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Game Theory
by Daniel Booth
# Game Theory

## Simple Concepts To Know

### What the fuck is meant by equilibria

### What do we mean by beliefs

### Mutual Knowledge

### Common Knowledge

## Elements of a game

### Players

### Nature

### Game Structure

## Solution Concepts (Just A
LIST ATM)

### Rational Strategies

### Iteratively not dominated Strategies

### Correlated Strategies

### Rationalizable Equilibiria

## General Method of Game
Setup and Solution

### 1)Collate Information

### 2) Identify WHAT THE
PROBLEM IS. What will the
solution look like?

### 3) Work through the
problem WARNING
ALGEBRA!

### 4) Solution

## Strategic Form Games

## Extensive Form Games

## Good Books on Game Theory

### Rubinstein

### Fudenberg & Tirole

### Gibbons

## Nash Refinements

### Extensive Form Games

### Strategic Form Games

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Don't think about this equilibrium as something "optimal" per se. Think of it as an occurance of strategies in a game where none of the players have a desire to change their strategy given other players strategies. Note well this can be a stupidly large solution concept and needs some refinements.

Pure Nash Equilibria

Mixed Nash Equilbria

Common knowledge is when every one in the games know a peice of knowledge and they know that others know...and they know that the other know etc etc. It sounds crazy but thats what it is.

Payoffs based on their own actions and the actions of others

Beliefs

Actions

Knowledge of other players and game

Signals

Strategies

Added Nature here, might be something to it

Strategic Game

Sequential Game

Finite

Infinte

1) Type of Game, Extensive, Normal Form

2) Number of Players

3) Set of Actions

4) Strategies

5) Utility Functions

6) Pay-Off Functions

The matrix style ones. All players move at the same time.

Players move after each other.

Sub-game Perfect Equilibria, Trembling Hand Equilibria, Proper, Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium, Perfect Baysian Equilibria, Cho-Kreps Refinement