1. I. Historical and Constitutional Considerations
1.1. A. Development of Administrative Law as a distinct field of public law
1.1.1. 1. Factors responsible for the emergence of administrative agencies
1.1.2. 2. The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies
1.1.2.1. The doctrine of separation of power does not prohibit the grant of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies. What is important to note is that there are existing control or checking mechanisms that can keep the regulatory agencies within legal bounds in the exercise of their delegated powers..
2. II. Control of Administrative Action
2.1. A. Administrative agencies and the executive power of the President
2.1.1. Two types
2.1.1.1. 1. Statutory
2.1.1.1.1. As they are created by law, they can also be abolished by law.
2.1.1.2. 2. Constitutional
2.1.1.2.1. Created directly by the constitution.
2.1.1.2.2. They are independent bodies that cannot be abolished by Congress. Their powers and functions are provided in the constitution and can only be modified by constitutional amendments.
2.1.2. Noblejas v. Teehankee: The members of the judiciary cannot be required to exercise any power or to assume any duty not connected with the administration of judicial functions. They cannot participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
2.1.2.1. Funa v. Duque : the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, Philhealth, ECC and HDMF because these agencies are under the control of the President.
2.1.3. Under the constitution the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws will be faithfully executed. Because of this power of control, the President can affirm, modify or overturn the actions or decisions of Departments. Bureaus and offices under the executive department which exercise rulemaking or adjudication powers.
2.2. B. Congressional Oversight Power
2.2.1. The power of congressional oversight covers all activities of Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence concerning the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
2.2.2. Categories
2.2.2.1. 1. Scrutiny
2.2.2.2. 2. Investigation
2.2.2.3. 3. Supervision
2.2.3. Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.
2.2.3.1. Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima: Section 12 of RA 9395 creating a joint congressional oversight committee to approve the IRR of the law is unconstitutional.
2.3. C. Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Decision-making
2.3.1. Judicial Review is the most effective check to prevent the capricious and abusive exercise of administrative power. It offers the most direct way to check arbitrariness in the exercise of agency powers and it provides immediate relief to the adversely affected parties.
2.4. D. The Ombudsman: its effectivity and visibility amidst bureaucratic abuse and irregularity
2.4.1. For an Ombudsman institution to be effective it must have the following essential characteristics:
2.4.1.1. 1. Political Independence
2.4.1.2. 2. Broad investigatory power
2.4.1.3. 3. Accessibility
2.4.1.4. 4. Lack of revisory jurisdiction
2.4.1.4.1. It is not meant to function as an appellate body to review the actions or decisions of administrative agencies in the exercise of their rulemaking and adjudication powers.
3. III. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies
3.1. A. Legislative Function
3.1.1. 1. Non-delegation doctrine
3.1.1.1. Since the constitution has vested upon the legislature the power to make laws, the latter cannot evade responsibility by delegating such power to some other body or agency.
3.1.1.2. What can be delegated is the power to implement the law.
3.1.1.2.1. Pelaez v. Auditor General: Requisites for Valid Delegation, the law must be complete in itself by:
3.1.2. 2. Permissible delegation
3.1.2.1. a. Ascertainment of Fact
3.1.2.1.1. Ascertaining certain facts or conditions upon which the effectivity or suspension of a law will depend is a power that can be delegated to administrative agencies.
3.1.2.2. b. Filling in of details
3.1.2.2.1. The filling in of details of a law delegating administrative functions to agencies is another area of permissible delegation
3.1.2.3. c. Administrative Rulemaking
3.1.2.3.1. The delegation of rulemaking power to administrative agencies is an exception to the non-delegation doctrine.
3.1.2.3.2. Its purpose being merely to implement the law, it has been characterized as "subordinate legislation" under the control of the Legislature.
3.1.2.3.3. When the rules promulgated are within the scope of the rulemaking grant and when the legal requirements for the valid exercise of the rulemaking power are observed, such rules, according to settled jurisprudence, have the force and effect of law.
