1. DD303 Methods Companion
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. Increasing reliance on neural based methods
1.1.1.1. Non experimantal
1.1.1.1.1. Neuroimaging
1.1.1.1.2. Cognitive neuropsychology
1.1.2. Experimental
1.1.2.1. Ethics
1.1.2.1.1. Ethical codes
1.1.2.1.2. Deontological approaches
1.1.2.1.3. Consequentialist approaches
1.1.2.2. Quantitavive methods
1.1.2.2.1. Statistical analysis
1.1.2.2.2. Computer exercises
1.2. Ch 1 Ethics
1.2.1. Introduction
1.2.2. Ethical approaches: deontology and consequentialism
1.2.3. Ethical issues
1.2.3.1. Competence
1.2.3.2. Informed consent
1.2.3.3. Withdrawal
1.2.3.4. Deception
1.2.3.5. Confidentiality and privacy
1.2.3.6. Risks
1.2.3.7. Recruitment and payment
1.2.3.8. Debriefing
1.2.3.9. Feedback and conveying specialist information
1.2.3.10. Colleagues and students
1.2.3.11. The safety of the researcher
1.2.3.12. Personal conduct
1.2.3.13. Internet-mediated research
1.2.4. Special cases
1.2.4.1. Work with patients
1.2.4.2. Brain imaging
1.2.4.3. Emotion research
1.2.4.4. Researching with children
1.2.5. Conclusion
1.3. Ch 2 Neuroimaging
1.3.1. TMA04 Option 2 Using examples discuss what can be learned about normal cognitive function by using haemodynamic imaging techniques such as fMRI and PET on healthy volunteers.
1.3.1.1. Cut of 19th July
1.3.1.2. 2000 word limit
1.3.2. Introduction
1.3.3. EEG and MEG: measuring the timing of electrical activity in the brain
1.3.3.1. Collecting data
1.3.3.2. Computing ERPs and ERFs
1.3.3.3. Estimating neuronal sources: the inverse problem
1.3.3.4. Statistical analysis of EEG/MEG data
1.3.3.5. The auditory oddball paradigm
1.3.4. Techniques based on metabolism and blood supply
1.3.4.1. Experimental design
1.3.4.2. PET: positron emission tomography
1.3.4.3. SPECT: single photon emission computerized tomography
1.3.4.4. fMRI: functional magnetic resonance imaging
1.3.4.5. Image processing and analysis
1.3.4.6. Data analysis
1.3.5. Transcranial magneic stimulation (TMS)
1.3.6. Choosing a technique
1.4. Ch 3 Cognitive neuropsychology
1.4.1. TMA04 Option 1 Cognitive neurospychologists often study single individuals rather than groups of people. Discuss, using examples of case studies, the advantages and disadvantages of this method of investigation.
1.4.1.1. Cut of 19th July
1.4.1.2. 2000 word limit
1.4.2. Why study damaged brains?
1.4.3. Historical perspective
1.4.4. Goals
1.4.4.1. Lesion localization
1.4.4.2. Assessment of deficit
1.4.4.3. Model building
1.4.4.4. Localization of function
1.4.5. Techniques
1.4.5.1. Standardised testing
1.4.5.2. Experimental neuropsychology
1.4.6. Dissociations and double dissociations
1.4.7. Issues
1.4.7.1. The Martian among us
1.4.7.2. Comparing brains
1.4.7.3. Subtractivity
1.4.7.4. Plasticity
1.4.7.5. Single-case versus group studies
1.4.7.6. Developmental versus acquired neuropsychological disorders
1.4.8. Cognitive neuropsychological rehabilitation
1.5. Ch 4 Quantitative methods
1.5.1. Two fundamentals
1.5.1.1. Why do we do statistics?
1.5.1.2. Estimating the mean: reducing error
1.5.2. Analysis of variance
1.5.2.1. The conceptual basis for analysis of variance
1.5.2.2. What is analysis of vaiance?
1.5.2.3. Analysis of variance with more than two conditions
1.5.3. Multiple factor analysis of variance
1.5.3.1. Interactions
1.5.3.2. Degrees of freedom
1.5.4. The assumptions underlying analysis of variance and most parametric statistics
1.5.4.1. Repeated measures
1.5.5. Making decisions under uncertainty
1.5.5.1. Drawing conclusions from statistical tests
1.5.5.2. Muliple comparison techniques
1.5.5.3. Type II errors, effect size and power
1.5.6. Analysing data for the case where the independent variables are continuous
1.5.6.1. Simple linear regression
1.5.6.2. Multiple linear regression
1.5.6.3. Analysis of covariance
2. Research Methods and Statistics in Psychology Coolican, H (2009)
3. Ch 1 Foundations of Cognitive Psychology
3.1. 2. What is cognitive psychology?
