Historical Background in Literature

1. Allen, Paul. Theological Method: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 2012. e-Book. Allen’s “explicit” purpose for writing the book is to recap the developments of theological methods in history. Additionally, the author’s “implicit” purpose is to quash ideas that theology is either “dull” or “irrelevant.” (p.1-2) His intended audience would then follow as those either wishing to or academically required to know the history of theological methods but not wishing to be bored to tears. Allen ultimately reveals himself as an anti-correlationist in his departure from Scripture via “Liberation Theology.” He at least intimates this at the outset of his book by redefining the idea of theological “method” [tool for construction] as not necessarily prejudicial or some railroad on a slant. (p. 7) Readers come to find that the prejudice or slant Allen refutes may be insufficiency of the Bible itself in method. Like Franke but unlike Lonergan and Lindbeck, the author identifies an ability to ascertain truth yet questions how via revelation, hermeneutics, and tradition that “knowing” in a theological sense is possible. This is where the author resembles the likes of Lonergan over Franke. He quotes Lonergan (as well as Lindbeck) quite extensively, implying that Lonergan is somehow integral to unwinding methodological perplexity. In short, Lonergan is oversold by Allen and simultaneously could not possibly be undervalued by a “perplexed” audience. Simply, a naïve audience looking for answers will not find it in Lonergan’s relativity explained by Allen. Allen earned his M.Div. in 1991 from the University of St. Michael's and his Ph.D. from the University of Ottawa/Saint Paul University in 2001. He is Associate Professor in the Department of Theological Studies at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. Similar to Franke, Allen specializes in systematic theology, the science-theology dialogue, and theological anthropology. Theological Method is his only significant publication to date. However, he has written contributing chapters in other’s work, as well as, published journal articles. During the winter semester of 2017-18, he taught a course on science-religion dialogue. Additionally, the author has received a research grant project entitled: “Creatures of God: An Evangelical-Catholic Dialogue on Sin, Evolution and Human Nature.” (2013-15) There is no doubt that in contrast to Franke’s Protestant influences Allen maintains a Catholic bent throughout his work. Such perhaps may be traceable to his educational background and grant pursuit. Additionally, from the very outset of the book, Allen touts the Apostle Paul as first a theologian who rests his theological method upon four pillars: justification by faith, an ethic of holiness, the issue of original sin, and the existence of the Holy Trinity. Moreover, and similar to Franke, Allen argues that Paul’s theological method remains in juxtaposition of both God’s revelation through Scripture and personal experience. (p. 46) If then not labeling Allen’s theological method as at least Pauline, then his readers may deduce by inclusion of the Patristics Irenaeus, Origen, and Athanasius as outright Catholic. On the other hand however, the author does concede that Origen may be more philosophical than doctrinal by comparison to Paul’s method. (p. 65) But further investigation along Allen’s plot-line reveals that he also waxes philosophical in his method. After moving through Augustine’s theological inquiry, as well as, luminaries such as Anselm and Aquinas, Allen measures natural theology against the sola scriptura theological methods employed by Calvin and Luther. Allen accuses Luther of developing “a canon about the canon” (p. 124) He is likewise critical of Calvin’s method as intentionally rearranging doctrine to address soteriological concerns. This comes as no surprise in consideration of Allen’s pro-Catholic stance on theological method. However, the final convincer that Allen prefers Catholic thinking in theological method over others is his introduction of and justification for “Liberation Theology.” In delaying for a moment in how Allen uses the historicity of thinkers’ theological methods to make his argument, the author divides theologians into two methodological doers of theology. Firstly, he names Bulmann, Tillich, Balthasar, Rahner, and Schillebeeckx as “correlationist.” Secondly, he names the likes of Barth as “anti-correlationist.” The former’s hallmark is to bring every area of human thought under the discipline of Christ. The latter’s hallmark is not to be constrained by such telos. In moving forward from either of these methods, Allen clearly declares his preferred method as “moving beyond strict boundaries between correlationist and anti-correlationist factionalism.” (p. 224) Instead, Allen clearly advocates a theological method that marries modern socio-economic conditions with theology. In his words, a theology whereby “the needs of the poor and disadvantaged are given pride of place as the starting point for theological reflection. . . sociologically speaking, liberation theologians have received a generous and welcome hearing from churches and academic [“correlationist”] theologians.” (p. 217) Thus, by popular ascent of Allen and others, “Liberation Theology” or the theology the Catholic Church has employed in its Latin America policy since 1960, is a conscience-driven method he finds preferable to correlationists using Scripture as a foundation.