3.1.3. 3. Limits on Rule-making Power
3.1.3.1. Limitations
3.1.3.1.1. 1. It must be authorized by law.
3.1.3.1.2. 2. The rules are promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
3.1.3.1.3. 3. The rules are within the scope of authority given by law.
3.1.3.1.4. 4. The rules must not be inconsistent with the law; it cannot change or amend the law.
3.1.3.1.5. 5. The rules must not be inconsistent with the constitution.
3.1.3.1.6. 6. The rules must be reasonable and germane to the purpose of the law.
3.1.3.2. Agency perception of the desirability of a rule is immaterial if it is shown that the rule is inconsistent with the law or the constitution.
3.1.3.2.1. The rule is void for being ultra vires or outside the scope of its rulemaking power.
3.1.4. 4. Publication and effectivity
3.1.4.1. Que Po Lay: the CB circular was published about three months after appellant's conviction of its violation. The circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect until its publication in the official gazette. The question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. Without publication there was no circular to be violated and the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
3.1.4.2. Tanada: Not only laws but also rules take effect fifteen days from publication in the official gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless otherwise provided by law.
3.1.4.2.1. Exceptions
3.1.4.3. Twin publication requirements:
3.1.4.3.1. 1. Three certified copies of every rule shall be filed with the UPLC.
3.1.4.3.2. 2. The rule must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
3.1.4.3.3. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp: Strict compliance with the publication and filing requirements cannot be dispensed with by allegations that the parties were notified of the existence of the rule.
3.1.5. 5. Penal regulations
3.1.6. 6. Interpretative Rules
3.1.6.1. Hilado v. Collector: the interpretation of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if thereafter the latter is of the opinion that a different interpretation should be given. An erroneous interpretation of the law cannot give rise to a vested right.
3.1.7. 7. Examples of rule-making in various agencies
3.1.7.1. a. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices
3.1.7.1.1. The government cannot abdicate its right to regulate public utilities for the protection of the public and the utilities themselves by authorizing the utilities to increase or decrease its rates or fares without hearing or approval by the agency created by law to regulate such entities.
3.1.7.1.2. Vigan Electric Co. v.PSC
3.1.7.1.3. A proposed rate must be published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first hearing thereon.
3.1.7.2. b. Licensing Function
3.1.7.2.1. Procedure
3.1.7.3. American Tobacco Co. v. Director:the power to hear can be delegated to hearing officers so long as the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law. Unless otherwise provided by law, the power to decide cannot be delegated for it requires the exercise of personal judgment or discretion. Delegating the power to decide to a hearing officer without statutory authority is offensive to due process.
3.1.7.4. GSIS v. Board of Commissioners HLURB: the HLURB can constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions since nothing in the enabling statute withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division.
3.2. B. Judicial Function
3.2.1. 1. Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt
3.2.1.1. a. General statutory provision
3.2.1.1.1. In case its subpoenas are disobeyed, it may invoke the aid of the RTC within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls.
3.2.1.1.2. Subpoena power.
3.2.1.1.3. In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
3.2.1.2. b. Special statutory grant
3.2.1.2.1. When it comes to the contempt power. Section 13 requires that this must be expressly provided or granted by law.
3.2.1.3. Requisites for Valid Subpoena
3.2.1.3.1. Evangelista v. Jarencio
3.2.1.3.2. 1. The inquiry is within the authority of the agency.
3.2.1.3.3. 2. The demand is not too indefinite.
3.2.1.3.4. 3. The information is reasonably relevant.
3.2.1.4. The privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked in administrative proceedings which are penal or criminal in nature.
3.2.1.4.1. Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.and Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners.
3.2.2. 2. Warrants of arrest, administrative searches
3.2.2.1. The Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative warrants.
3.2.2.1.1. Qua Chee Gan
3.2.2.2. It is only Judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
3.2.2.2.1. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
3.2.2.2.2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
3.2.2.3. The probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant may take into consideration certain factors like the passage of time, the nature of the building, or the condition of the entire area.
