XX-XXI century

1. Rise of Extreme political systems

1.1. Italy

1.1.1. Context: Crisis of the liberal state and the Biennio rosso (1919-20)

1.1.1.1. Paralysed parliamentary politics

1.1.1.1.1. configuration of political forces requiring coalition governments

1.1.1.1.2. maximalist revolutionary position by the Italian Socialist Party ⇒ don’t want to collaborate

1.1.1.1.3. Fragmentation of the liberal bloc and unstable parliamentary groups

1.1.1.1.4. Heterogenous and inexperienced Catholic Italian People’s Party (PPI)

1.1.1.1.5. ⇒ 4 Parliamentary Crises in 2 years

1.1.1.2. ‘Mutilated Victory”

1.1.1.2.1. Diplomatic failures in the Treaty of Versailles after WWI

1.1.1.2.2. Nationalistic grievance at a victory that is now ‘mutilated’ by Italy’s allies and government’s inability to protect Italy’s national interest

1.1.1.3. Post-War economic crisis

1.1.1.3.1. Labor agitation: rise of socialist campaigns, particularly in the North

1.1.1.3.2. Employers’ perception of a crisis of capitalism through government’s attiotude

1.1.1.3.3. Middle-Class resentment towards war profiteers and industrial workers

1.1.1.3.4. Failure to enact reform nor revolution

1.1.1.3.5. ⇒ Radicalisation of social groups

1.1.2. Support for Fascism

1.1.2.1. Northern Italy ⇒ industrial power house

1.1.2.1.1. Strong labour movements, socialist unions ⇒ targeted by the Fascist

1.1.2.1.2. Landowners, capitalists etc… ⇒ used the “services” of the Fascists to smash the leftist institutions

1.1.2.2. Antisemitism?

1.1.2.2.1. Until 1928 : jews were part of the elite of the Fascist movement

1.1.2.3. Class in Italy

1.1.2.3.1. Lower middle class ⇒ small shop keepers / small land owners ⇒ many supported the fascists because of the Great Depression ?

1.1.2.3.2. Upper middle class ⇒ managerial class of firms

1.1.2.3.3. Upper Class ⇒ large owners ⇒ amazed by the Fascist movement

1.1.3. Fascist take over

1.1.3.1. 27-31 October 1922: March on Rome and take over of governance

1.1.3.1.1. Mussolini's Blackshirts conquered strategic points across the country and gathered outside . King refused to declare the and implemented the bloodless transfer of power to the Fascists.

1.1.3.1.2. Became PM in a coalition Government (most of seats by Conservative non-fascist)

1.1.3.2. until 1924 ⇒ dysfunctional parliamentary regime

1.1.3.2.1. Voted the saying that the ACERBO LAW organization that would get the largest bloc vote would automatically get 2/3 of the seats in Parliament

1.1.3.2.2. Won the election in 1924 ⇒ had the constitutional power to amend the constitution

1.1.3.2.3. Turned the State into a fascist and dictatorial one

1.1.4. Definition of Fascism

1.1.4.1. absolute power of the state

1.1.4.2. reactionary ideological base

1.1.4.3. corporatism: taming capitalism by controlling labor and factory owners; although private property remains, the state controls the economy

1.1.4.3.1. destruction of agricultural unions in 1921

1.1.4.3.2. 1922: creation of fascist “union” with fast financial destruction of the labor unions

1.1.4.3.3. 1925: the “vidoni palae” agreement grants fascist unions monopoly on union contracts leading to the end of labor unions in Italy

1.1.4.3.4. Wages fixed by companies : cut in 2 + new "contributions" to mandatory unions

1.1.4.4. extreme nationalism

1.2. Germany

1.2.1. Roots

1.2.1.1. Importance of Landowners (especially in the East)

1.2.1.2. 1932: 1/3 of unemployed

1.2.2. Political Game

1.2.2.1. middle ground parties shrunk

1.2.2.2. The elite used the Nazism to kill the leftist forces BUT most of the money came from small people’s donations

1.2.2.2.1. Newspapers began being nice to Fascist and Nazism

1.2.2.3. MONTH PRIOR: discussion between the German elites to see if a little time of Hitler in Power could be useful

1.2.2.3.1. 4th of January (3 weeks before) : house of a leading banker and baron, Hitler, Himler, former chancellor (Von Papen) etc..

1.2.2.3.2. yes to moderate as minister if Hitler head + repression of the Jews

1.2.2.3.3. GOAL : find a solution to economic and political crisis quickly

1.2.3. Rise

1.2.3.1. 30th JANUARY 1933: Hitler Chancellor

1.2.3.2. 6 weeks after : Enabling Act of 1933

1.2.3.2.1. The Chancellor will be able to implement emergency measures without the consultation of the Reichstag

1.2.3.2.2. The Parliament wasn’t controlled by Nazis but only leftist people voted against… (444 voted for ; 94 voted against (Social Democratic Party of Germany) ; 109 absent)

1.2.3.3. Corporatism

1.2.3.3.1. 1928: creation of NSBO to compete with the labore unions (fails)

1.2.3.3.2. March 1933: right to strike suppressed, leaders of unions replaced by Nazis

1.2.3.3.3. May - occupation and nazification of the labor unions. By October 1934, the old federations are dissolved

1.2.3.3.4. NOW: wages fixed by companies with merit adjustments

1.2.4. Nazism & Capitalism

1.2.4.1. Early establishment

1.2.4.1.1. The German industry (e.g. IG-Farben) and the call for an authoritarian regime able to repress the organized working-class and restore profits

1.2.4.1.2. Nazism as the last resort of the German bourgeoisie to stabilize the political system and thus German capitalism

1.2.4.1.3. The (relative) convergence of interests between the Nazi regime and the German industry through the destruction of the organized working class and the left, business-friendly policies, rearmement, “aryanization”, the pillage of occupied countries, forced labor…

1.2.4.1.4. The “autonomy of the political” (Mason)? The absence of political power of German industrialists, the growing economic interventionism of the State, the shift from the struggle for markets to the struggle for raw materials

1.2.4.1.5. A profitable situation for the German armament-related industry (until 1944-45), but under Nazi leadership

1.2.4.1.6. The Nazi economy and the transformation of capitalism

1.2.4.1.7. The headlong rush of the Nazi regime and the destruction of German capitalism

1.2.4.2. Power cartel of the 3rd Reich

1.2.4.2.1. The ‘power-cartel’ of the Third Reich and the informal alliance between the Nazi regime (divided from 1936 between the Party itself and the SS-Police-SD complex), big business (industrial and agrarian), and the Army

1.2.4.2.2. The growing ascendance of the former, but with compromises at the beginning (1934)

1.2.4.2.3. The loss of power of the outward-looking industrialists (Schacht, 1936-37) and the Army (the Blomberg-Fritsch affair, 1938), and the road to economic autarky and Nazi hegemony (1936-1938)

1.2.4.3. The Working class and Nazism

1.2.4.3.1. An interclassist political party that was popular amongst a significant proportion of each and every social class up to the very end, although less amongst Catholics, the Left and the organized industrial working-class (Kershaw)

1.2.4.3.2. Massive individual working-class resistance in Nazi Germany after the return to relative full employment (Mason)

1.2.5. Reaction or revolution?

1.2.5.1. A restorationist ideology with modernizing effects: significant upward social mobility allowed by Nazi meritocracy, attempted dissolution of traditional social links (familial, religious, regional, corporatist), further industrialization and urbanization, concentration of capital at the expense of the old middle classes, and even massive (re)entry of women in the industrial workforce during WWII…

1.2.5.2. … but with the ongoing power and social reproduction of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy (even in the SS), the political marginalization of the most populist and idealists Nazis, and a subjective rather than objective transformation of German society (except for the destruction of the organized working-class and the elimination of the political and racial enemies of the regime) that showed its limits with the ongoing strength of the Churches and the family as well as the persistence of working-class or humanist values

1.2.5.3. Thus, the Nazi dictatorship was not an era of social revolution, nor of social reaction in the sense of an objective restauration of pre-capitalist society. But at its beginnings, it was a social reaction to the (limited) power of the organized working-class and the left, and its end brought immense social transformations, especially in East Germany:

1.2.6. Holocaust

1.2.6.1. The HISTORIKERSTREIT

1.2.6.1.1. The Historikerstreit was a dispute in the late 1980s in West Germany between conservative and left-of-center academics and other intellectuals about how to incorporate Nazi Germany and the Holocaust into German historiography, and more generally into the German people's view of themselves.

1.2.6.1.2. Nolte: Nazism as a reaction to bolshevism, Auschwitz as an imitation of the Gulag

1.2.6.1.3. Ducange: Nazism as notably a produce of the 1918-1923 (counter-)revolution and of the fear of revolution of the bourgeoisie after 1929

1.2.6.2. The Paradigms

1.2.6.2.1. Three paradigms to explain the Shoah according to Friedlander: the Sonderweg paradigm, the fascist paradigm, the totalitarian paradigm

1.2.6.2.2. Friedlander’s critique: too exceptionalist; antisemitism was not central in Italian fascism, and it was not exterminationist; the aim of the Nazi regime with the Holocaust was not to merely increase their power over European societies.

1.2.6.3. THE INTENTIONALISTS

1.2.6.3.1. Hitler had the will to eliminate the Jews since the beginning of his political career, it was his main political objective and he pursued it with determination

1.2.6.3.2. Strenghts and Weaknesses

1.2.6.3.3. KERSHAW’S CRITIQUES OF INTENTIONALISM

1.2.6.4. THE FUNCTIONALIST

1.2.6.4.1. MOMMSEN

1.2.6.4.2. BROSZAT

1.2.6.4.3. A minimization of the role of antisemitism and of Hitler in the making of the Holocaust?

1.2.6.4.4. KERSHAW’S CRITICAL DEFENSE OF FUNCTIONALISM

1.2.6.5. BEYOND FUNCTIONALISM AND INTENTIONALISM?

1.2.6.5.1. The Nazis wanted to make the Reich Judenrein, but they had no clear idea of how to do that until 1941-42 (Bauer)

1.2.6.5.2. Hitler did not participate (because he did not think it was a top priority) in the making of antisemitic measures from 1933 to 1938, resulting in a lack of clear objectives. That led rival bureaucracies to take incoherent and fluctuating initiatives that met practical difficulties. However, these bureaucracies would not back down, and in order to “work towards the Führer”, each failure would further radicalize their initiatives (Schleunes)

1.2.6.6. Other theories

1.2.6.6.1. ORTHODOX MARXISM

1.2.6.6.2. HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS?

1.2.6.6.3. ORDINARY MEN?

1.2.7. Hitler's Foreign Policy

1.2.7.1. Interpretative Currents

1.2.7.1.1. Orthodox Marxism: the (well-documented) imperialist ambitions of German industrialists

1.2.7.1.2. The ‘primacy of politics’: Hitler as personally directing the war according the Mein Kampf program

1.2.7.1.3. ‘Structuralists’: an unplanned and improvised expansion due to the radicalization of the Nazi regime, with Mein Kampf’s ideas acting as ‘ideological metaphors’ rather than concrete and realistic objectives, and with Hitler as improvising

1.2.7.1.4. FUNCTIONALISTS ANALYSIS

1.2.7.1.5. ‘PROGRAMATISM’ (HILDEBRAND)

1.2.7.1.6. Interpretative Currents

1.2.7.2. KERSHAW

1.2.7.2.1. Hitler set the main orientations and took the main decisions in foreign policy, even against the reluctance and objections of the Foreign Ministry

1.2.7.2.2. Nazi Germany foreign policy was partly the result of the 1918 defeat and the post-war order, in continuity with imperial Germany foreign policy in central Europe, and the object of a convergence of interest with the traditional elites… … but it was resulted in a diplomatic revolution, the traditional elites were increasingly marginalized in the decision-making process, Hitler personally took the greatest initiatives of the 1930s Germany foreign policy and sought an antibolchevik alliance with the UK and Poland, and economic factors played a minor role

1.2.7.3. THE LOGIC(S) OF NAZI GERMANY FOREIGN POLICY

1.2.7.3.1. The continuist thesis: continuity in the expansionist and imperialist goals of the German ruling elite before and during Nazism.

1.2.7.3.2. The innenpolitik or social-imperialist thesis: foreign policy as a way to ease internal tensions.

1.2.7.3.3. The opportunist and amateurist thesis: Hitler as an amateur and an opportunist (Mommsen)

1.2.7.3.4. KERSHAW

1.3. Spain

1.3.1. Spanish Civil war 1936 – 1 avr. 1939

1.3.1.1. No mass support to the Fascist movement… so the military, in close contact with the Spanish elite, tried to do the dirty work itself BUT failed

1.3.1.2. not fascist because no massive movement support

1.3.1.3. Lasted until 1976

1.3.2. ideological pillar of francoism

1.3.2.1. traditionalism (conservatism)

1.3.2.2. Anti communism ⇒ rejection of Marxist ideology

1.3.2.3. Catholic religion = root of Spanish nation

1.3.2.4. → enforced by Spanish falange (fascist party) // national movement = ONLY official political party BUT form 1945 = loose political influence in favor of the military, the traditionalists or technocrats.

