1. - The Core Protocols v3.3 #CoreProtocols
1.1. - The Core Commitments
1.1.1. - 1. I commit to engage when present.
1.1.1.1. - To know and disclose:
1.1.1.1.1. - what I want
1.1.1.1.2. - what I think, and
1.1.1.1.3. - what I feel
1.1.1.2. - To always seek effective help.
1.1.1.3. - To decline to offer and refuse to accept incoherent emotional transmissions.
1.1.1.3.1. "This could be passive aggressiveness, negative talk instead of tactful confrontation of issues (such as gossip or talking about people behind their backs), hiding concerns (e.g. saying "I don't want to talk about it"), etc..."
1.1.1.4. - When I have or hear a better idea than the currently prevailing idea, I will immediately either
1.1.1.4.1. - Propose it for decisive acceptance or rejection, and/or
1.1.1.4.2. - Explicitly seek its improvement.
1.1.1.5. - I will personally support the best idea
1.1.1.5.1. - regardless of its sources,
1.1.1.5.2. - however much I hope an even better idea may later arise, and
1.1.1.5.3. - when I have no superior alternative idea.
1.1.2. - 2. I will seek to perceive more than I seek to be perceived.
1.1.3. - 3. I will use teams, especially when undertaking difficult tasks
1.1.4. - 4. I will speak always and only when I believe it will improve the general results/effort ratio.
1.1.5. - 5. I will offer and accept only rational, result-oriented behavior and communication.
1.1.6. - 6. I will disengage from less productive situations
1.1.6.1. - When I cannot keep these commitments,
1.1.6.2. - When it is more important that I engage elsewhere.
1.1.7. - 7. I will do now what must be done eventually and can effectively be done now.
1.1.8. - 8. I will seek to move forward toward a particular goal, by biasing my behavior toward action.
1.1.9. - 9. I will use the Core Protocols (or better) when applicable.
1.1.9.1. - I will offer and accept timely and proper use of the Protocol Check protocol without prejudice.
1.1.10. - 10. I will neither harm - nor tolerate the harming of - anyone for his or her fidelity to these commitments.
1.1.11. - 11. I will never do anything dumb on purpose.
1.2. - The Core Protocols
1.2.1. - Pass (Unpass)
1.2.2. - Check In
1.2.3. - Check Out
1.2.4. - Ask For Help
1.2.5. - Protocol Check
1.2.6. - Intention Check
1.2.7. - Decider
1.2.8. - Resolution
1.2.9. - Perfection Game
1.2.10. - Personal Alignment
1.2.11. - Investigate
1.2.12. -
2. - Copy Hacker
2.1. "http://copyhackers.com/2014/04/website-persuasion/"
2.2. - Disrupt Then Reframe
2.3. - Prescribe the Symptom with Paradoxical Intervention
2.4. - Sell the Pain of Missing Out
2.5. - Highlight the Most Desirable Behavior
2.6. - Label ‘em Good
2.7. - Charge Up Your Story
2.7.1. - The Challenge Plot
2.7.2. - The Connection Plot
2.7.3. - The Creativity Plot
2.8. - The Power of a Secret
2.9. - Authority and the Herd Effect
3. - Behavior Economics Concepts
3.1. - Affective Heuristic
3.1.1. - We rely on good/bad feelings experienced in relation to a stimulus. For example --> 10% of patients act violently FEELS worse than than 10% of patients act violent towards each other, so the first 10% FEELS bigger.
3.1.2. - People don't have time to reflect, so their emotions are a heuristic shortcut.
3.1.3. - Nuclear power has high benefits and low risk, but people have an negative emotional reaction, and erroneously calculate the risk/benefit.
3.1.4. - Similar:
3.1.4.1. - zero price effect
3.1.4.2. - availability
3.1.4.3. - representativeness
3.2. - Anchoring
3.2.1. - A form of priming
3.2.2. - Exposure to an arbitrary number automatically serves as a reference point for subsequent judgments about value.
3.2.3. - #OneMarketplace Buy "20 ancilllary plans" or "With 1,000s or combinations, we've selected the best matches"
3.3. - Availability Heuristic
3.3.1. - Easiest information that comes to mind is how we make judgements (and leads us to erroneously calculating risk just because we remember something happening ...but forgot all the times it didn't happen)
3.4. - Bounded Rationality
3.4.1. - We have limits to our rationality, based on our thinking capacity, available information, and time.