3.2.2.3.1. Camara v. Municipal Court
3.2.2.3.2. The businessman, like the occupant of the residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.
3.2.3. 3. Imposition of fines and penalties
3.2.3.1. Requisites for the Valid Imposition of Fines and Penalties by an Administrative Agency
3.2.3.1.1. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan
3.2.3.1.2. 1. The subject matter must be within the control of the Legislature.
3.2.3.1.3. 2. The fine or penalty is not criminal in character.
3.2.3.1.4. 3. The agency must be expressly authorized to impose the fine or penalty.
3.2.3.2. Only courts of justice can impose criminal penalties.
3.2.3.2.1. The CAB is authorized by its enabling statute to impose a fine or civil penalty which is not in the nature of a criminal penalty. Accordingly, the CAB can impose the fine on PAL for violating its rule on unauthorized flagstop.
3.2.3.2.2. At the outset it must be stressed that an administrative agency is not a court of justice. It is not bound by the strict rules of evidence and procedure. It cannot impose criminal penalties for this would violate the rights of the accused as guaranteed by the constitution.
3.2.3.3. Requisites for a circular to have the force of a penal law
3.2.3.3.1. Perez v. LPG Refillers Assoc. of the Philippines
3.2.3.3.2. 1. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statue itself.
3.2.3.3.3. 2. The penalty for the violation must be provided by the statute itself.
3.3. C. Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards for a Valid Delegation
3.3.1. 1. Interest of Law and Order
3.3.2. 2. Public Interest
3.3.3. 3. Justice, equity, and substantial merits of the case
3.3.4. 4. What is moral, educational, or amusing
3.3.4.1. The standard in the case derived its sustainability from the sense and experience of the community which was used as a guide for the standard.
3.3.4.1.1. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission
3.3.5. 5. What is sacrilegious
3.3.5.1. Not a valid delegation.
3.3.5.2. To use “sacrilegious” as a standard is not sufficient because it there is no sense and experience of a national community where one can draw a consensus or some reasonable idea of what is sacrilegious.
3.3.5.2.1. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wisconsin
3.3.6. 6. Adequate and efficient instruction
3.3.7. 7. Reasonableness as an implied standard
3.3.8. 8. To promote simplicity, economy, or efficiency
3.3.9. 9. Maintain monetary stability, promote rising level of production and real income
4. IV. Administrative Procedure
4.1. A. Administrative Procedure in Administrative Code
4.1.1. Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not " courts of record ". They are not part of the judiciary.
4.1.1.1. DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution applies to administrative proceedings.
4.1.1.1.1. The seven "cardinal primary rights" outlined in Ang Tibay must be observed or complied with.
4.1.2. Secs. 1-26 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987
4.1.2.1. SCOPE: All agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges.
4.2. B. In Rule-Making, Price, Wage, or rate fixing
4.3. C. In Adjudication of Cases
4.3.1. 1. Rules of Procedure
4.3.1.1. Twin notice rule: publication in ONAR and newspaper of general circulation
4.3.1.1.1. Sec. 3, Book VII
4.3.1.2. Each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule.
4.3.1.2.1. Sec. 4, Book VII
4.3.1.3. Public participation
4.3.1.3.1. Sec. 9, Book VII
4.3.1.3.2. 1. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
4.3.1.3.3. 2. In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
4.3.1.3.4. 3. In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
4.3.2. 2. Due Process
4.3.2.1. a. Cardinal primary rights
4.3.2.1.1. Ang Tibay v. CIR
4.3.2.1.2. 1. The right to a hearing
4.3.2.1.3. 2. The right to have the tribunal consider the evidence presented.
4.3.2.1.4. 3. The right to be given a decision supported by evidence.
4.3.2.1.5. 4. The evidence must be substantial.
4.3.2.1.6. 5. The right to transparency. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
4.3.2.1.7. 6. The right that the tribunal acts on its own independent consideration of the law and facts.
4.3.2.1.8. 7. The right to decision rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
4.3.2.1.9. Any violation of the seven rights outlined in Ang Tibay can trigger a due process action that will invalidate the agency decision.