1.4. Japan

1.4.1. Roots

1.4.1.1. Death of Meiji emperor in July 1912 (// modernization of empire)

1.4.1.1.1. heir = emperor Taisho

1.4.1.1.2. Political crisis in the Japanese empire // Meiji constitution = military dominance over the civilian government

1.4.1.2. Japan entered the war on the side of the Entente during 1914 (Anglo jap treaty)

1.4.1.2.1. continue expansion in the pacific and in China

1.4.1.2.2. 1915 = 21 demands to Yuan Shikai ⇒ transformed china into Jap protectorate BUT in the end japan withdrew demand BUT continue to extent influence

1.4.1.2.3. Fulfill war demands for European allies ⇒ wartime boom good for industry (rapidinflation and rice riots)

1.4.1.2.4. Fall of Russia =Japan expansion in Siberia

1.4.1.2.5. → Japan present for peace of Paris treaty ⇒ gain a permanent siege in the league of nation organization + territorial gains

1.4.1.2.6. 3rd largest navy in the world after the war (submarine dvp)

1.4.1.3. Throughout the 1920s, various nationalistic and xenophobic ideologies emerged among right-wing Japanese intellectuals, but it was not until the early 1930s that these ideas gained full traction in the ruling regime.

1.4.1.3.1. Taisho democracy = two party political system

1.4.1.3.2. Peace preservation law of 1925 = criminalized socialism communist, republicanism and democracy ⇒ END of the Taisho democracy (died a year after)

1.4.1.4. During the Manchurian Incident of 1933

1.4.1.4.1. Radical army officers bombed a small portion of the South Manchuria Railroad and, falsely attributing the attack to the Chinese, invaded Manchuria.

1.4.1.4.2. International criticism of Japan following the invasion led to Japan withdrawing from the League of Nations, which led to political isolation and a redoubling of ultranationalist and expansionist tendencies.

1.4.1.5. 1933 = economy recovery of japan BUT year after = reduce military spending to avoid inflation ⇒ NEGATIVE response from strong military fascism rising in Japan

1.4.1.5.1. emergence of right wing admirals = wanted unlimited naval growth

1.4.1.5.2. Dream of greater east Asia co-prosperity sphere // objective of Mongolian buffer state = one more puppet state

1.4.2. Take over

1.4.2.1. In 1936, a group of right-wing Army and Navy officers succeeded in assassinating the Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi.

1.4.2.2. The plot fell short of staging a complete coup d’état, but it effectively ended rule by political parties in Japan and consolidated the power of the military elite under the dictatorship of Emperor Hirohito.

1.5. Stalinism

1.5.1. Roots in the Civil War

1.5.1.1. Rural Population not always overly supportive

1.5.1.1.1. Bolcheviks put limits on the free market of goods but the rural population didn’t wanted to see loss of control over their own products

1.5.1.2. Cultural Level in Russia was very low

1.5.1.2.1. 60% of illiteracy

1.5.1.3. War situation

1.5.1.3.1. 3 years of devastating of war

1.5.1.3.2. followed of 3 years of civil war

1.5.1.3.3. The economy was war-oriented…

1.5.1.3.4. PB of re-intagration of demobilized soldiers (in a bad economy and a partially devastated country…)

1.5.1.4. Extremely weak democratic traditions

1.5.1.5. No one ever tried to build a socialist society before

1.5.2. Pre-Stalin

1.5.2.1. Progressive loss of democracy

1.5.2.1.1. DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM ⇒ internal organization of communist revolution party

1.5.2.1.2. by 1921 = Bolsheviks corrupted and influenced ⇒ outlawed the internal discussion within. The party ⇒ some ppl opposed to it in the party

1.5.2.1.3. Decline democracy in 1918 and in 1921 when permanent decision to banned opposition

1.5.2.2. The spirit of equality (in the reading compared to French Revolution = from equality to dictatorship)

1.5.2.2.1. the 1921 communist dictatorship decision was an irreversible decision BUT full dictatorship to emerge = leader of. Communist party still infused of socialist ideology (equality and enlargement of democracy) = goal is still to increase the quality of life .

1.5.2.2.2. Dictators BUT still believe that they were fighting for greater equality and justice. But discrepancy btw ideals and reality

1.5.2.3. Structural Changes (1923 and beyond)

1.5.2.3.1. Bureaucratization

1.5.2.3.2. Distanciation

1.5.2.3.3. Autocratization

1.5.3. Rise of Stalin

1.5.3.1. Stalin ⇒ underground Bolshevik, from Georgia, real activist ⇒ extend democracy, specialist in underground operation, bank robbery.

1.5.3.1.1. 1922 became the general secretary of the Bolshevik party = appoint ppl within the party > new everybody = knowledge about his comrades

1.5.3.2. Lenin (undisputed leader of the Bolshevik) several strokes than died in January 1924 ⇒ successor? Not longer debate in the party so the top leader must decide successor ⇒ Trotsky and Stalin rivalry over power

1.5.3.2.1. Stalin won ⇒ incorporate the new ruling class = bureaucracy running the state.

1.5.3.2.2. Trotsky leading opponent to Stalin and dictatorial regime ⇒ paradox = was in the party during the end of democracy then after criticized it

1.5.4. Stalinization

1.5.4.1. 4 stages (fully fledged permanent bureaucratic rule)

1.5.4.1.1. Mass movement stage

1.5.4.1.2. Restriction of democracy in the post war

1.5.4.1.3. Elimination of democracy while retaining abstract goals of equality and few abuse of power and privileges

1.5.4.1.4. Removal of the original layer of Bolsheviks from The political party and power = emergence of the bureaucracy as new ruling class

1.5.5. The International / Commintern

1.5.5.1. Communist international (Zinoviev) ⇒ period. Gathering of parties that are very close, sympathetic to the Bolshevik revolution. Founded in march 1919 in Moscow

1.5.5.1.1. all kinds of different ppl not necesarly in lign with Lenin… or socialist parties in power. + discontent from WWI

1.5.5.1.2. Not a top down bureaucratic control organization. Communist party's most important role BUT not in control of the international = umbrella organization // gather ppl (anarchist, marxists…) = all variants of left socialist, communist….

1.5.5.2. Second congress in July- august 1920 ⇒ « 21 conditions » decision to which all romanization wanted to remain. Part of the international need to agree on // political outlook and internal organization // democratic centralism

1.5.5.2.1. debates about the conditions= lots of organization refused to adopted them

1.5.5.2.2. communist party of France against it for instance; one condition = have to change the name for « communist party of… » seriously opposed by a lot of ppl. all communist movement emerging from socialist mvt, in France SFIO section was a traditional name, wanted to keep their name (influence and tradition)

1.5.5.3. → same process that eliminated democracy in russia = applied to the communist international = serious discussion within the international = less frequent. First 4y = gathering every years = discussion than after increasing time between the international = diminishing independence

1.5.5.3.1. organization originally designed for revolution ⇒. Became completely controlled from Moscow, Kremlin sometimes executed order and strategies to all the parties around the world

1.6. Limits to/of ...

1.6.1. ... totalitarian Paradigm

1.6.1.1. Downplays the significant differences between Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia

1.6.1.2. The ongoing existence of social classes (contra Arendt)

1.6.1.3. A static model of history incapable of seizing the dynamics of fascism

1.6.1.4. An exaggeration of the monolithic and coherent nature of fascism

1.6.1.5. Focuses exclusively on fascist regimes at the expense of fascist movements

1.6.2. ... the modernization theory

1.6.2.1. Italy and Germany had a very different level of industrial development

1.6.2.2. Exaggerates the economic and social archaism of both countries and the resistance of traditional elites to modern society

1.6.2.3. Exaggerates the middle-class dimension of fascism

1.6.2.4. Downplays the autonomous dynamics of fascist movements

1.6.3. ... the orthodox marxist interpretation

1.6.3.1. Exaggerates the functional nature to capitalism of fascism

1.6.3.2. Downplays the real political autonomy of fascist movements and regimes towards big business

1.6.3.3. Exaggerates the instrumental character of ideology

1.6.3.4. Exaggerates the threat of working-class revolution in pre-Fascist Italy and pre-Nazi Germany

1.6.3.5. Downplays the difference between conservative dictatorships and fascist regimes

1.6.4. ... the fascist paradigm

1.6.4.1. Italian fascism and Nazism had a different conception of race, of the role of the State, and of modernity

1.6.4.2. Italian fascism penetrated far less Italian society than Nazism did in Germany

1.6.4.3. Italian fascism had far more limited and less ideological geopolitical ambitions than Nazism

1.6.4.4. Hitler was far more omnipotent and central in the workings of the regime than Mussolini

1.7. Strenght of the Fascist Paradigm

1.7.1. Common conditions

1.7.1.1. The imperialist et nationalist frustrations of the bourgeoisie after WWI

1.7.1.2. The coexistence between pre-capitalist and capitalist social structures and values and a quick industrialization

1.7.1.3. A crisis of the political system and of the political hegemony of the traditional bourgeois parties

1.7.1.4. The existence of an organized socialist working-class

1.7.1.5. A more or less severe social and economic crisis

1.7.2. Commonalities

1.7.2.1. Exacerbated nationalism, a post-WWI cult of militarism, war and violence, and expansionist tendencies

1.7.2.2. Radical anti-Marxism and the destruction of the organized working-class socialist organizations

1.7.2.3. The cult of a charismatic leader

1.7.2.4. The destruction of all political oppositions

1.7.2.5. An alliance with the ruling elites despite an anti-bourgeois rhetoric

1.7.2.6. A stabilization or restauration of the capitalist order at first, despite a revolutionary rhetoric

2. Post-WW1 Revolutions

2.1. Russian Revolutions

2.1.1. Roots

2.1.1.1. TSARISM Isolation

2.1.1.1.1. Autocratic, dictatorial, monarchical regime

2.1.1.1.2. The Tsar was isolated bc not supported by anybody after the significant defeats

2.1.1.1.3. Even Aristocrats disappointed by the Tsar

2.1.1.2. 1905 Failed Revolution

2.1.1.3. Anarchism

2.1.1.3.1. predominance of terrorist anarcho-communists due to the repressive context, with a small anarchist-syndicalist movement in 1905-06

2.1.1.3.2. The debate amongst Russian Anarchists in exile on terrorism (stopped in the West in the 1890s because inefficient)

2.1.1.3.3. 1907: invention of the concept of anarcho-communism

2.1.1.4. CATASTROPHIC WAR SITUATION:

2.1.1.4.1. 1917: Between 6 to 8 million dead, heavily wounded our captured by the ennemy (the most)

2.1.1.5. small and concentrated working class (~10%) in St Petersburg)

2.1.2. 23rd of February 1917

2.1.2.1. huge demonstration by women protesting against the lack of food, coal…

2.1.2.2. 1st repression > more protests

2.1.2.2.1. the Russian Soldiers refused to shoot and fraternized

2.1.2.3. 2 Mars ⇒ Tsar abdicated

2.1.2.4. The Duma elected a provisional government (practically only conservative forces)

2.1.2.4.1. Only one member a bit socialist

2.1.3. Between Revolutions period

2.1.3.1. EMERGENCE OF NEW bottom-up POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ⇒ THE SOVIETS

2.1.3.1.1. Soviets Unions ⇒ Soviet Council

2.1.3.1.2. differs from parliamentary democracies bc ACCOUNTABILITY through recalls

2.1.3.1.3. Soviets are left / socialists so clash with the Conservative Provisional Government

2.1.3.1.4. FEDERALIZATION of the Soviets ⇒ cities / provincial / national congress soviets

2.1.3.1.5. February - April

2.1.3.1.6. April - June : Anarchists

2.1.3.1.7. EARLY JUNE 1917 (official first one)

2.1.3.1.8. June - August

2.1.3.1.9. Continuity Thesis, Marc FERRO

2.1.3.2. ... that can be nuanced with a first bureaucratization

2.1.3.2.1. Top-Down Bureaucratization

2.1.3.2.2. Bottom-up Bureaucratization

2.1.3.2.3. ... leading to the creation of a First Bureaucratic class

2.1.3.2.4. ... and then to the Rigid Bureaucratic regime

2.1.3.3. CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT vs RADICALIZED CONSTITUENCY OF LEFTIST GROUPMENT

2.1.3.3.1. The government didn’t do much compared to what they promised

2.1.3.3.2. Progressive anarchization of society

2.1.3.3.3. SEPTEMBER : remaniement of the Provisional Government : 10 socialists and 6 non-socialists (but no Bolcheviks)

2.1.3.3.4. 23rd October 2nd National Soviet Congress: 650

2.1.4. October Revolution

2.1.4.1. debates between the Bolchevicks

2.1.4.1.1. even publication about “why we shouldn’t launch an insurrection””

2.1.4.1.2. Les Justes de CAMUS (Théâtre)

2.1.4.1.3. Aspirations

2.1.4.1.4. No choice ? (Moshe LEWIN)

2.1.4.2. Storming of the Winter Palace

2.1.4.2.1. Bolchevicks success:

2.1.4.2.2. Marc FERRO: October 1917 as a social revolution in Russia and a triple coup in Petrograd (military coup of the Bolshevik-led RMC, political coup of the Bolshevik Party, personal coup of Lenin inside the RMC)