3.5. - Certainty / possibility effect
3.5.1. - Changes in the probability of gains or losses do not affect people’s subjective evaluations in linear terms (see also prospect theory and zero price effect) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For example, a move from a 50% to a 60% chance of winning a prize has a smaller emotional impact than a move from a 95% chance to a 100% (certainty) chance. Conversely, the move from a 0% chance to a 5% possibility of winning a prize is more attractive than a change from 5% to 10%, for example. People over-weight small probabilities, which explains lottery gambling—a small expense with the possibility of a big win.
3.6. - Choice architecture
3.6.1. - This term was coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and refers to the practice of influencing choice by changing the manner in which options are presented to people. For example, this can be done by setting defaults, framing, or adding decoy options.
3.7. - Choice overload
3.7.1. - Also referred to as ‘overchoice’, the phenomenon of choice overload occurs as a result of too many choices being available to consumers. The application of heuristics in decision making becomes more likely with a greater number or complexity of choices. Overchoice has been associated with unhappiness (Schwartz, 2004), reduced self-control due to decision fatigue (Vohs et al., 2008), going with the default option, as well as choice deferral—avoiding making a decision altogether, such as not buying a product (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).
3.8. - Cognitive Bias
3.8.1. - A cognitive bias (e.g. Ariely, 2008) is a systematic (non-random) error in thinking, in the sense that a judgment deviates from what would be considered desirable from the perspective of accepted norms or correct in terms of formal logic. The application of heuristics is often associated with cognitive biases, some of which, such as those arising from availability or representativeness, are ‘cold’ in the sense that they do not reflect a person’s motivation and are instead the result of errors in information processing. Other cognitive biases, especially those that have a self-serving function (e.g. optimism bias), are more motivated. Finally, some biases, such as confirmation bias, can be motivated or unmotivated (Nickerson, 1998).
3.9. - Commitment
3.9.1. - Commitments or pre-commitments are often used as a tool to counteract people’s lack of willpower and to achieve behavior change, such as in the areas of dieting or saving—the greater the cost of breaking a commitment, the more effective it is (Dolan et al., 2010). From the perspective of social psychology, individuals are motivated to maintain a consistent and positive self-image (Cialdini, 2008), and they are likely to keep commitments to avoid reputational damage (if they are made publicly) and/or cognitive dissonance (if they are made privately) (Festinger, 1957). The behavior change technique of ‘goal setting’ is related to making commitments (Strecher, 1995), while reciprocity involves an implicit commitment.
3.10. - Confirmation bias
3.10.1. - Confirmation bias occurs when people seek out or evaluate information in a way that fits with their existing thinking and preconceptions.
3.10.2. - For example, a consumer who likes a particular brand and researches a new purchase may be motivated to seek out customer reviews on the internet that favor that brand.
3.10.3. - Confirmation bias has also been related to unmotivated processes, including primacy effects and anchoring, evident in a reliance on information that is encountered early in a process (Nickerson, 1998).
3.11. - Decoy effect
3.11.1. - Choices often occur relative to what is on offer rather than based on absolute preferences. The decoy effect is technically known as an ‘asymmetrically dominated choice’ and occurs when people’s preference for one option over another changes as a result of adding a third (similar but less attractive) option.
3.11.2. - For example, people are more likely to choose an elegant pen over $6 in cash if there is a third option in the form of a less elegant pen (Bateman, Munro, & Poe, 2008).
3.12. - Default (option)
3.12.1. - Default options are pre-set courses of action that take effect if nothing is specified by the decision maker (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), and setting defaults is an effective tool in choice architecture when there is inertia or uncertainty in decision making (Samson, 2014).
3.12.2. - Requiring people to opt-out if they do not wish to donate their organs, for example, has been associated with higher donation rates (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
3.13. - Diversification bias
3.13.1. - People seek more variety when they choose multiple items for future consumption simultaneously than when they make choices sequentially, i.e. on an ‘in the moment’ basis. Diversification is non-optimal when people overestimate their need for diversity (Read & Loewenstein, 1995). In other words, sequential choices lead to greater experienced utility.
3.13.2. - For example, before going on vacation I may upload classical, rock and pop music to my MP3 player, but on the actual trip I may mostly end up listening to my favorite rock music. (See also projection bias).
3.13.3. - This may work to our advantage with the #OneMarketplace
3.14. - Dual-system theory
3.14.1. - Dual-system models of the human mind contrast automatic, fast, and non-conscious (System 1) with controlled, slow, and conscious (System 2) thinking.