4.3.2.2. b. Notice and Hearing
4.3.2.2.1. Fundamental requirements of procedural due process.
4.3.2.2.2. 1. When required
4.3.2.2.3. 2. When not required
4.3.2.2.4. Administrative due process does not necessarily mean a trial-type hearing.
4.3.2.2.5. The right to cross-examination may be made available in certain quasi-judicial proceedings as part of due process.
4.3.2.2.6. If the decision is subject to administrative review, the reviewing officer must be different from the one who rendered the decision. Otherwise the review becomes farcical and violates due process.
4.3.2.2.7. A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in a proceeding in which he was not made a party.
4.3.2.2.8. Notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.
4.3.2.3. c. Form of and Promulgation of Judgment
4.3.2.3.1. In a disciplinary case, the respondent is not entitled to a copy of the report of the investigation committee created by the disciplining authority. He is entitled only to the administrative decision which is required to be supported by substantial evidence.
4.3.2.3.2. Findings of facts of administrative agencies, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, are binding on the courts. This is based on the respect or deference of the courts to administrative expertise.
4.3.2.3.3. Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.
4.3.3. 3. Jurisdiction
4.3.3.1. Filing the case in the wrong forum is a waste of time, effort and money.
4.3.3.1.1. EFFECT: Dismissal of the case.
4.3.3.2. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by agreement of the parties.
4.3.3.3. It is not waivable and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
4.3.3.4. The jurisdictional issue that usually arises is: which forum has jurisdiction over a particular case - the regular court or the administrative agency ?
4.3.3.4.1. This question can be resolved by a careful consideration of the issues of the case as well as the pertinent provisions of the enabling statute of the agency.
4.3.3.4.2. When there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between an agency and a court, the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies.
4.3.3.5. Specific instances
4.3.3.5.1. Courts have no jurisdiction over labor cases or the various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders. Jurisdiction pertains exclusively to the officials concerned under the DOLE. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
4.3.4. 4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the same facts
4.3.4.1. Administrative and judicial proceedings can arise from the same facts. These proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from each other and are not legally incompatible. They can proceed independently from each other.
4.3.4.2. They have different causes of action.
4.3.4.3. They have different purposes and their standard or quantum of evidence and procedure are not the same.
4.3.4.4. The result in one will not affect the result in the other.
4.3.4.5. Findings in criminal cases cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of criminal cases.
4.3.5. 5. Rules of Evidence
4.3.5.1. Sec. 12, Book VII
4.3.5.2. Different agencies have different rules.
4.3.5.3. 1. The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
4.3.5.4. 2. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
4.3.5.5. 3. Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence.
4.3.5.6. 4. The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
5. V. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
5.1. A. Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions
5.1.1. A decision of a court or a quasi-judicial body which has become final and executory can no longer be disturbed or re-opened.
5.1.1.1. Compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
5.1.2. GR: Courts will not interfere in the exercise of administrative discretion granted to agencies.
5.1.2.1. E: If there is grave abuse of discretion, the adversely affected party can seek judicial review.
5.1.2.1.1. Indicators
5.1.3. The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.
5.1.3.1. Sec. 15, Book VII
5.2. B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
5.2.1. GR: Administrative remedies must first be exhausted before recourse may be made to the courts, otherwise the resort to court will be premature and subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
5.2.1.1. When the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
5.2.1.2. When exhaustion of administrative remedies would amount to nullification of the claim. (e.g. time is of the essence)
5.2.1.3. When there is a violation of due process.
5.2.1.4. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
5.2.1.5. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned.
5.2.1.6. When there is irreparable injury.
5.2.1.7. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter.
5.2.1.8. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable.
5.2.1.9. When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings.
5.2.1.10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
5.2.1.11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
5.2.1.12. When no administrative review is provided by law.
5.2.1.13. Where the rule of qualified political agency applies.
5.2.1.14. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
5.2.1.15. Estrada v. CA
5.2.2. Failure to observe the doctrine does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If the motion to dismiss is not filed on time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case.
