1. Concepts
1.1. The idea of Democracy as understood by modern day definitions
1.1.1. Political Equality
1.1.1.1. Within an entity, all participants should have equal opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
1.1.1.1.1. Certainly was not the case back in 1919 where racial equality bill by Japan was rejected for consideration by the league of nations, and empires on both sides still owned colonies
1.1.2. Popular sovereignty
1.1.2.1. The ultimate power to make decisions is vested in the people, and by extension those they elect to represent them.
1.1.2.1.1. This took tangible form in the USA's congress effectively VETOing America joining the league of nations, thus torpedoing the birth of a potential world order
1.1.3. Popular consultation
1.1.3.1. Decision making has to be subject to institutional machinery through which public officials can learn what the people wish adopted or enforced
1.1.3.1.1. With the advent of the printing press, news reached the citizenry at unprecedented speeds, where negative reactions could have very real consequences such as union strikes, applying pressure for heads of state to make people-pleasing rather than sound decisions
1.1.4. Majority Rule
1.1.4.1. The belief that "When the people disagree on an issue, the government should act according tot he wishes of the majority rather than the minority."
1.1.4.1.1. Because the Big 3 were largely electoral democracies, they were subject to majority rule and knew it. Failure to adhere to the people's wishes was effectively "Political suicide"
1.1.5. See Ranney's "Democracy and Authoritarianism" as source, p.97-105
1.1.6. Beware the caveat that democracy as we understand in our current day is different from what they may have understood as democracy in 1919
1.2. Economic Repercussions as highlighted by Keynes
1.2.1. Concerns regarding the gravity of reparations the allied powers sought to levy against Germany
1.2.1.1. In efforts to pay off the reparations levied against them, Germany would not be able to afford it's imports which they relied on for survival since its transformation from an agricultural to an industrial state
1.2.1.2. Consequently German industry will "Be condemned to destruction" as the demand for food stuffs increase precisely as the inability to provide grows
1.2.2. Issue stemming from the divisive nature of the heads of state that were participating in the decision making process
1.2.2.1. Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy
1.2.2.2. Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week (Once again, democratic pressure)
1.2.2.3. Willson Woodrow to do nothing that was not just and right (this was obviously biased as the president had his own conception of just and right)
1.2.3. Prejudice against the perceived aggressor nation (Germany), would prevent the emigraton of her starving peoples to other potential centres and states capable of sustaining immigration
1.2.3.1. In lieu with his concerns on the grave reparations levied against germany, he espouses that it is effectively the death warrant of several millions of persons in Germany
1.2.4. See Keyne's "The Economic Repercussions of the Peace"
2. Other Key Sources
2.1. Nicolson's Peacemaking Diary Extract
2.1.1. Caveat of Bias with regards to his loyalties and goals (Too Close an alignment to USA interests to be taken objectively?)
2.1.2. Written with a "Then contemporary" view of things and should be taken as such
2.1.3. Highlights the difficulties of diplomatic work, and the eagerness of a USA orientated statesman to work on the "League of Nations Project" (Keep note that it is HIS view, not all USA!)
2.2. Birdsall's Versailles Settlement
2.2.1. Written in hindsight by a recent historian whom has had access to collated information, and the privilege of the passage of time
2.2.2. A defensive work defending woodrow wilson's idealism and efforts towards said ideas.
2.2.3. Can be viewed as a defense towards the points brought up as the conference being a failure due to its lukewarmness.
2.3. Paris 1919
2.3.1. Provides a record of perspective from each of the Big 3 during their participation of the peace talks
2.3.2. Records interactions between the 3 key players, as well as their personal view points of each other, and close confidantes.
2.3.3. A retrospective work written in comparatively recent times
3. Main Arguments vis-a-viz Counter Arguments
3.1. The Treaty was a failure because it was not realistic enough.
3.1.1. Wilson Woodrow was willing to make huge practical concessions in order to focus on the League, which thereafter he believed would gradually address all problems
3.1.2. All other members of the Big 3/4 were willing to take part in this contradicting, confusion and compromises party.
3.1.3. Ultimately each Head of state was interested int he pursuit of national goals rather than general unifying interest
3.2. The Treaty was a failure because the terms were TOO harsh and vindictive
3.2.1. There was no moderation because the subject discussed (Germany) Was never given an opportunity or hand in creating the terms. The original idea of creating terms among allies and submitting to Germany was thrown in the bin following inability for allies to develop any unified list of demands.
3.2.2. Public opinion also called for blood (especially the french). Unlike the PCC's predecessor the 1814 peace conference, many countries were still run by monarchies or aristocrats and thus public opinion held less sway.
3.2.2.1. The advent of the printing press also made political decision making and their results available to the masses at an unprecendented speed and quantity, further pressuring the leaders to buckle to public demand of harsh terms.
3.2.3. All of this resulted in an ultimatum, instead of a discussion, being handed to Germany, who effectively had to accept them under threat of resumption of the war.
