1. REFERENCES
1.1. European Commission. 2014. “Countries and regions: Venezuela.” September 9th. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ policy/countries-and-regions/countries/venezuela/>
1.2. Grabendorff, W. 2014. Cuba: Reforming the Economy and Opening Society. Oslo: NOREF.
1.3. Marthoz, J. 2014. Venezuela’s foreign policy: a mirage based on a curse
1.4. Lockhart, N 2014 Crisis in Venezuela: Will anybody support Democracy?.
2. LATIN AMERICA
2.1. CUBA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER
2.1.1. Benefits
2.1.1.1. The presence of thousands of Cuban medical personnel and educators in Venezuela has also helped Chavismo to implement its domestic social agenda
2.1.1.2. Cuban political, military and intelligence advisers have helped the Venezuelan regime to tighten its control over the opposition.
2.1.1.3. Cuba has largely benefitted from institutions like:
2.1.1.3.1. the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
2.1.1.3.2. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
2.2. ALBA
2.2.1. Alliance against the neoliberal agenda of the US.
2.2.1.1. Imagined as the incubator and hard core of a new wave of Latin American integration based on ideological notions of solidarity
2.3. "ANTI-HEGEMONIC” STRATEGIC
2.3.1. Inter-American Convention of Human Rights
2.3.1.1. Human Rights Commission, an organ that it considers a tool of the U.S.Human
2.3.1.2. Has denounced the Cand withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
2.4. BRAZIL
2.4.1. Interest
2.4.1.1. Reinforcing its own autonomy in relation to the U.S. and U.S.-dominated institutions
2.4.1.2. Carving for itself a more prominent role in South America and on the global scene.
2.4.1.3. Brasília has supported its Latin American integration visions
2.4.2. Disagreement
2.4.2.1. Chavismo’s radical anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism
2.4.2.2. Venezuela’s relations with “out of area” powers like Iran, Russia and China.
2.5. COLOMBIA
2.5.1. Traditional regional rival
2.5.1.1. Colombia is the key U.S. ally in the region, while Venezuela remains the main U.S. basher
2.5.1.2. Represent polar opposites on the current Latin American ideological map
2.5.2. Deeply interdependent
2.5.2.1. Because of trade, migration, drug-trafficking, transborder smuggling and security issues
2.5.2.2. Regulate their common border
2.5.2.2.1. Which serves as a sanctuary for armed and criminal groups and as a paradise for smugglers who undermine both countries
3. EUROPEAN UNION
3.1. FOREIGN POLICY
3.1.1. Pre-Chavez
3.1.1.1. Considered the EU to be a model for Latin American integration, social and economic development and pluralistic diplomacy.
3.1.1.2. EU-Latin American relationship as a “diagonal”
3.1.1.2.1. Help “pluralise” Latin America’s relations and soften U.S. hegemony in the region
3.1.2. Chavez’s presidency
3.1.2.1. Seen as an adversary (in a somewhat milder category than the U.S.)
3.1.2.2. Bilateral relations have soured recently over the Ukraine crisis when Caracas sided with Russia.
4. US. RELATIONS
4.1. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
4.1.1. Washington opinion
4.1.1.1. Considers Venezuela as a hostile nation that does not miss any opportunity to directly undermine U.S. interests and strategies
4.1.1.2. Regularly accuses it of being a major transit point for cocaine smuggling into the U.S. and Europe.
4.2. US. MEASURES
4.2.1. Military
4.2.1.1. The blocking of arms and military technology sales to Caracas
4.2.2. Economic
4.2.2.1. Non-aggression had prevailed due in particular to the oil factor
4.2.2.2. Venezuela is still the fourth-largest U.S. oil supplier
4.3. IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES
4.3.1. U.S. neoconservatives and radical Bolivarianists
4.3.1.1. Internal influence from the radicalism of their mutually reinforcing antagonistic discourses.
5. HUGO CHAVEZ
5.1. FOREIGN POLICY
5.1.1. Introduced two tectonic changes:
5.1.1.1. Dropped the liberal democratic ideology
5.1.1.2. Adopted a confrontational line with the West and pushed for a radical rearrangement of the international system.
5.1.2. soft balancing
5.1.2.1. “short of military actions” to frustrate the foreign policy objectives of other more powerful nations, and in particular the U.S
5.1.3. Autonomy
5.1.3.1. Delinking Venezuela and its allies from “imperialist” institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank through the creation of rival institutions like the Bank of the South
5.1.3.2. Adopted the Cuban national defence doctrine of asymmetric warfare, which was focused on the U.S. as the enemy.
5.1.3.3. Extended to the political terrain Venezuela’s engagement with the Arab/ Muslim world, until then mostly limited to oil diplomacy.