3.1.1. The scientific study of the mind
3.1.2. Subject matter
3.1.2.1. Emotion
3.1.2.2. Reasoning
3.1.2.3. Problem solving
3.1.2.4. Decision making
3.1.2.5. Memory - remembering
3.1.2.6. Recognition
3.1.2.7. Understanding language
3.1.2.8. Categorization
3.1.2.9. Perception
3.1.2.10. Attention
3.1.2.11. Conciousness
3.1.3. No easily defined boundries
3.1.3.1. Cognitive neuropsychology
3.1.3.2. Cognitive neuroscience
3.1.3.3. Lingustics
3.1.3.4. Artificial Intelligence
3.1.4. Methods
3.1.4.1. Experimentation
3.1.4.2. Cognitive neuroscience
3.1.4.3. Models
3.2. 3. A brief history of cognitive psychology
3.2.1. 3.1 Origins of cognitive psychology
3.2.1.1. Philosophy
3.2.1.1.1. Decartes
3.2.1.1.2. Locke
3.2.1.2. Wundt
3.2.1.2.1. Conciousness
3.2.1.3. Ebbinghaus
3.2.1.3.1. Memory
3.2.1.3.2. Perception
3.2.1.3.3. Experimental method
3.2.1.4. Willam James (Funtionalist)
3.2.1.4.1. Conciousness and behaviour
3.2.2. 3.2 Behaviourism and cognitive psychology
3.2.2.1. John B. Watson
3.2.2.1.1. 'behaviourism... holds that the subject of human psychology is the behaviour of the human being'
