1. Kuhn vs. Popper
1.1. falsifyability
1.1.1. Popper is convinced that there is no logic
1.1.2. Humes problem
1.1.2.1. one of the 2 fundamental problems of knowledge
1.1.2.2. we cannot get certain knowledge from experience
1.1.2.3. this is rejection of inductivism
1.1.2.3.1. going from sensory experience to knowledge
1.1.3. Demarcation problem
1.1.3.1. how to set science apart from non-science
1.1.3.2. according to Popper: science is falsifyable
1.1.3.2.1. it is possible to observe something that contradicts a science theorem
1.1.3.2.2. as long as the observations are consistent with the theorem, it is not false
1.1.3.2.3. you cannot say the theorem is true, because that would mean that inductivism is true.
1.1.3.2.4. all scientific knowledge consists of unfalsified, but falsifyable hypotheses
1.1.3.3. advantage of falsifyability
1.1.3.3.1. verifyability is too exclusive
1.1.3.3.2. it would need you to measure every single electron to state that electrons have a charge of -1 e
1.1.3.4. disadvantage of falsifyability
1.1.3.4.1. there are a lot of unfalsified falsifiable statements
1.1.3.5. popper doesn't allow for confirmation
1.1.3.5.1. opposite hypothesises are true on the same level
1.2. Tomas kuhn studied aristotle and found out he (A) was wrong
1.2.1. to follow Aristotle, you have to follow along with his viewpoints and truths. this is called the aristotle experience
1.3. kuhn and paradigms
1.3.1. according to kuhn, there are two types of periods in science
1.3.2. long periods of normal science
1.3.2.1. in this period, scientist share important fundamental assumptions
1.3.2.2. onthological assumptions
1.3.2.2.1. which objects exist
1.3.2.3. epistimological assumptions
1.3.2.3.1. what we can do
1.3.2.3.2. what we do know
1.3.2.4. methodological assumptions
1.3.2.4.1. how we get information
1.3.2.5. the assumptions together form a paradigm
1.3.2.6. new knowledge is made to fill the paradign, this is accumulation
1.3.2.7. the knowledge is determined by textbooks: textbook brainwash
1.3.2.8. but at some point, there are problems that don't fit in the paradigm: analomies
1.3.3. short periods of revolutionary science
1.3.3.1. anolamies are the start of revolutionary science
1.3.3.2. when anolamies pile up for the scientists, they will question the paradigm
1.3.3.3. a revolution in science brings about a shift in the paradigm
1.3.3.3.1. all the anomalies of the last paradigm can only be solved in a new paradigm
1.3.3.4. the new paradigm starts a new period of normal science
1.3.4. kuhn: there is a deep gap between succesive paradigms, they are incommensurable
1.3.4.1. they are fundamentally different and cannot be compared
1.3.4.2. even scientists of successive paradigms cannot work together because of the gap
1.4. competition or conformity
1.4.1. philosophers have to develop their own voice
1.4.2. scientists have to conform to rules, practices and methods
1.4.2.1. in a period of normal science, a conforming scientist is needed
1.4.2.2. popper hates this
1.4.3. a scientist should have an open critical and competitive attitude
2. key terms
2.1. philosophy
2.1.1. relation between the world and us and the relation between each other
2.1.2. started with Socrates, plato and Aristotle
2.2. forms of philosophy
2.2.1. natural philosopy vs. mmoral philosophy
2.2.1.1. from aristotle
2.2.2. theoretical philosophy
2.2.2.1. epistimology
2.2.2.1.1. knowledge: what if X is knowledg
2.2.2.2. metaphysics
2.2.2.2.1. external world: what is real
2.2.3. practical philosophy
2.2.3.1. ethics or moral philosophy
2.2.3.1.1. 'what is good?'
2.2.3.2. social and political philosophy
2.2.3.2.1. 'what is the ideal social contact?'
2.2.4. philosophy of science
2.2.4.1. a question of theorethical philosophy in the environment of science
2.2.4.2. started with Ernst Mach: 'i don't believe that atoms exist'
2.2.5. philosophy of mind
2.2.5.1. 'what if anything is a mental state?'