2. Clark, David K. To Know and Love God: Method for Theology. Edited by John S. Feinberg. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010. Kindle. Clark’s reason for writing the book is similar to Allen. Both intend to explore and describe the nature and task of theology throughout history. More specifically, however, it appears that Clark makes argument and defense for juxtaposing two equally important aspects to theological method. For evangelicals, these are firstly, scientia or biblical inerrancy and infallibility. But Clark argues that Christian evangelical theology transcends just biblical propositions. His thesis is that doing good theology involves more than, and simultaneously never less than, scientia. Hence, secondly Clark argues for sapentia or wisdom/philosophy as an equally important role in Christian theological method. At first blush, this perspective would appear to comport with Allen (conscientiously), Lonergan (culturally), and Lindbeck (linguistically) in prioritizing philosophical wisdom over Logos. However, contrary to the aforementioned scholars, Clark argues that Scripture alone maintains “sole and ultimate authority.” (loc. 1178) In this way, Clark comports more with Franke than the others. However, his caveat on priority of Scripture clearly comes with his warning against potential misuse/abuse of the Bible. Such error arrives by employing the Bible as a method in and of itself. Clark argues that Scripture may be misused, sans consideration of genre, for reinforcing what one thinks he or she already knows. Clark argues that “valuing abstract and general propositions over the Bible’s literary genres, implies that. . . the theologian’s task is to translate the Bible into a better, more useful form—that is, into sets of philosophy-like statements. The Bible uses many genres other than abstract, descriptive, or moral principles. These genres are not the sort of material from which readers can easily distill general principles [emphasis added].” (locs. 2051-2059) Overall the author directs Christian theology to advance “spiritual devotion, godly character, Christian community life, and effective service.” (loc. 1160) Clark earned his M.A. in Christian Thought from Bethel Seminary where he has retired from service as both Professor of Theology and Apologetics, as well as, Dean. He earned his Ph.D. from Northwestern University with primary interest in philosophy of religion and apologetics and special interest in epistemology. Clark has written eight books, dozens of articles, and has served on such boards as the InterVarsity Christian Fellowship. Such background has apparently prepared Clark to provide his audience critical yet respectful analysis of various authorities in the church and academia in the spirit of Christian ethics. For example, in general terms regarding those assuming authoritative roles in the church, Clark states that “commitment to theological authority usually deteriorates into authoritarianism. . . blind, indiscriminate, or unwarranted. . . that lies beyond all critique. . corrupted, degenerated, gone to seed. . . a self-reinforcing position that becomes immune to healthy critique.” (locs. 1562-1577) The author’s greatest concern in Christian ethics and impacts is the view post-modernists can easily glean from such authoritative attitude and behaviors cf. what the Bible actually says regarding oppression as an abuse of power. “Oppressors use an idolatrous claim to absolute and unquestionable truth. As a strategy to consolidate their position, they will often claim the authority of God. They may assert that God has called them to a mission.” (locs.1577-1579) Additionally, Clark is critical of Schleiermacher’s Pietist emphasis upon “religious experience” launching a “liberal theology” whereby the theological error is that experience is central to faith. In this way, Clark opens the door to the possibility that evangelicalism can easily become an experiential movement over what Clark deems a “spiritual movement” whereby “theological truth must be embodied in vivid, personal experience and in service” cf. “Schleiermacher’s generic religious experience.” (locs. 467-480) Clark sees Barth as advancing Schleiermacher’s “liberal view of theology.” Specifically, the author argues that Barth altogether rejects systematic theology due to its foundation upon “general philosophical assumptions” rather than the science of dogma (dogmatics) emanating from human inquiry. “Although its understanding of Christ is not infallible, dogmatics presupposes that Jesus Christ is the truth. . . an act of faith. . . not humanly induced thought, but the result of God’s gracious act toward the church.” (locs. 823-839) In this way Clark identifies with Allen who separates Barth from others as anti-correlationist. Further, both Allen and Clark place the likes of Tillich as a correlationist. While Schleiermacher connected theology to individual experience and Barth tied theology “to the experience of human persons generally”. . . Tillich said theology must do both. . . the human situation to produce the central questions of authentic human existence. . . philosophy asks the questions; theology provides the answers.” (locs. 840-842) Clark sees overemphasis in evangelical theology in use of what he terms “the kerygmatic pole” or Scripture over the “contextual pole” over original audience cf. contemporary audience however. He says that the security of what evangelicals view as “proper objectivity that pursues a form of knowledge correctly shaped by its object rather than by the biases of the knower.” However, “evangelical transporters can overemphasize the kerygmatic pole. They assume that inductive approaches to the Bible will enable them to avoid the influence of contemporary context. . . This is a naïve objectivism that fails to see how an interpreter’s outlook affects her interpretation.” (locs. 1108-1116) Thus, scientia and sapentia must be employed together for sake of applicable contextual theology to occur. His “dialogical” approach perhaps parallels Augustine’s balance of faith and reason in doing theology and apologetics. Firstly, setting biblical facts side-by-side in “proper relationship” is indeed “inductive science.” However, it is not theology. Secondly, imposing a philosophically-derived “system onto the biblical data” is indeed a “deductive method.” However, it is not good theology. Nonetheless, there is an effective “middle way.” In Clark’s method, “a theologian listens to Scripture, then develops tentative hypotheses, and then goes back to the Bible in a dialogical movement. . . makes reasoned judgments. . . considers their relative importance to each other and their relationship to culture and to life.” (locs.1012-1026).

3. Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology, 3rd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group. 2013. Kindle. Erickson’s purpose in writing the book is to provide his audience with proper theological method from his Baptist/Calvinist perspective while remaining gently critical of other views. By his own admission, Erickson seeks to “I have attempted to depict the differing parties as fairly as possible. It is my hope that all segments of the theological spectrum, both evangelical and nonevangelical, will continue to engage in careful and respectful dialogue.” (loc. 204) He goes so far as to instruct on the “Role of the Church” in dealing with key issues such as the doctrines of Revelation, God, Humanity, Sin, The Person of Christ, The Work of Christ, The Holy Spirit, Salvation, The Church, and The Last Things. Identification of his intended audience may be firstly drawn from the structure and layout of the book. Not only does the work conspicuously commence with a Part 1 lesson on how to study God, each and every chapter/part begins both with “Chapter Objectives,” “Study Questions,” and an “Outline.” Thus, it may safely be concluded that the book is designed for more than the casual or armchair student of theology and theological method. Rather, its intended audience is primarily aimed at those who are either leading or sitting in a classroom. Additionally, the tone of Erickson’s delivery can easily be surmised as emanating from one who wishes to draw others external to Baptist or at least mildly Calvinistic doctrine. By revealing to students his steady yet non-compromising approach, they are more likely to replicate his method. Erickson clearly sees counter productivity in polemic alienation. What results is Erickson’s sensible and gently afforded apologia. Moreover, the author justifies this, as well as, virtually every point he makes, with scriptural citation such as “gentleness” found in Galatians 5:22-23. In this way, the author teaches his readers/students to process opposing viewpoints and then cogently argue one's own position from Scripture. Such makes sense from Erickson’s background as Distinguished Professor of Theology at Western Seminary with more than twenty books in publication. He served as professor of theology and academic dean at Bethel Seminary (where Clark earned his M.A. and taught). He earned a B.A. from the University of Minnesota, a B.D. from Northern Baptist Seminary, an M.A. from the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. from Northwestern University. He is also an ordained Baptist minister with aforementioned tendencies towards Calvinism and egalitarianism, as well as, an opponent of liberal evangelicalism and postmodernism. He is also a strong proponent of systematic theology. Such qualities are undeniable via fair academic treatment of his text. Firstly, regarding his strong advocacy of systematic theology, Erickson argues that “theology came to be known as rational knowledge, a systematic and critical reflection on the content of the Christian faith. In recent times, however, faith is no longer regarded as an affirmation of truths.” (locs. 20402-20406) The source and absoluteness of that truth for Erickson differs from the cultural and linguistic relativity of Lonergan and Lindbeck, as well as, the conscience-driven truth of Allen. In this way, Erickson is more like Franke. A good example of this is reflected in Erickson’s methodological treatment of the Virgin Birth. Although the account only appears twice in Scripture, Erickson sees it as absolutely essential to Christology. “The virgin birth was at the forefront of [fundamentalist cf. modernist] debate. . . as an essential belief. . . To the former it was a guarantee of the qualitative uniqueness and deity of Christ, while to the latter it seemed to shift attention from his spiritual reality to a biological issue. (locs. 14820-14825) Thus, per Erickson, the issue should be a high priority for Christian theologians. Nonetheless, the author notes that “some evangelical systematic theology texts make little or no mention of the virgin birth in their treatment of Christology.” (loc. 14891) Examples such as these appear to be the driving factor for Erickson to provide his readers/students genuine tools in doing theology “aware of the reality of conditioning and of perspectivism. . .of our own fallibility and limitation, and hold our convictions with a degree of humility, so that we can correct ourselves as the process goes on.” (loc. 985) Such process includes weighing theories of truth and knowledge (epistemology). With regards to this subject, Erickson clearly opposes what he calls “Neofoundationalism” or a process where truth exists only in “the structure or architecture of knowledge.” Relativity of truth occurs when “certain basic propositions. . . regarded as true. . . other propositions were justified by their relationship to these. . . a foundation and a superstructure. . . major marks of modernism. . . to be avoided at all costs.” (locs. 1004-1020) Alternatively, Erickson’s truth resides in Scripture and its inerrancy. However, “any foundationalism tends to be thought of as tied to modernism. . . [but] There is a more modest version of foundationalism, which has always existed but has become especially popular since about 1975.” (locs. 4564-4585) In this idea of foundation of truth in Scripture, albeit qualified by proper interpretation by Erickson, the author agrees with Clark’s view on biblical inerrancy and valid “foundation” for theological method.

