1. 4. Neuroscientific Progress
1.1. Science is making impressive progress in explaining the nature of the relationship between mind and brain
1.1.1. Proof: History of science - World is flat but now it's round
2. define mental states in terms of functional role they play , rather then the physical form
3. Substance Dualism
3.1. The mind and body are fundamentally different sorts of things (substances)
3.2. Advocates: Socrates, Descartes
3.3. PHYSICAL vs. MENTAL
3.3.1. Physical: material, extended in space, physics, incapable of thought/feeling
3.3.2. Mental: immaterial, not extended in space or governed by laws of physics, capable of thought/feeling
3.4. +ve 1. Introspection & Self
3.4.1. Introspection matches up our ways of thinking about minds and our identities
3.4.2. Descartes: introspection reveals that the introspecting person is a thinking substance and nothing else - see only thoughts
3.4.3. Religions: concepts that identify the self as something separate from body and capable of existence separate from it
3.5. +ve 2. Complexity & Computation
3.5.1. Impossible for purely physical system to exhibit C&C abilities of the human mind
3.5.1.1. Mathematics & Language - beyond reach of purely physical systems
3.6. -ve 2. C&C
3.6.1. Argument from Irreducibility
3.6.1.1. Modern computers M&L abilities exceed the human mind
3.7. +ve. 3 Availability: Physical states are publicly available while mental states are private
3.8. +ve 4. Fallibility: Can be wrong about physical facts but will always be correct about your own mental states
3.8.1. Related: Epistemological Problem
3.8.1.1. What about the skinny girl who thinks she's not skinny?
3.8.1.2. Or the posessed girl who thinks she's on fire when she is physically fine
4. Property Dualism
4.1. Rejects the idea that there is a non-physical substance that is the basis for minds/mental states - rejects Substance Dualism
4.2. There is only physical substance but certain objects like the brain possess non-physical properties that no non-thinking physical objects possess
4.2.1. e.g. sensation of pain, having a sensation of red, thinking that P
4.3. Only the properties cannot be reduced or explained in terms of physical sciences (because subjective)
5. Epiphenomenalism
5.1. Spark: Substance Dualism cannot explain how mental states have causal effects on the physical
5.2. A type property dualism
5.3. Claims that mental properties are not part of the physical causal matrix that determines our thoughts and behaviour
5.4. Mental properties are side effects of physical systems that reach a certain level of complexity
5.4.1. Mental caused by brain. But mental does not affect brain. One way street.
5.4.1.1. Famous version - Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia to Descartes
6. Objections to Dualism
6.1. 1. Interaction Problem
6.1.1. A. If the mind and body are separate, how do they causally interact with one another?
6.1.1.1. Difficult to explain
6.2. 2. Unnecessarily Complex
6.2.1. Posits the existence of a second type of thing - immaterial substance - that has no role except to support tht ephenomena in question
6.2.2. Metaphysical Occam's Razor: Don't multiply entities beyond the minimum necessary to explain the phenomenon
6.3. 3. Explanatory Power
6.3.1. Having mind as a separate substance does not help us understand complex mental phenomena like reasoning, consciousness, qualia
6.3.1.1. We know what it's not..but not what it is
7. Mind-Brain Identity Theory - reductive materialism
7.1. Inter-Theoretic Reduction
7.1.1. show that higher level entities/phenomena are in fact instances of lower-level entities/phenomena
7.1.1.1. Famous instances of reduction - science: heat,sound, colour
7.1.2. mental states can be identified with brain states
7.2. Identity: Mapping between mental and brain states
7.2.1. TYPE - TYPE
7.2.1.1. a particular type of mental state is identical to a particular type of brain state
7.2.1.1.1. may be too restrictive - human brains only
7.2.2. TOKEN- TOKEN
7.2.2.1. for any given mental state there is some physical state to which it is identical
7.2.2.1.1. not restricted BUT there's not much explanatory power - why study neuroscience then? If everyone is different but just have a certain type of state
7.2.2.2. Mental states are related to physical events but NOT IDENTICAL TO EACH OTHER - random
7.3. 1. Humans are purely physical in origin
7.3.1. Science can explain the origins of human biology developmentally and evolutionarily
7.3.2. Mental can be reduced to physical: ontological parsimony - no mystical mind origin
7.4. 3. Neural Dependence
8. Anti-Identity Theory
8.1. 1. Introspection
8.1.1. Introspection doesnt support the idea of mental being just brains - argue dualism
8.1.2. Reply: our senses don't reveal fundamental physical character of things..light, sound, heat
8.2. 2. Meaning and Identity
8.2.1. Semantics: There seems to be statements, and properties that are true of mental states but not brain states and vice versa
8.2.1.1. mental not equal to brain states
8.2.2. Reply: We are using commonsense for now and they are bound to our incomplete knowledge of the world
8.3. 3. Qualia
8.3.1. Purely physical explanations cannot account or the subjective character of experience
8.3.2. Complete reduction is not possible since some aspects of mental experience are not reducible to physical SO Identity theory is false/incomplete
8.4. 4. Multiple Realizability
8.4.1. here may be indefinitely many types of brain states that physically realise a particular type of mental state (e.g belief)
8.5. 5. Ruling out Other Species' Brains
9. Nagel's Bat
9.1. Thomas Nagel 1974
9.2. Bats use echolocation to navigate - different experience from human (sight)
9.3. Even if can describe physically to the smallest bit, we will still not be able to experience it - cannot explain mind
10. Jackson's Mary
10.1. Frank Jackson
10.2. Mary the neuroscientist who has been raised in an entirely monochromatic room - she knows everything about neuroscience of vision and mind/brain