2.2.6. philosophical anthropology
2.2.6.1. tries to bridge the gap between theoretical and practical philosophy
2.2.6.2. deals with the questions of the metaphysics and phenomenology of the human person
2.3. classical philosophy of science
2.3.1. defined in vienna in the 20th century
2.3.2. Wiener Kreis
2.3.3. 1924-1936
3. philosophers
3.1. socrates
3.1.1. first philosopher
3.1.2. books where he speaks with people and uses thought experiments
3.1.2.1. with sofists, he is manipulative and sarcastic
3.1.2.2. with boys, he is friendly and pedagogically compliant
3.1.3. famous question: 'What is X?'
3.1.3.1. answers first with an example of x, but than dismisses it
3.1.3.2. the example is not the essence/core
3.1.3.3. with examples and counterexamples, he works towards the definition.
3.2. Mach
3.2.1. I don't believe atoms exist
3.2.2. also called budha of sciences
3.2.3. followed by Heinrich Gomperz
3.2.4. He tried not to follow other scientists, but wanted proof
4. conceptual analysis
4.1. trying to sort out what existence, good, evil etc. is, by looking at different standpoints
4.2. aim
4.2.1. finding the intentional definition
4.2.1.1. the definition in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
4.2.1.2. a list of conditions such that the defined term applies to all things meeting the condition and nothing else
4.2.1.3. 'all and only'
4.3. what it is
4.4. how we analyse a concept
4.4.1. make an intentional definition, falsify it with a counter example and improve the definition
4.5. thought experiments
4.5.1. started by Plato
4.5.2. philosophical methodology recommends using thought experiments to solve problems
4.6. 3 types
4.6.1. 1. factive thought experiment
4.6.1.1. starts with a very difficult imaginary case
4.6.1.2. 'what if...'
4.6.1.3. the reasoning can be counterfactual if it goes in against established facts
4.6.2. 2 conceptual thought experiment
4.6.2.1. core question: 'does the investigated concept apply to the scenario?'
4.6.2.2. this type stipulates what happens in the scenario
4.6.3. evaluative thought experiment
4.6.3.1. core question: 'what must an agent do in a situation?'
4.6.3.2. very useful in normative ethics
4.6.3.2.1. the study of ethical behaviour
4.6.3.2.2. investigates what questions arise and how ought to act in a moral questionable situation
4.7. famous problems/ thought experiments
4.7.1. demarcation problem
4.7.1.1. 'what is science?'
4.7.1.2. philosophy of science
4.7.2. decision demon
4.7.2.1. invented by Harry Frankfurt
4.7.2.2. PAP: principle of alternate possibilities
4.7.2.3. the decision demon :
4.7.2.3.1. is able to observe the deliberation process of the person
4.7.2.3.2. is able to change the decision of the person
4.7.2.3.3. only interferes when needed
4.7.2.4. if the person wants the same as the demon, they are morally responsible
4.7.2.4.1. alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility
5. method or not
5.1. heuristics
5.1.1. what Lakatos follows
5.1.2. Lakatos is for method
5.1.3. he analysed the dynamics of paradigm-units as a whole
5.1.4. those units are called research programmes
5.1.4.1. they can coexist and compete
5.1.4.2. their protective belt, the outer layer, can change
5.1.4.3. the core stays the same
5.1.4.4. progressive research programme
5.1.4.4.1. predicts novel facts - expands
5.1.4.4.2. level of precision increases
5.1.4.5. degenerative research programme
5.1.4.5.1. no expansion
5.1.4.5.2. finding excuses for anomalies
5.1.5. how to define, break down and solve problems
5.2. ever-increasing ocean of alternatives
5.2.1. feyerabend is against method
5.2.2. Feyerabend is a self-proclaimed epistemological anarchist
5.2.2.1. he founded the kraft kreis, the third wiener kreis
5.2.2.2. they discussed 'philosophical problems in a non-metaphysical manner and with special reference to the findings in the sciences'
5.2.2.3. he considered himself the true heir of John S. Mill
5.2.2.3.1. from Utilitarianism
5.2.3. new vision on competition
5.2.3.1. sciences should freely compete, and be able to exchange as on a marketplace of ideas
5.2.3.2. most important part of science: creativity
5.2.4. two principles
5.2.4.1. principle of tenacity
5.2.4.1.1. if you have anomalies, hold on to your ideas for a while, don't discard your paradigms immediately
5.2.4.2. principle of proliferation
