1. VI. Reconsidering Friedman and the A Priori
2. I. Friedman and the A Priori
2.1. 1. Introduction
2.2. 2. Challenging Naturalism
2.3. 3. Reichenbach and the Relativized A Priori
2.4. 4. The Tripartite Structure of Newtonian Physics
2.5. 5. The Tripartite Structure of General Relativity
2.6. 6. Logical Space and Empirical Space
2.7. 7. Constitutive Principles as Necessary, Non-empirical Presuppositions
2.8. 8. The Michelson-Morley Experiments
2.9. 9. Lorentz vs. Einstein
2.10. 10. The Relativistic Challenge
2.11. 11. The Idea of Prospective Communicative Rationality
2.12. 12. Lange’s Critique of Friedman
2.13. 13. Conclusion
2.13.1. 1. Mein Fahrplan
3. II. Newton, Relativity and Motion
3.1. 1. Introduction
3.2. 2. The Logical Positivists’ Reception
3.3. 3. The Space-Time Perspective
3.4. 4. DiSalle’s Critique of the Contemporary View
3.4.1. 1. Newton’s Analysis of Descartes’ Concepts of Motion
3.4.2. 2. Absolute Time
3.4.3. 3. Absolute Space and Absolute Motion
3.4.4. 4. Newton and Conventionalism
3.5. 5. Discussing DiSalle
3.6. 6. Newton’s Scholium
3.6.1. 2. Argument from Causes
3.6.2. 3. The Rotating Bucket
3.6.3. 1. The Metaphysics of Motion
3.7. 7. The Epistemology of Motion
3.8. 8. Time and Relativity
3.9. 9. Conclusion
4. III. On the Electrodynamic Origins of Special Relativity Theory
4.1. 1. Introduction
4.2. 2. The Relative Motion of the Earth and the Aether
4.3. 3. The Michelson-Morley Experiments
4.4. 4. Lorentz’s Aether Program
4.4.1. 1. The Origin of the Lorentz Transformations
4.4.2. 2. Electrostatics
4.4.3. 3. Theory of Corresponding States
4.4.4. 4. Lorentz Contraction
4.4.5. 5. Summary
4.5. 5. Poincaré’s Physics of Principles
4.5.1. 1. Poincaré’s Criticism of Lorentz
4.5.2. 2. Poincaré’s Contribution to the Lorentz Jubilee
4.5.3. 3. Summary
4.6. 6. Improving the Theory of Corresponding States
4.6.1. 1. Lorentz and the Covariance of Maxwell’s Equations
4.6.2. 2. Retarded Potentials and Electric Dipole Moment
4.6.3. 3. Lorentz Contraction Revisited
4.6.4. 4. Optics Revisited
4.6.5. 5. Electromagnetic Mass of an Electron
4.6.6. 6. Determination of l
4.6.7. 7. Lorentz’s Force Formula and Relativistic Momentum
4.6.8. 8. Invariance of Optical Phenomena
4.6.9. 9. Molecular Motion
4.6.10. 10. Summary
4.7. 7. Poincaré's Response
4.7.1. 1. 1904 St. Louis Lecture
4.7.2. 2. Poincaré's 1906 Article
4.7.3. 3. The New Mechanics (1906-1908)
4.7.4. 4. Summary
4.8. 8. Einstein's 1905 Relativity Paper
4.8.1. 1. Preliminary Formulation of Einstein’s 1905 Principles
4.8.2. 2. Einstein’s Construction of Natural Coordinates
4.8.3. 3. The Principles of Relativity
4.8.4. 4. Einstein’s 1905 Derivation of the Lorentz Transformations
4.8.5. 5. Summary
4.9. 9. Conclusion
5. IV. Reichenbach, Relativity and the A Priori
5.1. 1. Introduction
5.2. 2. Constitutive Principles
5.2.1. 1. From Kant to Reichenbach
5.2.2. 2. Schlick and Reichenbach on Cognition as Coordination
5.2.3. 3. Truth as Univocal Coordination
5.2.4. 4. Coordination Principles of Different Kinds
5.2.5. 5. Axioms of Coordination and Axioms of Connection
5.2.6. 6. Erfahrung and Erlebnis
5.2.7. 7. Coordination as Constitution
5.2.8. 8. Forces as Vectors
5.3. 3. Empirical Laws, Coordination, and Measurements
5.3.1. 1. Coordination as Construction
5.3.2. 2. The Interplay between Empirical Laws and Coordination Principles
5.3.2.1. 1. The Atwood Machine
5.3.2.2. 2. The Force Table Apparatus
5.4. 4. Refutation of the Kantian Synthetic A Priori
5.4.1. 2. Reichenbach’s Account of the Conventionality of Time
5.4.2. 3. Reichenbach’s Generalization of Einstein’s Synchronization Procedure
5.4.3. 4. Fluid-dynamical Analogy
5.4.4. 5. Causal Paradoxes
5.4.5. 1. The Hypothesis of the Arbitrariness of Coordination
5.4.6. 6. Principles of Absolute Time, Local Action, and Progressively Attainable Ideal
5.4.7. 7. Principle of Normal Induction