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1.1.1. Numerous highly regarded scientists returned to the U.S. following the scraping of the project. Many Canadians feel the project was a chance to show our country's innovation.

1.1.2. The development–which still had so much potential–could have simple switched to a smaller, more realistic goal rather than being completely scrapped.

1.1.3. Thousands of workers were left unemployed, and Canada's aeronautics industry went from among the top three manufacturer's in the world to absolute devastation.

1.1.4. Many individuals involved in the development of the Arrow went on to create other ingenious innovations (e.g. one branch of A.V. Roe Canada would later produce the Canada Arm on the International Space Station). Had the project been kept on in some capacity, Canada could have become a major player in the Space Race.

1.2. FOR

1.2.1. The project was known to be extremely expensive on the government's budget, with some statistics citing a $12.5 million price-point per aircraft.

1.2.2. According to Historian Michael Bliss, the production company A.V.Roe Canada was highly unorganized.

1.2.3. The product was difficult to market; even the Canadian Air Force was hesitant to purchase it due to costs, company leadership, and more. In fact, despite the technology being so widely revered by the aeronautics community and public alike, both the U.S. and U.K. refused to purchase the Arrow following the cancellation of development.

1.2.4. Mass interest in the Arrow's development lessened when the Soviets launched the satellite Sputnik, turning people's attention past the skies and to the stars.


2.1. FOR

2.1.1. Would protect us against violent communism (e.g. when Soviets secretly built launch pads in Cuba)

2.1.2. Refusing to accept nuclear weapons could damage economical trade and relations with the United States (e.g. the U.S. has stated that Canada should accept nukes to fulfill our role in NATO and NORAD)

2.1.3. Would qualify Canada as a 'great power' above the status of a 'middle power' that our part in NATO qualified us as.

2.1.4. Would protect Canada in the event of a major war, or–in extreme circumstances–invasion by the U.S. or another superpower.

2.1.5. By not accepting, in the event that Russia did launch a nuclear weapon, America's missiles would more likely intercept it later in its flight trajectory, further in Canada's south above the more populated provinces. Accepting the nukes would allow the defense weapons to be placed up North where aerial interception could occur in less populated areas (e.g. Yukon).


2.2.1. It would seem fickle and hypocritical to accept weapons when working with the U.N. on global nuclear disarmament

2.2.2. Accepting the weapons would lessen Canada's appearance as a visionary and technologically sufficient nation, and create a perception of dependancy on America.

2.2.3. It would be counter-active to the movement of banning nuclear weapons and promote global tension and hysteria.

2.2.4. Could potentially be counter-effective, as Canada's new power would make it a larger threat and thus target during global conflict.

3. CANADA'S ROLE IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (For & Against Diefenbaker's Choices)

3.1. FOR

3.1.1. Prevented the chance of provoking the Soviet Union further by placing Canada on a higher alert (DECON-3).

3.1.2. A photography team by the U.N. would have been a neutral way to verify the level of threat that the Cuban missiles placed on the West.

3.1.3. Keeping Canada removed from the conflict was another symbol of Canadian autonomy, like Vimy Ridge, the Chanak Crisis, and Canada's declaration of war during WWII.

3.1.4. Diefenbaker understandably felt that if the U.S. wanted support, Canada should have been consulted sooner as a true ally rather than left ignorant of the situation until it had reached a climax.


3.2.1. It was seen by many as a betrayal by Canada to both the commitments it made as part of NATO, and especially to NORAD with the U.S.

3.2.2. Some felt it made Diefenbaker and the government look fearful and weak against communism.

3.2.3. It also partially confirmed the lack of unity in the Canadian government, and thus declined the Conservative's approval ratings and lead to their defeat in the 1963 federal election.

3.2.4. It damaged already difficult relationships between the Diefenbaker and Kennedy administrations.