1. Boston's Big dig
1.1. Ambitious urban infrastructure project lasting nearly 40 years, 14.8 Billion dollars.
1.2. Faced several challenges, succeeded in some and failed in others.
1.3. involved building an extension of the central artery and carving out a new underwater tunnel to Logan airport
1.3.1. The beginning
1.3.1.1. In the 1980’s Governor Michael Dukakis considered how they might fix the central artery's problems
1.3.1.2. Fred Salvucci, the transportation secretary to the Governor, proposed the big dig project
1.3.1.3. Highly amenable solution to everyone initially
1.3.1.3.1. government launched aggressive mitigation programs - infrastructure to cover up for the disturbances the construction caused, promised that the airport terminal wouldn't exit into residential land and vowed ambitious environmental targets
1.3.1.3.2. Had something for everyone - Union workers, Police officers and minorities
1.3.1.4. democrats from Massachusetts dominated Washington and the argument that money that hadn't been spent in the interstate Highway System should be provided now, led many to believe that they had tapped into an infinite volume of Federal money
1.3.2. As time progressed
1.3.2.1. the Federal government capped its portion of the financial standing
1.3.2.2. project suffered huge cost overruns
1.3.2.2.1. Financial inaccuracy in planning
1.3.2.2.2. Dubious accounting method that hid true costs to the tune of 6 Billion dollars
1.3.2.2.3. Governor Weld transferred big dig’s assets to the Massachusetts turnpike authority, an unaccountable public body
1.3.2.3. Fatal technological errors
1.3.3. Analysis
1.3.3.1. The State
1.3.3.1.1. state had tried to pass on the risks that it was supposed to bear to the management Consultants
1.3.3.1.2. the contract was open ended and left no room for checks
1.3.3.1.3. No clear ownership
1.3.3.1.4. Finally used legal measures on Consultants to levy heavy fines
1.3.3.2. The consultants
1.3.3.2.1. The consultants were accountable to none.
1.3.3.2.2. Consultants also introduced Technology so sophisticated that the state was ill equipped to handle it
1.3.3.2.3. Finally, the authorities and management consultants did not bother to think through the technical solution for a long term lasting