3.14.2. - Many heuristics and cognitive biases studied by behavioral economists are the result of intuitions, impressions, or automatic thoughts generated by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011).
3.14.3. - Factors that make System 1’s processes more dominant in decision making include cognitive busyness, distraction, time pressure, and positive mood, while System 2’s processes tend to be enhanced when the decision involves an important object, has heightened personal relevance, and when the decision maker is held accountable by others (Samson & Voyer, 2012; Samson & Voyer, 2014).
3.15. - Empathy gap / Hot & Cold states
3.15.1. - It is difficult for humans to predict how they will behave in the future. A hot-cold empathy gap occurs when people underestimate the influence of visceral states (e.g. being angry, in pain, or hungry) on their behavior or preferences. In medical decision making, for example, a hot-to-cold empathy gap may lead to undesirable treatment choices when cancer patients are asked to choose between treatment options right after being told about their diagnosis.
3.15.2. - Even low rates of adherence to drug regimens among people with bipolar disorder could be explained partly by something akin to a cold-to-hot empathy gap, while in a manic phase, patients have difficulty remembering what it is like to be depressed and stop taking their medication (Loewenstein, 2005).
3.16. - Endowment Effect
3.16.1. - We place higher value on things after establishing ownership.
3.16.2. - Especially true for goods that wouldn’t normally be bought or sold on the market, usually items with symbolic, experiential, or emotional significance.
3.16.3. - The endowment effect is an illustration of the status quo bias and can be explained by loss aversion.
3.17. - Framing
3.17.1. - Choices can be worded in a way that highlights the positive or negative aspects of the same decision, leading to changes in their relative attractiveness. This technique was part of Tversky and Kahneman’s development of prospect theory, which framed gambles in terms of losses or gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Different types of framing approaches have been identified, including risky choice framing (e.g. the risk of losing 10 out of 100 lives vs the opportunity to save 90 out of 100 lives), attribute framing (e.g. beef that is 95% lean vs 5% fat), and goal framing (e.g. motivating people by offering a $5 reward vs imposing a $5 penalty) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).
3.18. - (Behavioral) Game theory
3.18.1. - Behavioral game theory is a mathematical approach to modeling behavior by analyzing the strategic decisions made by interacting players. Game theory in standard experimental economics operates under the assumption of the rational homo economicus, while behavioral game theory extends standard (analytical) game theory by taking into account how players feel about the payoffs other players receive, limits in strategic thinking, as well as the effects of learning (Camerer, 2003).
3.18.2. - An early example of research that uncovered violations of standard assumptions of rationality occurred in the form of a simple ultimatum game. In the experiment, one player (the proposer/allocator) is endowed with a sum of money and asked to split it between him/herself and an anonymous player (the responder/recipient). The recipient may either accept the allocator’s proposal or reject it, in which case neither of the players will receive anything. From a traditional game-theoretic perspective, the allocator should only offer a token amount and the recipient should accept it. However, results showed that most allocators offered more than just a token payment, and many went as far as offering an equal split. Some offers were declined by recipients, suggesting that they were willing to make a sacrifice when they felt that the offer was unfair (see also inequity aversion) (Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarz, 1982).
3.19. - Habit
3.19.1. - Habit is an automatic and rigid pattern of behavior in specific situations, which is usually acquired through repetition and develops through associative learning (see also System 1 in dual-system theory), when actions become paired repeatedly with a context or an event (Dolan et al., 2010). ‘Habit loops’ involve a cue that triggers an action, the actual behavior, and a reward.
3.19.2. - For example, habitual drinkers may come home after work (the cue), drink a beer (the behavior), and feel relaxed (the reward) (Duhigg, 2012). Behaviors may initially serve to attain a particular goal, but once the action is automatic and habitual, the goal loses its importance. For example, popcorn may habitually be eaten in the cinema despite the fact that it is stale (Wood & Neal, 2009). Habits can also be associated with status quo bias.
3.20. - Halo effect
3.20.1. - This concept has been developed in social psychology and refers to the finding that a global evaluation of a person sometimes influences people’s perception of that person’s other unrelated attributes. For example, a friendly person may be considered to have a nice physical appearance, whereas a cold person may be evaluated as less appealing (Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 1977). Halo effects have also been applied in other domains of psychology.
