.7.1. METHODOLOGY

7.5.1.7.2. THE TRINITY AND LAW IN THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION

7.5.1.7.3. LAW AND THE FALL

7.5.1.7.4. THE TRINITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE

7.5.1.7.5. LAW AND THE WORK OF CHRIST

7.5.1.7.6. LAW AND THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

7.5.1.7.7. THE LAST JUDGMENT

7.5.1.7.8. SUMMARY

7.5.1.7.9. THE LIMITED ROLE OF HUMAN LAW

7.5.1.7.10. CONCLUSION

7.5.1.8. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

7.5.2. B. SCHWEIKER (“A RESPONSE TO OLIVER O’DONOVAN’S THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS”)

7.5.2.1. Schweiker, “Freedom and Authority in Political Theology.”

7.5.2.2. 1. APPRECIATION AND TASK

7.5.2.3. 2. THE COMPLEXITY OF MORALITY

7.5.2.3.1. "By speaking of confirming our lives to an order antecedent to the will, O'Donovan hopes to break the seduction of the modern, Western reduction of moral order to human power." (114)

7.5.2.3.2. "Genuine freedom is found, O'Donovan argues, within 'the one public history which is the threatre of God's saving purposes and mankind's social undertakings'" (2). In this way O'Donovan seems to join a tradition of Anglican reflection, reaching from Hooker onwards, that links claims about God's covenantal and salvific will to a kind of natural law argument. It is the middle path between Protestant covenantalism and Roman Catholic moral and political thought." (114)

7.5.2.4. 3. HISTORY AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS

7.5.2.4.1. "O'Donovan's general task in this book is to challenge the modern separation of theology and politics." (116)

7.5.2.5. 4. THE CHRISTENDOM IDEA

7.5.2.6. 5. BY WAY OF CRITIQUE

7.5.2.6.1. "O'Donovan's contention, if I have understood him rightly, is that knowledge of the political (the law of thr political act), and the very metaphysical space of the political life are defined with respect to a specific revealed history." (122)

7.5.2.6.2. SCHWEIKER'S CRITICISM: "Suffice it to say, that I do not believe that all valid and politically relevant knowledge of ourselves, the world, and the divine msut be derived from scripture. I do not find the self-interpretation of persons or cultures necessarily demonic; they may reveal, in complex and ambiguous ways, a longing for the divine." (122) "In my judgment, exclusive reliance on 'revealed history'--seen not only in O'Donovan's work but also so-called narrative and postliberal theologies--funds forms of theological reflection below the complexity of the actual world in which we live." (123)

7.5.2.6.3. ILLUSTRATES THIS IN 4 ARGUMENTS--TWO HERMENEUTICAL, ONE NORMATIVE, ONE FUNDAMENTAL

7.5.2.7. 6. CONCLUSION

7.5.2.7.1. SCHWEILER'S FOURFOLD CRITICISM: "These four points--about social differentiation, religious diversity, textual complexity, individual dignity--find some resonance in O'Donovan's work. My point is that given his specific take on elements of reflection about moral freedom and the resulting revelationism, The Desire of the Nations work can tend towards a dyadic view of social reality, a homogenous religious conception, semantic reduction, and ambiguity about the status of persons." (126)

7.5.3. C. WOLTERSTORFF (“A DISCUSSION OF THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS”)

7.5.3.1. Wolterstorff, “A Discussion of The Desire of Nations.”

7.5.3.2. I

7.5.3.3. II

7.5.3.3.1. THE GENUS AND SPECIES OF THE POLITICAL ACT: "We set out with the knowledge that the political act belongs to the genus: authorized rule over others. Now we know its species: political rule is authorized rule over a people which protects the people against danger, promotes the heritage of the people, and judges cases which arise among the people." (91)

7.5.3.4. III.

7.5.3.5. IV.

7.5.3.5.1. "Perhaps the inauguration of the church requires the re-authorization of the state as it does not, for example, require the re-authorization of the family; that's what we must consider. That is, in fact, the heart of O'Donovan.'s argument." (102)