3.2.2.1.2. Applied psychology
3.2.2.2. Scientific and objective: Must be observable
3.2.2.2.1. Edward Thorndike
3.2.2.2.2. Skinner
3.2.2.2.3. Hans Eysenk
3.2.2.3. Principles of learning
3.2.2.3.1. Stimulus-Response (SR) chains
3.2.2.4. Does not offer an account of higher mental processes
3.2.3. 3.3 The problems with behaviourism
3.2.3.1. Language production
3.2.3.1.1. Lashley
3.2.3.1.2. Chomsky
3.2.3.2. Tolman
3.2.3.2.1. Rats in a maze learn location of food not just the route.
3.2.4. 3.4 Cognition and the brain
3.2.4.1. Classical neuropsychology
3.2.4.1.1. Possible functions of different brain functions
3.2.4.2. Cognitive neuropsychology
3.2.4.2.1. Possible cognitive components of cognition
3.2.4.3. Henry Molaison (HM)
3.2.4.3.1. Memory dissociation
3.2.4.4. Experimentation vs Cognitive Neuropsychology (CN)
3.2.4.4.1. Similarities
3.2.4.4.2. Differences
3.2.5. 3.5 Computers and the mind
3.2.5.1. Alan Turing
3.2.5.1.1. Turing test (The imitation game)
3.2.5.2. John McCarthy
3.2.5.2.1. Artificial Intelligence (AI)
3.2.5.3. David Marr
3.2.5.3.1. Vision
3.2.5.3.2. Functional levels of a cognitive sytem
3.3. 4. Science, models and the mind
3.3.1. Can we scientifically study unobservably mental processes and representations?
3.3.1.1. Science often invokes unobservable entities such as fields (gravity) and energies.
3.3.2. Models
3.3.2.1. Predictive power
3.3.2.2. Evaluation through testing
3.3.2.3. Computer modelling
3.3.2.3.1. Makes complexity managable
3.3.2.3.2. Simulates effects and varifies behaviour
3.3.2.3.3. Tests internal consistencey of the model
3.3.2.4. When is a model good?
3.3.2.4.1. Extent to which the model fits human behaviour
3.3.2.4.2. Validated by psychological theory
3.3.2.4.3. Parsimony - Ockham's Razor
3.3.3. 4.1 Cognitive neuroscience and the mind
3.3.3.1. Contributions of imaging
3.3.3.1.1. Identifies functional areas of the brain
3.3.3.2. Problems of imaging
3.3.3.2.1. May not advance understanding of cognition
3.4. Chapter notes by Tim Holyoake, http://www.tenpencepiece.net/
3.4.1. Areas covered in Tim's notes that are not directly included in this current chapter
4. Perceptual Processes
4.1. Ch 2 Attention
4.1.1. • The purpose of Attention is to bind features. Discuss. • In what circumstances may we be unable to give an accurate account of briefly displayed visual information? Discuss the theoretical implications of such findings. • We become aware of only a small proportion of the information registered by the senses. Why is this? • Do attentional processes operate serially or in parallel?
4.1.2. Attention is the process that gives rise to concious awareness
4.1.3. Naish (Author)
4.1.4. 1. Auditory attention
4.1.4.1. 1.1 Seperating sounds
4.1.4.1.1. Sound shadowing Intesity cues
4.1.4.1.2. Wave position
4.1.4.1.3. Wavelength
4.1.4.2. 1.2 Attending to sounds
4.1.4.2.1. Spotlight of attention
4.1.4.2.2. Broadbent (1954)
4.1.4.3. 1.3 Eavesdropping on the unattended message
4.1.4.3.1. Cocktail party effect
4.1.5. 2. Visual attention
4.1.5.1. 2.1 Knowing about unseen information
4.1.5.1.1. Sperling (1950)
4.1.5.1.2. Backward masking
4.1.5.2. 2.2 Towards a theory of parallel processing
4.1.5.2.1. Coltheart (1980)
4.1.5.3. 2.3 Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP)
