1. introductory
1.1. political movements have not been a dominant subfield in the study of social movements
1.2. in the 1960s and 1970s, the study of social movements was prominent in politics, but later that field moved to sociology.
1.3. some authors concerned with social movements in political sceince tend to adapt paradigms from other disciplines, considering interest groups, race, ethnicity, voting, or power analysis
1.4. the field of political science does not have a complete theoretical set on social movements, but its focus on institutions, focus on political organisation and the focus on the policy payoff of different strategies of action could be of great value to the study of social movements
2. american politics
2.1. the debates on the exercise of power in american politics developed the literature on social movements
2.2. the constellation of organised groups engaged in politics was seen as a fairly approximate representation of interests in society --> (Truman) new issues created disturbances producing new groups --> balancing the system of American politics
2.3. Dahl: the creation of multiple levels of government and te separation of power ignited all sorts of interest group into the political struggle
2.4. criticisms of pluralism:
2.4.1. how can social interests be translated into organised political interests? Bacharach and Baratz: there is a second face to power: the setting of the agenda..
2.4.2. Lukes: there is a third face to power: people who were generally excluded from meaning political access were also victims of cultural hegemony that determined how they considered their own interests.
2.4.3. Schattschneider: by mobilising support from outside actors, effectively calling in reinforcements, interests parties can alter the balance of power in a conflict in their favour --> this is what social movements do
2.5. public policy:
2.5.1. Lipsky (1968) argued that many groups in the political system lack power and therefore cannot get in the game. The way they can exercise influence is through protest, making them more direct actors
2.5.1.1. protest works not as a direct exercise of influence, but as a means to apeal and promote sympathetic action from more powerful allies
2.5.1.2. protest is the most attractive tool for those without other substantial resources
2.5.2. Piven and Cloward (1977) did extensive case studies of social unrest generated by poor people
2.5.2.1. they argue that protest is the only means in politics for poor people, but is rarely employed and not always effective
2.5.2.2. only in cases of significant societal change, are they effective; in their daily lives they are preoccupied with 'surviving'
2.5.2.3. organisers tend to waste unique moments of societal change by setting up the organisation, rather effort should go to remaining mobilised and disruptive
2.5.2.4. organisers face a dilemma as to how to manage their claims
2.5.2.4.1. on the one hand "they can build stable rganisation and undermine their political influence"
2.5.2.4.2. or "they can abjure [afzweren] formal organisation, stoke mobilisation, recognising that their disruption will be short-lived and unlikely to lead to substantial reform"
2.5.3. Lowi: social movements respond to changes in the political system. They are necessary outside-the-system means to promote public policy reforms.
2.5.3.1. the iron law of decadence: "that tendency of all organisations to maintain themselves at the expense of needed change and innovation"
2.5.3.2. social movements create reform where institutions have failed
2.5.3.3. movements that are successful tend to become routinised and then become part of the system they once threatened
2.5.4. Meyer (2005): explored the connections between social movements and public policy
2.5.4.1. the affect one another
2.6. interest groups and political advocacy
2.6.1. Olson in 1967 brought attention to the concept of free riding in social movements' organisations
2.6.2. need for incentives to participate
2.6.2.1. analysts distinguished between collective and selective benefits; collective benefits are those from which free riders are also better off
2.6.2.2. also difference was made between incentives being purposive (policy reform), material, solidary (good feeling and human connections)
2.6.3. organisers with more selective benefits to offer for participation are more successful in mobilising support
2.7. voting and mobilisation
2.7.1. Browning et al 1984: protest is not enough in the minority struggle for political access, and that while dramatic extrainstitutional action can work to set the policy agende, effective representation over a longer haul is predicated on building inroads in mainstream politics --> a notion derived from political science and its literature
2.7.2. protest-demand and electoral mobilisation were important resources that initiated a mobilisation path that passes through minority incorporation and ends at policy response.
2.7.3. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993): the degree of participation by minorities and individuals in politics depends on the political leaders who offer opportunities or who don't
2.7.4. costs of individuals to participate in politics is too high for most, the more for the poor and uneducated; leaders participate and mobilise
2.7.5. mobilisation occurs through social movements, inspiring people to vote, persuade, compaign and to give.