7.5.3.5.2. WOLTERSTORFF'S CRITICISM: He is arguing against O'Donovan's contention that the inauguration of the church required a re-authorication of political authority." (106)

7.5.3.5.3. SHALOM CRITICISM: "To which O'Donovan adds, somewhat hesitantly, that God's kingly rule within Israel is a mdoel for our understanding of God's rule within the surrounding nations. What I find striking about this threefold list is a certain absence: nothing is said about the flourishing, the well-being, the shalom of the people." (106)

7.5.3.5.4. SHALOM: "The concern of YHWH for the flourishing, the shalom, of the people is unmistakable. And that the monarch was authorized to mediate YHWH's goal of shalom for the people is evident, for example, from Psalm 72." (107)

7.5.3.5.5. SUMMARY OF CRITICISM: "In short, I fail to see that we are taught by Scripture that there was a re-authorization of the church, so that now the state is authorized to do only what is needed to insure justice." (108)

7.5.3.5.6. SUMMARY OF POSITION ON GOVERNMENT: "The state is a manifestation of God's providential care for humanity--of God's common grace--with the same task now that governmental authority has always had. Ever since God's call to Abraham to leave Chaldea, God's kingly rule of humanity has come in two forms: a providential form in 'secular' governmental authority, and a redemptive form in Israel and the church. Neither of these is to be assimilated to the other." (108)

7.5.4. D. BARTHOLOMEW (A ROYAL PRIESTHOOD? [MCCONVILLE; BARTHOLOMEW; CHAPLIN])

7.5.4.1. Bartholomew, Chaplin, Song, Wolters, A Royal Priesthood?

7.5.4.2. INTRODUCTION (BARTHOLOMEW)

7.5.4.2.1. INTRODUCTION: A ROYAL PRIESTHOOD

7.5.4.2.2. THE COVER AND GOYA'S THE THIRD OF MAY

7.5.4.2.3. OBSTACLES TO READING THE BIBLE ETHICALLY AND POLITICALLY

7.5.4.2.4. HOW HAS THE BIBLE BEEN USED ETHICALLY?

7.5.4.2.5. O'DONOVAN'S BIBLICAL, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS

7.5.4.2.6. O'DONOVAN'S READING OF THE BIBLE FOR POLITICS

7.5.4.2.7. O'DONOVAN'S BIBLICAL HERMENEUTIC

7.5.4.2.8. THIS VOLUME

7.5.4.3. 1. THE USE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE DESIRE OF THE NATION (R. W.L. MOBERLY)

7.5.4.3.1. Moberly notes the mention of Covenant's importance but not a development or interaction with its theme. (51, footnte 23-24)

7.5.4.3.2. GENERAL ISSUES OF SCRIPTURAL HERMENEUTIC

7.5.4.3.3. CUI BONO? WHAT IS AT STAKE IN THIS DISCUSSION?

7.5.4.4. 2. RESPONSE TO WALTER MOBERLY (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.5. 3. LAW AND MONARCHY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT (J. GORDON MCCONVILLE)

7.5.4.5.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.5.2. LOCATING ISRAEL'S HISTORY

7.5.4.5.3. DEUTERONOMY AND DAVID/ZION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT STORY

7.5.4.5.4. DEUTERONOMY AS CRITIQUE OF THE ZION-DAVIDIC SYNTHESIS

7.5.4.5.5. DEUTERONOMY AS A 'CONSTITUTION'?

7.5.4.5.6. DEUTERONOMY, GOVERNMENT AND CREATION

7.5.4.5.7. IMPLICATIONS FOR O'DONOVAN'S THESIS

7.5.4.5.8. THE ZION-DAVIDIC THEOLOGY BEYOND DEUTERONOMY

7.5.4.6. 4. RESPONSE TO GORDON MCCONVILLE (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.6.1. O'DONOVAN CONFESSES TO NOT WRITING ENOUGH ON COVENANT: "I plead guilty, on the other hand, to saying too little about 'covenant', thinking, on the other hand, that it was accounted for within the category of law, and on the other that it was a temptation to the modern mind, for which the slide from 'covenant' to 'cotnract' was a fatally easy one." (89)