4.1.5.3.1. Turvey (1973)
4.1.5.3.2. Broadbent and Broadbent (1987)
4.1.5.3.3. Vogel (1998)
4.1.5.4. 2.4 Masking and attention
4.1.5.4.1. Merikle and Joordens (1997)
4.1.6. 3. Integrating information in clearly seen displays
4.1.6.1. 3.1 Serial and parallel search
4.1.6.1.1. Treismen
4.1.7. 4. Attention and distraction
4.1.7.1. 4.1 The effects of irrelevant speech
4.1.7.1.1. Jones (1999)
4.1.7.1.2. Buchner et al. (1996)
4.1.7.1.3. Jones et al. (1990)
4.1.7.1.4. White noise shows minimal impact
4.1.7.1.5. Jones and Macken (1995)
4.1.7.1.6. Jones (1999)
4.1.7.2. 4.2 Attending across modalities
4.1.7.2.1. Ventriloquism efect
4.1.8. 5. The neurology of attention
4.1.8.1. fMRI shows audio and visual areas connected
4.1.8.2. 5.1 Effects of brain damage
4.1.8.2.1. Sensory neglect (hemispatial neglect)
4.1.8.3. 5.2 Event-related potentials
4.1.8.3.1. Woldorff et al. (1993)
4.1.9. 6. Concluding thoughts
4.1.9.1. Allport (1987)
4.1.9.1.1. Directs action
4.1.9.1.2. Enables focusing upon one stimulus at a time.
4.1.9.1.3. Automaticity
4.1.9.2. 2.3 Research study Hypnosis, time and attention
4.1.9.2.1. Naish (2003)
4.1.10. Why visual attention and awareness are different Lamme (2002)
4.1.11. Chapter notes by Tim Holyoake, http://www.tenpencepiece.net/
4.2. Ch 3 Perception
4.2.1. Chapter authors
4.2.1.1. Dr Graham Pike
4.2.1.2. Dr Graham Edgar
4.2.2. Will not be directly examined
4.2.3. TMA 01 Option 1 Evaluate the evidence that visual perception involves bottom-up and top-down processing.
4.2.3.1. Cut off 8th March 2011
4.2.3.2. 2000 word limit
4.2.4. 1. Introduction
4.2.4.1. Perception is the process of constructing a description of the surrounding world
4.2.4.2. 1.1 Perceiving and sensing
4.2.4.2.1. Atherton (2002)
4.2.4.2.2. Sensation
4.2.4.2.3. Perception
4.2.4.3. 1.2 The eye
4.2.4.3.1. Lens
4.2.4.4. 1.3 Approaches to perception
4.2.4.4.1. Milner and Goodale (1998)
4.2.4.4.2. Flow of information
4.2.5. 2. Gestalt approach to perception
4.2.5.1. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts
4.2.5.2. Perceptual organisation
4.2.5.2.1. Aksentijevic et al., (2001)
4.2.5.2.2. Closure
4.2.5.2.3. Good continuation
4.2.5.2.4. Proximity
4.2.5.2.5. Similarity
4.2.5.2.6. Two organisational priciples may conflict eg. similarity and proximity.
4.2.5.2.7. Koffka (1935)
4.2.5.3. Criticized for using simplified stimuli
4.2.6. 3. Gibson's theory of perception
4.2.6.1. Gibson (1966)
4.2.6.1.1. Direct perception
4.2.6.1.2. Criticised for not explaining how 'information is picked up'
4.2.6.2. 3.1 An ecological approach
4.2.6.2.1. Air theories
4.2.6.2.2. Ground theory
4.2.6.3. 3.2 The optic array and invariant information
4.2.6.3.1. Ambient optic array
4.2.6.3.2. Invariants
4.2.6.4. 3.3 Flow in the ambient optic array
4.2.6.4.1. Varient information
4.2.6.5. 3.4 Affordances and resonance
4.2.6.5.1. Affordance
4.2.6.5.2. Resonance
4.2.7. 4. Marr's theory of perception
4.2.7.1. David Marr (1982)
4.2.7.1.1. Bottom-up theory
4.2.7.1.2. Modular approach
4.2.7.1.3. Information processing perspective
4.2.7.1.4. Object recognition is the goal of perception
4.2.7.2. The grey level description
4.2.7.2.1. Module
4.2.7.2.2. Depolarization
4.2.7.3. The primal sketch
4.2.7.3.1. Raw primal sketch
4.2.7.3.2. Full primal sketch
4.2.7.4. The 2 1/2D sketch
4.2.7.4.1. Information from modules is aggregated
4.2.7.4.2. Stereopsis
4.2.7.4.3. Viewer-centered
4.2.7.5. 3D object-centered description
4.2.7.6. Evaluating Marr's approach
4.2.7.6.1. Supports
4.2.7.6.2. Challenges
4.2.8. 5. Constructivist approaches to perception
4.2.8.1. What you see depends upon what you know
4.2.8.2. Top-down
4.2.8.2.1. Stored knowledge guides perception
4.2.8.3. Sensory information is incomplete
4.2.8.3.1. It is necessary to construct a perception of the world
4.2.8.4. Irvin Rock (1977, 1983, 1997)
4.2.8.5. Richard Gregory (1980)
4.2.8.5.1. Perceptual hypotheses
4.2.8.6. Open questions
4.2.8.6.1. How are hypotheses generated?
4.2.8.6.2. What stops hypotheses generation?
4.2.8.6.3. How can we know something is wrong and still perceive it incorrectly?
4.2.9. 6. Physiology of the human visual system
4.2.9.1. Shapley (1995)
4.2.9.2. 6.1 From the eye to brain
4.2.9.2.1. Ventral stream
4.2.9.2.2. Dorsal stream
4.2.9.3. 6.2 The dorsal and ventral streams
4.2.9.3.1. Schneider (1967, 1969)
4.2.9.3.2. Rao et al. (1997)
4.2.9.3.3. Milner and Goodale (1995)
4.2.9.3.4. Bridgeman (1992)
4.2.9.4. 6.3 The relationship between visual pathways and theories of perception
4.2.9.4.1. Ventral
4.2.9.4.2. Dorsal
4.2.9.5. 6.4 A dual-process approach?