5.2.4.2.1. scientists should always look for alternatives to compare with your views
5.2.4.2.2. it can boost or revitalise your views
5.2.4.2.3. that boosts new inventions and prevents elimination of refuted theorems
5.2.5. knowledge is an ever-increasing ocean of alternatives, competing with each other, and promoting development
5.3. research traditions
5.3.1. of laudan
5.3.2. there can be competing research traditions in one domain
5.3.3. ideas come and go in the core
5.3.4. laudan doesn't consider less theory as degeneration
5.3.5. adds a context of pursuit
5.3.5.1. argues that pursuit (chasing) and acceptance are the 2 ways scientists look at theorems
5.3.5.2. acceptance is closely related to the epistemic attitude belief
5.3.5.3. pursuit means working with an idea, play with it and see how far you can go with it
5.3.5.3.1. rational if it means following the tradition with the highest rate of problem solving
6. free Will(y)
6.1. John Austin
6.1.1. all our actions are free unless they result from exulpation circumstances like chance and in or external compulsion
6.1.2. exulpating: free from blame
6.1.3. compulsion: irresistible urge to perform an act
6.2. free will is the necessary condition of moral responsibility
6.2.1. since the beginning of philosopy, a lot of arguments are against free will
6.3. two types of worries about the existence of free will and moral responsibility
6.3.1. fatalism
6.3.1.1. worries are logical or a priori
6.3.2. causal determinism
6.3.2.1. worries that are empirical and so in principle revisable
6.4. consequence argument
6.4.1. causal determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility
6.5. fatalism
6.5.1. we cannot do anything other than we do
6.5.2. assumptions
6.5.2.1. there is one actual future
6.5.2.2. truth is timeless, if a proposition is true now, it has always been true
6.5.3. fatalists look back at the past for reasoning. the past cannot be changed. they transpose this to the future: the future is fixed
6.5.4. cons
6.5.4.1. fatalism is counterintuitive, the direction of dependence is opposite. it will always have been true that an event happens, because you act to it from free will
6.5.4.2. retrospectively, it is true, but it doesn't explain the that the event happened
6.5.4.3. D. Lewis: "fatalists are philosophers take facts we count as irrelevant in saying what someone can do, disguise it somehow as facts of a different sort that we count as relevant and argue that we can do less than we think
6.6. causal determinism
6.6.1. mechanical philosophy, the view of the world as a clock
6.6.1.1. in the 16th and 17th century, the mechanization of the worldview happened, which sparked mechanical philosophy
6.6.1.2. principle of the causal closure of the physical: no physical effect has a non-physical cause
6.6.1.3. this led to causal determinism
6.6.2. the view that every event results from past events and the laws of nature
6.6.2.1. this also applies to us: our choices are unavoidable as well, they are determined by events beyond our control
6.6.2.2. we cannot be morally responsible
6.6.3. it doubts moral responsibility because of a 4th premise
6.6.3.1. moral responsibility requires free action
6.6.3.2. if causal determinism is true, we cannot be responsible for our actions
6.7. incompatibilism
6.7.1. consequence argument
6.7.1.1. from Peter Van Inwagen
6.7.1.2. contains 3 premises
6.7.1.2.1. if determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past
6.7.1.2.2. but it iis not up to us what went on before we were born and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are
6.7.1.2.3. the consequence of things including our acts are not up to us
6.7.1.3. if causal determinism is true, free will cannot be true
6.7.1.4. we only don't know which one of these is true. this makes the argument an argument for incompatibalism
6.7.1.5. Zonder titel
6.7.2. consists of two views
6.7.2.1. hard determinism: no free actions
6.7.2.2. libertarian determinism: free actions are caused by selves/agents
6.7.2.2.1. actions can only be free if they result form agent causation
6.7.2.2.2. Daniel Dennett: agent causation is a subspecies of event causation. he is a critic
6.7.3. there would also be an option to adopt indeterminism
6.7.3.1. indeterminism doesn't give us free will