1.3.3.3. Beneficiaries - the public and activists
1.3.3.3.1. Led by reports from the State. No checks indicated in the report
1.3.3.3.2. Inconsistent appreciation of the project's utility
2. Who has the most to gain or lose from a super airline?
2.1. Commercial Jet Aircraft market
2.1.1. Boeing
2.1.1.1. Long time supplier of aircraft to the US govt.
2.1.1.2. Commercial arm developed 14 models of aircraft
2.1.1.2.1. VLA category player - 747
2.1.1.2.2. Demand steadily decreasing from 1999 to 2008
2.1.2. Airbus Industrie
2.1.2.1. Relatively new firm (though had over 20 yrs of manufacturing aircraft by 1999)
2.1.2.2. Design enable crew to fly several different types of Airbus aircraft including A3XX
2.1.2.3. No VLA model till 1999
2.2. The case for VLA
2.2.1. Both Boeing and Airbus agreed on aggregate demand for passenger seats
2.2.2. Airbus
2.2.2.1. Felt a significant portion of increased seat demand would need a VLA
2.2.2.1.1. New route development had slowed
2.2.2.1.2. Taxi and gateway congestion at major airports
2.2.2.1.3. Lower demand for oddball flight timings
2.2.2.1.4. Hence, increasing flight frequency is an unsustainable solution
2.2.2.2. Project economics (see case) seemed to make higher profits than that of 747 (in terms of %)
2.2.2.3. See case for detailed explanation of demand modeling logic
2.2.3. Boeing
2.2.3.1. Had a different assumptions for modeling demand
2.2.3.2. Felt that VLA market too small
2.2.3.2.1. Demand to be met by smaller aircraft
2.2.3.2.2. Along with a new point to point routes
2.2.4. Major VLA airlines were of divided opinion
2.3. Airbus A3XX
2.3.1. Initial partner Boeing withdrew
2.3.1.1. Too "expensive" and "risky" demand ??
2.3.2. P.O.D
2.3.2.1. Same range as 747
2.3.2.2. 25% volume
2.3.2.2.1. 12% operating costs
2.3.2.2.2. 35% capacity
2.3.2.3. Lower emissions / noise
2.3.2.4. Same taxi requirements
2.3.3. Hurdles
2.3.3.1. FAA objections
2.3.3.2. 90 sec evacuation requirement
2.4. Potential reaction from Boeing
2.4.1. Develop a stretched version of 747
2.4.1.1. Scrapped once, but revived
2.4.1.2. Cost $4 Billion
2.4.2. Cut 747 prices
2.4.3. Develop a new VLA
2.4.3.1. Seemed unlikely given the investment cost of at least $13 Billion
2.4.3.2. Shareholders may not agree with Boeing
2.4.4. Do nothing
3. Columbia Shuttle disaster
3.1. The shuttle mission showed no signs of trouble
3.1.1. Hard to convince people to take a strong measure
3.2. Leaders take all the risk and the org feels "safe"
3.2.1. That s not ok
3.3. The alternatives were scary
3.3.1. So the management did want to face it
3.3.2. So they ignore it
3.4. Feedback to seniors failed
3.4.1. solutions
3.4.1.1. Protocols
3.4.1.1.1. incentivize to assess damage and prioritize accordingly
3.4.1.2. Formal structure
3.5. Management
3.5.1. Concluded on Day 1 0930 hrs that the debri hit is low risk
3.5.1.1. Why?
3.5.1.1.1. The special team was out preparing the report
3.5.1.1.2. They enquired from an "expert" who "knew" the management team
3.5.1.1.3. The "expert" said "we have seen it before, dont worry"
3.5.1.1.4. They basically had no data to term it as safe
3.5.1.1.5. Typical new input process
4. Bhopal Urban Development
4.1. India inherited civil services from the British
4.1.1. Govt. services lagged India's explosive growth
4.1.1.1. Pros: 1. Opportunity to make a difference
4.1.1.2. Cons: 1. Corruption 2. Inefficiency 3. Poverty
4.1.1.2.1. Weak governance stucture
4.1.1.2.2. Uneducated majority in urban civil services
4.1.1.3. Key areas of service
4.1.1.3.1. Water
4.1.1.3.2. Sanitation
4.1.1.3.3. Electricity
4.2. Bhopal
4.2.1. Sanitation
4.2.1.1. Challenges
4.2.1.1.1. Mindset - throwing garbage anywhere
4.2.1.1.2. Practice - open defacation
4.2.1.2. Solution
4.2.1.2.1. Create easy alternatives
4.2.1.2.2. Create awareness of dangers
4.2.1.2.3. "Market" research
4.2.1.2.4. Conduct pilot programs to create precedence of success
4.2.1.2.5. Create a sense of ownership
4.3. Indian govt. view
4.3.1. State must provide facilities in small towns and villages
4.3.1.1. Reduce pressure on urban development
4.3.2. Though 'experts' differ
4.4. How govt. can help improve
4.4.1. More active civil servants
4.4.1.1. Improve tax services e.g. Indore
4.4.1.2. Track down service usage and due remuneration e.g use technology to account for civic amenities' usage
4.4.1.3. Develop lean govt. organizations
4.4.1.4. Ensure training and education for lower rung employees
4.4.2. More active politicians
4.4.2.1. Public display of political will to get it done e.g Narendra Modi and Narmada River
5. Leadership lessons from the Great Rail Yatra
5.1. Mid 90s - Early 2000s Challenges
5.1.1. Low profit s