3.20.2. - For example, a study on the ‘health halo’ found that consumers tend to choose drinks, side dishes’ and desserts with higher calorific content at fast‐food restaurants that claim to be healthy (e.g. Subway) compared to others (e.g. McDonald’s) (Chandon & Wansink, 2007).
3.21. - Hedonic adaptation
3.21.1. - People get used to changes in life experiences, a process which is referred to as ‘hedonic adaptation’ or the ‘hedonic treadmill’. Just as the happiness that comes with the ownership of a new gadget or salary raise will wane over time, even the negative effect of life events such as bereavement or disability on subjective well-being tends to level off, to some extent (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). When this happens, people return to a relatively stable baseline of happiness. It has been suggested that the repetition of smaller positive experiences (‘hedonic boosts’), such as exercise or religious practices, has a more lasting effect on our well-being than major life events (Mochon, Norton, & Ariely, 2008).
3.22. - Herd behavior
3.22.1. - This effect is evident when people do what others are doing instead of using their own information or making independent decisions. The idea of herding has a long history in philosophy and crowd psychology. It is particularly relevant in the domain of finance, where it has been discussed in relation to the collective irrationality of investors, including stock market bubbles (Banerjee, 1992). In other areas of decision making, such as politics, science, and popular culture, herd behavior is sometimes referred to as ‘information cascades’ (Bikhchandi, Hirschleifer, & Welch, 1992).
3.23. - Heuristic
3.23.1. - Heuristics, which are commonly defined as cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb that simplify decisions, represent a process of substituting a difficult question with an easier one (Kahneman, 2003). Heuristics can also lead to cognitive biases. There are divisions regarding heuristics’ relation to bias and rationality. In the ‘fast and frugal’ view, the application of heuristics (e.g. the recognition heuristic) is an “ecologically rational” strategy that makes best use of the limited information available to individuals (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002). Furthermore, while heuristics such as affect, availability, and representativeness have a general purpose character, others developed in social and consumer psychology are more domain-specific, examples of which include brand name, price, and scarcity heuristics (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
3.24. - Hindsight Bias
3.24.1. - This bias, also referred to as the ‘knew-it-all-along effect’, is a frequently encountered judgment bias that is partly rooted in availability and representativeness heuristics. It happens when being given new information changes our recollection from an original thought to something different (Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007). This bias can lead to distorted judgments about the probability of an event’s occurrence, because the outcome of an event is perceived as if it had been predictable. It may also lead to distorted memory for judgments of factual knowledge. Hindsight bias can be a problem in legal decision making. In medical malpractice suits, for example, jurors’ hindsight bias tends to increase with the severity of the outcome (e.g. injury or death) (Harley, 2007).
3.25. - IKEA effect
3.25.1. - While the endowment effect suggests that mere ownership of a product increases its value to individuals, the IKEA effect is evident when invested labor leads to inflated product valuation (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012). For example, experiments show that the monetary value assigned to the amateur creations of self-made goods is on a par with the value assigned to expert creations. Both experienced and novice do-it-yourselfers are susceptible to the IKEA effect. Research also demonstrates that the effect is not simply due to the amount of time spent on the creations, as dismantling a previously built product will make the effect disappear. The IKEA effect is particularly relevant today, given the shift from mass production to increasing customization and co-production of value. The effect has a range of possible explanations, such as positive feelings (including feelings of competence) that come with the successful completion of a task, a focus on the product’s positive attributes, and the relationship between effort and liking. The effort heuristic is another concept that proposes a link between perceived effort and valuation (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004).
3.26. - Inequity aversion
3.26.1. - Human resistance to inequitable outcomes is known as ‘inequity aversion’, which occurs when people prefer fairness and resist inequalities. In some instances, inequity aversion is disadvantageous, as people are willing to forego a gain, in order to prevent another person from receiving a superior reward. Inequity aversion has been studied through experimental games, such as dictator, ultimatum, and trust games (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), and the concept has been applied in business and marketing, including research on customer responses to exclusive price promotions (Barone & Tirthankar, 2010).
3.27. - Inertia
3.27.1. - In behavioral economics: the endurance of a stable state associated with inaction and the concept of status quo bias (Madrian & Shea 2001). In social psychology the term is sometimes also used in relation to persistence in (or commitments to) attitudes and relationships.
3.27.2. - JW- I think this is about the idea that a guy who is viewed as a dick on the road will continue to be a dick (e.g. flip off the person he just cut off who had honked at him...his social state is currently asshole, so he goes with it?)