3.2.3.1. Resulted in unrealistically high reparations being paid by germany
3.2.3.2. Full blame absorbed by Germany
3.2.3.3. Home Territory with german inhabitants to be carved up and divided between various allied countries
3.2.3.4. Depravation of all overseas colonial assets
3.2.3.5. Partial disarmament of German military
3.2.3.5.1. Reduction of standing army to 100,000
3.2.3.5.2. General Staff disbanded
3.2.3.5.3. War production severely restricted
3.2.3.5.4. Creation of DMZ between France and Germany (On german soil)
3.3. The Treaty was a failure because it failed to be sufficiently harsh or realistically policed
3.3.1. A combination of above 2 arguments.
3.3.1.1. German resentment was allowed to fester and grow because of
3.3.1.1.1. Lost lands with german majority inhabitants
3.3.1.1.2. Unrealistically huge reparations forced to be paid
3.3.1.1.3. Forced to accept full blame
3.3.1.1.4. Had to accept allied army occupation
3.3.1.2. Allied disputes which contributed to this problem were
3.3.1.2.1. Reluctance to make concessions on security and money
3.3.1.2.2. America demanded repayment of debts by her allies (including france and Britain), despite the fact that they needed it to rebuild themselves
3.3.1.2.3. They arbitrarily redrew the maps of the world, with huge inconsistencies when matching principles to facts on the ground.
3.3.1.2.4. Lack of investment/faith in the League of Nations plan, which led to insufficiently cooperation in policing treaties
3.4. The Treaty demonstrated the limitations of power, treaties, and the importance of context
3.4.1. As opposed to the preceding discussions of 1814, the world was too afraid and angry to listen to Germany
3.4.2. The Big 3 could make a deal out of the ceasefire, but they were not able to turn it into a method to guide the world into a new system that could prevent future wars
3.4.3. Public opinion wanted blood and in that age, it could not be ignored.
3.4.4. Zero sum objectives and the failure to get past it led to treaties that needed rules to be universal, or for compromises that needed to work.
3.4.4.1. These would only work if compromises could be enforced and sustained by power. Only USA had the sufficient muscle left to do that. Instead of any policing, they just became words on paper.
3.4.4.1.1. I.e. Zero Sum results such as severe crippling of German economy and industry for the sake of french security, was not policed and allowed to be wielded politically
3.4.5. The decision to exclude Germany and Russia from these discussions ironically altered the context with which the discussions were shaped and viewed
4. Key Terms
4.1. The Big 10, and it's subsequent deriviations the Big 5, Big 4, Big 3
4.1.1. Big 10 Included head of states of Italy, Japan, Britain, France, USA, as well as various delegates
4.1.2. This then degenerated into the Big 5, with just the 5 head of states
4.1.3. Japan was then alienated and left out of the Meetings because of the eurocentric nature of them
4.1.4. Then Italy left after rage quitting due to perceived unfairness by his allies, leaving Clemenceau, Wilson Woodrow, and Lloyd George to discuss the future of Europe between the 3 of them
4.2. Democracy? See Concepts
4.3. Who were the allies?
4.3.1. Japan, Britain, italy, France, England, USA?
4.3.1.1. Didn't Japan just join because they wanted to grab the Shandong peninusla from Germany (Prior to WWI they were already invading parts of China weren't they?)
4.4. Central Powers
4.4.1. Austria-hungary, germany, Ottoman empire?
4.4.1.1. Why was Germany forced to take the butt of all the treaty terms then? Why was there comparatively so little clauses for the other 2 belligerents?
4.4.1.2. Wasn't an Ottoman delegation allowed to make their stances know at the PCC? Why not the Germans?
4.5. The 14 Points
4.5.1. 1. Open Covenants of peace, openly arrived at, shall not be subject to any kind of private rearrangement
4.5.2. 2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war. With the exception when part is closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
4.5.3. 3. Removal of Economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
4.5.4. 4. Adequate guarantees that national armaments would be reduced to lowest point consistent with domestic safety
4.5.5. 5. Impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, where the population governed must have equal weight with the equitable government
4.5.6. 6. Evacuation of all Russian Territory, and the allowance of her to develop politically independent
4.5.7. 7. Belgium to be evacuated and restored
4.5.8. 8. French territory should be freed and invaded portions restored.
4.5.9. 9. Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be along the lines of nationality
4.5.10. 10. People of austria-hungary to be accorded free opportunity for autonomous development
4.5.11. 11. Romania, Serbia and montenegro to be evacuated and restored
4.5.12. 12. Turkish ottoman empires to be assured sovereignty, but all other nationalities to be assured undoubted security in their own autonomous development. Dardenelles should be permanently opened as free passage
4.5.13. 13. Independent Polish state to be erected, along the lines of polish populations.
4.5.14. 14. General association of nations must be formed (League of Nations)
4.5.15. The germans threw themselves at the mercy of Woodrow Wilson in asking him to mediate the peace along the lines of the 14 points, but the Europeans later made amendments to these 14 points. Something Germany could be reasonably angry about considering they signed the ceasefire under an understanding that the peace armistice would be made along the lines of these 14 points (Instead of the massive reparations clauses they ended up having to accept under threat of war)