5.1.2. Inefficient
5.1.3. Loss of market share
5.2. 2004 onwards - changes introduced
5.2.1. What they achieved
5.2.1.1. 3 compnonents
5.2.1.1.1. Commercial
5.2.1.1.2. Technical
5.2.1.1.3. Human
5.2.2. How they achieved
5.2.2.1. Happened due to collective action of 3 groups of actors
5.2.2.2. Key actors
5.2.2.2.1. Communicated and maintained an atmosphere of honesty and integrity
5.2.2.2.2. Railway minister and advisors
5.2.2.2.3. Railway Board ( senior management)
5.2.2.2.4. Railway staff
5.2.3. Why they were able to achieve
5.2.3.1. Leaders (Minister --> local level management, in that order) built trust with staff
5.2.3.2. Challenged entrenched mindsets
5.2.3.2.1. Axle load increase
5.2.3.2.2. Tariff increment in some categories of passenger services
5.2.3.2.3. Political sensitive areas not touched; focused on other areas
5.2.3.3. The top leadership respected people, protocol, procedures
5.2.3.4. Demonstrated patience in initiating and maintaining changes
6. The Iridium Global Satellite Phone System
6.1. New system
6.1.1. Technical
6.1.1.1. Ability to make calls from anywhere on earth
6.1.1.1.1. Key USP
6.1.1.1.2. Independent of surrounding comms systems
6.1.1.2. Complex system of 66 satellites
6.1.1.2.1. Low earth orbit
6.1.1.2.2. Roving satellites
6.1.1.3. Ground stations
6.1.1.4. Handsets
6.1.1.4.1. Only component NOT manufactured by Motorola
6.1.1.4.2. Made by Japanese handset firm Kyocera
6.1.1.5. At perfect conditions, Line of Sight transmission
6.1.1.5.1. 2.4kbps rate
6.1.1.5.2. 16dB
6.1.1.5.3. LoS critical for connectivity
6.1.2. Extensive testing??
6.1.3. Commercial
6.1.3.1. Timeline
6.1.3.1.1. 1990: Announcement
6.1.3.1.2. 1992-93: Funding - mostly by other high tech firms
6.1.3.1.3. 1998: 100 percent satellite launch
6.1.3.2. Product
6.1.3.2.1. Reference product - Heavier than Iridium when designed, became lighter by the time of launch
6.1.3.2.2. Complex; "required dexterity"
6.1.3.2.3. Motorola remained supportive / optimistic about its baby, even when sales were bad
6.1.3.3. Price
6.1.3.3.1. Both product and service charged at extremely high premiums
6.1.3.3.2. Though goal was to capture 1 M of 8 M business travellers
6.1.3.4. Promotion
6.1.3.4.1. High ad spend = eyeballs
6.1.3.4.2. No structured sales force for services in place esp. in foreign markets
6.1.3.5. Placement
7. Discovery channel
7.1. Had origins in specialized programing
7.2. Had changed course to grow and be profitable, while sticking to core genre
7.2.1. John Hendricks bought out investors opposed to Europe expansion
7.3. Indian Cable TV industry
7.3.1. Content is king and scale is queen
7.3.2. mid 90s to mid 2000s
7.3.2.1. Content provider
7.3.2.1.1. MSO
7.3.2.2. Content provider --> paid MSO for distribution
7.3.2.2.1. MSO charged fixed fee / underreported subscription from LCO
7.3.3. late 2000s onwards
7.3.3.1. TRAI proposal accepted
7.3.3.1.1. Ph 1: subscriber addition in digital cable space + separate licensing regime for MSO/LCO
7.3.3.1.2. Ph 2: Shift to digital cable
7.4. Discovery India grew in 3 phases
7.4.1. Ph 1: 1995 - 2000 Education channel - built reputation but no money.
7.4.1.1. Education hour in schools
7.4.1.2. started charging for programs -- saw dip in subscription
7.4.2. Ph 2: 2000 - 2008
7.4.2.1. Initial - cut offices, staff, programming
7.4.2.1.1. Stopped school programs
7.4.2.2. Localization started
7.4.2.2.1. Hindi translation
7.4.2.3. More global flagship programs
7.4.2.4. To break dependence on distributors
7.4.2.4.1. partnered with Sony for channel boquet
7.4.2.5. 2004-2009:
7.4.2.5.1. Launched lifestyle channel
7.4.3. Ph 3: 2008-2014
7.4.3.1. grew from 3 to 11 channels
7.4.3.1.1. Had 2 spare channel licenses
7.4.3.2. Added programs in Tamil, Telugu, Bengali
7.4.3.3. Special prog. for HD subscribers
7.4.3.4. TG realignment
7.4.3.4.1. Sold to: kids Wanted to sell to: adults
7.4.3.4.2. Branding through SRK programs
7.4.3.5. Adding programs from global library
7.4.3.5.1. Also, creating content in India for global consumption
7.4.3.6. Research
7.4.3.6.1. TAM reports -Benchmarking vs. past performance
7.4.3.6.2. Commissioned market studies
7.4.3.6.3. Talk to discovery
7.4.4. Ph 4: The future
7.4.4.1. Take content mobile
7.4.4.1.1. More and more people spend time on mobile for regular entertainment
7.4.4.2. Discovery Kids: Take programing beyond edutainment to actual education
7.4.4.2.1. localized to school curriculum
7.4.4.2.2. Would make the brand a serious name in knowledge distribution in India
7.4.4.3. Discovery Business??
7.4.4.3.1. Business programming possible?
7.4.4.3.2. India - booming economy - more and more people in Discovery TG turning to business