3.28. - Intertemporal choice
3.28.1. - A field of research concerned with the relative value people assign to payoffs at different points in time. It generally finds that people are biased towards the present (see Present bias) and tend to discount the future (see Time discounting).
3.29. - Licensing effect
3.29.1. - Also known as ‘self-licensing’, the licensing effect is evident when people allow themselves to do something bad (e.g. immoral) after doing something good (e.g. moral) first (Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010). Well-publicized research in Canada asked participants to shop either in a green or a conventional online store. In one experiment, people who shopped in a green store shared less money in a dictator game (see Game theory). Another experiment allowed participants to lie (about their performance on a task) and cheat (take more money out of an envelope than they actually earned) and showed more lying and cheating among green shoppers (Mazar & Zhong, 2010).
3.30. - Loss aversion
3.30.1. - Loss aversion is an important BE concept associated with prospect theory and is encapsulated in the expression “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is thought that the pain of losing is psychologically about twice as powerful as the pleasure of gaining, and since people are more willing to take risks to avoid a loss, loss aversion can explain differences in risk-seeking versus aversion. Loss aversion has been used to explain the endowment effect and sunk cost fallacy, and it may also play a role in the status quo bias. The basic principle of loss aversion is sometimes applied in behavior change strategies, and it can explain why penalty frames are sometimes more effective than reward frames in motivating people (Gächter, Orzen, Renner, & Starmer, 2009). The website Stickk allows people to commit to a positive behavior change (e.g. give up junk food), which may be coupled the fear of loss—a cash penalty in the case of non-compliance.
3.31. - Mental Accounting
3.31.1. - This concept refers to the fact that people treat money differently, depending on factors such as the money’s origin and intended use, whereby they do not think of it in terms of formal accounting. A key term in mental accounting is that of fungibility, the fact that all money is the same and has no labels. According to the theory, people treat assets as less fungible than they really are, and they frame assets as belonging to current wealth, current income, or future income. Marginal propensity to consume (MPC: The proportion of a rise in disposable income that is consumed) is highest for money in the current income account and lowest for money in the future income account (Thaler, 1990).
3.31.2. - Consider unexpected gains: Small windfalls (e.g. a $50 lottery win) are generally treated as ‘current income’ that is likely to be spent, whereas large windfalls (e.g. a $5,000 bonus at work) are considered ‘wealth’ (Thaler, 2008). Another example from mental accounting is credit card payments, which are treated differently than cash. According to the theory, credit cards decouple the purchase from the payment by separating and delaying the payment. Credit card spending is also attractive because on credit card bills individual items (e.g. a $50 expense) will lose their salience when they are seen as a small part of a larger amount due (e.g. $843) (Thaler, 1999). (See also Partitioning for ideas related to mental accounting.)
3.31.3. - #OneMarketplace
3.32. - Optimism bias
3.32.1. - People tend to overestimate the probability of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative events, a phenomenon known as optimism bias.
3.32.2. - For example, we may underestimate our risk of being in a car accident or getting cancer relative to other people. A number of factors can explain unrealistic optimism, including self-serving biases, perceived control, being in a good mood, etc. A possible cognitive factor that has been identified in optimism bias is the representativeness heuristic (Shepperd, Carroll, Grace & Terry, 2002).
3.33. - Overconfidence (effect) / Planning Fallacy
3.33.1. - The overconfidence effect is observed when people’s subjective confidence in their own ability is greater than their objective (actual) performance. It is frequently measured by having experimental participants answer general knowledge test questions. They are then asked to rate how confident they are in their answers on a scale. Overconfidence is measured by calculating the score for a person’s average confidence rating relative to the actual proportion of questions answered correctly.
3.33.2. - Overconfidence is similar to optimism bias when confidence judgments are made relative to other people. A big range of issues have been attributed to overconfidence, including the high rates of entrepreneurs who enter a market despite the low chances of success (Moore & Healy, 2008).
3.33.3. - The planning fallacy is another example of overconfidence, where people underestimate the length of time it will take them to complete a task, often ignoring past experience (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994).
3.34. - Partitioning
3.34.1. - The rate of consumption can be decreased by physically partitioning resources into smaller units, for example cookies wrapped individually or money divided into several envelopes. When a resource is divided into smaller units (e.g. several packs of chips), consumers encounter additional decision points—a psychological hurdle encouraging them to stop and think. In addition to the cost incurred when resources are used, opening a partitioned pool of resources incurs a psychological transgression cost, such as feelings of guilt (Cheema & Soman, 2008).