2.1.4.2.3. Moshe LEVIN: rather a mass movement headed by the Bolchevicks rather than a minority coup.

2.1.4.2.4. AT THE BEGINNING: alliance with the Socialist Revolutionaries

2.1.4.3. Relations with the Anarchists

2.1.4.3.1. Embracement & development

2.1.4.3.2. Divisions

2.1.4.3.3. Repressions

2.1.5. Outcome

2.1.5.1. Lenin and Trotsky’s belief in a world revolution… leads to ‘Red imperialism’

2.1.5.2. The Bolsheviks were able to win the Civil War notably because they were able to mobilize the popular masses, were not Russian nationalists, and were not willing to restore the antebellum situation in the countryside

2.1.5.3. The Bolsheviks as the only party capable to building an adequate State and as the only alternative to the Whites (Moshe LEWIN)

2.2. Chinese Revolution

2.2.1. Crumbling Empire

2.2.1.1. Foreign Influences

2.2.1.1.1. Opium Wars (1839-42 / 1856-1862)

2.2.1.1.2. Sino-Japanese war (1994-95)

2.2.1.2. Domestic Reasons

2.2.1.2.1. Population growth (150Mi > 300Mi (1800) > 450Mi (1850))

2.2.1.2.2. Over-production of literate men

2.2.1.2.3. Grand Canal > hydraulic despotism

2.2.1.2.4. Many revolts

2.2.1.3. Outcome

2.2.1.3.1. 1911 ⇒ railroad between Chengdu and Wuhan ⇒ state owned to after sell it to other powers ⇒ nationalists revolts = repressed + army and soldier discontent in Wuhan = call for insurrection

2.2.1.3.2. 1911: Emperor deposed

2.2.1.3.3. 1st January 1912 ⇒ Sun Yat Sen (never ruled China) declared the republic of China, provision gov

2.2.1.3.4. BUT replaced by Yuan Shikai (military chief) ⇒ Able to mobilize big army to fuel the revolution

2.2.2. The intellectual Origins of the Revolution : May 4th Movement

2.2.2.1. May 4th 1919: mostly academical movement protesting against the transfer of German possession to Japan as the result of the Treaty of Versailles

2.2.2.2. Literary revolution: using the the oral language in place of the literal one

2.2.2.3. Flourishing Magazines

2.2.2.4. Lucien Bianco: May Fourth Movement at the root of the origins of the Communist Revolution

2.2.3. First United Front (1924-27)

2.2.3.1. A merger of the KMT & CCP

2.2.3.1.1. KMT founded in 1919 by Sun Yat-Sen

2.2.3.1.2. 1921: CCP founded

2.2.3.1.3. working class based (and not farmers)

2.2.3.1.4. First United Front (1925-27)

2.2.3.1.5. Opportunity for the CCP

2.2.3.1.6. Growth of the CCP allowed

2.2.3.2. The Role of the Soviet Union

2.2.3.2.1. Moscow forced the alliance on the CCP

2.2.3.2.2. Leninist theory: during the 1st anti-imperialist phase of a revolution, the ‘national bourgeoisie” in colonial and semi-colonial countries is itself revolutionary

2.2.3.2.3. 1920s: Sun-Yat Sen refused the alliance because feared a “communistization” of KMT and China ⇒ attempted coup on him changed his mind

2.2.3.2.4. 1923: Joint statement made officialising the KMT-Soviet Alliance

2.2.3.3. CCP’s defiance towards the KMT and ambitions

2.2.3.3.1. Make use of the KMT name to foster the growth of Communist Strength

2.2.3.3.2. Convert the Kuomintang into a communist party ⇒ FAILED

2.2.3.4. The split and the purge of communists in the KMT

2.2.3.4.1. Before 1925: United Front fostered by Sun Yat Sen

2.2.3.4.2. Prepared the Northern Expedition ⇒ the CCP was against

2.2.3.4.3. April 12, 1927: Shanghai massacre, one the event signing the rupture between the CCP and the KMT

2.2.3.5. Result of the collapse

2.2.3.5.1. 1928 = Peking under Kuomintang rule BUT japanese annexation of Manchuria (1933)

2.2.3.5.2. 1931 = foundation of Chinese soviet republic with Mao as president

3. Resitance

3.1. Before WW2

3.1.1. Anti-fascist movements in Italy

3.1.1.1. Preexisted the take over of Mussolini

3.1.1.2. Weaker after because harder to organize

3.1.2. 1930s

3.1.3. ⇒ struggle btw fascism and Anti-Fascism

3.2. WW2

3.2.1. In General

3.2.1.1. Despite collaboration (such as Petain, or the Ustaše)

3.2.1.1.1. Resistance is deeply connoted as against Fascism (1939-)

3.2.1.1.2. Until 22nd June 1941, Resistance to the Nazi or the Italian wasn’t a mass movement

3.2.1.2. June 1941: OPERATION BARBAROSSA

3.2.1.2.1. No soviet preparation

3.2.1.2.2. All communists began to engage in the Resistance

3.2.1.2.3. anti-fascism movement ⇒ Transnational civil movement

3.2.1.3. 1942: the Nazi decided to instaure a Labour Draft in Europe (= STO)

3.2.1.3.1. More people joined the Resistance to escape the forced work in German Industries

3.2.1.3.2. Eastern Europe regime of occupation was way worse than the one in Easter Europe even for the STO equivalent

3.2.1.3.3. More collaboration in France than Scandinavia

3.2.2. Comparative Resistance

3.2.2.1. BELGIUM

3.2.2.1.1. Resistance and Collaboration

3.2.2.1.2. Main service provided to the Allied forces ⇒ guides to allied forces (bc the German took the signs ect…)

3.2.2.2. FRANCE

3.2.2.2.1. More collaboration in France than Scandinavia

3.2.2.2.2. More resistance in the South than the North of France (easier to hide + free zone)

3.2.2.2.3. 2/3 of France in the South of the Loire was liberated by the Resistance

3.2.2.2.4. Myth of the Resistance

3.2.2.3. ITALY

3.2.2.3.1. more developed than in France

3.2.2.3.2. self-liberated zones

3.2.2.3.3. 25 April 1944 ⇒ official liberation date

3.2.2.4. GREECE

3.2.2.4.1. 2/3 if not more where liberated by the resistance before the Allies even landed

3.2.2.4.2. Inside Hitler's Greece, Mazower

3.2.2.5. YOUGOSLAVIA

3.2.2.5.1. Partisans

3.2.2.5.2. TITO

3.2.2.6. German Resistance ⇒ 1/2 Mi dragged in front of nazi courts for anti-regime activities

3.2.2.6.1. underground news papers

3.2.2.6.2. strikes

3.2.2.6.3. economic sabotage

3.2.3. Gender & resistance

3.2.3.1. Civilian resistance was as important as military resistance. It is in the civilian resistance that women played a majority role

3.2.3.2. medals ⇒ majority of male (even though military units of the Maquis were men, women transported food to the Maquis, lived in the population, made the liaisons between maquis/groups, gathered info and more directly exposed than the men…)

3.2.3.3. ITALY

3.2.3.3.1. women role in the military

3.2.3.3.2. spread of images of women with guns

3.2.3.3.3. women units (same with Greece)

3.3. “Whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism.“ (Horkheimer 2005, s. 226).

3.3.1. (Fascism &) NAZIS with State entreprises

3.3.1.1. jews were to be eliminated

3.3.1.2. business community was not resistant

3.3.1.2.1. The HIGHER, the less resistant you are

3.3.1.3. IN GERMANY

3.3.1.3.1. Aristocrats hated Hitler but didn’t join Resistance because they did quite well under the Nazis

3.3.2. ⇒ national and social revolution became intertwined in the same movement

3.3.2.1. ⇒ Population acceptance of Capitalism was at its lowest at the end of 1945

3.3.2.2. Catholic Democrats / Social Democrats for Catholics

3.3.3. The Popular Mood forced significant concession regarding capitalism

3.3.3.1. not a return to 30s politics ⇒ need change

3.3.3.1.1. Social Insurances: unemployment, health… Retirement…

3.3.3.1.2. National services : Health, transport, energy…

3.3.3.2. recent acquisition of budget power for normal citizens (61% of budget on vital goods in 1850 in Germany ; 1990: 14.6%)

3.3.3.3. 1930s - 1970s (USA) & 1990s (Europe) ⇒ decrease of inequalities before explosion

3.3.3.3.1. Min: 34% (USA) & 29% (Europe)

3.3.3.3.2. USA ⇒ 47% of wealth for the 10% // 35% in Europe (2010)

3.3.4. EASTERN EUROPE

3.3.4.1. Prior to communist ⇒ up to 1939 )> “neo colonial economy” )> dependent on richer part of the World (Western Europe)

3.3.4.1.1. Already under developed and prior inequalities BUT WHY ?

3.3.4.2. some improvements under communism

3.3.4.2.1. Illiteracy rate wiped out

3.3.4.2.2. managerial elite as good as in the West

3.3.4.2.3. Socialized medicine ⇒ health public services

3.3.4.2.4. ⇒ shouldn’t neglect these advancements gotten to the expense of Democracy

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4.1.1. ...

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5. Global Sixties

5.1. Context

5.1.1. A larger Framework (1950s to 1970s)

5.1.1.1. Rooted in the 50s

5.1.1.1.1. 1956 as a crucial year for many societies

5.1.1.1.2. US Civil Rights Movements gaining steam in the mid-50s

5.1.1.1.3. East Asia

5.1.1.2. Extending into the 70s: radicalisation reached a high point, affecting more people than in the late 60s

5.1.2. Mid sixties

5.1.2.1. Precipitators of the global 60s

5.1.2.1.1. Civil Rights Movement, most notably, the Detroit Riots in 1967 with more than 400 deaths

5.1.2.1.2. Anti nuclear weapons movement of the 1950s and 60s gradually evolving into anti-Vietnam war movement

5.1.2.1.3. US student movements + anti-Vietnam war movement

5.1.2.1.4. Similar movements gradually became increasingly international

5.1.2.2. Paradox of the global-60s

5.1.2.2.1. Though radical social protest movements usually happen amidst socio-economic difficulty, the 60s was actually a period of economic boom

5.1.2.2.2. Ironically, it might have been the post war economic boom in the 50s and 60s that made people less insecure, thereby motivating them to protest against the status quo (reversal of normalcy)

5.1.2.2.3. Increased standards of living made possible due to the rise of the welfare state, expansion of the university system etc

5.1.2.3. Often characterised as a cultural revolution (true on some counts, false on others)

5.1.2.3.1. Cultural conservatism in the post WWII period: radicalism of the 30s and 40s had been crushed by McCarthyism

5.1.2.3.2. Social movements thus agitated for an even more radiant future, against the inequalities of the present, even in spite of the socioeconomic security that the present offered

5.2. Political reorientation: Emergence of the New Left

5.2.1. Whereas the Old Left was more focused on labour movements and unionisation, aligned with traditional Marxist ideals and emphasised class struggle, the New Left had a more socio-cultural agenda

5.2.2. Timeline of the New Left

5.2.2.1. 1950s and 60s as the genesis, with Spanish underground movements (underground because of the dominance of the Franco regime) in 1956

5.2.2.2. 1968 saw progressive social movements increasing in intensity

5.2.2.2.1. University and high school movements and protests in the US, but short-lived and ephemeral

5.2.2.2.2. Black Civil Rights movement as an important precursor and a component of the 1968 movements

5.2.2.2.3. In addition, wave of anti-nuclear weapon movements in late 50s, early 60s feeding into 1968 protest movement too → by 1960s, it was the Vietnam issue that took over (with protestors previously engaged in anti-nuclear weapon issue transitioning into anti-Vietnam war)

5.3. Western Europe

5.3.1. Italy

5.3.1.1. Italian student movements as the precursors of future student protest movement techniques

5.3.1.1.1. 1966: Italy as the starting point of the method of campus occupations (Trento, Milan University of the Sacred Heart)

5.3.1.1.2. 1967-1968 spread of campus movements in Italy, in 1968, the whole university system in Italy was paralysed because of the movements

5.3.2. France

5.3.2.1. May 1968 French movements as pivotal moment in French social history: “La France s’ennui”

5.3.2.2. 1968 as a mixture of normal union activities (marches/speeches etc) + novel student action (inspired by Italian techniques in Trento and Milan)

5.3.2.3. Historiography (Mai 68, Boris GOBILLE)

5.3.2.3.1. Current narratives

5.3.2.3.2. Contemporaneous Narratives

5.3.2.3.3. BIASES TO AVOID

5.3.2.4. The Student Movement

5.3.2.4.1. Sources

5.3.2.4.2. Dynamics

5.3.2.5. The Timeline

5.3.2.5.1. 6 May: students protests in Paris, 30,000 people in Paris protest against the repression at the Sorbonne

5.3.2.5.2. 10 May (Fri): decision taken to occupy quartier latin (build barricades), spontaneuous activity

5.3.2.5.3. Next work day (Monday) in protest against police brutality (labour movement solidarity with the student movement on 10 May who set up the barricades)

5.3.2.5.4. 14 May: workers in aviation plant near Nantes go for strike for local reasons → occupation of the factory