4. Franke, John. The Character of Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005. Logos. Franke’s purpose in writing the book is to provide commonsense terms for the nature of, as well as, the task and purpose in doing theology so that its missiology may be applied to a post-modern society. For Franke, “postmodern anthropologists have discarded the assumption that culture is a preexisting social-ordering force that is transmitted externally to members of a cultural group who in turn passively internalize it.” (p.114).With regards to theology’s nature, Franke argues that by Calvinist “maxim” it grows from knowledge of both God and ourselves. He persists that “a reforming and nonfoundational [sic] approach to theology is both appropriate and necessary for finite and fallen human beings and is required by the nature of the subject of theology, the Triune God revealed in Jesus Christ.” Further, doing theology either from “above” or “below” has inherent consequences. The former emphasizes God’s revelation but “can also lead to the assumption of one right, unchanging, timeless theology [emphasis added].” The latter “can also lead to the development of sectarian theologies that work against the unity of the church.” (p. 84) According to Franke, Good theology is done “while securing the epistemic primacy of God as the one who establishes truth and works out its justification.” (p.197) Franke earned his D. Phil. from University of Oxford in 1997. He also has his M.A. in Biblical Studies. He is Associate Professor of Theology at Biblical Theological Seminary and has been Visiting Professor of Missional Theology at Yellowstone Theological Institute. He has also served as either professor or lecturer on Systematic and Historical, as well as, Missional theology. In addition to Character of Theology, he has written Manifold Witness: The Plurality of Truth, Barth for Armchair Theologians, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1-2 Samuel in the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture and Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context. The “task” of theology, although “subject to cultural settings (thought forms and concepts) is assigned the mission of “assisting the church in extending and establishing the message of the gospel in a variety of contexts.” (pp. 84-85) The author pre- clarifies such task for Christian theologians as “assisting the community of Christ’s followers in their missional vocation to live as the people of God in the particular social-historical context in which they are situated.” (p. 44). Additionally, and in relation to other thinkers in this annotated bibliography, Franke expresses his views on “truth.” Particularly he views the Christian faith as containing “truths” as studied and articulated by its theologians. (p. 40) Such perspective sharply contrasts the likes of Lindbeck and Lonergan who view truth as relative and thus inconclusive to any objective determination of reality. Despite Franke teaching Systematic theology, Franke argues that the task of doing theology even transcends systematic “collecting and understanding all the relevant passages in the Bible on various topics and then summarizing their teachings clearly.” Rather, he more aligns himself with Carl F. H. Henry in asserting the task of theology is “to exhibit the content of biblical revelation as an orderly whole [emphasis added].” In any event, just as H. Wayne McDill’s inductive exegetical preaching espouses (at least in part), discovery and expression of “timeless truth,” Franke sees the missiology of Christian theology. (p. 88) Compared to Henry’s migration from early twentieth-century culturally-isolated fundamentalism towards a more culturally-engaged evangelicalism, it appears as though Franke has exchanged the mission of dealing with “modernism” for dealing with “postmodernism.” Just as would have been dealt with by Henry and his colleagues at Fuller Seminary, capitulation to opposing cultural-theological forces is neither the battle-plan nor purpose of Christian theologians dealing with postmodernism. (p. 85) Theology is neither purposed to “accommodate” culture nor is it to remain “disengaged from it. (p. 85) Rather, the task and purpose combined into one (relatively) succinct statement by Franke is stated as: “the task of theology in its various historical, cultural, ecclesial, and confessional contexts and expressions is to offer its particular witness to the Christian faith as an ecumenical enterprise for the purpose of contributing to the common task of the church to clarify the teaching of the one faith. (p.118). However, Franke concedes that “understanding of the nature, task, and purpose of theology, coupled with the commitment of theology to truth, raises the question of justification, particularly in the midst of the plurality of convictional communities.” (p.194) In this way Franke mirrors Erickson. Such “plurality” may be arrested in Logos, Franke argues. “The ongoing work of the Spirit is manifest in the appropriation of the biblical narrative in order to speak to the church for the purpose of creating a socially constructed ‘world’ that finds its coherence in Jesus Christ in accordance with and in anticipation of the ‘real’ world as it is willed to be by the Father.” (p.196)