5.2.3. Applies where the act of the agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power.
5.2.3.1. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
5.2.3.2. If quasi-legislative, doctrine of ripeness.
5.3. C. Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort
5.3.1. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene
5.3.2. Industrial Enterprises Inc. v. C.A.
5.3.3. The court will YIELD its jurisdiction to the agency when the case or issue requires for its resolution the expertise or specialized knowledge of the agency and a uniformity of ruling is essential to implement the policy of the regulatory statute being administered by the administrative agency.
5.3.4. For the applicability of the doctrine, there must be a concurrence of jurisdiction between a court and an administrative agency over a certain case or issue.
5.4. D. Standing to Challenge
5.4.1. Procedural principle which the courts utilize to determine when to allow party litigants to have access to judicial review of official or government action.
5.4.2. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
5.4.2.1. 'Legal standing' means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged.
5.4.2.1.1. The term 'interest' is material interest, an interest in the issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or by a mere incidental interest.
5.4.2.1.2. The interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
5.4.2.2. The preliminary issue of Locus Standi is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
5.4.2.2.1. Kilos Bayan
5.4.2.2.2. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have been allowed to sue in cases involving constitutional issues.
5.4.2.2.3. Environmental litigation
5.4.2.2.4. Class suit and intergenerational responsibility
5.4.2.3. Requisites
5.4.2.3.1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
5.4.2.3.2. 1. Plaintiffs must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is:
5.4.2.3.3. 2. There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.
5.4.2.3.4. 3. It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
5.4.3. Does it have to be a constitutional issue?
5.4.3.1. YES
5.4.3.1.1. 1995 Kilos Bayan
5.4.3.2. NO
5.4.3.2.1. Association of Data Processing Service Organization v. Camp
5.4.3.3. As long as a governmental action is being questioned, you can use locus standi principle. (sir)
5.5. E. Ripeness
5.5.1. When the agency is performing its quasi-legislative or rulemaking function, the appropriate doctrine to apply in so far as judicial review is concerned is the Doctrine of Ripeness.
5.5.2. Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner: The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem of ripeness of a controversy is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring a court to evaluate both fitness of the issues for judicial resolution and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."
5.5.3. Considerations
5.5.3.1. NALCP v. Shultz
5.5.3.2. 1. Whether or not there is congressional intent negative to judicial review.
5.5.3.3. 2. The possibility of the courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative policies due to premature adjudication.
5.5.3.4. 3. The fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
6. VI. Modes of Judicial Review
6.1. A. Statute
6.1.1. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
6.1.1.1. Appeal from RTC to CA
6.1.1.2. Applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.
6.1.1.2.1. CSC v. Magoyag: when an agency can be said to be exercising quasi-judicial function. It involves, among others, the holding of hearings, findings of facts and the conclusions that can be drawn from them as a basis for their decisions.
6.1.2. 1987 Constitution, Article IX - A, Sec. 7
6.1.2.1. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
6.1.3. BP 129, Sec. 9
6.1.3.1. Jurisdiction
6.1.4. EO 292, Sec. 25
6.1.4.1. Judicial Review
6.2. B. Certiorari
6.2.1. In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law can be raised. Factual questions are not the proper subject of appeal by certiorari. Thus, a party cannot raise a question of fact under a Rule 45 petition.
6.2.1.1. BCDA v. Reyes: distinction between a question of law from a question of fact: " Jurisprudence dictates that there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
6.2.2. The special original action of certiorari under Rule 65 is strictly grounded on jurisdictional issues, that is lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
6.2.2.1. FUNCTION: to set aside or modify the proceedings before the tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
6.2.2.2. The petitioner must show that there is no appeal, or plain, speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
6.2.2.2.1. Will not lie when there is
6.2.2.2.2. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.
6.2.2.3. Not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. It is not allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
6.2.2.3.1. Hadji-Sirad: the resort to a special civil action for certiorari was held to be improper or unjustified when the remedy of appeal by petition for review was clearly available.