5.3.2.5.5. By 19 May, 2 million on strike; by 23 may, 10 million workers

5.3.2.5.6. 29 May: counter demonstrations in Paris

5.3.2.5.7. Next 5 weeks (until end of June): Sorbonne as the centre of the French revolt

5.4. Eastern Europe

5.4.1. Poland (9 March 1968)

5.4.1.1. Initially triggered by the performance of a theatre piece by the students — “the only things Moscow sends us are jackasses, idiots and spies”

5.4.1.2. Began with 4000 students marching through Warsaw to protest against the jailing of 2 students, resulting in 50 being arrested

5.4.2. Yugoslavia: protests against Stalinist (Titoist) leadership of Yugoslavia

5.4.2.1. University of Belgrade renamed as “Red University” to denounce the “fakeness” of Soviet communism

5.4.2.2. June 1968: “Down with the Red bourgeoisie” against Tito and his ossified communist party elites

5.5. Czechoslovakia: Prague Spring (1968)

5.5.1. Alexander Dubcek (leading reformist) as new head of Communist Party (Jan 1968)

5.5.2. Importance of the cultural sector

5.5.2.1. One of the struggles of the social movement being on the cultural front

5.5.2.2. People more attuned to what came out from the cultural sector than other developments

5.5.2.3. Main literary magazine was on liberal quasi-democratic trend until 1967, but then Communist Central Committee (prior to rise of reformists) fired liberal leaning editors, resulting in student protests in 1967 → Dubcek reinstates editors on 23 Jan 1968 as part of his reforms

5.5.3. Dubcek’s reform action plan

5.5.3.1. Elements of democratic reform

5.5.3.2. Launched series of mass meetings in factories, clubs, bars etc across country where people could say something about what they thought about the different clauses of the action programme → deliberative democracY

5.5.3.3. 15 March 1968: Dubcek fires prosecutor general and interior minister responsible for the repression of students back in 1967

5.5.4. Summer 1968: deepening of trend towards democracy BUT also presence of countermovements

5.5.4.1. Deepening democratisation and strong social movements

5.5.4.1.1. May 1968: 400,000 people show up for May Day in Prague, which were normally very orchestrated by the communist party

5.5.4.1.2. June 1968: extraordinary party congress on 9 Sept planned, with the agenda being to revamp the party leadership (which already had a new team since Jan under Dubcek), implication being further democratisation

5.5.4.2. Countermoves by EE/USSR leaders

5.5.4.2.1. Increasing number of military manuevres take place on/near Czechoslovak soil (by other Warsaw Pact countries), with Warsaw Pact leaders calling emergency meetings on the “emergency situation” in Czechoslovakia → question of how to put a stop to the Czechoslovakian situation

5.5.4.2.2. Warsaw Pact letter to Dubcek: “We are deeply disturbed by the events in your country”, want to return to a Stalinist “normalcy”

5.5.4.2.3. 19 July: Soviet Public Bureau issues an invitation for the entire upper level of then Czechoslovakia Communist Party to visit, they respond by inviting USSR leaders to Czechoslovakia

5.5.4.2.4. Meeting happens close to Russian border, very tense

5.5.4.2.5. 21 August: Soviet and Warsaw Pact intervention, tanks move into Czechoslovakia and Prague → END OF PRAGUE SPRING

5.6. Asia

5.6.1. South-Korea

5.6.1.1. April 1960 mass movements forcing out dictatorship of Syngman Rhee

5.6.2. Japan

5.6.2.1. movements against militarisation by American troops on Japanese soil

5.6.2.2. Context

5.6.2.2.1. economically, Japanese industry was emerging from the damage of the war and was starting its long phase of high economic growth

5.6.2.2.2. politically, there was the consoliation of the two major parties

5.6.2.3. 1960 Ango Struggle against the renewal of the US-Japan Joint Security Treaty, with citizens’ movement agitating for peace

5.6.3. Thailand

5.6.3.1. 1973 social movement that forced out dictatorship

5.7. Historiographical evaluation of the success of the global 60s?

5.7.1. Jeremy Suri

5.7.1.1. international counter culture was, in fact, complicit in many of the elements of society it criticised

5.7.2. Will Morris

5.7.2.1. overemphasis on politics in 1968 has 3 failures

5.7.2.1.1. (i) it mistakenly imbues “apolitical” acts with political weight;

5.7.2.1.2. (ii) it obscures the perspective of 68ers who maintain the primacy of culture (or at least parity) over politics;

5.7.2.1.3. (iii) it sidelines scholarly investigations into 68 cultural ramifications

5.7.3. Conservative right wing authors

5.7.3.1. 68 as a symbol of decline

5.7.4. Norbert Frei

5.7.4.1. reform rather than revolution or decay

5.7.5. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey

5.7.5.1. 68 as the starting point for future social movements = success not to be measures in concrete results, but the emergence and acceptance of new forms of politics

5.7.6. Horn

5.7.6.1. “first movement that is truly transcontinental” because it occured almost simultaneously int he 1st, 2nd and 3rd worlds, though these movements all agitated for different things

5.7.6.1.1. 1st world: student, worker protests, civil rights (France, US)

5.7.6.1.2. 2nd world: anti-bureaucratic dissent (1968 Prague Spring)

5.7.6.1.3. 3rd world: national liberation movements (Senegalese protests agaisnt PM Leopold Sedar Senghor: an ambassador of negritude but leading a neocolonial state!)

5.7.7. Legacy

5.7.7.1. Growing centralism, trend towards political conservatism, the “postwar social compact” beginning to fray, to show its excesses

6. Roots of World War 1

6.1. Uneven and combined industrialization in Europe

6.1.1. Rudolf HILFERDING

6.1.1.1. Capitalism didn’t spread to the world at the same paste

6.1.1.2. Capitalism is imported at its most advanced level in other countries ⇒ revolutionary effects faster and stronger

6.1.1.2.1. ⇒ THUS, the biggest factories in the World appear in the newest Capitalist countries (Russia, Japan…)

6.1.1.2.2. ⇒ stronger socio-economic tensions in Russia and Germany because stronger effects.

6.1.2. Leon D. TROTSKY

6.1.2.1. Newest Capitalist countries are better developed because didn’t have to create the path through anarchical developments (Russian coal mines in the Dumbass > UK coal mines)

6.1.2.1.1. ⇒ privilege of Historical Backwardness

6.1.3. The Changes brought by Industrialization

6.1.3.1. From British industrialization to the industrialization of war to necessary industrializations to a war of industrializations.

6.1.3.2. UK precocious industrialisation and imperial expansion favoured both the weakening of its hegemony due to the financial burden of the Navy and the Empire, but also ultimately its victory over Germany.

6.1.3.3. Russia’s need to finance its industrialization results in an alliance with France, already industrialized and with more surplus capitals than Germany, resulting in the encirclement of the latter.

6.2. The Real German Sonderweg

6.2.1. Sonderweg = specifical pathway ⇒ the Bourgeois Liberal Elite failed to take power thus, Germany was developed through Authoritarianism (leading to Nazis)

6.2.2. Germany, a later comer in the colonial game

6.2.3. Germany’s late and rapid industrialization during the Long Depression (1873-1896) results in Geopolitical frustration, the military-industrial-agrarian protectionist compromise, socio-political destabilization and an aggressive attitude towards Russia and Great Britain.

6.2.3.1. Needed a massive investment in the Navy to fuel the growth and the regime (military > more budget | industry > outlet of the arm race | agrarian elite > get jobs as officers)

6.2.4. Germany’s weakly centralized State and its inability to raise the adequate tax revenues for its growing military spendings, as well as Russia’s rearmament and the progressive loss of power of the German aristocracy in the army, prompted its generals to seek a preventive war as early as 1912.

6.3. The EASTERN question

6.3.1. Big Power geopolitics

6.3.1.1. From the “artificial” safeguard of the Ottoman Empire to avoid Russian continental hegemony to the rise of an aggressive Turkish nationalism in the Balkans

6.3.1.1.1. If not been supported financially and militarily by France and UK during the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War => collapse

6.3.1.2. The Compromise of 1867 and the rise to power of the Magyar aristocracy led to Austra-Hungary’s expansion in the Balkans, resulting in an alliance with Germany and mounting tensions with Russia and the Serbian “Piedmont” (= (only) center of unification of Serbs)

6.3.1.3. The 1905 defeat against Japan drove Russia towards westward expansion and allowed for its alliance with Britain whilst its 1908 humiliation (Tsar forced to backdown when Austria-Hungary unilaterally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina) pushed it to war in 1914.

6.3.2. Ottoman Empire

6.3.2.1. Chronology

6.3.2.1.1. 1 229: foundation

6.3.2.1.2. 1229-16th: growth

6.3.2.1.3. 16th-1918: decline

6.3.2.2. Accelerating decline

6.3.2.2.1. Egypt

6.3.2.2.2. French expansion in Northern Africa

6.3.2.2.3. 1875: Bosnia pro-independence revolt

6.3.2.2.4. 1876: Bulgaria pro-independence revolt

6.3.2.2.5. ⚔️ 1877-78: Russo-Turkish war

6.3.3. Balkan Wars (1912 & 1913)

6.3.3.1. The 1911: Agadir Crisis gives a free hand to Italy to invade Libya, resulting in a weakening of the Ottoman Empire and prompting the Balkans powers to attack

6.3.3.2. The 2nd Balkan War, the end of the Russo-Bulgarian alliance, and Russia’s total support to Serbia in 1914.

7. Colonization, Decolonization & Neo-Colonialism

7.1. Early roots of “post-colonialism”

7.1.1. Haiti and Latin America: 1801 Haitian Revolution expelling the French colonialists, but resulted in the punishment of Haiti by other countries, who refused to recognise its independence

7.1.2. Japan: 1905 Russo-Japanese war (and Japanese victory) inspired anti-colonial movements worldwide

7.2. Historiography of Decolonization in France

7.2.1. Empire Colonial et Capitalisme Français - J. Marseille

7.2.1.1. Sum Up

7.2.1.1.1. TRADITIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

7.2.1.1.2. Marseille's Periodization

7.2.1.2. The divorce

7.2.1.2.1. THE TURNING POINT OF THE 1930s

7.2.1.2.2. DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE FRACTIONS OF FRENCH CAPITAL

7.2.1.2.3. THE STAGES OF THE DIVORCE

7.2.2. L'intérêt économique Fr et la décolonization de l'Afrique du Nord - Saul

7.2.2.1. Hypthesis

7.2.2.1.1. French North Africa remained attractive for private capital until the independences (and beyond)

7.2.2.1.2. This profitability explains the modernization of North African companies by the State since the end of the 1940s, with a limited financial burden (3,5-4% of the French State’s expenses were devoted to the empire between 1950 and 1958).

7.2.2.1.3. Beyond cartierism (Marseille), Marxism and colonialism: decolonization was neither exclusively a matter of profitability nor caused the ruin of the French economy

7.2.2.2. Conlusions

7.2.2.2.1. French economic interests did not play a significant role in the decolonization of French North Africa because they had no economic reason to do so

7.2.2.2.2. Between 1945 and the independences, no economic sector was in terminal decline, profitability remained relatively satisfactory and stable even in the last years, and there was no disinvestment

7.2.2.2.3. The driving force behind the decolonization of French North Africa was the anti-colonial struggle

7.2.2.2.4. Neither colonization nor decolonization ruined France

7.3. Impacts of WW1 and 2

7.3.1. Undermining the narrative of “civilising mission"

7.3.1.1. Façade of European invincibility undermined

7.3.1.2. European colonial master recalled colonial administrators due to shortage of manpower on the homefront, with these vacant posts in the colonies being filled by locals

7.3.2. Disillusionment in the colonised world

7.3.2.1. French and British had made many promises to colonies to gain their support in the war effort (improved living standards, more autonomy etc), but the fact that these promises were generally not kept post-WWI increased disillusionment

7.3.2.2. HCM as an example of someone disillusioned by WWI: the hypocrisy of Wilson’s 14 points (self-determination) → increased attraction to communism as an alternative

7.3.3. Independence of former colonies created impetus for other colonies to similarly declare independence

7.3.3.1. Indonesia (1949), followed by Vietnam victory over French at Dien Bien Phu (1954)

7.3.3.2. Colonised people took heart from these events, particularly in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria): 1960s saw 17 nations declaring independence from colonial masters

7.3.4. WWII compounding the impacts of WWI

7.3.4.1. Colonies excited by the rapid defeat of Frane, which demonstrated that even the colonial powers could quickly be brought to their knees

7.4. Snapshot of decolonization

7.4.1. India

7.4.1.1. Western educated figures as leaders of the independence movement

7.4.1.2. Dominant model of anti-colonial resistance was non-violent (Gandhi + Congress)

7.4.1.3. Ultimately, the cost of repression was too high for the British → decided to grant independence

7.4.2. Egypt

7.4.2.1. Initial enthusiasm for Wilson’s 14 points (especially the idea of self-determination)

7.4.2.2. Post WW1 leadership went to Versailles to make their case for independence but failed to do so

7.4.2.3. 1936: UK relinquished control over Egypt (with notable exception of the Suez canal)