4.2.9.5.1. Synergistic and interconnected
4.2.9.5.2. Binsted and Carlton (2002)
4.2.9.5.3. Fitts (1964)
4.2.9.6. 6.5 Combining bottom-up and top-down processing
4.2.9.6.1. Is there evidence that perception contains BOTH bottom-up and top-down processing?
4.2.9.6.2. Enns and Di Lollo (1997)
4.2.9.6.3. Enns and Di Lollo (2000)
4.2.9.6.4. Hupe et l. (1998)
4.2.10. What’s new in visual masking? Enns J.T. & DiLollo, V. (2000)
4.2.11. Chapter notes by Tim Holyoake, http://www.tenpencepiece.net/
4.3. Ch 4 Recognition
4.3.1. Chapter authors
4.3.1.1. Dr Graham Pike
4.3.1.2. Dr Nicola Brace
4.3.2. Will not be directly examined
4.3.3. TMA 01 Option 2 Evaluate that face recognition involves processes that are different from those used in other types of recognition.
4.3.3.1. Cut off 8th March 2011
4.3.3.2. 2000 word limit
4.3.4. 1. Introduction
4.3.4.1. Simple model of visual recognition
4.3.4.1.1. Constuct descriptions based on retinal images
4.3.4.1.2. Store descriptions
4.3.4.1.3. Compare what is seen to what is stored
4.3.4.1.4. Enable recognition that is independent of viewing angle
4.3.4.2. 1.1 Recognition in the wider context of cognition
4.3.4.2.1. Humphreys and Bruce (1989)
4.3.5. 2. Different types of recognition
4.3.5.1. 2.1 Object and face recognition
4.3.5.1.1. Humphreys and Bruce (1989)
4.3.5.2. 2.2 Active processing - recognizing objects by touch
4.3.5.2.1. Gibson (1986)
4.3.5.2.2. Lederman et al., (1993)
4.3.5.3. 2.3 Recognizing two-dimensional objects
4.3.5.3.1. Template matching
4.3.5.3.2. Feature recognition theories
4.3.5.3.3. Structural descriptions
4.3.5.4. 2.4 Object-centred vs viewer-centered descriptions
4.3.5.4.1. Marr (1982)
4.3.6. 3. Recognizing three-dimensional objects
4.3.6.1. Marr and Nishihara (1978)
4.3.6.1.1. Canonical coordinate frame
4.3.6.2. 3.1 Marr and Nishihara's theory
4.3.6.2.1. Define a central axis
4.3.6.3. 3.2 Evaluating Marr and Nishihara's theory
4.3.6.3.1. Evidence that axis location is central to generation of 3D descriptions
4.3.6.4. Biederman's theory
4.3.6.4.1. Biederman (1987a)
4.3.6.4.2. Supporting evidence
4.3.6.4.3. Challenges
4.3.7. 4. Face recognition
4.3.7.1. Tanaka (2001)
4.3.7.1.1. Likened to expert recognition
4.3.7.2. 4.1 Recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces
4.3.7.2.1. Bahrick et al (1975)
4.3.7.2.2. Bahrick (1984)
4.3.7.2.3. Yin (1969)
4.3.7.2.4. 4.1 Recognizing unfamiliar faces in matching tasks
4.3.8. 5. Modelling in face recognition
4.3.8.1. Young et al. (1985)
4.3.8.1.1. Diary study
4.3.8.1.2. Mistakes in reconizing people
4.3.8.1.3. Face must be recognized before semantic info and name can be retreived.
4.3.8.1.4. Semantic info can be retrieved without name
4.3.8.1.5. Name never recalled without semantic info
4.3.8.2. Model of person recognition
4.3.8.2.1. Hay and Young (1982)
4.3.8.2.2. Young et al. (1985)
4.3.8.2.3. Bruce and Young (1986)
4.3.8.2.4. Supporting laboratory evidence
4.3.8.3. 5.1 A connectionist model of face recognition
4.3.8.3.1. IAC model
4.3.8.3.2. Excitation and activation accounts for priming effects
4.3.8.3.3. Accounts for laboratory findings and everyday errors
4.3.9. 6. Neuropsychological evidence
4.3.9.1. Prosopagnosia
