1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
1.1. ART 13 TEU: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND LOYALTY IN THE INTERESTS OF EU CITIZENS
1.2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND COUNCIL ARE DIFFERENTS
1.2.1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL VOTES PER CONSENSUS,
1.2.1.1. DECIDES THE EUROPEAN UNION DESTINY: SET THE POLITICAL GOAL
1.2.1.1.1. COMPOSED BY THE HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT
1.2.1.2. THE PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETING CAN BE A MINISTERIAL PERSON REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER ONE DEPENDING ON THE AGENDA AND THE TOPPIC.
1.2.1.3. PRESIDENT ELECTED BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE FOR 2/5 YEARS
1.2.1.3.1. HAS NO VOTING RIGHTS, PRESIDEES THE MEETINGS.
1.2.1.4. EVVERY MEMBER HAS A REPRESENTATION AMBASSADOR
1.2.2. AN EXCEPTION FOR THE CONSENSUS IS THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, IS NEEDED QUALIFIED MAJORITY.
1.2.2.1. THE PROCEEDING ARE NOT PUBLISHED BUT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE ISSUES
1.2.3. IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, HE JUST SET THE POLITICAL GOALS.
1.2.4. BODY OF THE EU IN THE MAASTRICH TREATY, FIRST MENTIONED IN EUROPEAN SINGLE ACT
1.2.4.1. ENTERED IN THE EU FRAMEWORK IN THE TREATY OF LISBON 2009
1.3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1.3.1. IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT YOU CANNOT BE A MEMBER OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, GOVERNMENT OR ANOTHER EU INSTITUTION
1.3.1.1. MEMBERS HAS IMMUNITY AND RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT
1.3.2. LEGISLATIVE POWER AND BUDGETARY DISCUSS THE BUDGED OF THE POLITICS
1.3.3. POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
1.3.3.1. THE COUNCIL HAS TO PRESENT HIS PROGRAMMS TWICE A YEAR
1.3.4. EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN
1.3.4.1. DEALS WITH BAD ADMINISTRATION CASES: ENHANCE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
1.4. EUROPEAN COMISSION
1.4.1. SUPRANATIONAL INSTIUTION
1.4.1.1. DOESN'T REPRESENT THE STATES IS THE GUARDIN OF TREATYS
1.4.2. ONE COMISSIONAIR PER MEMBER STATE 27 TODAY
1.4.3. THE PRESIDENT IS APPOINTED BY TH EUROPEAN COUNCIL
1.4.3.1. THEN VOTED BY MAJORITY BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1.4.4. COMISSIONAIRS CANNOT MIXED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS CANT ENGAGE IN OTHER REMUNARATE ACTIVITY
1.4.5. MADE THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS BASED ON THE GOALS STABILISHED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
2. SOURCES OF LAW
2.1. PRIMARY LAWS: MOST IMPORTANTS:
2.1.1. TREATY OF EUROPEAN UNION
2.1.2. TREATY OF FUNCTIONING OF EUROPEAN UNION
2.1.3. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF EUROPEAN UNION
2.1.3.1. CAN BE APPLIED ONLY WHEN THE MS IS APPLYNG EU LAW,
2.1.4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2.2. SECONDARY LAWS
2.2.1. INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.2.2. SECONDARY LAW
2.2.2.1. BINDING LAWS
2.2.2.1.1. REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES AND DECISIONS
2.2.2.2. NON BINDING
2.2.2.2.1. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPINIONS
2.2.2.2.2. DECLARATIONS: MADE BY MEMBER STATE OR INTERGOVERNMENTAL
2.2.3. SOFT LAWS
2.2.3.1. COMMUNICATIONS AND GUIDELINES
2.3. TO ECJ: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE PART OF THE LEGAL ORDER,BC ARE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2.4. INTERNATIONAL LAW IS BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAWS
2.5. THE CHOSE ABOUT THE SOURCE IS UP TO THE LEGAL BASIS
2.6. TREATIES
2.6.1. HIGHER LEGAL SOURCE OF THE EU LEGAL ORDER
2.6.2. PROTOCOLS SERVE TO COMPLEMENT THE TREATYS, OPEN EXCEPTIONS TO MEMBER STATES SO THEY ARE BINDING
2.6.3. THE AMENDS TO TREATIES CAN BE MADE BY THE PARLIAMENT, COMISSION OR BY MS PROPOSAL THAT ARE SUBMITED TO THE COUNCIL, THAT APPOINT A CONVENTION TO ANALYSE, IN THE CONVENTION ADOPTS A RECCOMENDATION BY CONSENSUS FOR THE INTERGOVERNMENTALCONFERENCE
3. INDIRECTED EFFECT OF EU LAW
3.1. MS LIABILITY FOR BRENCHING EU LAW
3.1.1. MS DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE TRANSPOSITION OF OBLIGATTIONS
4. CJEU:
4.1. SINGLE INSTIUTION: CORRECT AND UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF EU LAW
4.1.1. DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN COMMOM FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY
4.1.1.1. IN FREEDOM SECURITY AND JUSTICE DOES NOT EXAMINE THE VALIDITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
4.2. ONE JUDGE FOR EACH MS, 11 ADVOCATES THAT SUBMIT THEIR OPINION TO THE CASE
4.3. RESPONSABILE FOR THE INFRIGMENT PROCEDURE,ANNULMENT PROCEDURE, SECOND INSTANCE JURISDICTION (FROM GENERAL COURT)
4.3.1. TO CONTROL COMPLIANCE OF THE MS, DECISION IS DECLARATORY BUT SANCTIONS ONLY AFTER ANOTHER IP. THE INICIATIVE IS DONE BY THE COMISSION