5. Henry, Carl F. H. God, Revelation, and Authority; God Who Speaks and Shows, Vol. 1. Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1999. Logos. Henry’s audience are those doing theological battle with liberal or post-modern “Christian” practitioners. Such count themselves Christian while denying the very fundamental dogmatic tenets of Christianity. In other words, Henry defends the fundamentalist viewpoint for sake of both those holding a traditional conservative theology, as well as, those he considers as errantly holding a liberal perspective that judges his literal interpretive apologetic method as old-fashioned tom-foolery. Moreover, Henry provides fundamentalism and its contemporary synonyms (evangelicalism/Christian conservatism) with tools of defense of such old-fashioned literalism. Firstly, he offers a rudder of rational orthodoxy with an apologia of respectability. Secondly, he argues conservative interpretive boundaries for responsible Protestant biblical scholarship. Henry’s God, Revelation, and Authority, Vol. 1 God Who Speaks and Shows serves as foundational to his six-volume set that contrasts the fourteen-volume liberal tome of Karl Barth. Henry references Barth extensively in God Who Speaks and Shows as a constant source of differentiation in liberal and conservative methods. Perhaps being formerly best known as a member of the founding faculty of Fuller Seminary, his cohorts included Wilbur Smith, a Presbyterian pastor of wealthy background and another example of faculty and students of the “Old” Princeton Seminary rejecting its progressively more liberal migration in Christological theology. Henry had also been a close follower of J. Gresham Machen who was fired from Princeton as a result of his continued conservative Christology. Other refugees from modernism included Henry’s contemporaries Everett Harrison and Harold Lindsell. In reporting the class discussion engaged in Liberty University’s CHHI 940 regarding fundamentalism and evangelicalism, Kevin King, Professor at Liberty’s Rawlings School of Divinity (whom wrote his doctoral dissertation on Henry’s fundamental method) named Henry the “Luminary of Fundamentalism.” Moreover, despite Barth’s Christological shortcomings in the face of Henry’s fundamentalism, King argues that “If we knew what formed a person we might not think their reaction is so strange or misguided.” Nonetheless, in citing Rolland D. McCune in Second Generation New Evangelicals, King boils down the split of evangelicals from fundamentalists that includes ecclesiastical separation, evangelism, social interaction, and scholarship. Other publications arguing Henry’s perspective include The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism and The Protestant Dilemma that hoped pastors would disseminate the fundamentals of Christian faith to the hoi polloi (common people). For Henry, at least according to King, the Arts either “set or respond to culture emotionally.” In application, politics, economics, military history, science, culture, and lastly theology influence complex belief constructs of the hoi polloi. In this, King argues that a “robust intellectual agenda would have pushed theology closer to the front of the list.” Of course, one primary enemy of fundamentalism was liberal intellectualism itself. For King, ultimately, “Henry did not reach the hoi polloi.” For Henry, evangelicals are not engaging the culture appropriately. Thus, Henry’s argument that “we will be a cult by [the year] 2000.” This drives Henry’s purpose for writing the book. His penchant for defending his rational orthodoxy and sensibly, as well as questioning opposing viewpoints, makes his points difficult to summarily dismiss without greater scholarly investigation. His “fixed and final” truths for all reality shirk value in emotion and sharply trade it for intellection reason or “rationality” as the superior currency of argumentation. In contrast to Lonergan and Lindbeck, Henry regards truth as absolute. Namely, Henry says that regardless due to either religious or secular myth “that infuses all reality with time and change—no reason remains whereby to vindicate the permanent value or significance of any myth, or to condemn the Nazi myth and a call to embrace it.” (p. 64) But not only in popular cultural agreement in the post-WWII era, Henry uses Scripture extensively in making his case. Such historical thinking is reminiscent of J. Gresham Machen’s commonsense reality. Henry quotes Machen not as frequently as he does Barth, but perhaps more meaningfully. For example, Henry states that “If any one thing must be clear to the historian, it is that Christianity at the beginning was founded squarely upon. . . a ‘gospel.’” (p. 162) With respect to scholars, scholarship and myth, Henry engages in what he deems “considerations” cf. “divine revelation.” On the one hand, Henry argues in stark contrast to the likes of Lindbeck and Lonergan that truth does not exist outside of relativism and thus cannot be absolute. “Unless truth is a relevant consideration, consistency and coherence too are extraneous considerations.” (p. 65) Further, contra to Lindbeck and Lonergan, “experiential considerations can [only] offer tentative and flexible conclusions about God in relation to us.” (p. 80) Conversely, with respect to divine revelation, Henry argues that “Human reasoning now becomes the first court of appeal, and establishes all man’s beliefs up to the desperation point where revelation becomes additionally necessary.” (p. 87) But this is not to restrict Henry’s fundamentalism as fundamentally against just the theories of Barth, Lindbeck, and Lonergan. Indeed, Lindbeck and Lonergan were not even threats to Henry’s position at the time of publication. However, not only do the high-Christological views of René Descartes, Gottfried von Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza comport with Henry’s theology, but the likes of John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume aggravate Henry in that he considers their views as being “discontinuous with daily life and experience.” Moreover, these methods of sole reliance upon “experience” reflects that of Immanuel Kant. Such “rationalists” detach “man’s rationality from the transcendent Logos as the ultimate ground of truth and source of order, and by asserting the complete autonomy of human reasoning.” (pp. 38-39)