10.3. But when she goes out into the real world and sees red, she will have a whole new experience.
10.3.1. Physical facts alone do not exhaust what can be known about the mind
11. Chalmer's Zombies
11.1. David Chalmer's philosophical zombies
11.2. Imagine a world identical to ours - physically - but the people cannot experience qualia
11.3. Possible response of materialist: - Qualia
11.3.1. 1. Deny the intuitions or the coherence of the cases
11.3.2. 2. Deny intuitions' validity as reflections of the fundamental nature of the world - history of science is instructive
11.3.3. 3. Appeal to different types of knowledge - especially Jackson/Nagel
11.4. The fact that we can conceive such an idea shows that intrinsic features of our conscious experience are distinct from physical features of the sort appealed to by various forms of materialism.
11.5. Anti identity theory AND functionalism
12. Eliminative Materialism
12.1. acknowledge that a reduction from FP to neuroscience is unlikely
12.2. Problem is not with neuroscience but with folk psychology - misleading us
12.2.1. Neuroscience will trump over folk psychology - powerful framework
12.2.1.1. ELIMINATION VS REDUCTION
12.2.2. Churchland's examples: thoery of hear, stars and astronomy - the old frameworks were abandoned entirely
12.2.2.1. 1. FP is systematically unable to explain major and behavioural pheomena
12.2.2.2. 2. Dubious record of folk wisdom
12.2.2.3. 3. Dependence on language for both its entities is sturcture. - cannot readily explain non linuguistic/pre-linguistics cognition
12.2.3. Anti-Churchland
12.2.3.1. 1. Introspection
12.2.3.1.1. begs the questions - may change as we reconceptualise our experience
12.2.3.2. 2. Exaggerration of FP's inadequacies
12.2.3.2.1. some aspects of FP might be retained and we shouldn't be shackled by it
12.2.3.3. 3. Neurosciencetific understanding is still of relative infancy
13. Functionalism - token physicalists
13.1. Functional role = causal relations it bears to environment, body and other mental states
13.2. Popular in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence
13.2.1. Suggests that we can study the mind as a computational system - can study without bothering about neuroscience
13.3. vs. Behaviorism
13.3.1. Similar > focus on causal relations
13.3.2. diff > the functional definitions involve reference to other mental states
13.4. ANTI-FUNCTIONALISM
13.4.1. Cannot account for qualia
13.4.2. Inverted thought experiment: functional roles are identical but phenomenal character is very different
13.4.3. Block's China Brain
13.4.3.1. a society of people mimicking the functional organization of the human brain
13.4.3.1.1. functionalist: system would be a mind since it instantiates the functional roles of human brain
13.4.3.2. All mental phenomena we know of are systematically dependent on brain phenomena - brain activity > mental
13.4.3.3. Absent qualia - not a mind
13.4.3.3.1. Thus, there is more to mentality than functional roles - reductio ad absurdum
13.4.4. Functional definition implies disciplinary/methodological autonomy
13.4.4.1. Churchland's temperature example
13.4.5. Folk Psychology
13.4.5.1. There is no easy way to link psychological states to phsycical states - dims prospects fora tidy edutcion of Folk psychology to neuroscience
14. Behaviourism
14.1. John Watson, B.F. Skinner
14.1.1. Originates in skepticism about whether mental states like thoughts and feelings are truly scientific and objective enough to be the basis for psychology
14.1.2. B.F. Skinner
14.2. Theories and explanations entirely in terms of publically observable behaviour
14.2.1. B's explanations take the form of laws connecting the particular physical stimuli to particular physical responses.
14.3. Analytical/Philosophical behaviourism: analyses mental states in terms of behaviour
14.4. DENY
14.4.1. Subjective experiences are inherent/essential to thought
14.4.2. Nor do they have a place in scientific study of mind (methodological behaviorism
14.5. ACCEPT
14.5.1. That we have internal/subjective experiences
14.6. PROBLEMS
14.6.1. 1. Thoughts and perceptions that don't lead to behaviour e.g. daydreaming
14.6.2. 2. Mental states that can't be clearly described in terms of actual behaviours or dispositions to behave - enjoying a certain music
14.6.3. 3. Possibility of the same behaviour but different mental states - inverted spectrum problem
15. Folk Psychology
15.1. Commonsense body of explanations and "theories" or understanding of our own and other's thoughts/actions by appeal to notions like belief, desire, intention.
15.2. Shortcomings > need philosophy & psychology
16. Biggest Problem: Qualia
16.1. the subjective character of experience
16.1.1. vivid nature of qualia is not easily explained
16.1.2. popular objection to purely physical accounts of the mind (materialist theories of mind)