1. Defending FP If commonsense psychology were to collapse, it would be a great intellectual catastrophe. If we are wrong about the mind, it is the most wrong we have ever been. Everyone can understand the polemic which begins at the beginning of midsummer's nights dream and understand reasoning used. Proof of how successful it is most of the time. 1. It works often 2. Complex and predictable generalisations about observable causes 3. Indispensable - you cannot predict some things any other way 'We have no reason to doubt - indeed, we have substantial reason to believe - that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire explanation.'
2. Churchland's objections and the replies 1. Stagnant (reply: Computationalism and indication of success - not failure) 2. Not integrated with scientific theory (reply: reduction is needed or wanted) 3. Cannot explain central cognitive phenomena (reply: FP is only partial, but why should it explain things like sleep, surely that is for the biologist) 4. Never get generalisations that give you predictive power (Reply: no more a problem for FP than for other 'special' sciences Does eliminativism undermine itself? Not true Q.E.D (that which was to be demonstrated). Like self-refuting claim of the vitalist. Rosenberg's objections 1. Neural circuitry cannot carry information around semantically 2. Evolutionary argument/disjunction problem
3. Commonsense psychology belief/desire psychology. Our everyday understanding of mental states. Offers explanation and prediction of actions by appealing to belief/desire/hope/pain (e.g. propositional attitudes) Key properties of these are: 1. Semantically evaluable (extrinsic) 2. Casually efficacious (intrinsic) Invoked to explain ordinary attributions such as: 'He did A because he believed b and wanted C. Ceteris paribus a theory of mind. Foder: Standard, causal generalizations in FP lead only to behavioural predictions 'via a lot of further assumptions about how people's preferences may affect their actions in given situations.' Churchland - convenient solution for the problem of other minds.
4. 2 issues 1. Ontological commitments that come with acceptance of FP 2. Truth of FP - are the commitments correct? (Eliminitivism thinks it is a false theory and that beliefs/desires don't cause actions in that way.
5. Positions: -Churchland, Rosenburg: Eliminativist -Denett: Instrumentalist -Foder: Realist -Bratman: As well as beliefs and desire there is 'something else' motivating action. He calls this intention.