6. fLindbeck, George. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-liberal Age. 25th Anniversary ed. Louisville: John Knox, 2009. Kindle. In following Lindbeck’s method, the author pursues his “rule theory” that juxtaposes reconciliation with myriad flavors of belief-holders as occurring via both confession and conversation with dissident religions. This “anti-foundationalism” smacks of a perspective that Bernard Lonergan held as expressed in his book Method in Theology. In fact, Lindbeck employs sixty-five references to Lonergan (similar to Allen’s use of Lonergan) in The Nature of Doctrine. In short, if Lonergan’s intended audience would be theologically/culturally feelings-based or in some fashion attracted to fideism, then Lindbeck’s intended audience would be attracted to an any doctrine goes pluralism. In other words, while the former trades the necessity of Scripture for approaches around cultural bias, the latter trades the necessity of Scripture in determining true religion from counterfeit for an indeterminate experiential standard. And with no actual yardstick for truth, pluralism fits Lindbeck’s method as well as fideistic feelings fit Lonergan’s method. Thus, tantamount to Lindbeck’s argument is the measurement of reason over truth. But unlike Lonergan, for Lindbeck there is truth in such things as love, hate, and jealousy (loc. 1215) Nonetheless, in this and other matters, Lindbeck holds that human beings cannot be truly certain of anything. Such an outlook might be argued as transcending pluralism and regarding first-order skepticism. (locs. 234, 931, 3419) For both Lonergan and Lindbeck, personal and individualized data-collection are tantamount to doing theology, although Lonergan leans upon cultural bias. On the other hand, Lindbeck argues more emphasis upon cognitive means promulgated by the language of the culture. In re-emphasizing the difference between these two cohorts, Lonergan valued Aquinas heavily in his Seminary writings while Lindbeck regards Thomastic arguments as essentially “fideistic” when compared to those of Martin Luther (loc. 3453) In essence, Lindbeck’s method keys upon one’s experiential and personalized data inputs into a cognitive environment of uncertain truth in doing theology. Lindbeck’s background may provide some insight into this conclusion including his Lutheran priority. Lindbeck (1923 – 2018) the son of Lutheran missionaries was born in and lived in China until he was seventeen years old. He received his B.A. in 1943 and his B.D. in 1946. He earned his Ph.D. from Yale in 1955 with concentration on medieval studies. In this can be seen perhaps Lindbeck’s bent away from Aquinas and onto Luther. As noted earlier, Lindbeck agreed with Luther’s rational arguments for faith but vehemently referred to Thomastic arguments as fideistic. Luther’s 95 Theses against Catholicism may have had some influence upon Lindbeck and a clearly Catholic Aquinas. However, not apparent in Lindbeck’s text is his own railing against propositional theology cf. propositions held in Luther’s 95 Theses. In any event, Lindbeck’s regard for Luther over Aquinas perhaps, at least in part, led Lindbeck to serve as a Delegate Observer to the Second Vatican Council and liaison between Catholics and Lutherans on ecumenical matters. He in fact served between the years1968 to 1987 as member of the Joint Commission between the Vatican and Lutheran World Federation. This perhaps led to his writing of The Nature of Doctrine, perhaps Lindbeck’s most influential work. In it, the author finds little truth as component of doing theology outside of relativism. (locs. 234-235, 238-241, cf. 1336-1338) For him, the relativity of truth is in and of itself doctrine. For example, ontological truth such as Christ as messiah remains ontologically necessary for keepers of the Christian faith. However, Lindbeck parses such doctrinal “truth” from “intrasystematic” truth. Therein, Lindbeck reveals that although doctrine requires truth so to speak, in his first-order skepticism, there is no certain truth. Thus, truth becomes a matter of language over certainty. For Lindbeck, his “cultural-linguistic” method accepts the veracity of ontological truth sans first-order truisms but only as incidental to matters of cultural discourse or linguistics. Thus, not only is Lindbeck revealed as a first-order skeptic but first-order relativist. But Lindbeck remains fair in acknowledging his relativism. For example, “intratextuality” or “intrasemiotic” or “universally true” means that there is no necessarily timeless theological truth reserved for any Scripture whatsoever [emphasis added]. Rather, interpretation of a relative Scripture (or whatever the kind) migrates with the cognitive resources of an individual. Moreover, and similar at least in this regard to Lonergan, such is made evident by cognitive responses to either cultural theological ascension or migration from any particular scriptural truth. Lindbeck’s perspective is self-admittedly preceded by the likes of Barth and Frei. (locs. 3075-3268) However, the author resolves that he is inconclusive in his very own theory, since truth is [first order skeptically] indeterminable and thus inconclusive. Moreover, acknowledging that his ecumenical target in reasoning pluralism sans the certainty of definable truth might also itself be flawed. However, even in this, Lindbeck argues that the audacity of Christianity remains in its extinguish of reason, in its insistence upon self-determined yet consensus truth. This is something that Lonergan might better argue as at least culturally-driven truth. But Lindbeckian reasonableness for plurality nonetheless overlooks 1 Peter 3:15 in that Christians are scripturally to give reason for their faith. For Lindbeck, however, justification for reason over fact remains off of Christians and onto Catholic Aquinas. “No interpretive gymnastics can evade Thomas’s unwavering insistence on this point. . . Lindbeck extends the book’s argument about the ‘particularistic universality’ of religious truth claims, in light of misgivings among readers about relativism. . . [All] are equally ‘valid’ roads.” (locs. 358-400) For the student that wishes to study doctrinal divides among denominations (i.e. Baptist cf. Presbyterian) in Christianity, Lindbeck is useful. For the student who considers Christian dogma above doctrinal divides among the denominations as pertinent to unifying reconciliation, the capitulation Lindbeck considers (such as between Catholic and Protestant) is never going to happen this side of the millennial kingdom. (locs. 186 cf. 467-558, 910)