3.34.2. - Related research has found that separate mental payment accounts (i.e. envelopes with money) can disrupt a shopping momentum effect that may occur after an initial purchase (Dhar, Huber, & Khan, 2007). (For related ideas, see also Mental accounting). #OneMarketplace
3.35. - Peak-end Rule
3.35.1. - According to the peak-end rule, our memory of past experience (pleasant or unpleasant) does not correspond to an average level of positive or negative feelings but to the most extreme point and the end of the episode (Kahneman & Tversky, 1999). The rule developed from findings that showed that evaluations of a past episode seem to be determined by a weighted average of ‘snapshots’ of an experience, thus neglecting its actual duration. These prototypical moments are related to the judgments made when people apply a representativeness heuristic (Frederickson & Kahneman, 1993).
3.36. - Preference
3.36.1. - In economics, preferences are evident in theoretically optimal choices or real (behavioral) choices when people decide between alternatives. Preferences also imply an ordering of different options in terms of expected levels of happiness, gratification, utility, etc. (Arrow, 1958). Preferences are sometimes elicited in survey research, which may be associated with a range of problems, such as the hypothetical bias, when stated preferences are different from those expressed in actual choices.
3.36.2. - Armin Falk and colleagues have developed cross-culturally valid survey questions that are good predictors of preferences in behavioral experiments. These include questions about risk taking (see Prospect theory), social preferences (e.g. about reciprocity) and time discounting (Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, & Sunde, 2012). #LookUp
3.37. - Present bias
3.37.1. - The present bias refers to the tendency of people to give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs between two future moments (O’Donoghue, &, Rabin, 1999). (See also Time discounting.)
3.38. - Priming (Conceptual)
3.38.1. - Conceptual priming is a technique and process applied in psychology that engages people in a task or exposes them to stimuli. The prime consists of meanings (e.g. words) that activate associated memories (schema, stereotypes, attitudes, etc.). This process may then influence people’s performance on a subsequent task (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982).
3.38.2. - For example, one study primed consumers with words representing either ‘prestige’ US retail brands (Tiffany, Neiman Marcus, and Nordstrom) or ‘thrift’ brands (Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Dollar Store). In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants primed with prestige names then gave higher preference ratings to prestige as opposed to thrift product options (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, & Tanner, 2008). Conceptual priming is different from processes that do not rely on activating meanings, such as perceptual priming (priming similar forms), the mere exposure effect (repeated exposure increases liking), affective priming (subliminal exposure to stimuli, evoking positive or negative emotions) (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), or the perception-behavior link (e.g. mimicry) (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
4. - Mental Notes cards
4.1. - Achievements
4.1.1. "We are more likely to engage in activities in which meaningful achievements are recognized."
4.2. - Aesthetic-Usability Effect
4.2.1. "Aesthetically pleasing designs are often perceived as being easier to use."
4.3. - Affect Heuristic
4.3.1. "Our current emotions influence our judgement and decisions"
4.4. - Anchoring & Adjustment
4.4.1. "When making decisions, we rely too heavily -- or anchor -- on one trait or piece of information"
4.5. - Appropriate Challenges
4.5.1. "We delight in challenges, especially ones that strike a balance between overwhelming and boring."
4.6. - Authority
4.6.1. "We want to follow the lead and advice a legitimate authority."
4.7. - Autonomy
4.7.1. "We seek out situations where we can exert influence or control over something"
4.8. - Chunking
4.8.1. "Information grouped into familiar, manageable units is more easily understood and recalled."
4.9. - Collecting
4.9.1. "Where there is interest, people like to amass units that add to or complete a set."
4.10. - Commitment & Consistency
4.10.1. "We desire to act in a manner consistent with our stated beliefs and prior actions."
4.11. - Competition
4.11.1. "When sharing the same environment, we'll strive to attain thing that cannot be shared."
4.12. - Conceptual Metaphor
4.12.1. "We make sense of a new idea or conceptual domain by likening it to another."
4.13. - Contrast
4.13.1. "When scanning new visual information, we are unconsciously drawn to things that stand out against their surrounding."
4.14. - Curiosity
4.14.1. "When teased with a small bit of interesting information, people will want to know more."
4.15. - Delighters
4.15.1. "We remember and respond favorably to small, unexpected and playful pleasures."