7.5.4.6.2. This helps me see how O'Donovan would critique my dissertation: 'It is a gloriously seventeenth-century reading of Deuteronomy that McConville offers us, a 'constitution', complete with limited monarchy, separation of powers and individualism; and I thank him for it warmly, but I can't quite believe it." (90)

7.5.4.6.3. Look into McConville for dissertationr eader.

7.5.4.7. 5. A TIME FOR WAR AND A TIME FOR PEACE: OLD TESTAMENT WISDOM, CREATION AND O'DONOVAN'S THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (CRAIG G. BARTHOLOMEW)

7.5.4.7.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.7.2. CREATION ORDER

7.5.4.7.3. EPISTEMOLOGY

7.5.4.7.4. WISDOM AND POLITICS

7.5.4.7.5. CONCLUSION

7.5.4.8. 6. RESPONSE TO CRAIG BARTHOLOMEW (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.8.1. O'Donovan doesn't respond to the covenantal challenges

7.5.4.9. 7. THE POWER OF THE FUTURE IN THE PRESENT: ESCHATOLOGY AND ETHICS IN O'DONOVAN AND BEYOND (M. DANIEL CARROLL R.)

7.5.4.9.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.9.2. OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS AND ESCHATOLOGY

7.5.4.9.3. ESCHATOLOGY IN THE ETHICS OF O'DONOVAN

7.5.4.9.4. THE DEMANDS OF ESCHATOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA

7.5.4.9.5. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE BOOKS OF ISAIAH AND AMOS

7.5.4.9.6. CONCLUSION

7.5.4.10. 8. RESPONSE TO DANIEL CARROLL R.

7.5.4.11. 9. POWER, JUDGMENT AND POSSESSION: JOHN'S GOSPEL IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (ANDREW T. LINCOLN)

7.5.4.11.1. VARIATIONS ON OLD TESTAMENT JUDGMENT THEMES

7.5.4.11.2. POWER AND JUDGMENT IN JESUS' MISSION

7.5.4.11.3. POWER AND JUDGMENT IN THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF JESUS

7.5.4.11.4. POSSESSION AND COMMUNITY IDENTITY

7.5.4.11.5. JUSTICE, TRUTH AND LIFE

7.5.4.12. 10. RESPOSNE TO ANDREW LINCOLN (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.13. 11. PAUL AND CAESAR: A NEW READING OF ROMANS (N. T. WRIGHT)

7.5.4.13.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.13.2. A FRESH PERSPECTIVE?

7.5.4.13.3. INITIAL COMMENTS

7.5.4.13.4. TOWARDS A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRESH READING OF PAUL

7.5.4.13.5. NEW CREATION, NEW COVENANT: THE HEART OF ROMANS

7.5.4.13.6. CONCLUSION

7.5.4.14. 12. RESPONSE TO N.T. WRIGHT

7.5.4.15. 13. 'MEMBERS OF ONE ANOTHER': CHARIS, MINISTRY AND REPRESENTATION: A POLITICO-ECCLESIAL READING OF ROMANS 12 (BERND WANNENWETSCH)

7.5.4.15.1. ECCLESIOLOGY AND POLITICS

7.5.4.15.2. PARAKLESIS: THE GENUINE POLITICAL SPEECH ACT OF THE CHURCH

7.5.4.15.3. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BODY

7.5.4.15.4. MEMBERS OF ONE ANOTHER: THE REPRESENTATION OF CHARIS AND MINISTRY

7.5.4.15.5. REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY

7.5.4.16. 14. RESPONSE TO BERND WANNENWETSCH (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.17. 15. THE FUNCTION OF ROMANS 13 IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS (GERRIT DE KRUIJF)

7.5.4.17.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.17.2. TWO VISIONS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND GOD IN ROMANS 13

7.5.4.17.3. JUDGMENT AND THE PARADIGMATIC POLITICAL ACT

7.5.4.18. 16. RESPONSE TO GERRIT DE KRUIJF (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.19. 17. THE APOCALYPSE AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY (CHRISTOPHER ROWLAND)