4.3.9.1.1. Exceptionally rare
4.3.9.1.2. All familiar faces affected
4.3.9.1.3. Recogition of personal identity NOT affected
4.3.9.1.4. Ability to recognize expressions can be unaffected
4.3.9.1.5. Young et al. (1993)
4.3.9.1.6. Bauer (1984)
4.3.9.2. 4.2 Capgras delusion
4.3.9.2.1. Ellis and Young (1990)
4.3.9.3. Can covert recognition be turned into overt recognition?
4.3.9.3.1. Sergent and Poncet (1990)
4.3.9.3.2. Diamond et al. (1994)
4.3.9.3.3. Morrison et al. (2001)
4.3.10. 7. Are faces 'special'?
4.3.10.1. Prosopagnosia
4.3.10.1.1. fMRI scans suggest brain areas specialised for face recognition
4.3.10.2. Johnson and Morton (1991)
4.3.10.2.1. Babies have attentional bias towards faces leading to expertise
4.3.10.3. Inversion effect
4.3.10.3.1. Face specific
4.3.10.3.2. General expertise
4.3.10.3.3. Inversion effect is acquired as a result of expertise and is not a ‘face-specific’ effect.
4.3.10.3.4. Searcy and Bartlett (1996)
4.3.10.4. Configural processing
4.3.11. Can generic expertise explain special processing for faces? McKone (2007)
4.3.11.1. McKone suggests that the evidence favours face specificity over expertise
4.3.12. Chapter notes by Tim Holyoake, http://www.tenpencepiece.net/
5. Memory
5.1. Ch 5 Working Memory
5.1.1. Chapter Author
5.1.1.1. Graham J Hitch
5.1.2. 1. Introduction
5.1.2.1. 1.1 Human memory as a multifaceted system
5.1.2.1.1. Evidence suggests memory is not a single system
5.1.2.1.2. Oldest thoretical distinction - STM/LTM
5.1.2.2. 1.2 Distinction between short-term and long-term memory
5.1.2.2.1. Observations suggest two separate storage systems.
5.1.2.2.2. 'Modal' model
5.1.2.2.3. 5.1 Understanding ‘garden-path’ sentences
5.1.2.2.4. Shallice and Warrington (1970)
5.1.2.3. 1.3 Working memory as more than STM
5.1.2.3.1. 5.2 Studying the effect of an irrelevant memory load on verbal reasoning
5.1.2.3.2. Daneman and Carpenter (1980)
5.1.2.3.3. Turner and Engle (1989)
5.1.3. 2. The structure of working memory
5.1.3.1. 2.1 A multicomponent model
5.1.3.1.1. Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
5.1.3.1.2. Observation suggests there are separate resources for dealing with verbal and visuo-spatial information
5.1.3.1.3. Baddeley and Lieberman (1980)
5.1.3.1.4. Logie (1995)
5.1.3.1.5. Smyth and Waller (1998)
5.1.3.1.6. Alternative accounts to the Baddeley & Hitch (1974) / Baddeley (1986) model
5.1.3.2. 2.2 Phonological working memory
5.1.3.2.1. Baddeley et al. (1975)
5.1.3.2.2. Baddeley et al. (1984)
5.1.3.2.3. 2.2.1 Developmental and cross-linguistic differences
5.1.3.2.4. 2.2.2 The irrelevant speech effect
5.1.3.2.5. 2.2.3 Neural basis
5.1.3.2.6. 2.2.4 Theoretical issues
5.1.3.3. 2.3 Executive processes
5.1.3.3.1. 2.3.1 Central workspace
5.1.3.3.2. 2.3.2 Attention
5.1.3.3.3. 2.3.3 Fractionation
5.1.3.3.4. 2.3.4 Coherence and the binding problem
5.1.4. 3. Vocabulary acquisition
5.1.4.1. 3.1 Neuropsychological evidence
5.1.4.1.1. Baddeley et al. (1988)
5.1.4.1.2. Patient KF
5.1.4.1.3. Cowan (1988)
5.1.4.2. 3.2 Individual differences
5.1.4.2.1. If learning vocab depends on the capacity to hold a phonological sequence over a short interval, then the two abilities should be correlated