6.7.3.2. actions cannot be free by being uncaused or by resulting from chance
6.8. Frankfurts decicion demon and the regimentation of the consequence argument
6.8.1. via transitivity, the premises 3 and 4, we can say alternate possiblility is a necessary condition of moral responsibility
6.8.1.1. frankfurts decision demon is a counterexample
6.8.2. Dennett: in relevant aspects, causal determinism and free will are compatible
6.9. traditional compatibalism
6.9.1. actions are free if
6.9.1.1. they are caused by ones will or desires
6.9.1.2. they are not externally constained
6.9.2. in the possible worlds in which you had chosen otherwise, you would have done otherwise
6.9.3. counterexamples, both by Richard taylor
6.9.3.1. physiologist can induce any will in me as he pleases, by pushing buttons on an instrument attached to me
6.9.3.1.1. so he is a mind-puppet
6.9.3.2. with traditional compatibilism, a drug addict acts freely if he can get his drugs
6.9.3.2.1. this seems counterintuitive
6.10. Hierarchical compatibalism
6.10.1. from frankfurt
6.10.2. comes from the drug addict example
6.10.3. there are 2 types of desires
6.10.3.1. first order desires
6.10.3.1.1. for the drug addict: I want drugs
6.10.3.1.2. directed on objects
6.10.3.2. second order desires
6.10.3.2.1. I don't want to be addicted
6.10.3.2.2. directed on the first order desires
6.10.3.2.3. there can also be third order and so on
6.10.4. self integration
6.10.4.1. with the drug addict, the desires are in conflict
6.10.4.2. self integration is the criterion for moral responsibility
6.10.4.3. self-integrated: the various orders of desires are in harmony, and the agent fully identifies with them
6.10.4.3.1. aware of them
6.10.4.3.2. acts on them
6.10.4.3.3. doesn't deceive oneself about them
6.10.4.4. 3 types of addicts with diffent scales of self-integration
6.10.4.4.1. the Wanton addict
6.10.4.4.2. the unwilling addict
6.10.4.4.3. the happy addict
6.10.4.4.4. the occasional drug user
7. defining knowledge
7.1. 3 types of knowledge
7.1.1. factual knowledge
7.1.1.1. knowing what the rules of calculation are
7.1.2. ability knowledge
7.1.2.1. knowing how to play violin
7.1.3. acqaintance knowledge
7.1.3.1. knowing a city or person
7.2. propositon (def.)
7.2.1. the meaning of the fact
7.2.2. it isnt about the language in which the proposition is stated
7.2.3. also not knowing how to do something ability-wise
7.3. propositional knowledge
7.3.1. we call people who know something epistemic agents, abbreviated S
7.3.2. we call the proposition that S knows P.
7.4. ways to defining knowledge:
7.4.1. 'S knows that P if and only if ...
7.4.2. 'S knows that P if and only if S believes that P'
7.4.2.1. the belief condition
7.4.3. 'S knows that P if and only if S believes that P and P is true
7.4.3.1. the extra condition is for if the belief of S were wrong
7.4.4. 'S knows that P if and only if S believes that P, P is true, and S is justified in believing that P'
7.4.4.1. relative truth: thruth for person 1 might be different from the truth of person 2
7.4.4.2. justification condition
7.4.4.2.1. makes sure S has a reason to believe P
7.4.4.2.2. epistemic luck: cases in which it is only accidental that P happens to be true for S
7.4.4.3. defined this way in Plato's dialogue
7.4.5. the last definition has been true for 24 centuries, until 1963: the Gettier problem
7.4.5.1. the Gettier problem is to rule out any cases of epistemic luck left
7.4.5.2. there is a gap between what makes S believe P and the truthmaker of P
7.4.5.3. truthmaker:
7.4.5.3.1. the fact that makes P true
7.4.5.4. Example:
7.4.5.4.1. S has reasons to believe that 'jones owns a Ford'
7.4.5.4.2. he concludes: 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' = P
7.4.5.4.3. S knows nothing about Brown, but since he includes it in his statement and he has reason to believe part of it, it is not ruled out
7.4.5.4.4. it turns out: Jones has no Ford and Brown is in Barcelona
7.4.5.4.5. the statement is still true but only through epistemic luck
7.4.6. 'S knows that P if and only if S believes that P, P is true, and S is justified in believing that P and S' grounds for believing P have no false propositions
7.4.6.1. this statement complies the Gettier problem, but is too strict
7.4.6.2. someone is accused of something and there are 99 true accusations and 1 false accusation.