6.2.2.4. St. Martin Funeral Homes: "...all references in the amended Sec. 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts as appropriate forum for the relief desired.
6.2.2.5. Requisites
6.2.2.5.1. 1. Grave abuse of discretion
6.2.2.5.2. 2. No other speedy, plain, and adequate remedy
6.2.3. May be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former.
6.2.4. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission maybe brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
6.2.4.1. Sec. 7, Article 1X-A of the Constitution
6.2.4.2. Galindo and Pinto: under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission has appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases.
6.2.4.2.1. In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy for the party adversely affected is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 64.
6.3. C. Prohibition
6.3.1. May be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former.
6.3.2. Based on lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
6.3.3. It is also required that there is no appeal, or plain speedy remedy under the ordinary course of law.
6.3.4. FUNCTION: to stop or terminate the proceeding in the tribunal or agency against whom the action is directed.
6.3.5. A preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.
6.3.5.1. Simon: the writ of prohibition was granted because the CHR has not yet promulgated its resolution of the case filed before it.
6.3.5.2. Paredes: it was denied because the petitioners did not avail of the Cabinet review and approval of the challenged rates of fees and charges proposed by the agency.
6.3.5.3. Chua Hiong: if a Filipino citizen is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he can seek protection from the courts either by a writ of habeas corpus or Prohibition. The legal basis for the petition for prohibition is the absence of the jurisdictional fact - alienage.
6.3.6. Requisites
6.3.6.1. 1. Grave abuse of discretion
6.3.6.2. 2. No other speedy, plain, and adequate remedy
6.3.7. Covers both ministerial and discretionary functions.
6.4. D. Mandamus
6.4.1. Requirements
6.4.1.1. 1. The duty is plain and ministerial.
6.4.1.2. 2. The right of petitioner is clear and controlling.
6.4.1.3. 3. There is no plain, speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
6.4.2. Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion. Neither is it proper to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a certain course of conduct.
6.4.3. PRC v. DE Guzman: "The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is a long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government."
6.4.4. May be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former.
6.5. E. Declaratory Relief
6.5.1. An action which any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order,, or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
6.5.2. Must be brought before there has been a breach of the contract or statute the construction of which is sought.
6.5.3. Cannot be employed to prevent the collection of taxes upon which the government depends for its existence.
6.5.4. Requisites
6.5.4.1. Mirando
6.5.4.2. 1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
6.5.4.3. 2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
6.5.4.4. 3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
6.5.4.5. 4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
6.6. F. Habeas Corpus
6.6.1. A special proceeding often invoked in deportation cases. Persons detained upon the orders of immigration authorities may test the validity of their detention by means of the writ of habeas corpus.
6.6.2. This special remedy is often called as "the great writ of liberty".
6.6.3. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that it is the speedy remedy to secure the release of the person who is illegally detained.
6.6.4. GR: Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.
6.6.4.1. E: in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
6.6.5. Lucien Tran Van Nghia: the Supreme Court held that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus could be mooted if the petitioner is provisionally released by the posting of a bond.
6.7. G. Injunction as provisional remedy
6.7.1. A party who is seeking judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency may ask for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
6.7.2. This is a provisional remedy while the review is pending. It is in aid of the principal action and its functional value is to preserve the rights of the party seeking judicial review.
6.7.3. After the judgment on the merits, the injunction may either be dissolved or made permanent or final.
6.7.4. May be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former.
6.7.5. Lemi v. Valencia:"While courts should exercise great care in granting preliminary mandatory injunctions because the writ operates not merely to preserve the status quo between the parties but to compel one of them to perform a positive act, however the Supreme Court has held in Meralco v. Del Rosario that courts should not hesitate in granting the writ in cases of extreme urgency, where petitioner's right to the writ is clear, where considerations of relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor, where there appears to be a willful invasion of petitioner's right, the injury inflicted upon him being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction would not be to create a new relation between the parties but solely to re-establish a pre-existing relation between them recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the respondent."