7. fLonergan, Bernard. Method in Theology, 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Kindle. In following Lonergan’s method, his purpose for writing the book is to describe a logical series of psychological steps of data collection that form an individualized and personal truth. Since this makes truth both subjective, relative, and thus anti-absolute, he argues that the rationale for gleaning “truth” trumps facts. Moreover, any discovery of error is inextricably linked to the very rationale employed in the collection of data. His order of methodical psychological progression may be described as one beginning with moral psychological judgment and concluding with consensus of at least some common ethical axioms. Lonergan’s approach remains mostly apologetic in nature via his ethical ground-rules for theology. The author clearly pins cultural bias as a necessary invalidator for application of any moral judgment whatsoever. Consequently, knowledge itself remains entirely subjective for Lonergan. It may be critically defensible that for Lonergan, there is no objective truth whatsoever. This is due to unavoidable cultural bias and its effects upon data. Lonegran (1904-1984) was born in Buckingham, Quebec. He is known best for his Generalized Empirical Method. This methodology argues that the mind reaches knowledge by an incline of data. Such ascent from data occurs via a progressive process growing from hypothesis to verification. In this regard, creation of one’s theology remains no different than other disciplines such as math, science, art, historiography, philosophy, and the like. Philosophies regarding each, by their very nature and nature of mankind, evolve via creativity. Data is king, and data is subjective, the place where creativity drives truth. Moreover, Lonergan views humans as creators of their own values and meanings. We all do this via constructs employing both commonsense and cultural/ethical conditioning into a compound of one complex personal truth. Since data is both subjective and inconclusive, so then must be the outcome of any moral judgment based around the data. It is no surprise that much of Lonergan’s Seminary interests at the Gregorian University in Rome were based around characters such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Kant, and Marx. He was ordained as a Jesuit Priest circa 1936-37. After completing two years of doctoral study there, he returned to Canada in 1940 in order to teach theology at Montreal’s Collège de l'Immaculée Conception. Lonergan also taught at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto from 1947 to 1953 before returning to teach at the Gregorian University from 1953 to 1965. He was the Stillman Professor at Harvard University in 1971-1972 and became Distinguished Visiting Professor of Theology at Boston College in 1975. His first major work towards establishment of Generalized Empirical Method was delivered in 1957 via his book Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. But it is the content of his 1972 work Method in Theology that must more narrowly be explored. Such “critical realism” argues that the source of a given error clarifies the destination’s determination or “knowledge” of ethics. Regarding objectivity in knowing anything, Lonergan argues that there are both elementary and compound elements in both “objects” and “knowing” itself. Elementary knowing is “any cognitional operation” of the senses including understanding. Thus, the elementary object is what is “intended” in elementary knowing [emphasis added]. Furthermore, “compound knowing” is the “conjunction” of “several instances” of elementary knowing all rolled into one single knowing [emphasis added]. If this sounds difficult to follow, it is. However, viewing Lonergan as a bricklayer helps. Each brick in his method is begotten from the last and begetting the next. Compounding abounds in a “transcendental” fashion from the “unknown” to the “better known.” Simply, what is experienced equals what is understood, and this drives what is conceived. Such conception drives what is “affirmed to be real.” What is affirmed as real “can be the same as what is approved as truly good.” (pp. 15-16) Carrying Lonergan’s epistemological conception further along into metaphysics and theology, the author also transcends the transcendental epistemology he uses as his foundation. Namely, he first asks, “What am I doing when I am knowing?” and answers that this is cognitive theory. Secondly, he asks, “Why is doing that knowing?” and answers that this is epistemology itself. Thirdly, he asks, “What do I know when I do it?” and answers that this is metaphysics. But such transcendental method comes up short of comprising a total theological method. While the transcendental method “supplies the basic anthropological component,” it fails to provide the “specifically religious component” necessary for theology. (p. 27) Lonergan’s view on religion truly ties together his theological method. Although truth appears to be an exercise in compound subjectivity and experiential relevancy, he argues religion as “accepting the judgments of fact and the judgments of value that the religion proposes.” (p. 114) Of course, in Lonergan’s own words, whatever religion purports comes by the same compound truth that governs all science including theology. However, the additional component included in the author’s own concession, is “faith.” Faith goes beyond the individual, according to Lonergan. Rather it is a group-think of truthful reality as measured by “community” of agreement. “It may be ascetic and mystical. . . It may be theoretical. . . It may be a compound.” (p.114) The academic usefulness of Lonergan’s methodology is his basic rational cognitive approach to truth. Its practical weakness for Christian doctrine is that humanity is unable to know anything for certain but accepts truth via group-think faith. This leaves 1 Peter 3:15 in the lurch, something that rational apologists hold dear. George Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-liberal Age makes known his association with Lonergan. Lonergan makes no mention of his association with Lindbeck however. There is obvious connection between Lonergan’s liberal theology to the liberal age Lindbeck addresses in his book.