4.3.1.1. INDIVIDUALS CANNOT GO TO THE CJEU DIRECTLY THEY ONLY CAN URGE TO THE COMISSION OR MS.
4.3.1.1.1. TH ONLY DEFENSE FOR MS ARE FORCE MAJORE
5. GENERAL COURT
5.1. ANNULMENT PROCEDURE FOR NON PRIVILIGED APPLICANTS (MS EG)
5.1.1. ACTIONS OF MS AGAINST ACTS OF THE COMISSION
6. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
6.1. TO ARGUE MUST EXIST LACK OF COMPETENCE, INFRINGMENT OF AN ESSENCIAL PROCEDURE, INFRINGMENT OF TREATIES, ANYTHING RELATED TO SECONDARY LAW OR WRONG APPLIED,
6.1.1. THE VIOLALTION OF AN ESSENCIAL PROCEDURE :FAILURE TO CONSULT AN INSTITUTION OR ORGAN WHEN NECESSARY AND INCORRECT LEGAL BASIS,
6.1.1.1. THE ECJ CAN ONLY ANNUL THAT ACT UNDER JUDGMENT, BUT NOT CHANGE IT
6.1.2. TO INDIVIDUALS BE ABLE TO PERSUE AND ACT THEY MUST SHOW A DIRECT CONCERN, A LINK BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ACT,
6.1.2.1. annulment against acts not addressed to the plaintiffs have been considered admissible in extremely limited cases
6.1.2.1.1. NEW REGIME: INDIVIDUALS, acts against regulatory acts that directly affect them and do not involve any implementing measures
6.2. PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE
6.2.1. OF INTERPRETATION: TO SAY IF THE NATIONAL LAW HAS COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW
6.2.2. OF VALIDITY: FOR EU SECONDARY LAW, WORK AS AN ANNULMENT PROCEDURE.
6.2.3. THE ECJ CAN MODIFY THE QUESTION DRAFTED BY THE NATIONAL COURT, TH EXCEPTIONS FOR THE ADMINISSIBILITY ARE
6.2.3.1. CASES NON GOVERNED BY EU LAW
6.2.3.2. FICTIUS DISPUTES
6.2.3.3. RELEVANCE
6.2.4. EFFECTS: INTERPRETATION: IS BINDING OTHER JUDGES UNDER THE SAME MATTER MUST APPLY THE SAME UNDERSTANDING
6.2.5. EFFECTS: VALIDITY: INVALIDE ACTS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE EU LAW, EFFECT ERGA OMNES
7. HAGUE CONGRESS
7.1. CONFEDERAL: EU AS A TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
7.2. FEDERALIST: STABILISHMENT OF A ONE FEDERAL STATE NO MORE NATIONAL STATES
7.3. FUNCTIONALIST: INTEGRATION BETWEEN EUROPEAN STATES
7.3.1. Schuman, that was the idea followed.
7.3.1.1. purposes of Schuman declarations: avoid conflicts in Europe, in short term.
7.3.1.1.1. *"Nothing is possible without men's will, and nothing last long without institutions." *
7.3.1.2. Long term one:Create a foundation for a union of the European States.
8. TREATIES
8.1. TREATY OF PARIS
8.1.1. 1951 EUROPEAN STEEL AND COAL COMMUNITY:
8.1.1.1. First step for european integration process.
8.1.1.1.1. creation of Spaak commission.