7. VII. Extent of Judicial Review
7.1. A. The Law-Fact distinction
7.1.1. Guides the courts in determining the extent or scope of judicial review.
7.1.2. It can be readily seen that in these cases, conclusions were drawn from certain sets of facts. These conclusions were characterized as conclusions of law and consequently subject to judicial review.
7.1.2.1. Dauan, Reyes Vda. de Santiago, and Aboitiz Shipping Corp.
7.1.3. While agencies can initially decide questions of law, their decisions on such questions are not conclusive upon the courts, but are subject to judicial review.
7.2. B. Question of Law
7.2.1. Reviewable because the courts are the final interpreters of the law.
7.3. C. Question of Fact
7.3.1. No longer reviewable if supported by substantial evidence.
7.3.1.1. Section 25(7) of the Administrative Code of 1987
7.3.1.2. When a reviewing court is convinced that the factual findings of the agency are not supported by substantial evidence, it should overturn such findings.
7.3.1.2.1. Gonzalez: Contrary to the finding of the agency, the employees were dismissed not because of union activity, but because of pilferage.
7.3.1.2.2. Universal Camera: the phrase "the record considered as a whole" was clarified by the US Supreme Court to include not just the record at the level of the Board, but also to include the findings and recommendation of the Hearing Officer. In this case the findings of the Hearing Officer happened to be contrary to the findings of the Board.
7.4. D. Questions of Discretion
7.4.1. GR: The courts will not interfere in the exercise of discretionary authority of administrative agencies.
7.4.1.1. E: If the agency action can be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion, the adversely affected party can invoke the corrective power of certiorari.
8. VIII. Enforcement of Agency Action
8.1. Res Judicata
8.1.1. 1. Bar by prior judgement
8.1.1.1. 1. The former judgment must be final
8.1.1.2. 2. The judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.
8.1.1.3. 3. It must be a judgment on the merits.
8.1.1.4. 4. There must be, between the first and the second actions:
8.1.1.4.1. 1. Identity of parties
8.1.1.4.2. 2. Identity of subject matter
8.1.1.4.3. 3. Identity of cause of action
8.1.1.5. Ipekdijian Merchandising v. CTA
8.1.2. 2. Conclusiveness of judgment
8.1.2.1. APPLICATION: when a fact or question has been judicially passed upon and decided in a former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.
8.1.2.2. EFFECT: Such decision is conclusive as far as the parties to that case and persons in privity with them are concerned and can not again be litigated in a future case between such parties or their privies in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action for as long as the decision has not been reversed by proper authority.
8.1.2.3. Requires Identity of issue, not identity of cause of action.
8.1.2.4. Facura v. CA
8.1.3. APPLICATION: not just to courts but also to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial function
8.1.3.1. Heirs of Maximo Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla
8.1.3.2. Only to judicial or quasi judicial, not exercise of administrative powers.
8.1.3.2.1. Nasipit Lumber v. NLRC
8.2. Finality of Judgment
8.2.1. Immutability of final and executory judgments (non quieta movere)
8.2.1.1. GR: Not even the court that issued the decision which has become final and executory can amend or correct it, except for clerical errors; and neither can the Supreme Court do this
8.2.1.1.1. E: When the decision is void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction of the court that issued it, and this can be questioned at any time.
8.2.1.2. Clavano v. HLURB
8.3. In the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, decisions can be enforced through:
8.3.1. Writ of Execution
8.3.1.1. Agencies can enforce their quasi-judicial decisions which have become final and executory by issuing writs of execution.
8.3.1.1.1. GSIS v. CSC: " ...the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power; or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides."
8.3.2. Mandamus
8.3.2.1. When the execution of a final and executory decision is resisted or not followed by the party against whom the decision was rendered, a writ of mandamus can be obtained from the courts.
8.4. In the exercise of its licensing or franchising function, the law empowers agencies to:
8.4.1. Suspend, cancel or revoke licenses, permits or franchises upon a determination of violations of the law or the terms and conditions of the license or franchise.