5.1.4.2.2. Baddeley et al. (1998)
5.1.4.2.3. Gathercole et al. (1997)
5.1.4.2.4. Service (1992)
5.1.4.2.5. Papagno and Vallar (1995)
5.1.4.3. 3.3 Experimental studies
5.1.4.3.1. Papagno and Vallar (1992)
5.1.4.3.2. Papagno etal.(1991)
5.1.4.3.3. Evidence suggests that for adults the phonological loop is necessary for learning non-words
5.1.5. 4. Modelling the phonological loop
5.1.5.1. Two-component model insufficient
5.1.5.1.1. Learning?
5.1.5.1.2. Long-term phonologcal memory?
5.1.5.1.3. How is the order of items remembered?
5.1.5.2. Mathematical and computational models of the phonological loop
5.1.5.2.1. Brown et al. (2000)
5.1.5.2.2. Burgess and Hitch (1992, 1999)
5.1.5.2.3. Page and Norris (1998)
5.1.5.2.4. Test of adequacy
5.1.5.3. 4.1 Serial order
5.1.5.3.1. Associative models
5.1.5.3.2. Non-associative models
5.1.5.3.3. Temporal grouping effect
5.1.6. Chapter notes by Tim Holyoake, http://www.tenpencepiece.net/
5.1.7. Baddeley, A. (2000) ‘The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol.11, pp.417–23.
5.1.8. Baddeley, A. (2003) ‘Working memory and language: an overview’, Journal of Communication Disorders, vol.36, pp.189–208.
5.2. Ch 6 Long Term Memory: Encoding to retrieval
5.2.1. 1 Introduction
5.2.1.1. Episodic Memory
5.2.1.2. Encoding, Storage and Retrieval
5.2.2. 2 Encoding
5.2.2.1. 2.1 Levels of processing
5.2.2.1.1. ‘Multi-store’or‘Modal’ memory model.
5.2.2.1.2. Depth of Processing
5.2.2.1.3. Type I Processing
5.2.2.1.4. Type II Processing
5.2.2.2. 2.2 Relational and item-specific processing
5.2.2.2.1. Relational processing (Elaboration)
5.2.2.2.2. Item-specific processing (Integration)
5.2.2.2.3. 2.2.1 Encoding processing and Mandler’s (1980) dual-process model of recognition
5.2.3. 3 Memory stores and systems
5.2.3.1. 3.1 Multiple memory systems
5.2.3.1.1. Episodic Memory
5.2.3.1.2. Semantic Memory
5.2.3.2. 3.2 Declarative and procedural memory
5.2.3.2.1. Declarative knowledge
5.2.3.2.2. Procedural knowledge
5.2.4. 4 Retrival
5.2.4.1. 4.1 Encoding specificity and transfer appropriate processing
5.2.4.1.1. Encoding specificity
5.2.4.1.2. Transfer appropriate processing (TAP)
5.2.5. 5 Implicit memory
5.2.5.1. 5.1 Perceptual and conceptual implicit memory
5.2.5.1.1. Conceptual implicit tests
5.2.5.2. 5.2 Accounts of implicit memory
5.2.5.2.1. 5.2.1 TAP account
5.2.5.2.2. 5.2.2 Memory systems accounts
5.2.5.3. 5.3 Implicit memory and amnesia
5.2.6. 6 Jacoby's process-dissociation framework
5.2.7. 7 Remember and know judgements
5.2.7.1. 7.1 Do remember and know judgements reflect different response criteria?
5.3. Ch 7 Autobiographical Memory and the Working Self
5.3.1. 1 What are autobiographical memories?