8.1.2. FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG
8.1.3. CREATION OF A SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTION
8.1.4. COMPOSITION: THE COMISSION, THE PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL THE COURT
8.2. THE TREATY OF ROME
8.2.1. BIRTH OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM
8.2.1.1. EURATOM: 1958: NO EXPIRATION DATE
8.2.1.2. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: 1957: COMMOM MARKET WITH AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL
8.2.1.2.1. BROAD AND HORIZONTAL SCOPE: ONE EXTERNAL CUSTOMNS TARIFF: SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
8.2.1.3. Estabilishment of a common internal single and competitive market.
8.3. COMMOM EUROPEAN DEFENSE
8.3.1. FAIL:
8.3.1.1. EMPTY CHAIRS MADE BY FRANCE: DE GAULLE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN FURTHER INTEGRATION AND WAS ASBSENTE IN VOTE WHEN THERE WAS UNANIMITY RULE OF VOTE
8.3.1.1.1. LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE: ABSENCE OF QUALIFIED MAJORITY WHEN AFFECT FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTES.
8.4. MAASTRICHT TREATY
8.4.1. BEYOND MONETARY AND ECONOMIC
8.4.1.1. POLITICAL FACTORS
8.4.1.1.1. CREATION OF EUROPEAN UNION
8.4.1.1.2. CREATED THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION STATUS
8.5. AMSTERDAM TREATY 1997
8.5.1. MORE SUPRANATION APPROACH FOR IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
8.5.2. PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: EXERCISE OF THE EU COMPETENCES BY THE EU INSTITUTIONS.
8.5.3. ENHANCED COOPERATION: PARTICIPATION OF AT LEAST 9 MEMBERS: USING EURO
8.5.4. CREATION OF SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHTS IN CASE OF BREANCH MANTAINING THE DUTIS
8.6. TREATYH OF NICE
8.6.1. ENLARGED THE UNION EASTERN STATES
8.6.1.1. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS NON BINDING OUTSIDE EU
8.7. TREATY OF LISBON 2009
8.7.1. DRAFT CONSTITUTION TREATY
8.7.1.1. FUTURE OF THE UNION:
8.7.1.1.1. BETTER DIVISION OF COMPETENCES
8.7.1.1.2. SIMPLIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
8.7.1.1.3. MORE DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY
8.7.1.1.4. CONSTITUTION FOR EU CITIZENS
8.7.1.2. TREATY OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TFEU
8.7.1.3. TREATY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (BASIC RULES + DETAILED LEGAL REGIME OF THE COMMOM FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY CFSP
8.7.1.3.1. BINDING LEGAL FORCE BUT MOVED TO AN ANNEX OF THE TREATIES.
8.7.2. THIS CONSTITUTION NEVER ENTERED INTO FORCE, BC OF THE REJECTION OF NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE.
8.7.3. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS SAME VALUE AS TREATYS
8.7.4. DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN EUROPEAN LEVEL INDIRECTLY
8.8. SEA: Single european act:Codifies de role of the European Council.
9. VAN GEND AN LOOS CASE
9.1. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, 4 FOUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF INTERNAL MARKET,
9.1.1. CREATION OF A CUSTOM DUTYS WITH 3 COUNTRYS AND ABOLITION OF DUTYS AND TAXES BETWEEN THE MEMBERS
9.1.2. ABOLITION OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
9.1.3. PROHIBITION OF INTERNAL DISCRIMINATORY REGIME IN INTERNAL TAXATION
9.2. IMPORTED FORMALDEHYDE IN NETHERLANDS FROM GERMANY PAYED 8% BUT FIRTS USED TO PAY 3% ARGUED FOR BREACH HAPPENED BECAUSE OF A REARRANGEMENT OF CLASSIFICATION
9.2.1. ECJ MEMBERS INTERVIENED ARGUING: A INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT SUBJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, APPLIED ONLY TO STATES
9.2.2. HE WAS NOT A MEMBER OF EEC, CANNOT DIRECTLY BENEFIT FROM TREATY OF ROME
9.2.3. TREATY OF ROME REMEDY:INFRINGMENT PROCEDURE
9.2.3.1. procedimento jurídico usado pela EU para garantir que os estados membros estão cumprindo com suas obrigações:
9.2.3.1.1. identificação da violação: a comissão europeia como guardiã dos tratados, identificando uma violacao como a não transposicao de um tratado, cidadãos e empresas podem denunciar
9.2.3.1.2. fase do procedimento: pré contencioso: notificação forma por carta: ao Estado membro que possui geralmente 2 meses para responder
9.2.3.1.3. parecer fundamentado: reasoned opinion: a comissão emite o parecer fundamentado e concede 2 meses para regulação
9.2.3.1.4. fase contenciosa: judicial: no tribunal de justiça da união europeia: TJEU: com condenação ordena correção
9.2.3.1.5. com a condenação: com o não cumprimento da decisão pode-se retornar ao TJEU para multas e sanções,
9.2.3.2. exemplos: não transposição de diretivas, aplicação incorreta de regulamentos, violação de regras concorrenciais
9.2.3.3. objetivo: garantir eficácia e uniformidade do direito da EU. promovendo
10. EU COMPETENCES
10.1. PRINCIPAL OF CONFERRAL
10.1.1. UNION OPERATES UNDER THE LIMITIS STABILISHED ON TREATYS
10.1.2. TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS ON TREATYS AND RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLES
10.1.3. THE EU MUTS IDENTIFY AND SHOW THE LEGAL BASE DEFINED ON TREATYS
10.1.3.1. THE LEGAL BASE IS CHOSEN AS BEING THE MOST SIMILAR AND SPECIFIC, THE ECJ CAN ANNUL THE ACT
10.1.4. THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE
10.1.4.1. MEANS THAT UNDER: CUSTOMS LAW, MONETARY POLICY AND COMPETITION RULES FOR TAXATION, COMMOM COMMERCIAL POLICY, AND MARINE BIOLOGICAL RESOURSES, ONLY THE EU CAN ACT, STATES ONLY WITH EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION
10.1.4.2. CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, WHEN IT PROVIDES LEGISLATIVE ACT OF THE UNION
10.1.5. NEW COMPETENCES INPLIES A REVIEW OF THE TREATYS, TO TRANSFER COMPETENCES FROM NATIONAL TO SUPRANATIONAL
10.2. SHARED COMPETENCES
10.2.1. PRE-EMPTION PRINCIPLE: THE MEMBER STATES CAN INTERVIENE ONLY IF THE EU HAS NOT REGULATED IT YET.
10.2.1.1. INTERNAL MARKET, SOCIAL POLICY, CONSUMER PROTECTION, TRANSPORT, ENERGY, PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS,
10.3. SUPPORTING COMPETENCES
10.3.1. TRAINING AND EDUCATION, TOURISM, CULTURE, INDUSTRY, CIVIL PROTECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION ERASMUS PROGRAMM
10.3.1.1. COMPETENCE OF MEMBER STATE THE EU INTERVIENES ONLY TO FACILITATE COORDINATION AMONG MEMBERS
10.3.2. DOESN'T EXIST THE PRE EMPTION PRINCIPLE.
10.4. FLEXIBILITY CLAUSE
10.4.1. IN NECESSARY ACTIONS, WITHOUT THE NECESSARY POWERS PROVIDED IN TREATYS, TO PERSUE THE OBJECTIVE THE COUNCIL WITH A PROPOSAL OF THE COMISSION AND AFTER THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT. SHALL ADOPT THE PROVISIONS
10.4.1.1. CAUSES NOT COVERED BY TREATIES,
10.5. THEORY OF IMPLICIT POWERS
10.5.1. PRINCIPLE OF EFFET UTILE: USE THE POWERS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE RESULT, AETR CASE 1970
10.6. THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCES ARE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY AND SUBSIDIARY
10.6.1. PROTOCOL 2 OF LISBON TREATY
10.6.1.1. THE EUROPEAN COMISSION HAS TO JUSTIFY EVERY LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, IN RESPECT OF THE SUBSIDIARY PRINCIPLE
10.6.1.1.1. TO VOTE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
10.6.2. Subject bound: comission
10.6.3. The beneficiarys are the members state
11. Legislative procedure
11.1. THE EU COMISSION HAS THE POWER TO PROPOSAL
11.1.1. THEN THERE IS THE JOINT BY THE EU PARLIAMENT, AND COUNCIL
11.1.1.1. O PARLAMENTO EUROPEU COMPOSTO POR REPRESENTANTES ELEITOS PELOS CIDADÃOS DA EU, DISCUTEM A PROPOSTA PODENDO SUGERIR EMENDAS,
11.1.1.2. TRILOGOS SÃO REUNIÕES INFORMAIS ONDE EXISTE A TENTATIVA DE REALIZAR UM ACORDO DE COMPROMISSO
11.1.1.3. COM O COMPROMISSO ALCANÇADO O PROJETO VAI PARA O PARLAMENTO EUROPEU PARA VOTAÇÃO FINAL