7.4.6.3. with this statement, it would mean that the judge is unable to know that the person is guilty
7.4.7. "S knows that P if S believes that P, P is true, S is justified in believing P and there is no defeater'
7.4.7.1. defeater: further information that undermines the belief of S in P
7.4.8. 'S knows that P if S has a true belief in P and S' belief that P can be tracked back to the fact that P'
7.4.8.1. replacing justification
7.4.8.2. the belief of P must originate in the fact that P
7.4.8.3. theory of Goldman
7.4.8.4. also called causal analysis
7.4.9. 'S knows that P if S has a true belief that P and if P were false, S wouldn't believe that P'
7.4.9.1. sensitivity condition
7.4.9.2. this rules out that S would believe something bases on false knowledge that can be tracked back to something where S thought that P
7.4.9.3. example: S is at the countryside and sees a barn. he believes it is a barn. the farmers replaced all barns exept this one with fake barns. in the end, S is right, but it is epistemic luck
8. metaphysics
8.1. physicalism
8.1.1. the realist strategy
8.1.2. started by John locke
8.1.3. opposite of phenomenalism
8.1.4. trades in certainty for the existence of an exernal world
8.1.5. everything is physical, everything supervenes on the physical
8.1.6. physicalist vocabulary
8.1.6.1. terms reffering to ordinary objects
8.1.6.2. according to Carnlap, there is a wide range between the physical and phenomenal vocabulary
9. empiricism
9.1. logical empiricism
9.1.1. inventors of philosophy of science
9.1.1.1. job prescription: to describe the relation between data and the endproduct
9.1.1.2. first, it was said that the report should verify the sentences, now we say confirm
9.1.2. two types of context a PoS should worry about
9.1.2.1. context of discovery
9.1.2.1.1. too much uncontrollable factors, it is idiosyncratic
9.1.2.1.2. there are no patterns in discovery processes
9.1.2.2. context of justification
9.1.2.2.1. is rational
9.1.3. Law of 3 stages
9.1.3.1. Theological stage
9.1.3.1.1. interpret things as being supernatural or from gods
9.1.3.1.2. 3 sub stages
9.1.3.2. metaphysical stage
9.1.3.2.1. dominated by forces and powers
9.1.3.2.2. alive beings have vis vitalis
9.1.3.2.3. this stage has a shortcoming, why?
9.1.3.3. positive stage
9.1.3.3.1. the most sophisticated stag
9.1.3.3.2. combination of observation and theorizing
9.1.3.3.3. you get the how explanation
9.1.4. indirect perception
9.1.4.1. we perceive the world indirectly
9.1.4.2. gives a problem:skepticism
9.1.4.3. we cannot say the world exists, but it is highly probable
9.1.5. central thesis: verification principle
9.1.5.1. only statements that are verifiable through the senses (empirically verifiable) are meaningful
9.1.6. first called logical positivism
9.1.6.1. developed by John Stuart Mill, August Comte
9.1.6.2. started with the law of 3 stages
9.1.7. Humes fork
9.1.7.1. part of epistomology
9.1.7.2. invented by Hume, a empiricist
9.1.7.3. two kinds of propositions
9.1.7.3.1. relations of ideas
9.1.7.3.2. matters of fact
9.1.7.4. a statement is either analytic or synthetic
9.1.7.4.1. analytic
9.1.7.4.2. synthetic
9.1.7.5. this needs a clear definition for statement and meaning
9.1.7.5.1. statement: it is here 20 degrees
9.1.7.5.2. meaning: the thermometer shows 20 degrees
9.2. verificationism
9.2.1. verifiability is the criterion to distinguish sense and nonsense
9.2.2. promoted by logical empiricism
9.2.3. verification theory: the meaning of a synthetic statement is the procedure one should follow to ferify the statement
9.3. phenomenalism
9.3.1. George berkely
9.3.1.1. Subjective/empirical idealism
9.3.2. the phenomenalist strategy
9.3.3. gives up on the external world as a physical world
9.3.4. the world only consists of our sensations
9.3.5. the our is because knowledge is intersubjective
9.3.5.1. knowledge is not that subjective that it will be private
9.3.5.2. we communicate about knowledge
9.3.5.3. Neurath
9.3.6. opposite of physicalism
10. skepticism
10.1. skepticism against empiricism
10.1.1. indirect perception + sensory knowledge
10.1.2. we don't know if something is true because it can be changed while/by perceiving it
10.1.3. two skeptical problems
10.1.3.1. metaphysical problem
10.1.3.1.1. questions the existence of the external world and its material nature
10.1.3.2. epistemological skepticism
10.1.3.2.1. argues that human knowledge is impossible
10.1.4. empiricists often solve one problem and leave the other
10.1.4.1. Thomas Reid: common sense strategy
10.1.4.1.1. it is common sense that there is external material
10.1.4.2. Mill: phenomenalist strategy
10.1.4.2.1. Moore: restrict the object to immediate experience
