1. Mind-Brain Identity Theory - reductive materialism
1.1. mental states can be identified with brain states
1.2. Inter-Theoretic Reduction
1.2.1. show that higher level entities/phenomena are in fact instances of lower-level entities/phenomena
1.2.1.1. Famous instances of reduction - science: heat,sound, colour
1.3. Identity: Mapping between mental and brain states
1.3.1. TYPE - TYPE
1.3.1.1. a particular type of mental state is identical to a particular type of brain state
1.3.1.1.1. may be too restrictive - human brains only
1.3.2. TOKEN- TOKEN
1.3.2.1. for any given mental state there is some physical state to which it is identical
1.3.2.1.1. not restricted BUT there's not much explanatory power - why study neuroscience then? If everyone is different but just have a certain type of state
1.3.2.2. Mental states are related to physical events but NOT IDENTICAL TO EACH OTHER - random
1.4. 1. Humans are purely physical in origin
1.4.1. Science can explain the origins of human biology developmentally and evolutionarily
1.4.2. Mental can be reduced to physical: ontological parsimony - no mystical mind origin
1.5. 3. Neural Dependence
1.5.1. All mental phenomena we know of are systematically dependent on brain phenomena - brain activity > mental
1.6. 4. Neuroscientific Progress
1.6.1. Science is making impressive progress in explaining the nature of the relationship between mind and brain
1.6.1.1. Proof: History of science - World is flat but now it's round
2. Anti-Identity Theory
2.1. 1. Introspection
2.1.1. Introspection doesnt support the idea of mental being just brains - argue dualism
2.1.2. Reply: our senses don't reveal fundamental physical character of things..light, sound, heat
2.2. 2. Meaning and Identity
2.2.1. Semantics: There seems to be statements, and properties that are true of mental states but not brain states and vice versa
2.2.1.1. mental not equal to brain states
2.2.2. Reply: We are using commonsense for now and they are bound to our incomplete knowledge of the world
2.3. 3. Qualia
2.3.1. Purely physical explanations cannot account or the subjective character of experience
2.3.2. Complete reduction is not possible since some aspects of mental experience are not reducible to physical SO Identity theory is false/incomplete
2.4. 4. Multiple Realizability
2.4.1. here may be indefinitely many types of brain states that physically realise a particular type of mental state (e.g belief)
2.5. 5. Ruling out Other Species' Brains
3. Nagel's Bat
3.1. Thomas Nagel 1974
3.2. Bats use echolocation to navigate - different experience from human (sight)
3.3. Even if can describe physically to the smallest bit, we will still not be able to experience it - cannot explain mind
4. Eliminative Materialism
4.1. acknowledge that a reduction from FP to neuroscience is unlikely
4.1.1. Problem is not with neuroscience but with folk psychology - misleading us
4.1.1.1. Neuroscience will trump over folk psychology - powerful framework
4.1.1.1.1. ELIMINATION VS REDUCTION
4.1.1.2. Churchland's examples: thoery of hear, stars and astronomy - the old frameworks were abandoned entirely
4.1.1.2.1. 1. FP is systematically unable to explain major and behavioural pheomena
4.1.1.2.2. 2. Dubious record of folk wisdom
4.1.1.2.3. 3. Dependence on language for both its entities is sturcture. - cannot readily explain non linuguistic/pre-linguistics cognition
4.1.1.3. Anti-Churchland
4.1.1.3.1. 1. Introspection
4.1.1.3.2. 2. Exaggerration of FP's inadequacies
4.1.1.3.3. 3. Neurosciencetific understanding is still of relative infancy
5. Functionalism - token physicalists
5.1. define mental states in terms of functional role they play , rather then the physical form
5.2. Functional role = causal relations it bears to environment, body and other mental states
5.3. Popular in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence
5.3.1. Suggests that we can study the mind as a computational system - can study without bothering about neuroscience
5.4. vs. Behaviorism
5.4.1. Similar > focus on causal relations
5.4.2. diff > the functional definitions involve reference to other mental states
5.5. ANTI-FUNCTIONALISM
5.5.1. Cannot account for qualia
5.5.2. Inverted thought experiment: functional roles are identical but phenomenal character is very different
5.5.3. Block's China Brain
5.5.3.1. a society of people mimicking the functional organization of the human brain
5.5.3.1.1. functionalist: system would be a mind since it instantiates the functional roles of human brain
5.5.3.2. Absent qualia - not a mind
5.5.3.2.1. Thus, there is more to mentality than functional roles - reductio ad absurdum
5.5.4. Functional definition implies disciplinary/methodological autonomy
5.5.4.1. Churchland's temperature example
5.5.5. Folk Psychology
5.5.5.1. There is no easy way to link psychological states to phsycical states - dims prospects fora tidy edutcion of Folk psychology to neuroscience
6. Behaviourism
6.1. John Watson, B.F. Skinner
6.1.1. B.F. Skinner
6.2. Originates in skepticism about whether mental states like thoughts and feelings are truly scientific and objective enough to be the basis for psychology
6.3. Theories and explanations entirely in terms of publically observable behaviour
6.3.1. B's explanations take the form of laws connecting the particular physical stimuli to particular physical responses.