7.4.2.3.1. Regime that took over was conservative elite, uninterested in social reforms (in the 50s and 60s)

7.4.2.4. Suez Canal crisis as an example of neocolonialism

7.4.2.4.1. To nullify political opposition, Nasser capitalised on trade unions, working class and police to outst Naguib (incumbent, supported by small middle class, political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood)

7.4.2.4.2. 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the gradual evacuation of Britain from Egypt

7.4.2.4.3. Erosion of Nasser’s pro-Western orientation hastened when US and Britain refused to give Egypt the funds that had been agreed upon for the Aswan High Dam → Nasser nationalise Suez Canal Company (which UK, France were major shareholders of) to finance the dam

7.4.2.4.4. 1967: 6-day war

7.4.3. North Africa

7.4.3.1. Two modes of anti-colonialism: peaceful or revolutionary

7.4.3.2. Most violent revolutonary movements were in those of colonial settlers

7.4.3.2.1. Example: Algeria wherein the pied noir (European origin people) did not want to leave Algeria after having been in Algeria for centuries

7.4.3.2.2. 1954: French North Africa instability, with guerilla warfare in Morocco and Tunisia, and the Front de Libération in Algeria → French sue for peace in Vietnam (Geneva Accords in 1954) to focus on French North African possessions

7.4.3.2.3. 1956: complete independence given to Morocco and Tunisia, focus on counterinsurgent war to retain Algeria, which had a significant pied noir popualtion

7.4.3.2.4. 1956-1958: France tried to create a new Franco-Muslim society to prepare for Algeria’s integration into France

7.4.3.3. Native elite were often not much better (Egyptian example), with political independence often being merely an elite-elite transferral of power and economic control

7.5. Cold War & the rise of Neoloconialism

7.5.1. Independence movements against the backdrop of the Cold War

7.5.1.1. Leaders of anti-colonial movements looking for allies to help them gain independence; cognisant of the fact that their struggle was occuring within the international context of a fight between the US and USSR → nationalist leaders try to recruit US or USSR on their side

7.5.1.1.1. Recruitment of the US could not be so directly anti-colonial because of its partnership with colonial powers; rather, nationalist leaders framed their struggle as one against the spread of communism in their region

7.5.1.2. As a result, both US and USSR used aid packages, technical assistance, military intervention etc to encourage newly independent nations to adopt programs that aligned with their superpower interests

7.5.2. Desire to upkeep facade of Western strength and power leading to preoccupation with domina theory (Wen-Qing Ngoei: The Arc of Containment)

7.5.2.1. Fall of Singapore perceived by the US and UK to lower the prestige of the white race in the eyes of the Asiatic people, demonstrating that “white empires...can be defeated...by non-whites” (Foreign Affairs journal)

7.5.2.2. State Department finding missions in 1950 found that the Japanese had demonstrated the way the Chinese would invade the region in the future, making it imperative that Vietnam not fall to the communists → domino theory → explains US preoccupation with the region

7.5.3. NAM and Bandung Conference (1955)

7.5.3.1. Nehru, 1953 in Cairo: the strongest urge in the developing world = “nationalist urge against foreign domination” + emphasis on multicultural unity

7.5.3.2. Perception in the West of the nascent NAM

7.5.3.2.1. Dulles: viewed with caution, deemed to be an example of racial anti-western solidarity, a consolidation of the Sino-Indian entente, as a LEFTWARD SHIFT IN THE THIRD WORLD

7.5.3.2.2. Herald Tribune: Red China is no netural and no third force; what the NAM is is a formidable and ambitious move to apply the principle of Asia for Asians

7.5.3.3. Reaction — SEATO (1954) as a regional security pact

7.5.3.3.1. Meant to show the advantages of cooperation between East and West, “there should be no cleavage between the Western and Asian nations” (Dulles, 1955)

7.5.3.3.2. Source of alienation and tension between Asian nonaligned opinion and US allies and partners

7.5.3.4. Bandung Conference (1955)

7.5.3.4.1. 29 Asian and African nations, with the governments co-sponsoring the Conference, including Zhou Enlai (China), Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Philippines

7.5.3.4.2. Result: communique essentially calling for (i) collaboration and solidarity between nations of the third world; (ii) reliance on dependency on Europe and North America; (iii) alternative way of just global governance (outside the Cold War paradigm)

7.5.3.4.3. Impacts

7.6. Legacy and continuity

7.6.1. Cold War rivalries as a form of neocolonialism?

7.6.2. Neocolonialism in the sense that it is still an elite class that is exploiting the masses

7.6.3. Cultural dominance of the colonial masters

7.6.3.1. Whereas British colonisation was indirect, French colonisation was direct, pragmatically relying on the assimilation of the African people into a French civilisation

7.6.3.2. French educated native elite in West Africa taking over: Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal PR) prided himself on his French

7.6.3.3. School system focused more on French politics and culture rather than that of their own countries

7.6.4. Cultural dominance of the colonial masters

7.6.4.1. HQs in the global north, branches in the global south to produce their goods in the most cost efficient way possible and to exploit EOS

7.6.4.2. 2011 Forbes: top 147 MNCs control 40% of the world’s wealth

7.6.4.3. Confer infra: Washington Consensus and the dominance of the ideology of neoliberalism in hegemonic global institutions like the IMF and WB forcing newly independent countries (EE) to adopt neoliberal policies or face non-assistance or political isolation

7.7. Challenging western discursive domination

7.7.1. Postcolonialism

7.7.1.1. Provincialising Europe (Dipesh Chakrabarty): the need to approach history strategically from the point of inversion, but that is not to say that

7.7.1.1.1. (i) there is a rejection of modernity, liberal values etc;

7.7.1.1.2. (ii) that there is cultural relativism or nativism;

7.7.1.1.3. (iii) instead, Europe’s acquisition of the term “modern” is itself a piece of global history

7.7.1.2. Criticism: Postcolonialism’s popularity lies more with the increased visibility of academic intellectuals of Third World origin rather than the concepts rigourous for critical inquiry; rather than a “description” per se, it is more a discourse; Moreover, it is silent on its relationship with contemporary capitalism

7.7.2. Nuance between postcolonial and decolonial: postcolonial as assuming that colonisation is over, whereas de-colonial grapples with colonialism’s continued forms even after de jure decolonisation (Kiran Asher, Amherst)

7.7.3. Rejection of the overemphasis on the CW: Jeremi Suri: “Cold War was not the universal driver of global change”

7.7.4. Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (1950)

7.7.4.1. According to Césaire, colonialism acts to “decivilise” the coloniser themselves

7.7.4.1.1. Césaire located the origins of fascism within colonialism itself, in the very traditions of humanism that critics believed fascism threatened

7.7.4.1.2. “The Christian bougeois has a Hitler inside him”

7.7.4.2. Fanon: “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World”

7.7.4.2.1. Because of Césaire’s affiliation with communism, Fanon is privileged over the former

7.8. The Vietnam War

7.8.1. French Indochinese War

7.8.1.1. Postdam Conference (July 1945)

7.8.1.1.1. Ended the war in Europe, but not necessarily that in Asia

7.8.1.1.2. Northern half of Vietnam relegated to the KMT to disarm the Japanese, whereas the southern hald was given to the British to dismantle Japanese infrastructure

7.8.1.2. August Revolution (1945) by HCM

7.8.1.2.1. Revolution launched by the Viet Minh (led by HCM, including CPV) against the Empire of Vietnam and the Empire of Japan, that quicky seized control of most rural villages and cities through Northern, Central and Southern Vienam

7.8.1.2.2. Sought to created unified regime for the entire country under Viet Minh

7.8.1.2.3. Declaration of DRV by HCM on 2 Sep 1945

7.8.1.2.4. French reassertion of control in South Vietnam

7.8.1.2.5. Chinese troops occupied north Vietnam starting August 1945, allowed Viet Minh provisional government to remain and exercise authority

7.8.1.3. Precursor to the French-Indochina war (1945-1946)

7.8.1.3.1. French plundering of Saigon in August 1945

7.8.1.3.2. 6 March Franco-Vietnamese Accord: HCM and DRV start to negotiate with France in the hopes of preserving national independence and to avoid war

7.8.1.4. French-Indochina War (1946-1954)

7.8.1.4.1. By 1950s, war increasing turning against the French because of (i) gradual internationalisation of the war; (ii) increasing guerilla warfare by the Viet Minh in both the north, center and south

7.8.1.4.2. French war efforts financed by the Americans — 41% in 1952

7.8.1.4.3. Dien Bien Phu (1954)

7.8.1.4.4. 1954 also the period when Algerian Liberation Front (nationalist movement) activity started to agitate against France; Algeria as strategically more important than Vietnam, given the pied-noir population there; intervention in Algeria as a “makeup” for French defeat in Indochina but eventually led to the end of France as a global power

7.8.1.5. Geneva Accords (1954)

7.8.1.5.1. North Vietnam run by HCM, Viet Minh; South Vietnam run by Diem (French educated), supported by the US and the West

7.8.1.5.2. Commitment to hold democratic elections within 2 years (in 1956)

7.8.1.5.3. Agreement signed by DRV, France, PRC, USSR, UK, but not the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam), though the US “took note” of the ceasefire agreement

7.8.2. US Vietnam War

7.8.2.1. Context of post French-Indochina war, pre American Vietnam war

7.8.2.1.1. Civil war following the Geneva Accords

7.8.2.1.2. Diem as a dictator, keeping population under tight control and censorship; by 1963, politically isolated, with dwindling US support → general staged a coup and removed Diem

7.8.2.1.3. Viet Minh benefitted from political chaos, strengthening its underground presence and building up supply lines in South Vietnam

7.8.2.2. American intervention, second Vietnam War

7.8.2.2.1. Tonkin incident (2 and 4 August 1964)

7.8.2.2.2. Escalation of American intervention

7.8.2.2.3. Tet Offensive (Jan 1968)

7.8.2.2.4. DRV economic reliance on USSR and China (similar to the dependence of the State of Vietnam, and Diem previously on the West)

7.8.2.3. Domestic opposition to the Vietnam War (confer Global 60s revolutions)

7.8.2.3.1. Protest movements in the US against the Vietnam War as a confluence of domestic movements (Civil Rights Movement, Anti-Nuclear Weapon Movement), and international trends (Italian and French 68 revolution)

7.8.2.3.2. "Vietnam syndrome” = extreme reluctance of US citizens to support US involvement in war abroad, manifested in “draft dodgers” and “conscientious objectors” against military conscriptions

7.8.2.3.3. VW as a unifying cause

7.8.2.4. American influence in Germany; Internationalisation of opposition to Vietnam War, but tempered by American influence

7.8.2.4.1. American hegemony in Europe post-WWII

7.8.2.4.2. Although mass media facilitated internation coordination for anti-VW movements, the international movements cannot be reduced to merely a pale imitation of the US anti-VW movement, because they were deeply enmeshed within local contexts as well

7.8.2.5. HR discourse in the Colonial Wars

7.8.2.5.1. Different definitions of CW between the superpowers (empire of liberty v empire of justice/equality)

7.8.2.5.2. At the same time, different conceptions of HR for other actors

8. The Collapse of the USSR

8.1. The Waves

8.1.1. Immediate aftermath of death of Stalin (1953)

8.1.1.1. Anti Stalin demonstrations in USSR satellite states like Czechoslovakia, Hungary (first wave of protests)

8.1.1.2. Relative liberalisation of politics that allowed European communist parties to develop a reformist wing

8.1.1.2.1. Hungary: Imre Nagy as a reformist PM, undid previous regime’s heavy handed style of communist governance

8.1.2. Khrushchev “secret speech” in 1956 as a frontal assault of Stalin

8.1.2.1. Interpreted as a greenlight for relaxation of dictatorial control

8.1.2.2. Poland: relaxation of censorship, political prisoners released, greater freedoms for social protest movements (Communist Youth Branch and handmade signs and slogans “Down with False Communism” etc)

8.1.2.3. Hungary

8.1.2.3.1. October 1956: demonstrations of 200,000 people; attacks on radio stations to call for withdrawal of Soviet troops; spontaneous working class movements (take over factories and declare “Workers’ Councils”) → goal of reform not to adopt Western way of life, but to have a democratic communism, or rather to go back to a “purer” form of communism (as opposed to Stalinism or that prescribed by the USSR) → DOWN WITH FALSE COMMUNISM

8.1.2.3.2. November 1956: USSR troops militarily overpower that of Hungary

8.1.2.3.3. Result: new government installed, Imre Nagy executed, but new government ruled with carrots and sticks rather than only heavy handed manner

8.1.3. 1976 Polish protests against food prices

8.1.3.1. First major, anti-Stalinist mass social movement, precursor to Solidarnosc (will take over government later)

8.2. Perestroika and Glasnot through elite and popular mobilisation

8.2.1. Robert Daniels’ irony of the vydvizhentsy (promotees)

8.2.1.1. Toppling of Stalin by Khrushchev ironically created a greater sense of collective leadership, preventing the over-concentration of power in the hands of a single person (ie, a similar Stalin situation)

8.2.1.2. emboldened party elites to overthrow Khrushchev after the Cuban Missile Crisis