10.1.4.2.2. all that we are aware of, are possible phenomena and not physical objects
10.2. carthesian skepticism
10.2.1. defined by Descartes
10.3. S knows they have hands. but the possibility of being a brian that is fed mempries cannot be ruled out
10.3.1. S cannot know that P because tho know P, S should be able to exclude all skeptical alternatives to P
10.4. a challenger can only put forward relevant alternatives
10.5. S should be able to exclude all relevant alternatives, which often makes skepticism irrelevant
11. Mind-Body problem
11.1. closely related to skepticism
11.2. defined by Descartes
11.3. Descartes makes a distinction in 2 types of substance, that can exist independently
11.3.1. res cognitans
11.3.1.1. the mind, the thinking thing
11.3.2. res extensa
11.3.2.1. body/matter, the extended thing
11.4. interaction problem
11.4.1. it seems that the body and mind interact, but do they? below are the possible 'solutions'
11.4.2. interactionism
11.4.2.1. from Descartes
11.4.2.2. the mind and body interact
11.4.2.3. according to him, the interactions take place in the pineal gland, the only part of the brain that doesn't divide in a right and left hemisphere
11.4.3. parallelism
11.4.3.1. the mind and body seem to, but actually don't interact
11.4.3.1.1. appearance of interaction
11.4.3.2. pre-established harmony
11.4.3.2.1. defined by Leibnitz
11.4.3.2.2. it is like two clocks running at the same time, God has pre-established what happens in the mind and body
11.4.3.3. occasionalism
11.4.3.3.1. God intervenes on each occasion in which there seems to be interaction between mind and body
11.4.3.3.2. God actively interferes and keeps creating throughout history
11.4.3.4. Double aspect theory
11.4.3.4.1. defined by Spinoza
11.4.3.4.2. it does not accept substance dualism
11.4.3.4.3. there is only one substance: the world / God
11.4.3.4.4. mind and body are separate, but parallel since they come from one creature
11.4.4. epi-phenomenalism
11.4.4.1. there is only one-way traffic: from body to mind
11.4.4.2. the mind is a by-product or epi-phenomenon of the body
11.4.4.3. this stategy has as advantage that there are no metaphysical causes
11.4.4.4. con: mental states have both physical and non-physical properties
11.4.5. currently, monism and spcecifically materialism or physicalism are leading
11.4.6. Idealism
11.4.6.1. only minds and their contents exist
11.4.7. logical or philosophical behaviourism
11.4.7.1. according to Ryle, Descartes made a cathegory mistake
11.4.7.1.1. mental causation is not the relation of two separate things, but mental and behaviour are the same thing
11.4.7.2. it avoids unobservable mental states by reducing them to observable behaviour
11.4.7.3. pro: it specifies the disjunctions of behavioural dispositions as impossible
11.4.7.3.1. i wrote exactly what he said and i have no clue what it means
11.4.7.3.2. the relation between mental states and behaviour is conceptual, not causal
11.4.7.4. some part of experience is purely qualitative. this aspect is called qualia
11.4.7.4.1. being with and without qualia can create the same behaviour, this is a problem for behaviourism
11.4.8. Reductive materialism
11.4.8.1. the mind and brain are the same
11.4.8.1.1. this is also called the brain state theory or identity theory
11.4.8.2. the mental state is identical to the brain state
11.4.8.3. identity theory goes further in saying that mental types can be identified by physical types
11.4.8.3.1. this is type-type identity
11.4.9. functionalism
11.4.9.1. argument from multiple realizations
11.4.9.1.1. other beings also have minds: animals can be in pain in the same way as humans
11.4.9.1.2. this is an argument against identity theory and for functionalism
11.4.9.2. mental states can be fully characterized by their functional role
11.4.9.3. they can be in relation to 3 things
11.4.9.3.1. Sensory input
11.4.9.3.2. behavioural input
11.4.9.3.3. other mental states
11.4.9.4. supervenience describes the relation between mental states and their material realization
11.4.9.4.1. a supervenient states supervenes on a subvenient/underlying state, as long as the identities of the subvienient states are the same
11.4.9.4.2. this implies the identity of the supervenient state, they are the same as well
11.4.9.4.3. there can be no difference qua supervenient states without a difference qua subvenient states
11.4.10. eliminativism
11.4.10.1. what functionalists do to mental states is the same as what non-scientific folk do when they explain things with god, witches
11.4.10.2. knowledge argument
11.4.10.2.1. all there is to know is wrong
11.4.10.2.2. the full physical information is all there is to know