Module 2: Mills v. Pate, 225 S.W.3d 277 (2006); Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso
1. Facts
1.1. Parties
1.1.1. Joyceline Mills, Appellant
1.1.2. Dr. John Pate, M.D., Appellee
1.2. What Happened
1.2.1. Mills met with Dr. Pate seeking liposuction and thigh lift. Dr. Pate told the patient that she would look beautiful after the operation.
1.2.2. Mills signed an informed consent document informing her of the possible side effects and possible complications.
1.2.3. After the procedure, Mills followed Pate's post-operation instructions, but noticed irregularities outside of the expected bruising and swelling.
1.2.3.1. Pate informed Mills that having a second surgery would ensure that Mills would have smooth skin with no further irregularities. Mills signed another informed consent form and the second procedure was completed.
1.2.4. Mills was dissatisfied with the second surgery. Mills brought suit against Pate under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA)
1.3. Procedural History
1.3.1. The 346th District Court, El Paso County granted Dr. Pate a traditional motion for summary judgement and a no-evidence summary judgement.
1.3.2. Mills appealed to the Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.
2. Issue
2.1. Whether the summary judgement proof establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more elements of the appellant's claims.
3. Application
3.1. Appellant's arguments
3.1.1. The Appellant argued that the trial court should not have granted traditional motion for summary judgement to Dr. Pate since a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether her injuries occurred due to the procedures.
3.1.2. The Appellant made a fraudulent concealment claim based on the evidence that Dr. Pate knew that she had irregularities after the surgery and that Dr. Pate modified the list of adverse effects in the informed consent form for the second surgery.
3.1.3. The Appellant argued that Dr. Pate did not disclose information to her to the second liposuction procedure and if she had known of the risks/hazards then she would have refused treatment.
3.2. Appellee's arguments
3.2.1. Dr. Pate argued that the two year statute of limitations referenced in the act bar the appellant's claims.
3.2.2. Dr. Pate argued that he did obtain the appellant's informed consent for both procedures.
3.3. Court's application of the Rule
3.3.1. The court determined that Dr. Pate had adequately disclosed the risks and hazards of the procedures and Dr. Pate's assurances that the second surgery would fix the irregularities caused by the first surgery did not create a genuine issue of material fact.
3.3.2. The court determined that the appellant presented probative evidence to support the elements of her breach of warranty claim.
3.3.3. The court determined that the appellant knew of the irregularities resulting from the first procedure six months after the procedure. Therefore the appellant's fraudulent concealment claim does not stand.
4. Conclusion
4.1. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision in part, reverse, in part, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
5. Impact
5.1. Key v. Viera, Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston.: Key engaged Viera to conduct a liposuction procedure and face lift. Key experienced irregularities after the procedures. The court ruled that Key failed to file a suit within the two year statute of limitations period and that the Viera's motion for summary judgement lacked specificity to provide the nonmovant with fair notice in order to produce evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the judgement of the trail court.
5.2. 329 S.W.3d 510 - METHODIST HOSP. v. ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.): Zurich issued workers' compensation policies to Methodist hospitals. Worker's comp claims were subject to a $1 million deductible per accident. Zurich agreed to handle and pay the worker's compensation claims and then bill Methodist for payments within the deductible. Methodist argued that two claims were not compensable because of pre-existing conditions. Methodist claim a breach of express warranty action against Zurich. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling.
6. Importance
6.1. A healthcare professional would care about the decision because it would inform them on refining their marketing tactics and informed consent protocols to align with their state's regulations.
7. Influence
7.1. The ruling impacts marketing tactics for practitioners offering elective procedures. Practitioners have to be careful in how they advertise and market the benefits, risks, and hazards of the procedures as to not raise issues of fraudulent concealment or breach of express warranty.
7.2. The ruling also impacts medical practice insurance liabilities. Due to the ruling, medical malpractice insurers have clearer guidelines on what constitutes medical malpractice if a patient is unsatisfied with the results of elective procedures.
8. Rule of Law
8.1. Legal Principles
8.1.1. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
8.1.1.1. Statute of Limitations
8.1.1.1.1. There is a 2 year statute of limitations contained in section 10.01 of Article 4590i.
8.1.1.2. Informed Consent
8.1.1.2.1. Risks and hazards inherent in the procedure must be disclosed and agreed to by the patient before conducting the procedure
8.1.1.3. Breach of Express Warranty - Under Statues of Frauds
8.1.1.3.1. Services provided must conform to the character and quality of the services described.
8.1.2. Fraudulent Concealment
8.1.2.1. Suspends the limitations in a medical negligence case until the patient discovers the fraud or could have discovered the fraud with reasonable dilligence
8.1.3. No-Evidence Motion for summary judgement is valid when the evidence does not raise genuine issues of material fact.
8.2. Legal Precedent
8.2.1. Wyatt v. Longoria, 33 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.)
8.2.1.1. The successful movant carried the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law.
8.2.2. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex.2001)
8.2.2.1. The plaintiff may not choose the most favorable date for beginning the statute of limitations. Limitations must begin on the date the alleged tort occurred.