7.5.4.19.1. OLIVER O'DONOVAN ON THE APOCALYPSE

7.5.4.19.2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BEAST AND BABYLON

7.5.4.19.3. CONTRASTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE APOCALYPSE

7.5.4.19.4. PRACTICAL ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF THE APOCALYPSE

7.5.4.20. 18. RESPONSE TO CHRISTOPHER ROWLAND (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.21. 19. ETHICS AND EXEGESIS: A GREAT GULF? (GILBERT MEILAENDER)

7.5.4.22. 20. POLITICAL ESCHATOLOGY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: OLIVER O'DONOVAN'S 'CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM' (JONATHAN CHAPLIN)

7.5.4.22.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.22.2. CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM

7.5.4.22.3. CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY

7.5.4.22.4. CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LIBERALISM

7.5.4.22.5. AFTER CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM

7.5.4.22.6. O'DONOVAN'S 'DISPENSATIONALIST POLITICAL ESCHATOLOGY': CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

7.5.4.23. 21. RESPONSE TO JONATHAN CHAPLIN (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.23.1. FIRST AMENDMENT: "Also in passing, I should acknowledge that what I wrote on the First Amendment in Desire may be historically wrong. I am prepared to lsiten symapthetically to the view that its original intention was to allow the states the prerogative of establishing religion and deny it only to the federal government. But the doctrine I wanted to identify was articulated elsewhere in the same period, and the point of the discussion was anyway not to answer the historical question of its source, but to examine a late-modern orthodoxy that nobody doubts prevailed eventually." (312)

7.5.4.24. 22. REVISITING CHRISTENDOM: A CRISIS OF LEGITIMIZATION (COLIN J.D. GREENE)

7.5.4.24.1. THE REIGN OF GOD AND THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY

7.5.4.24.2. JESUS: LORD OF LORDS

7.5.4.24.3. THE EARLY CHURCH

7.5.4.24.4. ROMANS 13

7.5.4.24.5. THE CHRISTENDOM SETTLEMENT

7.5.4.24.6. THE CHRISTENDOM SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST

7.5.4.24.7. REVISITING CHRISTENDOM

7.5.4.24.8. CONCLUSION

7.5.4.25. 23. RESPONSE TO COLIN GREENE (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.26. 24. 'RETURN TO THE VOMIT OF "LEGITIIMATION"'?: SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE POOR (PETER SCOTT)

7.5.4.26.1. AUTHORITY OF THE POOR AND THE POVERTY OF AUTHORITY

7.5.4.26.2. THE ARGUMENT OF THIS PAPER

7.5.4.26.3. ATTENDING TO LEGITIMATION: TRUE SPEECH AND IDEOLOGY

7.5.4.26.4. PRAXIS AND KNOWLEDGE

7.5.4.26.5. CHRIST AND POLITICAL ORDER

7.5.4.26.6. IN JESUS CHRIST, A REVOLUTION

7.5.4.26.7. SCRIPTURAL, PRACTICAL REASONING?

7.5.4.27. 25. RESPONSE TO PETER SCOTT (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.28. 26. A TIMELY CONVERSATION WITH THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY, NATION AND STATE (JOAN LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.28.1. THE 'ROMANTIC', THE 'CIVIC' AND THE 'FUNCTIONAL' NATION

7.5.4.28.2. THE NATION AS A THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT

7.5.4.29. 27. RESPONSE TO JOAN LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN (O'DONOVAN)

7.5.4.30. 28. ACTING POLITICALLY IN BIBLICAL OBEDIENCE? (JAMES W. SKILLEN)

7.5.4.30.1. INTRODUCTION

7.5.4.30.2. WELFARE POLICY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

7.5.4.30.3. ACTION ON WELFARE REFORM AND READING THE BIBLE

7.5.4.30.4. READING O'DONOVAN

7.5.4.30.5. CHURCH, SOCIETY AND RULERS

7.5.4.30.6. ROMANS 13

7.5.4.30.7. HISTORY AND THE STATE

7.5.4.30.8. CONCLUSION

7.5.4.31. 29. RESPONSE TO JAMES W. SKILLEN (O'DONOVAN)

7.6. VI. CONCLUSION