11.1.1.4. APÓS ISSO, TEM A PÚBLICAÇÃO NO DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA EU E OS PAÍSES TEM A OBRIGAÇÃO DE IMPLEMENTAÇÃO
11.1.2. THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL CAN URGE TO THE COMISSION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL
11.1.3. THERE IS A REGULATION TO THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CITIZENS, THERE IS A NUMBER OF SIGNATURES, MADE BY THE CITIZENS, AND MUST BE STABILISHED A COMITEE,
11.1.4. ON THE ORDINARY PROCEDURE THE PROPOSAL CAN BE BE VALUATED 3 TIMES, IF THE PARLIAMENT REMAINS IN SILENT ON A DRAFT THE ACT IS ADOPTED,
11.2. IF THE TREATY ADMITS, ITS POSSIBLE TO ADMIT A SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE:
11.2.1. ENVOLVE MAIS PARTICIPAÇÃO DOS ESTADOS MEMBROS E MENOS DO PARLAMENTO EUROPEUI
11.2.1.1. A PROPOSTA PODE SER APRESENTADA POR UM GRUPO DE ESTADOS MEMBROS
11.2.1.1.1. ATIVIDADE DO PARLAMENTO EUROPEU MAIS LIMITADA, O CONSELHO EUROPEU DECIDE ADOTAR A PROPOSTA OU NÃO
11.3. THE DELEGATED ACTS EXIST TO AMEND AND MODIFY A LEGISLATION OF THE EU WITH MORE FACILITY,
11.3.1. ITS MORE EFFETIANTLY AND FAST, ITS A JURIDICAL ACT TO MODIFY LEGISLATIVE ACT AS DIRECTIVES OR REGULATIONS
11.3.1.1. MUST BE A HABILITATED CLAUSE
11.3.1.1.1. THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL HAS 2 MONTHS GENERALY TO VETE THE DELEGATED ACT, OTHERWISE IT WILL BE ADMITED
11.4. THE IMPLEMENTING ACTS ARE USED TO CREATE RULES OF PRACTICAL USE
11.5. THE DIRECT EFFECT OF EU LAW:
11.5.1. THE PRIMARY EFFECT MEANS THAT THE PROVISION CAN BE CLAIM ON NATIONAL COURT,
11.5.1.1. DIFFERENT FROM DIRECTED APPLYCABILITY, THAT ONE DOESNT NEED TO BE APPLIED ON NATIONAL TO BE CLAIMED
11.5.1.1.1. THIS IDEA COMES FROM THE VAN LOOS CASE, MUST BE PRECISE, UNCONDITIONAL, AND CONFERS RIGHTS UPON INDIVIDUALS, CAN HAVE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EFFECT,
11.5.2. O efeito direto é um princípio do direito da União Europeia que permite que os cidadãos e os Estados-membros invocem disposições do direito da UE diretamente em seus tribunais nacionais, sem a necessidade de uma legislação nacional que as implemente. Isso significa que certos regulamentos, diretivas e outros atos da UE podem ter efeito imediato e ser aplicáveis nos Estados-membros, mesmo que ainda não tenham sido transpostos para a legislação nacional. Existem duas formas principais de efeito direto: 1. **Efeito Direto Vertical**: Refere-se à possibilidade de um indivíduo invocar uma disposição do direito da UE contra o Estado ou entidades públicas. 2. **Efeito Direto Horizontal**: Refere-se à possibilidade de um indivíduo invocar uma disposição do direito da UE contra outro indivíduo ou entidade privada. O efeito direto é essencial para garantir a uniformidade da aplicação do direito da UE nos diferentes Estados-membros e para proteger os direitos dos cidadãos europeus. A Corte de Justiça da União Europeia (CJUE) tem desempenhado um papel crucial na interpretação e aplicação do efeito direto nas suas decisões.
11.6. INDIRECTED EFFECT OF EU LAW: CONSISTENTE INTERPRETATION AND LIABILITY OF MEMBERS
11.6.1. PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE: EQUAL SITUATIONS MUST BE TRATED ON THE SAME WAT EVEN IF THEY ARE IN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF JURISDICTION
11.6.1.1. PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS: MS MUST GUARANTEE THE APPLICABILITY
11.6.2. Basicamente, o efeito indireto implica que, quando um tribunal nacional aplica a legislação nacional, ele deve interpretá-la de maneira compatível com o direito da UE, mesmo que essa norma da UE não tenha efeito direto. Isso significa que os tribunais devem fazer um esforço para interpretar suas leis nacionais de maneira a respeitar as obrigações da UE, promovendo a harmonização das legislações nacionais com as normas europeias.