1. pain
2. “inverted spectrum”
3. Philosophical Behaviorism
3.1. (i) The meaning of sentences attributing mental states to an individual can be analyzed into a set of sentences about how the individual would behave under a variety of circumstances. (2) Mental states and processes are behavioral dispositions.
3.1.1. problems
3.1.1.1. inverted-spectrum people are impossible
3.1.1.2. behaviorism is counterintuitive
3.1.1.2.1. the exhibiting the behavior characteristic of someone in pain is not enough to make it the case that someone is really in pain and
3.2. observe their behavior
3.3. If C3-PO behaves like he is in pain, then he is in pain
3.3.1. yes
3.4. nonchauvinistic
4. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory
4.1. mental states are identical with brain slates
4.1.1. problems
4.1.1.1. mental states and brain states seem very different
4.1.1.2. no explanation of why a brain state of this type is identical with that mental state
4.1.1.3. "mysterians” - have suggested that the correct explanation might be the sort of thing that minds like ours simply cannot understand, but it is no answer
4.1.1.4. The problematic part emerges when we think about creatures that don't have brains like ours
4.1.1.5. C3-PO - can’t experience pain, can't think about math problems
4.1.1.5.1. yes
4.1.1.6. Chauvinistic
4.2. Do other people have mental states? Yes, If they have brains like yours
4.3. it is not easy to determine whether or not you and your friend have inverted spectrums, but it is empirically possible to find out.
5. Panpsychism
5.1. matter may have two quite different kinds of properties
5.2. a primitive form of consciousness is also a basic property of all matter in the universe.
5.3. pain and the taste of sweetness are somehow constructed from the more primitive consciousness that all matter possesses
6. Introspection
6.1. Use for obtaining knowledge about one's own mental
6.2. Cannot be used to obtain knowledge about other people’s mental states
7. problem of other minds (epistemology and metaphysics)
7.1. Do other people (and things like robots or fish) have mental states?
7.2. Are their mental states similar to yours?
7.3. How can we know?
8. mind-body problem (metaphysics)
8.1. How are mental states and processes related to physical and biological and behavioral phenomena?
9. Cartesian Dualism
9.1. body and mind are distinct entities
9.2. unique properties of mental states
10. substance dualism (theist and atheist)
10.1. problems
10.1.1. you have no introspective access to other minds
10.1.2. we have no way of determining whether C3-PO or animals have a mind
10.1.2.1. no
10.1.3. we could never know whether another person had an inverted color spectrum
10.1.4. If minds and matter are metaphysically distinct substances, then how is it possible for them to causally interact with one another?
11. Functionalism
11.1. analytic functionalism
11.1.1. folk psychology
11.1.2. a commonsense theory
11.1.3. pain is any state that plays the pain-role in a complex causal system
11.1.4. C3-PO - can experience pain, can think about math problems
11.1.4.1. yes
11.1.5. nonchauvinistic
11.2. eliminativists
11.2.1. commonsense mental states they are the posits of a mistaken folk theory, and we should come lo grips with the fact that they do not exist
11.3. psycho-functionalism.
11.3.1. scientific psychology and neuroscience can define our mental state terms and specify the causal roles that mental slates play
11.3.1.1. problems of functionalizm
11.3.1.1.1. allows in too much and thus attributes mental states to systems that surely don’t really have mental states.
11.3.2. nonchauvinistic