8.2.2. CAPITALIST ANTECEDENTS IN THE LATE USSR

8.2.2.1. Gorbachev’s motivation for glasnost and perestroika: prophylactic party reform

8.2.2.1.1. Party apparatus was unreliable for support (cf Robert Daniels’ irony above) → hence, Gorbachev wanted to make his position more secure and less reliant on the party apparatus, strengthen his leadership position → glasnost and perestroika

8.2.2.1.2. “Our enemies...write about the apparatus that broke Khrushchev’s neck, and about the apparatatus that will break the neck of the new leadership”

8.2.2.1.3. To that end, (i) he planned to shift power (both at the central and local) from the party to a strengthened state apparatus with himself as the PR; (ii) stacked Central Committee with new blood that was loyal to him; (iii) coopted national elites in the Soviet republics

8.2.2.2. THE ROOTS OF THE PERESTROIKA

8.2.2.2.1. By 1985, when Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the CP of the USSR, the need for economic and social restructuring had become urgent with the slowdown of economic growth in the USSR in the 1970s-80s, the growing cost of the military engagement in Afghanistan, and the social unrest

8.2.2.2.2. The economy was stagnating, over-centralized, focused on military industrial production, over-bureaucratized, corrupt and inefficient, and ridden by a shadow economy that compensated for the lack of state consumer goods

8.2.2.2.3. The administration of industry was inert, industrial discipline was lacking, workers and employees lacked incentives, the industrial ministries acted as independent bodies writing their own plans and often deceiving the central planners about their real economic resources, and plans would be fulfilled in a routine and bureaucratic fashion with little concern for quality

8.2.2.2.4. Gorbachev and a team of academics had begun to work on scenarios for the restructuring of the USSR while working as the Minister for Economic Policy (1982-84)

8.2.2.3. THE PERESTROIKA

8.2.2.3.1. The goals of the Perestroika: 1) changes in economic mechanisms towards more autonomy of economic units from one another and the state; 2) the democratization of political control over the economy by granting larger powers to the organs of popular, local control (Soviets)

8.2.2.3.2. In 1987, a program for economic reform was adopted, aiming at making enterprises independent, self-financing and self-sufficient by breeding competition and market price regulation, with bankruptcy becoming an option

8.2.2.3.3. From 1988, cooperatives operated on a limited liability basis, were allowed to employ non-cooperative labour, with wages and working conditions subject to individual contract, were to decide themselves the income distribution, could raise capital by issuing shares, and had complete freedom regarding sales and purchases

8.2.2.4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERESTROIKA

8.2.2.4.1. The (limited) legalization of entrepreneurial activity, as well as the legacy of the USSR’s legal system (which gave precedence to the rule of the nomenklatura over the rule of law), made the decriminalization of the previously shadow economy possible, allowing for the creation of a criminal-political nexus, i.e. the alliance between shadow businessmen and high-ranking officials of the CP

8.2.2.4.2. By the late 1980s, it was still the nomenklatura who was ruling over the USSR, and who later reorganized as pro-marketization neo-nomenklatura in the independent post-Soviet States …

8.2.3. Frustration of the new CPSU generation

8.2.3.1. Brezhnev era and beyond emphasised continuity and the reduction of the circular flow of power

8.2.3.2. Status quo interests of upper officiadom strongly integrated with policy making + more difficult for new blood to be promoted because of old guard → frustration

8.2.4. Gorbachav’s courting of the intelligentsia

8.2.4.1. Post Chernobyl, Gorbachev realised the extent of ossification within the party, even at the lower levels

8.2.4.2. Forced to enlist the support of the intelligentsia in his reform efforts, in exchange for the relaxation of political constraints on intellectual freedom

8.2.5. Popular mobilisation intelligentsia

8.2.5.1. Diverse interests of the population — not everyone viewed “reformed communists” well: in Hungary, some segments of the population viewed them with suspiciond

8.2.5.2. Environmentalism and colonial narrative

8.2.5.2.1. Moscow as a colonial authority with extractice industries, resource-based economies being set up in many of the republics, with Moscow stealing resources

8.2.5.2.2. Contra to romantic notion of the “nation rooted in nature” and that a nation should control its own natural resources instead of being exploited

8.3. The Historiography of the End

8.3.1. Glennys Young, Fetishizing the Soviet Collapse: “collapse” as a politically loaded and analytically consequential term, assuming that the USSR and its system were (i) doomed to fail by deadly flaws, and that its fail would be (ii) without human agency, a quick and irreversible process wherein the previously existing structure is turned into unrecognisable rubble

8.3.2. Fukuyama, “The end of history” (1989) (essay written for National Interest and not the 1992 book)

8.3.2.1. CPSU under Gorbachev moving towards glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (reconstruction) as the Marxist “end of historye

8.3.2.2. By “end of history” = ideal form of political org was liberal democracy and market economies =/= nothing else of historical significance would occur later

8.4. The End of the Cold War

8.4.1. Four factors playing a significant role in the end of the Cold War

8.4.1.1. (i) rejection of Brezhnev Doctrine = glasnost and perestroika;

8.4.1.2. (ii) Reagan and NATO triumphalist school;

8.4.1.3. (iii) economic crisis;

8.4.1.4. (iv) popular unrest (workers and HR movements)

8.4.2. Key events

8.4.2.1. EE Soviets gradually moving away from USSR influence (even before 1990, in 1989)

8.4.2.1.1. July 1989: Gorbachev speech signalling unwillingness to use force against protestors in countries within USSR orbit

8.4.2.1.2. Hungary: Oct 1989, new constitution allowing for multiparty system and competitive elections; rehabilitation of Imre Nagy

8.4.2.1.3. East Germany: Oct 1989 massive protests, with Gorbachev telling East German leaders of the need to reform, suggested that incumbent be replaced by more reform-minded leader > Nov, the wall falls

8.4.2.2. 1990: May Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies election

8.4.2.2.1. 1991: August Coup against Gorbachev but failed, but sounded death knell for Gorbachev → 25 Dec resignation

8.4.3. Helped the installation of the Washington Consensus

8.4.3.1. Tariq Ali (Pakistani-British historian): “The collapse of ‘communism’ in 1989 created the basis for a new social agreement, the Washington Consensus, deregulation and the entry of private capital into hitherto hallowed domains of public provisions would become the norm everywhere, making traditional social democracy redundant and threatening the democratic process itself”

8.4.3.2. Neoliberal: market-led development, “reduction” of state involvement and privatisation to increase economic growth

8.5. Inevitability of peaceful USSR collapse is questionable

8.5.1. Previous uprisings against the CPSU were met with violence and CPSU victory (1956 Hungary, 1968 Prague, Soviet troops stationed throughout EE)

8.5.2. Rather, the “dismantling” of the USSR must be viewed in context of (i) glasnost and perestroika; (ii) Reagan

8.5.2.1. Archie Brown: policies made USSR “case to be communist by definition” because there was no more monopoly on power (perestroika and glasnost on information), no more state ownership of production (perestroika), no ideological commitment (profit motive in perestroika), no international movement

8.5.2.2. Gorbachev’s decision to allow elections with a multi-party system and create a presidency for the USSR began a slow process of democratisation the eventually destabilised Communist control and contributed to the collapse of the USSR

8.5.2.3. Repeal Art 6 of Constitution that gave CPSU the leading role in the USSR, with laws in 1990 facilitating the introduction of a multiparty electoral system → Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies (elected in May 1990) → Boris Yeltsin

8.5.2.4. Tension between (i) pluralists and newly empowered deputies like Yeltsin (Russian nationalist), and (ii) hardline Communist elite (desire to thwart Gorbachev)

8.5.3. Ivan Berend, “The Collapse: A revolutionary symphony"

8.5.3.1. Polish and Hungarian case studies: combination of popular protest and non-violent negotiation

8.5.3.1.1. Poland: pluralisation of the regime came about through multiple rounds of social movements, compromises between the party and opposition (Solidarnosc and outside like the Church), which intensified after the exchange of the Brezhnev Doctrine with the Sinatra Doctrine

8.5.3.1.2. Hungary: basic confrontation occurred within the party (top down) between the centrist-conservatives and the reformists

8.5.3.2. Nationalism as a substitute for failed modernisation

8.5.3.2.1. In the context of the 1990s, but can be applicable to the present day as well

8.5.4. Controversy surrounding Solidarnosc in Poland

8.5.4.1. Revolutionary, anti-USSR credentials

8.5.4.1.1. Nonviolent struggle against Polish communist government in 1946

8.5.4.1.2. First independent trade union in Warsaw Pact country

8.5.4.1.3. 1981: imposition of martial law drove Solidarnosc underground, where it survived due to Western support and Polish emigre groups

8.5.4.2. Controversial legacy post 1989

8.5.4.2.1. Poland divided betwen a “post-Soviet world Solidaristic Poland” dedicated to traditional and Christian values and a “liberal” Poland focusing on market and pluralist principles

8.5.4.2.2. Post-USSR overhaul of economy and privatisation under Walesa (see Lecture 12) led to high rates of joblessness (human cost of “bloodless revolution” too high) → population felt “tricked” by liberalism

8.6. HR displacing anti-imperialism as the dominant form of internationalism

8.6.1. Within the USSR: HR critical to be used by opposition on the left and right, internal and external dissidents to criticise the USSR regime

8.6.2. HR indeed helped decry and criticise things like torture and repression, but failed to denounce material disparities, corruption, or global hierarchies of power

9. Economy

9.1. Economic Development

9.1.1. Overview "Asian Tigers"

9.1.1.1. 1965: most of the Asian tigers supplied less than 1/20th, some countries even less economically powerful than MNCs

9.1.1.2. 1995: Asian Tigers produced 1/5th of global output

9.1.1.3. Within the apogee of decolonisation → (i) desire to catch up economically with the rest; (ii) desire for economic autonomy

9.1.2. Previous Catch Up examples

9.1.2.1. England as the inventor of the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, context of the other parts of the world not being developed

9.1.2.2. France: 19th century, French hopelessly economic behind because of archaic class structure, infantile banking system, unfavourable commercial laws (governmental set-up did not promote commerce)

9.1.2.3. Industrial development then spread to other parts of the world in concentric circles

9.1.2.3.1. Belgium as the first other country as a promoter of the industrial revolution given its geographical proximity to the UK

9.1.2.3.2. France: chemical industry and fashion

9.1.2.3.3. UK textile production as the cutting edge industry in the beginning of the industrial revolution, BUT then invention of cotton gin proved to be the big breakthrough that the US needed to catch up

9.1.2.4. Thus, British economic domination insufficient to prevent other countries from becoming more powerful economically speaking as well

9.1.2.5. However, tariffs and protectionism were not a panacea/silver bullet for development during that time: case study of Mexico

9.1.2.5.1. High tariffs present to protect domestic industries, but industrial leaders did not invest in increasing productivity, hence lack of economic development

9.1.2.5.2. Example: oldest spinning wheel in Mexico lay idle for 3 years because of an inactive drive wheel that no one could repare

9.1.3. post-war Asian economic miracles

9.1.3.1. Relationship between war and post-war economic development

9.1.3.1.1. Weakened cohesion among the traditional elite and power brokers, meaning that there was less opposition to the government’s selective targeting of certain industries for subsidies etc

9.1.3.1.2. Effects of American Cold-War related involvement

9.1.3.2. State intervention to compel economic development

9.1.3.2.1. Besides low wages (undesirable), there was also the implementation of government market-oriented policies: free trade zones, free trade (abandonment of tariffs)

9.1.3.2.2. In addition, interventionist policies like targetted state subsidies, and import substitution strategies (subsidies and assistance for companies in certain industries), tax exemptions etc

9.1.3.2.3. Taken together, the State takes an active role in economic development

9.1.3.2.4. Social context as conducive for such state intervention as well: relatively lower level of inequality meant that it was easier to target specific sectors favour certain industries

9.1.3.2.5. Alice Amsden (leading developmental economist), “Third World Industrialisation: ‘Global Fordism’ or a New Model?”

