1. Prohibitions and Algorithms
1.1. Naked restrictions: Fix prices, impose minimum resale price, limit output
1.1.1. Cartels and leniency programs
1.1.1.1. Tools against
1.1.1.1.1. Increase the negative consequences
1.1.1.1.2. Increase the devoted resources to fight them
1.1.1.1.3. Increase the prob to discover them
1.2. Ancillary: R&D JV, producttion agreements, tien-ins
1.2.1. Ancillary vertical agreements; again balance plus//negs
1.2.1.1. Eff No double gain=cournot Exclusion of free riders
1.2.1.2. Intrabrand reduction of comp Interbrand foreclose Collusion more prob
1.2.1.3. If <30% is OK, unless it fix resale $ and limits passive sales (so called hardcorerestrictions)
1.2.1.4. Use of the rule of reason in conection to resale price maintenance clauses
1.2.1.5. STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON for tie ins: Coercion?, >30%MS, Anticompe effects of the tying
1.2.2. Ancillary horizontal agreements
1.2.2.1. i.e. SSO: balance plus//negs
1.2.2.1.1. Reduction in competition Foreclse other techs Exclusion fo other companies
1.2.2.1.2. Efficiency gains: inteoperability, mkt integr. quality, safety
1.2.2.1.3. Two contrary forces: Openess vs Mkt power
1.2.2.1.4. IP: reasonable and non discriminatory conditions= no exclusionary conducts
1.3. Algorithm in the EU
1.3.1. Naked agreements
1.3.1.1. Does if produce effects on compeition No:Lawful Yes:2
1.3.1.2. Use 101(3) No:Unlawful Yes:Lawful
1.3.2. Ancillary Agreements: IE if they make sense even with low mkt shares
1.3.2.1. Any anticompetitive effect? No:Lawful Yes:2
1.3.2.2. >mkt treshhold (30%) No:Lawful Yes:3
1.3.2.3. Use 101(3) No:Unlawful Yes:Lawful
1.4. Algorithm in the US
1.4.1. Does it threatens compeition in SR? No:Lawfull Yes:Continue with 2
1.4.2. Does it produced procomp effects? No:Unlawful perse rule Yes: 3
1.4.3. Is mkt power enough to affect mkt? No:Lawful Yes:4
1.4.4. Procompetitive effects? No:Perse unlaw yes:5
1.4.5. Can the procomp. be achieved with something less harmfull? Yes:Lawfull but maybe injunctions No: Balance
2. Section 1
2.1. Paragraph Explanation: First=the prohibition Second=the saction
2.2. Wants to drive under scruntiny: Any kind of cooperation among firms, because it grants undeserved mkt power Reduces competiion Reduces autonomy
2.2.1. THAT IS: ARRANGEMENTS=Contracts, combinations in the form of trust, conspirations.In the US this concept is very broad and sometime contradictory
2.2.1.1. What is not an agreement? Oligopolistic interdependence
2.2.1.2. Plus factor doctrine: Evoluted as an evidentiray doctrine
2.2.1.2.1. Conspirational rational (internal)
2.2.1.2.2. Oportunity
2.2.1.2.3. Market plus factors (external)
2.3. Wans to prosecute: Any arrangement which is able to prevent, restrict or distort competition, that is able toreduce welfare in sr and lr
2.4. IN THE US VS EU
2.4.1. Contacts may be deemed subject matter for an agreement, but they are not enough to hold a rpice fixed//parallel conduct
2.4.2. Public distance is not a discrimaintory element
2.4.3. More lax interpretation, more comprehensive
2.4.4. There could be cultural factor. Also since criminal charges are involve it may be dangerous
3. Art 101
3.1. Paragraph Explanation: First=the prohibition Second=the saction Third=Conditions in which 1 doesn't apply
3.1.1. third paragraph:1. improve prod//econ 2. Cosumer surplus share 3.Not unnecesary conditions 4. Doesnt erradicate competition
3.2. Wants to drive under scruntiny: Any form of cooperation among independent firms. Because in EU every economic operator should determine independently their business policy
3.2.1. Decisions by associations of undertakers: For example trade association.
3.2.2. Agreements; A genuine concurrence of will, that is a meeting of minds
3.2.3. Concerted practices
3.2.3.1. Contacts
3.2.3.1.1. The change from the 70s to 90s Before the contacts were piece of evidence, after 90s they constitute a concerted practice, because it eliminates uncertainty
3.2.3.1.2. Concertation
3.2.3.2. Internal use
3.2.3.2.1. In the EU is important to take public distance, in case a comeptitor reveals its strategy
3.2.3.3. Parallel mkt beha
3.2.3.3.1. Some parallel beh may result from OLIGOPOLISTIC INTERDEPENDENCE
3.2.3.4. Mkt effects
3.2.3.4.1. They do not play any role in the def of concerted practice. But they may play a role in setting the fine, proving the E of a CP, or in an ancillary agreement that went wrong