4.16. - Duration Effects
4.16.1. "Perception of time is subjective"
4.17. - Familiarity Bias
4.17.1. "We tend to develop a preference for things merely because we are familiar with them"
4.18. - Feedback Loops
4.18.1. "We are engaged by situations in which we see our actions modify subsequent results."
4.19. - Framing
4.19.1. "The way in which issues and data are stated can alter our judgement and affect decisions."
4.20. - Gifting
4.20.1. "We feel the need to reciprocate when we receive a gift."
4.21. - Humor Effect
4.21.1. "Humorous items are more easily remembered and enjoyed!"
4.22. - Juxtaposition
4.22.1. "Our brains will force a connection between any two items shown together or in sequence."
4.23. - Limited Access
4.23.1. "We naturally desire things that are perceived as exclusive or belonging to a select few."
4.24. - Limited Choice
4.24.1. "We're more likely to make a choice when there are fewer options."
4.25. - Limited Duration
4.25.1. "Given a choice between action and inaction, a limited time to respond increases the likelihood that people will participate."
4.26. - Loss Aversion
4.26.1. "We hate losing or letting go of what we have (even if more could be had)."
4.27. - Need for Certainty
4.27.1. "We crave certainty and are more likely to take action if specific information is available."
4.28. - Ownership Bias
4.28.1. "We more highly value goods or services once we feel like we own them."
4.29. - Pattern Recognition
4.29.1. "Our brains seek ways to organize and simplify complex information, "
4.30. - Peak-End Rule
4.30.1. "We judge our past experiences almost entirely by their peaks (pleasant and unpleasant) and how they ended."
4.31. - Periodic Events
4.31.1. "Recurring events create sustained interest, anticipation, and a sense of belonging."
4.32. - Positive Mimicry
4.32.1. "We learn by modeling our behavior after others."
4.33. - Priming
4.33.1. "Subtle visual or verbal suggestions help us recall specific information, influencing how we respond."
4.34. - Proximity
4.34.1. "Things that are close to one another are perceived to be more related than things that are spaced farther apart."
4.35. - Recognition over recall
4.35.1. "It's easier to recognize things we have previously experienced than it is to recall them from memory."
4.36. - Reputation
4.36.1. "We care more deeply about personal behaviors when they may affect how peers or the public perceive us."
4.37. - Scarcity
4.37.1. "We infer value in something that has limited availability or is promoted as being scare."
4.38. - Self-Expression
4.38.1. "People seek opportunities to express their personality, feelings, or ideas."
4.39. - Sensory Appeal
4.39.1. "We are engaged by and more likely to recall things that appeal to multiple senses."
4.40. - Serial Position Effect
4.40.1. "We have much better recall of the first and last items within a list."
4.41. - Set Completion
4.41.1. "The closer a collection is to being complete, the more we desire collecting all pieces."
4.42. - Sequencing
4.42.1. "We are more likely to action when complex activities are broken down into smaller tasks."
4.43. - Shaping
4.43.1. "To teach something new, start with the simplest form of the behavior; reinforce increasingly accurate approximations of the behavior."
4.44. - Social Proof
4.44.1. "We tend to follow the patterns of similar people in new or unfamiliar ways."
4.45. - Status
4.45.1. "We constantly assess how interactions either enhance or diminish our standing relative to others and our personal best."
4.46. - Status Quo Bias
4.46.1. "We tend not to change an established behavior (unless the incentive to change is compelling)"
4.47. - Story
4.47.1. "All our decisions are filtered through a story -- real or imagined -- that we believe"
4.48. - Surprise
4.48.1. "Our brains are aroused by new and unexpected discoveries (within our normal routines)"
4.49. - Trigger
4.49.1. "We need small nudges placed on our regular paths to remind and motivate us to take action."
4.50. - Uniform Connectedness
4.50.1. "Elements that are connected by uniform visual properties are perceived as being more related than elements that are not connected."
4.51. - Variable Rewards
4.51.1. "We value things when they cost more."
4.52. - Value Attribution
4.52.1. ""Random" rewards make powerful motivators; they seem scarce and unpredictable (and they're less likely to conflict with intrinsic motivation)."
4.53. - Visual Imagery
4.53.1. "Vision trumps all other senses and is the most direct way to perception."
5. Cognitive Lode : Brain Gems
6. Design Theory
6.1. Defining experience
6.1.1. Dewey
6.1.2. McCarty & Wright