9.1.3.2.6. Non Align-Movement and economic development

9.1.3.2.7. Developmental banks as a pathway towards modernity

9.1.3.2.8. China not really an “Asian tiger” because the pathway of development was different

9.1.3.2.9. EU

9.1.3.3. HELPED BY NEOLIBERALISM ?

9.1.3.3.1. Britz Bartel: “neoliberalism provided [Regan and Thatcher] with the political and ideological tools to shut down industries, impose austerity and favour the interests of capital over labour"

9.2. Inequalities

9.2.1. Causes of inequality: neoliberalism the cause of inequality

9.2.1.1. between countries — not necessarily neoliberalism

9.2.1.1.1. Tenets of the neoliberal global economic system: open to trade

9.2.1.1.2. Yes, neoliberalism leading to inequality

9.2.1.1.3. No, developmental state as a subversion of determinism of “world capitalist economic system” of “core and periphery”

9.2.1.2. Inequality within countries

9.2.1.2.1. Privatisation in EE countries (post-Soviet failed modernisation) + feed into elite-elite transfer of power from colonial era to enrich old elites + entrench incumbent elite power

9.3. Dependency theories

9.3.1. Frank

9.3.1.1. ARGUMENT

9.3.1.1.1. Capitalism is a system of (world-wide) exchange, and whatever part of the world is affected in any fundamental way by exchange is ‘capitalist’

9.3.1.1.2. Incorporation into the world capitalist system leads to the development of underdevelopment in most areas, because the ‘metropolis’ exploits its ‘satellites’ by appropriating surplus (and concentrating investments)

9.3.1.1.3. The capitalist world system as based on an exploitative relation which forms a chain of expropriation of economic surplus, where “at each step along the way the relatively few capitalists above exercise monopoly power over the many below”

9.3.1.1.4. The ‘lumpenbourgeoisie’, i.e. the merchant capital class who controls the export and import trades and the export-oriented agriculture, has an economic interest in perpetuating an under protected and under industrialized economy, legacy of colonial times, and so State policy is geared to the needs of the non-industrial export-oriented sectors

9.3.1.2. BREWER’S CRITIQUE

9.3.1.2.1. There is a difference between class monopolies and individual monopolies, monopoly control of the means of production and monopoly in exchange… thus “the assertion that exploitation is the result of monopoly becomes an empty tautology”

9.3.1.2.2. Economic and geographical hierarchies can coincide, but they are not the same (class hierarchies)

9.3.1.2.3. Frank is incapable of accounting for the transformation of the relations of production from merchant capital to modern monopoly capitalism in the peripheries, as well as their (relative) development due to foreign investment (attracted by lower costs of production)

9.3.1.2.4. Underdevelopment cannot be explained by the transfer of surplus (defined in a rather loose fashion) but by its (unproductive) uses

9.3.1.2.5. International trade can be beneficial to modernizing economies (ex. Turkey, Brazil, South Korea…), and self-sufficiency detrimental (ex. ‘Arab socialist’ countries)

9.3.1.2.6. Many Third World countries have had very high levels of industrial protection, and State investment have been poured into infrastructure and ‘heavy’ industry (ex. Iran)

9.3.1.2.7. A methodological problem of making “brief, sloganistic assertions” and then justify them by a series of historical examples, without considering counter examples

9.3.2. General

9.3.2.1. Argument

9.3.2.1.1. The participation as a satellite in the capitalist world system leads to a distorted and dependent economy, based on an unequal exchange between peripheries producing cheap raw materials for export and centers selling them (mainly for the unproductive consumption of the elite) high value goods, leading to a growing imbalance of payment and indebtment of the former

9.3.2.1.2. Even a nationalist government cannot succeed in promoting capitalist development because of the constraints imposed by the international economy

9.3.2.2. BREWER’S CRITIQUE

9.3.2.2.1. ‘Import substituting’ industrializations can succeed, even with a limited internal market, thanks to a higher competitivity on the international market

9.3.2.2.2. Patterns of specialization can be changed

9.3.2.2.3. And indeed, some Third World countries have succeeded in replacing imports of manufactured goods, or even in exporting manufactured goods themselves (‘export-oriented industrialization’)

9.3.3. Wallerstien

9.3.3.1. Argument

9.3.3.1.1. The capitalist world system, or ‘world-economy’, is divided into core, semi-peripheric and peripheric States, with transfers of surplus from the latter to the former due to the capacity of the former to alter the terms of trade through imperialism, monopolies, protectionism at home and open door policies elsewhere… at the expense of the latter

9.3.3.2. BREWER’S CRITIQUE

9.3.3.2.1. The notion of a semi-periphery can easily become an excuse for ad hoc explanations and to account for change when it cannot be obscured

9.3.3.2.2. Wallerstein seems to count anybody who produces for profit in the market as a capitalist

9.3.3.2.3. Relations of production are overlooked because they are seen as secondary results of the functioning of a world system defined by the existence of market links

9.3.4. Amin

9.3.4.1. Arguments

9.3.4.1.1. The accumulation of capital takes place on a world scale, a world divided into many distinct national social formations, containing different modes of production

9.3.4.1.2. Unequal specialization is both cause and consequence of uneven development

9.3.4.1.3. The development of capitalism in the periphery is thus blocked by the superior competitive strength of the industries of the center, manifested in an ability to undercut the industries of the periphery or to establish a price level which prevents new industries emerging at all

9.3.4.2. BREWER’S ASSESMENT

9.3.4.2.1. When comparative advantages are such than the less developed area is excluded from (notably industrial) activities which are relatively labour-intensive, forcing them to specialize in agriculture (land intensive), resulting in an increased pressure on the land, raising rent and low wages / high unemployment, Amin is right

9.3.4.2.2. Trade can cause unemployment when capital is mobile and productivity differences outweigh differences in wages, resulting in the more advanced country having the higher rate of profit, leading capital out of the less developed country

9.3.4.2.3. Amin claims that the same products were produced at the center and in the periphery, although if products are not specific, there is no room for unequal specialization, and Amin’s analysis evaporates, along with the theory of unequal exchange

9.3.4.2.4. Levels of productivity and their evolution are taken for granted by Amin, but once capital becomes mobile, it is difficult to see why technology, and hence productivity levels, cannot be transferred, along with capital. They clearly have been in some cases, as Amin knew.

9.3.4.2.5. Amin admitted that transfer of industries from the center to the periphery is indeed the tendency, but argued this tendency does not dominate because 1) it takes time, 2) capitalism needs the high wages of the center to provide a market, and 3) the need for balance of payment equilibrium

9.3.4.2.6. To conclude, Brewer argues that Amin provided a plausible account of the evolution of a periphery which is integrated, by stages, into a world market, while retaining a distinct wage level, a distinct social structure (persistence of pre-capitalist modes) and a lagging productivity level, at least in some sectors; but he did not have an adequate explanation of the evolution of productivity, especially in the era of multinational companies

9.3.5. BREWER’S ASSESMENT OF DEPENDENCY THEORY

9.3.5.1. The Bases

9.3.5.1.1. All countries are dependent on the world market, and some ‘centers’ (like Belgium) even more than some ‘peripheries’ (like India)

9.3.5.2. The Critics

9.3.5.2.1. It is hard to assess what is a ‘restricted’ or ‘distorted’ capitalist development, since it presupposes an abstract pattern of capitalist development. Indeed, early writers in the dependency tradition meant that the periphery would lag further behind the center, remain under industrialized, and continue to depend on primary product exports to pay for their imports of manufactures. However, this is not what happened, as industrial output and exports grew more rapidly in ‘peripheries’ than ‘centers’ in the last decades

9.3.5.2.2. Finally, how to account for the gross unevenness of capitalist development in the Third World? Is there any common feature to all the ‘peripheries’? In East Asia, some ‘peripheries’ have experienced extremely high rates of growth, and have become centers; elsewhere, growth have been very slow, especially per capita.

9.3.5.3. CONCLUSIVE Critic

9.3.5.3.1. For Brewer, the success of dependency theory is not to be attributed to its analytical efficiency, as it has failed to explain the burst of industrialization and the extreme unevenness of development in the so-called periphery

9.3.6. BRENNER’S CRITIQUE OF WALLERSTEIN

9.3.6.1. The Idea of Wallerstein

9.3.6.1.1. Wallerstein, like Smith, identifies capitalism with an increased commercialization and geographical division of labor, and conceives “surplus maximization” and market competition as essentially transhistorical forces, rather than seeing them as specifically capitalist imperatives that drive (uneven and combined) economic development. The production of raw materials for export can result both in development or underdevelopment

9.3.6.2. The Critics

9.3.6.2.1. It is class structures and social property relations that “determine the course of economic development or underdevelopment over an entire epoch”, and these are the outcome of class struggles: the example of post-feudal England and Qing China

9.3.6.2.2. Economic growth under capitalism is neither the result of its geographical and commercial expansion, nor that of the transfer of surplus from peripheries to cores, nor that of specialization, but rather of the mute compulsion of market competition, which forces market-dependent actors to satisfy market imperatives (increase labor productivity, diminish costs and prices, etc.) as to maintain or expand their rate of profit and reproduce themselves as capitalist actors, thus allowing for the development of the forces of production through a process of accumulation by innovation

9.3.6.2.3. Wallerstein, like Smith, identifies capitalism with an increased commercialization and geographical division of labor, and conceives “surplus maximization” and market competition as essentially transhistorical forces, rather than seeing them as specifically capitalist imperatives that drive (uneven and combined) economic development. The production of raw materials for export can result both in development or underdevelopment

9.3.6.2.4. “In fact neither development in the core nor underdevelopment in the periphery was determined by surplus transfer. […] The uniquely successful development of capitalism in Western Europe was determined by a class system, a property system, a system of surplus extraction, in which the methods the extractors were obliged to use to increase their surplus corresponded to an unprecedented […] degree to the needs of the development of the productive forces”.

9.4. The Origin & Cycles of Inequalities (Piketty)

9.4.1. Origins

9.4.1.1. Inequality tends to rise when the avg rate of return on capital exceeds growth rate. Since the rate of return on inherited wealth will always grow faster than the income one earns through compensated labour → as long as there is patrimony, increasing inequality is the nature of capitalism, which can only be checked through state intervention

9.4.1.2. Top 1000th of the population owns nearly 20% of total global wealth, with bottom 50% owning less than 5% of global wealth

9.4.1.3. POLITICAL CHOICE OF REPARTITION

9.4.1.4. Limitations: (i) too Western centric; (ii) too deterministic (nothing can be done except tax the institutions of inequality)

9.4.2. Cycles

9.4.2.1. Statistically, up to 1980, between-country inequality has been increasing relative to within-country inequality, but after 1980, within-country inequality has been increasing relative to between-country inequality

9.4.2.1.1. Up to 1980, welfare state in Europe reducing within-country inequality; Soviet economic malaise increasing between-country inequality

9.4.2.1.2. Post 1980, neoliberalism and the dismantling of the welfare state increased within-country inequality and increased between-country inequality too (exploitation); but growth of the developmental state of China also decreased between-country inequality

9.5. Neoliberalism & Privatisation

9.5.1. Etymology

9.5.1.1. Initially termed “denationalisation” in the 1920s, and “reprivisation” in the 1930s by the Nazi regime — Maxine Sweezy (1941): Nazis use “reprivatisation” to remedy low private consumption, high savings level, but at the cost of greater social inequality

9.5.2. Privatisation of economic wealth as the central element of neoliberal political and economic theory and practice

9.5.3. Privatisation under neoliberalism began in the West in the 1980s and 90s (1980-1991: 6,000 big enterprises sold off in the non-socialist world)

9.5.3.1. Genesis in the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) (1947) as an IO of economists, philosophers, historians as a reaction against the proposed International Trade Order to create a charter regulating international trade

9.5.3.1.1. MPS organised by Friedrich von Hayek and Chicago School of Economics, financially supported by powerful business magnates, politicians, diplomats etc

9.5.3.1.2. Ideology: with the individual as the unit of focus, neoliberalism is necessary for, and compounds individual liberty and freedom (moralistic angle)

9.5.3.2. Irony of MPS neoliberalists: liberalism was supposed to be laissez-faire, but its goal was a competitive global trading order, which counterintuitively required high levels of intervention to ensure state non-interference and adoption of neoliberalism

9.5.3.3. Case study of the Chilean “Chicago Boys” (1970s-80s)

9.5.3.3.1. 1975: during recession, Pinochet turn to Chicago Boys to guide the economy

9.5.3.3.2. Goal: neoliberal economic reform not just for economic vitality, but for social reform and rejuvenation

9.5.3.3.3. General method: gain access to government coercive power (already consolidated under the previous Pinochet regime) to privatise and create new, competitive society

9.5.3.3.4. Specific method

9.5.3.3.5. Results

9.6. Rise of neoliberalism

9.6.1. Political explanation

9.6.1.1. Threat to the political power of the corporate capitalist class in the 1970-80s; collapse of the post-war Keynesian social consensus

9.6.1.1.1. Rising unemployment and accelerating inflation, compounded by oil crises led to widespread discontent → conjoining of labour and urban social movements augured a socialist alternative to social compromise

9.6.1.1.2. Neoliberal project as a prophylactic counterrevolutionary project to nip revolutionary labour-urban social movements and communist influence

9.6.1.2. But contradictory ideologies: utopic drive v material reality

9.6.1.2.1. Want to make domestic labour competitive with global labour, BUT instead outsourced cheap labour to third world

9.6.1.2.2. Privatizations and Deregulations for efficiency BUT unemployment

9.6.1.2.3. > Piketty: contradiction between rhetorical benefits for all (moral argument by MPS), and reality of benefits for some

9.6.2. Economic threat to the position of the ruling class

9.6.2.1. Postwar social compact: restrain the economic power of the upper classes, redistribute wealth so that labour can be accorded larger share of economic pie

9.6.2.1.1. It worked because growth was strong, and the restraints (welfare state) were thus minimal,

9.6.2.1.2. BUT when growth collapsed in the 1970s, the economic interests of the ruling class felt threatened

9.6.2.2. Harvey D. (Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 2007) thesis: neoliberalism ineffective at revitalising global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded in restoring class power

9.6.2.2.1. Turn to neoliberal politics in the 1970s because of the collapse of the postwar social compact

9.6.2.2.2. Theoretical utopianism of the neoliberal argument (market freedom = freedom) has not materialised, more likely a system of justification and legitimation