6.4. Analytical/Philosophical behaviourism: analyses mental states in terms of behaviour
6.5. DENY
6.5.1. Subjective experiences are inherent/essential to thought
6.5.2. Nor do they have a place in scientific study of mind (methodological behaviorism
6.6. ACCEPT
6.6.1. That we have internal/subjective experiences
6.7. PROBLEMS
6.7.1. 1. Thoughts and perceptions that don't lead to behaviour e.g. daydreaming
6.7.2. 2. Mental states that can't be clearly described in terms of actual behaviours or dispositions to behave - enjoying a certain music
6.7.3. 3. Possibility of the same behaviour but different mental states - inverted spectrum problem
7. Folk Psychology
7.1. Commonsense body of explanations and "theories" or understanding of our own and other's thoughts/actions by appeal to notions like belief, desire, intention.
7.2. Shortcomings > need philosophy & psychology
8. Biggest Problem: Qualia
8.1. the subjective character of experience
8.1.1. vivid nature of qualia is not easily explained
8.1.2. popular objection to purely physical accounts of the mind (materialist theories of mind)
9. Substance Dualism
9.1. The mind and body are fundamentally different sorts of things (substances)
9.2. Advocates: Socrates, Descartes
9.3. PHYSICAL vs. MENTAL
9.3.1. Physical: material, extended in space, physics, incapable of thought/feeling
9.3.2. Mental: immaterial, not extended in space or governed by laws of physics, capable of thought/feeling
9.4. +ve 1. Introspection & Self
9.4.1. Introspection matches up our ways of thinking about minds and our identities
9.4.2. Descartes: introspection reveals that the introspecting person is a thinking substance and nothing else - see only thoughts
9.4.3. Religions: concepts that identify the self as something separate from body and capable of existence separate from it
9.5. +ve 2. Complexity & Computation
9.5.1. Impossible for purely physical system to exhibit C&C abilities of the human mind
9.5.1.1. Mathematics & Language - beyond reach of purely physical systems
9.6. -ve 2. C&C
9.6.1. Argument from Irreducibility
9.6.1.1. Modern computers M&L abilities exceed the human mind
9.7. +ve. 3 Availability: Physical states are publicly available while mental states are private
9.8. +ve 4. Fallibility: Can be wrong about physical facts but will always be correct about your own mental states
9.8.1. Related: Epistemological Problem
9.8.1.1. What about the skinny girl who thinks she's not skinny?
9.8.1.2. Or the posessed girl who thinks she's on fire when she is physically fine
10. Property Dualism
10.1. Rejects the idea that there is a non-physical substance that is the basis for minds/mental states - rejects Substance Dualism
10.2. There is only physical substance but certain objects like the brain possess non-physical properties that no non-thinking physical objects possess
10.2.1. e.g. sensation of pain, having a sensation of red, thinking that P
10.3. Only the properties cannot be reduced or explained in terms of physical sciences (because subjective)
11. Epiphenomenalism
11.1. Spark: Substance Dualism cannot explain how mental states have causal effects on the physical
11.2. A type property dualism
11.3. Claims that mental properties are not part of the physical causal matrix that determines our thoughts and behaviour
11.4. Mental properties are side effects of physical systems that reach a certain level of complexity
11.4.1. Mental caused by brain. But mental does not affect brain. One way street.
12. Objections to Dualism
12.1. 1. Interaction Problem
12.1.1. Famous version - Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia to Descartes
12.1.2. A. If the mind and body are separate, how do they causally interact with one another?
12.1.2.1. Difficult to explain
12.2. 2. Unnecessarily Complex
12.2.1. Posits the existence of a second type of thing - immaterial substance - that has no role except to support tht ephenomena in question
12.2.2. Metaphysical Occam's Razor: Don't multiply entities beyond the minimum necessary to explain the phenomenon
12.3. 3. Explanatory Power
12.3.1. Having mind as a separate substance does not help us understand complex mental phenomena like reasoning, consciousness, qualia
12.3.1.1. We know what it's not..but not what it is
13. Jackson's Mary
13.1. Frank Jackson
13.2. Mary the neuroscientist who has been raised in an entirely monochromatic room - she knows everything about neuroscience of vision and mind/brain
13.3. But when she goes out into the real world and sees red, she will have a whole new experience.
13.3.1. Physical facts alone do not exhaust what can be known about the mind
14. Chalmer's Zombies
14.1. David Chalmer's philosophical zombies
14.2. Imagine a world identical to ours - physically - but the people cannot experience qualia
14.3. The fact that we can conceive such an idea shows that intrinsic features of our conscious experience are distinct from physical features of the sort appealed to by various forms of materialism.
14.4. Anti identity theory AND functionalism
14.5. Possible response of materialist: - Qualia
14.5.1. 1. Deny the intuitions or the coherence of the cases
14.5.2. 2. Deny intuitions' validity as reflections of the fundamental nature of the world - history of science is instructive
14.5.3. 3. Appeal to different types of knowledge - especially Jackson/Nagel