5.3.2. 2 Autobiograpical memory across the lifespan
5.3.2.1. Working Self
5.3.2.1.1. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000)
5.3.2.2. Lifespan retrieval curve
5.3.2.2.1. 2.1 Childhood amnesia
5.3.2.2.2. 2.2 The reminiscence bump
5.3.2.2.3. 2.3 Recency
5.3.3. 3 Autobiogrphical knowledge, episodic memory, the working self and memory construction
5.3.3.1. 3.1 Autobiographical knowledge
5.3.3.1.1. 3.1.1 General events
5.3.3.1.2. 3.1.2 Lifetime periods
5.3.3.2. 3.2 Episodic and semantic memory
5.3.3.2.1. 3.2.1 Recollective experience
5.3.3.3. 3.3 The working self
5.3.3.3.1. Retrieval mode
5.3.3.3.2. 3.3.1 Goals and the working self
5.3.3.4. 3.4 Constructing autobiographical memories
5.3.3.4.1. Generative retrieval
5.3.3.4.2. Direct retrieval
5.3.4. 4 Autobiographical memory in distress
5.3.4.1. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
5.3.4.2. 4.1 Traumatic event
5.3.4.3. 4.2 Response at the time of trauma
5.3.4.4. 4.3 Subsequent psychological symptoms
5.3.4.4.1. 4.3.1 Re-experiencing symptoms including intrusive memories
5.3.4.4.2. 4.3.2 Avoidance symptoms
5.3.4.4.3. 4.3.3 Amnesia as avoidance
5.3.4.4.4. 4.3.4 Hyperarousal symptoms
5.3.4.5. 4.4 Impact of symptoms
5.3.4.6. 4.5 The nature of intrusive trauma memories
5.3.5. 5 What are autobiographical memories for?
6. Concepts and Language
6.1. Ch 8 Language Processing
6.1.1. 1 Introduction
6.1.1.1. Mental lexicon
6.1.2. 2 Word recognition
6.1.2.1. 2.1 Spoken word recognition
6.1.2.1.1. 2.1.1 Segmenting the speech stream
6.1.2.1.2. 2.1.2 Parallel activation
6.1.2.1.3. 2.1.3 Lexical competition
6.1.2.2. 2.2 Visual word recognition
6.1.2.2.1. 2.2.1 Models of visual word recognition
6.1.2.2.2. 2.2.2 Mappings between spelling and sound
6.1.2.2.3. 2.2.3 Eye movements in reading
6.1.3. 3 The mental lexicon
6.1.3.1. Semantic content
6.1.3.2. Semantic organization
6.1.3.3. 3.1 Morphology
6.1.3.3.1. Morphemes
6.1.3.3.2. Inflectional change
6.1.3.3.3. Inflectional morphology
6.1.3.3.4. Derivational morphology
6.1.3.3.5. Full-listing approach
6.1.3.3.6. Decompositional approach
6.1.3.4. 3.2 Accessing word meanings
6.1.3.4.1. Spreading activation models
6.1.3.4.2. 3.2.2 Semantic ambiguity
6.1.4. 4 Sentence comprehension
6.1.4.1. 4.1 Syntax
6.1.4.1.1. Phrase structure
6.1.4.1.2. Thematic role assignment
6.1.4.2. 4.2 Models of parsing
6.1.4.2.1. Garden path model
6.1.4.2.2. Constraint-based model
6.1.4.3. 4.3 Is parsing autonomous?
6.1.4.4. 4.4 Constraints on parsing
6.1.5. 5 Conclusion
6.2. Ch 9 Concepts
6.2.1. Explaining categorization
6.2.2. Where next?
6.3. Ch 10 Language and Thought
7. Thinking
7.1. Ch 11 Problem Solving
7.1.1. 1. Introduction
7.1.1.1. 1.1 What is a 'problem'?
7.1.1.2. 1.2 Protocol analysis in problem-solving research
7.2. Ch 12 Judgement and Decision Making
7.3. Ch 13 Reasoning
8. Challenges for Cognitive Psychology
8.1. Ch 14 Cognition and Emotion
8.2. Ch 15 Conciousness
8.2.1. Will not be directly examined
8.2.2. TMA06 Option 2 What are the difficulties encountered by psychologists in studying conciousness? To what extent have theory and research in cognitive psychology helped overcome these difficulties?
8.2.2.1. Cut off 27th September 2011
8.2.2.2. 2000 word limit
8.3. Ch 16 Applying Cognitive Psychology
8.3.1. Will not be directly examined
8.3.2. TMA06 Option 1 To what extent has cognitive theory and research enhanced our understanding of the difficulties involved in obtaining accurate eyewitness evidence.
8.3.2.1. Cut off 27th September 2011
8.3.2.2. 2000 word limit