9.6.2.3. Example of the US

9.6.2.3.1. 1970s: growing sense among upper class that the anti-business, anti-imperialist climate that had emerged towards the end of the 1960s had gone too far → thus need to be restrained

9.6.2.3.2. Republicans (party of business) needed a popular base to achieve its ends → capitalise on moral and social conservatism (Christian rightwing) → white working class persuaded to vote consistently against its own material interests on cultural, nationalist, and religious grounds

9.6.2.3.3. 1973-1975: diminished tax revenue at a time of rising social expenditures from the welfare state → neoliberalism solution = dismantle welfare state = curb labour unions, layoff in public employment, wage freezes, cutbacks in social provisions

9.6.3. Global return of neoliberalism: neocolonialism and neoimperialism?

9.6.3.1. New international compact depended on the reanimation and reconfiguration of the US imperial tradition

9.6.3.2. Entailed closer integration of the global economy with a well-defined financial architecture: IMF, WTO, World Bank setting out new guidelines to spread the neoliberal tradition → Washington Consensus (1989, John Williamson, the standard IMF reform package)

9.6.3.3. Closer collaboration among top capitalist powers: G7 bringing Europe and Japan into alignment with US to shape global financial and trading system that effectively forced all other nations to submit

9.6.3.4. EXAMPLE OF CHICAGO BOYS IN CHILE

9.7. Eastern Europe Privatization

9.7.1. Pressure on Eastern Europe to adopt neoliberalism

9.7.1.1. Leading Western governments and IOs dominated by neoliberalism policy agenda, and since they held the resources that EE needed for development, countries that opposed neoliberal ideas risked punishment by financial markets and political isolation

9.7.1.2. Geopolitical motivations of a political realignment from East to West, with EE countries wanting to cement country’s Western identity and differentiate themselves from Russia + incentive of EU membership

9.7.1.3. Pressure on EE especially great because it was forced to compete not only among itself, but also against international powerhouses like China and India

9.7.2. Pathways to privatisation in the post-Soviet world

9.7.2.1. Poland

9.7.2.1.1. Managers of state owned companies set up private companies and then merged them with the state enterprises that they manage so that they could gain decisional power

9.7.2.1.2. → when the SOEs were sold off in the 1990s, they were seriously undervalued (because of the managers’ influence) → managers could then buy off the SOEs at low prices

9.7.2.2. Hungary: partial privatisation

9.7.2.2.1. Profitable parts of SOEs privatised, whereas non-profitable parts of SOEs kept as state properties so the government would either have to run them or shut them down eventually

9.7.2.3. Czechoslovakia: coupon privatisation

9.7.2.3.1. All citizens over 18 could purchase coupons for a nominal price in exchange for SOE share → 71% of eligible people did so

9.7.2.3.2. Subversion of the egalitarian purpose by investment privitisation funds

9.7.3. Consequences of neoliberalism (privatisation + free market)

9.7.3.1. Context of the important social function of the workplace, especially in Soviet bloc

9.7.3.1.1. Workplace had outsized role in planning social support networks, leisure networks etc, hence when these companies shutdown, people lost not only their income, but also their social support network

9.7.3.2. Problem of inefficient production and uncompetitiveness

9.7.3.2.1. Protectionism and state subsidies (foreign trade control) under the Soviet system made Soviet SOEs non-competitive

9.7.3.2.2. Problematic when neoliberalism led to the abolition of foreign trade controls, meaning that post-Soviet companies now had to compete with the productive and efficient Western companies

9.7.3.3. Problem FDI and foreign ownership of companies

9.7.3.3.1. Context

9.7.3.3.2. Less compunction to keep open: foreign investors have less link to the local community, and thus less compunction for the welfare of the local people, more concerned with the profitability of their assets → if company is unprofitable, investor would just shut it down

9.7.3.3.3. Lack of reinvestment in domestic context: even if company were profitable, the investor would likely channel the profits back to his home country rather than reinvest it in the local context

9.7.3.3.4. Anti-competitive behaviour: example of West German investors buying up East German companies only to shut them down to reduce competition and to gain market share

9.7.3.4. Result

9.7.3.4.1. Hungary: from 1989-1993, ⅓ of all jobs disappeared

9.7.3.4.2. Even after neoliberalism started to bring economic growth, the problems of privatisation still persisted, with economic growth benefitting the owners of capital rather than the population as a whole

9.7.4. Ukraine (Ukraine and the Empire or Capital, Yurshenko)

9.7.4.1. THE 4 MYTHS

9.7.4.1.1. THE MYTH OF TRANSITION

9.7.4.1.2. THE MYTH OF DEMOCRACY

9.7.4.1.3. THE MYTH OF THE ‘TWO UKRAINES’

9.7.4.1.4. THE MYTH OF THE ‘OTHER’

9.7.4.2. POST-SOVIET UKRAINE

9.7.4.2.1. Political Power

9.7.4.2.2. During the 1980s-1990s, there is a rise in property and economic crimes perpetrated notably by gangs

9.7.4.2.3. Hyper-stagflation reached its climax in the middle of the 1990s: output has shrank by some 50 %, inflation reaches 10 000 % in 1993, wages decline by more than 60 % in real terms

9.7.4.2.4. The disintegration and disempowerment through marketization reforms and assaults on workers collective rights of a once powerful Ukrainian working class in Donbas was a fertile ground for their manipulation by the ‘masters of the Donbas’ to turn their angriness away from social and economic demands towards separatism and calls for Novorossiya

9.7.4.2.5. The ‘Orange Revolution’, following a massive electoral fraud (2004), put in power Yushchenko, who began his presidency with the aim to fight corruption, join the WTO and build closer relations with the EU and NATO

9.7.4.3. THE ROOTS OF THE 2014 CIVIL WAR

9.7.4.3.1. In a context of heavy capitalist concentration, with a quarter of the top 100 Ukrainian companies in the hands of just four FIGS, when Yanukovych became president in 2010, the last obstacles to the concentration of power and capital in the hands of the Donetsk bloc disappeared

9.7.4.3.2. The wave of tax reforms, the increasing neoliberalization of the economy, a wave of privatization and restructuring of energy generation and supply sector to create market for oligarchic FIGS of the Donetsk bloc, as well as the authoritarian, repressive (notably towards rival oligarchs like Tymoshenko), cronyist and usurpatory policies of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, generated both socio-political dissatisfaction domestically and condemnations and threats of sanction internationally

9.7.4.3.3. This was not sustainable, as the economic and financial dependence of Ukraine to foreign markets and the IMF made it vulnerable to pressure from the West and Russia alike, leading the first to support right-wing nationalist parties and the second (with the assistance of the industry-owning oligarchy of Donbas) to obtain Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the treaty at the Third EU Eastern Partnership in Vilnius in November 2013, precipitating the Maidan revolution in Kyiv, the fall of Yanukovych, the anti-Maidan movements in Eastern Ukraine, and eventually the (civil) war of 2014-2023

9.8. Thomas Piketty, une critique illusoire du Capital, BIHR & HUSSON

9.8.1. DEFINITIONS

9.8.1.1. Capital as anything generating revenue to its owner (Piketty): a reification and a deification of capital, and thus a ‘fetishist’ definition of capital (Bihr)

9.8.1.2. Market, competition, profit, wages, capital, debt… do not exist as such and are social constructs (Piketty): the fact that they are social constructs do not mean they are not objective as they are relatively autonomous from social actors and constrain their actions, and are the phenomenal forms of the capitalist relations of production (Bihr)

9.8.1.3. Inequalities, exclusively of revenues and patrimony, as the product of an inequalitarian regime (Piketty): a tautological and reductive definition of inequalities, which should be studied as phenomenal manifestations of structural social relations, as both qualitative and quantitative, as multidimensional (also between genders, generations, regions…) and as a system (not only of revenues and patrimony, but in terms of housing, ‘cultural capital’, education, health, access to public spaces and medias…)

9.8.2. THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOMENT (1910s-1970s): BIHR

9.8.2.1. THE ROOTS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOMENT

9.8.2.1.1. The social-democratic moment and the rise of the ‘fiscal and social State’ as an ‘ideological revolution’ in a context of war, revolution and economic crisis (Piketty): the acknowledgment yet underestimation of the role of class struggles, armed antifascisms and the fear of revolution in the compromise between social-democrats and the ruling classes

9.8.2.1.2. Social-democracy as an interclassist (grouping workers, peasants and public servants), party-centered (with subordinate associations and unions), pluri-tactical (combining strikes and elections), mono-strategical (aiming at exercising power) and under German Marxist ideological influence political movement

9.8.2.1.3. The rise of social-democracy was conditioned by the modalities of capitalist accumulation at that time, as capitalist concentration and centralization allowed for that of the working class, as the homogenization of its conditions allowed for greater working-class unity, and as the need to attract workers pushed companies to implement social measures that workers sought to further extend. And as the growth of the ‘fiscal and social State’ was the objective of this rising political force, capitalist accumulation created conditions favorable to this growth

9.8.2.1.4. In addition, this objective was adequate to the requirements of capitalist accumulation at that time: the shift to a predominantly ‘intensive accumulation’ (based on a rising labor productivity) of capital necessitated public investments in ‘human capital’ through generalized education, healthcare, etc. thus creating a convergence of interest between social-democrats and capitalism

9.8.2.1.5. In addition, to ensure macroeconomic stability and growth, it was necessary to regulate how these productivity gains would be shared between labor (wages) and capital (profits), and for this the rise of the ‘fiscal and social State’ was adequate

9.8.2.1.6. It also allowed for the building of efficient public infrastructures

9.8.2.1.7. … And, as the social-democratic movement was hegemonic in the working class, it allowed for its ‘social pacification’ through a compromise between the former, who would curb the revolutionary tendencies of the working class, and the bourgeoisie, who would pay for social peace by accepting redistributive fiscal and social policies

9.8.2.2. THE LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOMENT

9.8.2.2.1. The illusion and limits of the co-management of companies, and Piketty’s obscuring of workers self-management

9.8.2.2.2. The illusion and limits of social democracy’s ‘educational justice’, and Piketty’s obscuring of the perpetuation of social inequalities in primary and secondary education

9.8.2.2.3. The absence of a transnational fiscal cooperation, one of the failures of social democracy according to Piketty, is logical as the Keynesian-Fordist regime of capital accumulation implies that each ‘fiscal and social State’ controls its fiscal policies

9.8.2.2.4. Finally, according to Bihr, social democrats always sought for the perpetuation of capitalism, whether Keynesian-Fordist or neoliberal: the examples of Germany from Ebert to Schröder

9.8.3. THE NEOLIBERAL MOMENT (1980s-2020s): HUSSON

9.8.3.1. THE NEOLIBERAL MOMENT

9.8.3.1.1. The ‘exhaustion of [labor] productivity gains’ is the defining feature of the neoliberal moment, and it is the beginning of this exhaustion that led to the crisis of profitability of the 1970s

9.8.3.1.2. However, profits have risen up since then, despite the exhaustion of productivity gains, and thanks to the diminishing share of wages in the distribution of added value, i.e. thanks to the rise of the rate of exploitation

9.8.3.1.3. This should have led to a shrinking demand, but neoliberal measures have compensated for this by ensuring 1) the redistribution of part of the profits to the upper class as revenues to be spent rather than reinvested, 2) the growth of credit and indebtment and 3) the conquest of new markets

9.8.3.1.4. However, this restauration of profits failed to relaunch capital accumulation, as productive investments have stagnated, although the compression of wages have been justified by the need to increase competitivity

9.8.3.1.5. This situation has been made possible by 1) the rise of unemployment and an increased competition on the (henceforth global) labor market, and 2) fewer opportunities of profitable investment, due to the shift of demand towards services where there are fewer productivity gains to be made (but Brenner argues that profitability is also declining in the industrial sector)

9.8.3.1.6. Financialization plays a major role in this scheme, as it 1) ensures redistribution of wealth to the upper class, 2) favors over indebtment, and 3) facilitates globalization and thus the decrease of wages by putting workers in competition on a global scale

9.8.3.2. THE CENTURY OF INEQUALITIES

9.8.3.2.1. Different Periodizations

9.8.3.2.2. The growth of the 1945-1974 era is not explained by the decrease of inequalities (Piketty), but rather the other way around: it is the growth of labor productivity that allowed for economic growth

9.8.4. OTHER CRITIQUES OF PIKETTY

9.8.4.1. DAVID HARVEY

9.8.4.1.1. The declining share of wages in the distribution of added value since the 1970s is due to the political and economic weakening of the working class due to the mobilization of technologies, unemployment, relocation and anti-salary policies by capitalists and governments

9.8.4.1.2. For Harvey, Piketty obscures rather than shed light at this class offensive: “There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning” (Buffett)

9.8.4.2. Branko Milanovic

9.8.4.2.1. even if what is stated is true, it relies on history hence on empiricism. History alone will prove him wrong or right.

9.8.5. OTHER INEQUALITIES

9.8.5.1. GENDER

9.8.5.1.1. The unequal transmission of patrimony is one of the greatest factor of economic inequality between men and women, especially amongst business owners

9.8.5.2. Race

9.8.5.2.1. Despite the diminution of inequalities of revenues between Black and White populations in the US since the 1960s, patrimony inequalities are still very high