Stalin's emergence to power following Lenin was inevitable
Richard Pipes Three Ways Stalin's emergence to power following Lenin was inevitable
1. Movement Against Intellectualism
1.1. Resistance to Bureaucratization
1.1.1. The emergence of resistance within the working class was a critical factor contributing to Stalin's rise. Workers in the Bolshevik Party expressed strong objections regarding the bureaucratic management of the party, particularily criticizing the control exerted by intellectuals.
1.2. Lenin's Opposition to Power
1.2.1. Lenin's viewpoint was at odds with the workers' demands. His deep disdain for any form of democracy, "spontaniety" as he labelled it, led him to reject the idea that workers could effectively produce socialism or manage the economy.
1.2.2. Stalin held a pessimistic view of the proletariat,considering them "malingers" who sought factory jobs to evade military service, even claiming that Russia lacked lacked a true proletariat in the Marxist sense.
1.3. Outlawing Dissent
1.3.1. In response to the unrest, Lenin's approach was to outlaw organized dissent rather than democratize the party, potentially restoring it to its elements of self-rule.
1.3.2. At the Tenth Congress, he covertly passed a resolution banning all form of "factionalism", indicating the effective stifling of any organized oppostion to the leadership of the Politboro and the Central Commitee.This move set the stage for a consolidation of power within the party.
1.4. Stalin's Strategic Positioning
1.4.1. Lenin's choice of Stalin for as General Secretary stemmed from his belief that Stalin would suppress "factionalism" and maintain the party's orthodox direction. However, Stalin cleverly reframed any dissent against his methods as "factionalism", destroying the last vestiges of democracy within the Communist Party.
1.4.2. This in due time, undermined potential figures of opposition like Trotsky, who faced similar accusations of "factionalism" when attempting to challenge Stalin's authority.
1.5. Unrivaled Position
1.5.1. Stalin increasingly utilized his post to place loyal supporters in strategic positions of responsibility, effectively consolidating power. He was uniquely postioned within the three leading organizations of the party -- the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat--while Trotsky was only a member of one.
1.5.2. This strategic advantage assured Stalin's dominance within the party and reinforced his ascent to power, making his rise almost inevitable following Lenin's death.
1.6. Overall, the worker's opposition to bureaucracy and the intellectual's control, combined with Lenin's authoritarian measures, created conditions that facilitated Stalin's consolidation of power.
2. Failure of the Bolsheviks
2.1. Weak Government
2.1.1. Richard Pipes proposed that the Bolsheviks seized power amidst a weakened government that collapsed during wartime, making it a prime moment for a power grab
2.1.2. Failure of Lenin's Strategy & Overconfidence in Poland
2.1.2.1. Lenin's attempts to incite a European war through covert promotions of strikes and mutinies failed as foreign governments effectively countered these subversive tactics
2.1.2.2. Lenin displayed overconfidence believing that "hundreds of thousands" of German communists would join the Red army in Poland. His assumptions led to a shattering defeat by the Polish, as he failed to gauge the Polish political culture that valued property and nationalism, consequently not responding to Leninist propaganda.
2.2. Misjudgement of Russia's Conditions & Beliefs about the Western Proletariat
2.2.1. Lenin and the Bolsheviks viewed Russia as a backward peasant nation and preferred to seize power in advanced industrialized countries like Germany and England, this left them unprepared for the realities of the West
2.2.2. The Bolsheviks thought it was crucial to quickly spread the revolution to the West, which they perceived as having a genuinely class-concious proletariat. However,they underestimated the common European worker's attachment to private property and capitalism, which diminshed their revolutionary potential and confined their strategy to strictly the boundaries of Russia
2.3. 'Socialism in One Country'
2.3.1. After his failed efforts to export the Communist revolution to the West, Lenin concluded he would no longer promote revolutions outside Russia, resultingly laying the groundwork for the "Socialism in One Country" concept which Stalin later hijacked, to use for his own benefit(in succession).
2.3.2. The collapse of Bolshevik efforts to promote global revolution highlighted the need for a stable state and an effective bureaucracy, necessitating a different leadership style than what Lenin and his associates practiced. As adamant revolutionaries, they were ill-equipped for administrative tasks such as dealing with paperwork, giving instructions to scattered party cells, or appointing low-level officials, deeming it insufferably tedious.
2.3.2.1. In contrast, of all the high-ranking Bolsheviks(including military genious Trotsky), Stalin demonstrated a unique capability for bureaucratic organization and managing the state's needs. This set the stage for his rise to power as the only Bolshevik who prioritized such administrative functions
2.4. Overall the Red Army's failure to export the revolution facilitated Stalin's ascent as the figure capable of executing the necessary bureaucratic and administrative reforms to guide the future governance of Russia.
3. Massive Bureacracy
3.1. Inadequate Party Structure
3.1.1. The Communist Party was ill-equipped to handle the extensive responsibilities associated with building a bureaucracy due to a lack of trainned personnel, necessitating the employment of 'bourgeois specialists', who required strict oversight to mitigate risks of disloyalty.
3.1.2. Stalin capitalized on this situation by creating a loyal bureaucratic apparatus through material incentives, ensuring that party officials remained dependent on him for their privileges.
3.2. Centralized Control & Bureaucratic Expansion
3.2.1. The Russian bureaucracy expanded drastically because all aspects involving multiple individuals had to be managed by party organs, necessitating an extensive administrative framework. The entire national economy, social institutions, cultural associations, the clergy, and everything else down to the smallest entities required management from the center.
3.2.2. The Bolsheviks recognized that even seemingly innocuous organizations could serve as vessels for political dissent, leading to the establishment of a massive bureaucratic apparatus.
3.3. Stalin's Stragtegic Patronage
3.3.1. Upon becoming General Secretary, Stalin implemented strategies to solidify his influence by bestowing benefits upon top bureaucrats, such as improved living conditions and extra rations, further binding them to his leadership.
3.3.2. Consequently, by the time Lenin began to withdraw from his responsibilites on account of health complications, a priviliged elite of party officials had emerged, primarily appointed by Stalin, thus diminishing the influence of grassroots Communist Party members in running party affairs.
3.4. Lenin's Realization & Response
3.4.1. Lenin, initially unaware of the burgeoning bureaucracy, had presumed that such a system could not endure under communism. When Trotsky alterted him to its expansion, exceedingly enraged, Lenin resorted to purges to eliminate opportunists and idlers within the party, but these efforts were largely ineffective.
3.4.2. Ultimately, the party-state dictatorship he had imposed became reliant on its own bureaucratic agents, who operated with increasing autonomy from the party's foundational ideals.