2.7.6. Rosenstone and Hansen's model is based on rational choice theory and public choice field of political science
2.7.6.1. social movements are a institutional tool political leaders can use to mobilise people
2.8. urban riots
2.8.1. Eisinger and Tilly: frequency of protest bears a curvilinear relationshop with political openness
2.8.1.1. if there is openness, there are more channels, then protest is less likely due to possibilities to engage/claim less costly
2.8.2. McAdam (1982): the theoretical frameworks for analysing social movements in sociology and political science are incomplete
2.8.2.1. sociologists fail to address the institutionalised political processes while political scientists fail to consider how noninsitutional entities can effect change inside political institutions
2.8.2.2. McAdam attempts to bridge divide: political process model --> emphasises an interaction between internal and external forces
2.9. identity
2.9.1. "political scientists have generally seen collective identities constructed in response to the structural conditions of various constituencies, and much of the leading academic work has focused on the politics of race
3. comparative politics
3.1. developed world: politial sociology
3.1.1. Tarrow (1989): used events data analysis and found that social movements, even if resource-poor can continuously influence the political system, through increased access, shifting electoral alignments, divided elites and influential alles
3.1.1.1. social movements interaction and react to the political changes, which create new opportunities
3.1.1.2. Tarrow's work is firmed based on political science, due to its reliance and the relevance for social movements' survival on the poltiical system; an integrated part
3.1.1.3. "he agrees with sociologists that repertoirs of contention and framing matter in the social movement" --> interdisciplinary
3.1.2. Kriesi and colleagues examined left political movement in France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland.
3.1.2.1. Koopmans: "the development and characteristics of protest are shaped by the available political opportunities for mobilisation"
3.1.2.2. Untitled
3.1.3. Giugni (2004): social movements are affected by and affect the political opportunity structure and public opinion
3.1.3.1. hypothesis: interactions among portest activities, political alliances, and public opinion increase the likelihood that social movements bring about policy changes
3.1.3.2. public opinion on its own does not affect policy change, but it is the interaction of the 3 together
3.1.4. McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly (2001): built a theoretical framework bases on analyses of political processes, involving mobilising structures, framing processes, repertoires of contention [standpunt of twistpunten] and opportunity and threat
3.2. developed world: public opinion
3.2.1. Opp (1989): social theory of political protest --> individuals weigh costs and benefits of protest participation and decide on an outcome that will max their own utility
3.2.1.1. collectivism conception of rationality --> it is rational to engage in group protest, because the likelihood of succes is higher than protest by individuals only --> critical mass is relevant for participation
3.2.1.2. feelings of efficacy [werkzaamheid/doeltreffendheid] and (partially) the relative deprivation and resource mobilisation theories
3.2.1.3. builds on economy, but links own model to current sociological explanations of social movements
3.2.2. Dalton (1988): citizen participation in the advanced democracies have been on the rise, governments have a harder time satisfying their citizens
3.2.2.1. criticises theorists who believe this brings about a crisis in democracy
3.2.2.2. social movements are ideology-driven and act like interest groups in that they change the political landscape and build a permanent place for themselves in mainstream politics
3.3. developing world: repression
3.3.1. Rustow (1970) and Bermeo (1999) contend that moderation is not a prerequisite for democratisation; political violence, protest and radical mobilisation need not hinder the democratisation of a state
3.3.1.1. ruling political elites might allow democratisation to proceed despite extremist violence, in case they believe the extremists do not stand a chance
3.3.1.2. mass mobilisation as a power force in democractic transition, because of its force
3.3.2. Wood (2000): study of democracy movements forged from below by the insurgency of poor people (El Salvador and South Africa)
3.3.2.1. the insurgency reshapes economic interests and opportunities and forces economic elites to share power and/or wealth
3.3.2.2. mass mobilisation as a power force in democratic transition, because of its ability to transform elite perception
3.3.3. Boudreau (2004): studies repressive strategies of states and the subsequent modes of collective action and resistance that arose in its response to repression
3.3.3.1. there is a clear interaction between repression and resistance
3.4. developing world: revolution and rebellion
3.4.1. Goldstone (2003): structural theories of revolution
3.4.1.1. a state with weakened structural capabilities and a predilection [voorliefde] for conflict between the state and te elites will be prone to revolution
3.4.1.2. "a marked imbalance between the demands of a changing population on the economy and the government, and the ability of the government to respond creates a situation of declining political stability. Whenever such imbalances become widespread, so too does the risk of revolutions"
4. international relations
4.1. Skocpol (1979): possible successful revolutions rely largely on the internatonal context that the authorities within the state face
4.2. Imig and Tarrow (2001): study citizen protest on European integration: "protestors might increasingly voice opinions greagrding the EU, but they will ask their national governments to act as their representative, thereby continuing to give their state a leading role"
4.3. Knopf (1998): study of whether citizen mobilisation is an important contributor to folicy policy decision-making
4.3.1. activism has been a source of state preference in foreign policy
4.4. Keck and Sikkink (1998): study the interaction of nonstate actors in an increasingly globalised world
4.4.1. transnational advocacy networks (TAN) emerge when the domestic channels for participation are hindered, making international forums the only way for activists to raise their issues: network theory
4.4.2. --> international contacts can amplify the demands back into the domestic arena; holding domestic governments accountable