6. THE OIL FACTOR
6.1. FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT
6.1.1. Powerful tool
6.1.1.1. Efforts to assure its autonomy from the West
6.1.1.2. “Buy” political support and gather votes at the United Nations (UN) by promoting its soft/social power diplomacy.
6.1.2. Double-edged sword
6.1.2.1. Have increased spaces for corruption both at home and abroad
6.1.2.2. Has also led PDVSA to neglect its core business of drilling for and refining oil.
7. CHINA
7.1. SUBSTITUTE OF U.S. AND EUROPE
7.1.1. Economic
7.1.1.1. Venezuela accounts for 6% of Chinese oil imports and has accepted some $50 billion in oil-backed loans from China
7.1.1.1.1. Cooperation has included arms sales and high-tech ventures
7.1.1.2. Beijing is Venezuela’s second-largest trading partner and a major industrial investor
7.1.1.3. Has benefitted from the collapse of Venezuela’s manufacturing industry
7.1.1.4. To assure its natural resource needs and open markets for its companies
7.1.2. Diplomatic and Geopollitical
7.1.2.1. To erode U.S. hegemony in the region
7.1.2.2. Channel Russia’s return to the region
8. RUSIA
8.1. VLADIMIR PUTIN
8.1.1. Military
8.1.1.1. Delinking the Venezuelan army from Washington
8.1.1.1.1. Through a dramatic increase of arms purchases from Russia
8.1.1.1.2. Holding of joint naval exercises.
8.1.2. Support in International issues
8.1.2.1. Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria to its endorsement of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and meddling in Ukraine.
9. CRISIS
9.1. CHAVEZ AND MADURO'S GOVERNMENT
9.1.1. Political party
9.1.1.1. Project for refounding the nation, based on the vindication of the poor people
9.1.1.2. Anti-neoliberal political orientation and for its plentiful social aids, something that was possible thanks to oil income
9.1.1.3. Imposed a new way of relation with his followers: the so-called “participative democracy”
9.1.1.3.1. This practice created a sentiment of being the political protagonist among the lower classes
9.1.2. After Chavez’s death
9.1.2.1. The problem became particularly acute due to the lack of leadership
9.1.2.2. Maduro, Chavez’s minister of foreign
9.1.2.2.1. It has been clear that he does not have the talents of his predecessor
9.2. DOES THE SUPPORT EXIST TO THE DEMMOCRACY?
9.2.1. Violence
9.2.1.1. Human rights violations and protesters’ crimes have already left deep wounds in the society
9.2.2. International Interventions
9.2.2.1. The OAS (Organization of American States)
9.2.2.1.1. Has been experiencing difficulties in playing a decisive role when democracy is challenged by violent social upheavals
9.2.2.2. UNASUR (Union of South-American Nations)
9.2.2.2.1. Create a commission to mediate between the parties
9.2.2.3. MERCOSUR’s (Common Market of the South)
9.2.2.3.1. It has just emitted a call for peace and respect for democracy
9.3. PLOTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
9.3.1. Violent demonstrations
9.3.1.1. Protesters have deployed incendiary bombs, guns, and barricades against the government and public property as well as citizens, resulting in injuries and death
9.3.1.1.1. Strategy calling for a change by extra-constitutional means
9.3.1.1.2. They bet that an escalation of violence might provoke a presidential substitution (or an international intervention)
9.3.2. Pacific demostrations
9.3.2.1. Led by the opposition, in order to channel the general dissatisfaction of the society with the economic situation.
9.3.2.2. The United States shared this idea of the government “confront peaceful protestors with force"
9.3.3. Government responses
9.3.3.1. Leopoldo Lopez, who was accused of instigation to commit crimes and unlawful assemblies and riots
9.3.3.2. The expulsion of diplomatic officers from United States
9.3.3.3. Called on its own partisans to express their support and organize marches in its favour.
9.3.3.3.1. Promote confrontation and increase the already existing social tensions
10. IRAN AND ARAB
10.1. RELATIONS
10.1.1. Were based on:
10.1.1.1. Push up oil prices in order to promote their internal development and international influence
10.1.1.2. Ideological strand
10.1.1.2.1. Tehran is a key determinant of anti-Americanism and Chavez relished publicising his meetings with former Iranian president Ahmadinejad
10.1.1.2.2. Also helped Tehran to expand its diplomatic and political presence among ALBA member states.
10.1.1.3. Washington is particularly incensed by Iran’s military sales and assistance to Venezuela
10.1.1.3.1. follows a strongly pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel policy that has repercussions in the U.S
10.1.1.4. Caracas’s constant support of the Iranian nuclear programme