8. The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (Cambridge Companions to Religion). Edited by Kevin J. Vanhoozer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Kindle. Vanhoozer writes (or more aptly compiles a series of essays then contributes to) his work for the explicit purpose of either defining and actually defending postmodernism or training Christian theologians in refuting such. A close second (if not also a primary focus) however is to disembowel the foundations of Christian theological method, again, either for real or designed as boot-camp practical training for Christian apologists. By viewing Vanhoozer’s biography, what remains most-likely is that the author is okay with Christianity, so long as it includes cultural and linguistic modifiers that cause departure from a doctrine he considers bombastic. Alas, while Erickson is clear to note that Christian doctrine has its “foundations” in scriptural truth and postmodern method has its “foundations” in compound experience, Vanhoozer attempts to juxtapose the two methods, using his application to nullify the foundational qualities of Christian method. This Vanhoozer expresses as if the two foundations were interchangeable. Such agenda becomes apparent from the outset simply by viewing the structure Vanhoozer has employed via two sections entitled “Types of Postmodern Theology” and “Christian Doctrine in Postmodern Perspective.” Moreover, his employment of “Deconstructive Theology” is reminiscent of (if not a carbon copy of) Beilby’s deconstructive external apologetics that are deployable to refute the theological positions of Dawkins or Ehrman. Vanhoozer is Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. According to the school’s Web site on February 8, 2018, this is Vanhoozer’s third stint there (1986-90, 1998-2009, and 2012-present). Vanhoozer earned his B.A. from Westmont College, his M.Div. from Westminster Theological Seminary and Ph.D. from Cambridge University, England. His works related to The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology include Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge, 1990). Ricoeur argued the idea of the “capable human being” as mastering self-knowledge only through understanding and relation to the world and of our life through personal experience. Vanhoozer’s book Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Zondervan, 1998) won the 1999 Christianity Today Book Award. Vanhoozer also won CT’s 2006 Best Theology Book of the Year for First Theology: God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics (InterVarsity, 2002). For Vanhoozer, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology compounds from one philosophical conundrum to the next. Firstly, “if ideas represent reality, and words represent ideas. . . [do] words represent reality. . . the problem of the veil of language. . . ‘Which description of reality is best?’. . . ‘interpretation–universalism’. . . things exist and are the way they are only relative to conceptual schemes.” Such leads to epistemological anxiety and paranoia (pp. 26-27) Secondly, in the whirlwind of Descartes cf. Barth/Schleiermacher, the idea of God is a problem for postmodernists. “[Descartes’ idea] God could only have been caused by a real God distinct from himself, and thus God exists. . . [Barth argues] whenever Christianity is founded on human religious experience [also Schleiermacher] the question will arise whether religion is a purely human phenomenon and thus God a mere projection.” (pp. 27-28) Vanhoozer’s typologies of postmodernists include firstly, “deconstructive or [nihilist] eliminative (Mark C. Taylor, Carl Raschke, Charles Winquist)” (p. 16) marked by the proposition that language is a set of “arbitrary distinctions” in that no single language “carves up the world at its joints.” Rather, languages are “social constructions” unable to provide “universal reliability.” (p. 10) Although Vanhoozer categorizes Lindbeck as “postliberal,” it is likely that he and Lonergan (unmentioned by Vanhoozer) belong in this typology. Even Vanhoozer’s caveat “by and large, the two lists overlap, with the exception that the ‘conservative’ option in the first book becomes the ‘postliberal’ in the second,” he would then name Lindbeck as “conservative.” Secondly, “constructive or revisionary (David Ray Griffin)” (that in addition to a postmodern typology, Vanhoozer also argues as a “theology”) marked by the proposition of “prideful constructions of modernity – buildings, conceptual systems, political regimes, theologies. . . are in fact historically conditioned, culturally conditioned, and [constructed by]. . . finite beings.” (p. 20) Thirdly, “liberationist (Harvey Cox, Cornel West)” (p. 16) marked as “feminist” (p.17) but is more reminiscent of “liberationist” as is, practically speaking, Allen’s self-identification. He also qualifies John Paul II as a “conservative or restorationist” (p. 16) and sees postmodernism as having “religious” theologies. These are evident in the “constructive” theologies of David Ray Griffin and David Tracy. (p. 16) Vanhoozer sees Lindbeck as “postliberal.” (p. 17) Following such extensive taxonomy of post-modernism, Vanhoozer deconstructs Christian belief on the lines of Lindbeck’s method but ties in the linguistics of Scripture itself in context of interpretational “language game.” (pp. 161-162 cf. 166). Similar to Clark, Vanhoozer sees sapentia as major motivator for evangelical activities. (p. 167)