1. kundenreaktionen
1.1. kundennutzen maximiert zahlungsbereitschaft
1.1.1. rhapsody geschäftsmodell
1.1.2. itunes geschäftsmodell
1.1.3. amazon geschäftsmodell
1.2. einsatz von drm?
1.2.1. arten: copy-protection, draconian drm, watermarking
1.2.2. einfluss auf wtp
1.2.2.1. More specifically, the presence of shared DRM increases piracy and reduces the mean WTP of nonpirates. The estimated piracy rates are 6.8% for the absent shared DRM condition and 9.7% for the present shared DRM con- dition, while the (unconditional) mean WTP estimates are $.83 and $.69, respectively. Thus, we con- clude that the removal of shared DRM restrictions has the dual impact of lowering hardcore piracy and increasing WTP for digital music.(sms)
1.2.3. akzeptanz
1.2.3.1. Reactance theory (Brehm 1966) considers how people react when their personal freedoms are reduced, threatened, or eliminated (Clee and Wicklund 1980; Lessne and Venkatesan 2006; Thomas, Donnell, and Buboltz 2001).
1.2.4. implikationen?
1.2.4.1. sinha, machado, sellman
1.2.4.1.1. evtl. auch verantwortlich für langsameres wachstum des online musikverkaufs(sinha, machado, sellman)
1.2.5. nutzen
1.2.5.1. netzeffekte für shops, die sich auf consumer electronics auswirken
1.2.5.2. record industry will drm und würde zB microsofts geschäftsmodell (zune pass) nicht gutheissen ohne drm (dont think twice)
1.2.5.3. First, there should not exist any significant, negative impact of file sharing on the sales of alternative music formats from which the industry derives substantial revenues (e.g., CDs primarily, but also vinyl records and music videos). Second, file sharing should enhance the demand for complementary, revenue-generating goods and services, such as other digital songs and concerts. Third, lifting DRM restrictions should enhance consumers’ utility and increase overall sales of digital music files. (sms)
1.2.5.4. The key problem is that if even a small fraction of users are able to transform content from a protected to an unprotected form, then illegitimate distribution networks are likely to make that content available ubiquitously. (if piracy is the problem)
1.2.5.5. copy protection has been ineffective! (measuring the effect)
1.2.5.6. Overall, there was no indication that DRM would increase or decrease music sales. The vast majority of respondents did not mind limited DRM or did not think about DRM when making purchases. Those that did avoid DRM expressed an aversion to paying for music in general. (competing against online)
1.2.6. The goal of a DRM system is to enforce licenses3 between a content provider (the licensor) and a consumer (the licensee) that define rules about authorized use of managed content. There are only a limited number of technologies that can be employed to build DRM systems to achieve this goal. (if piracy is the problem)
1.3. preis?
1.3.1. risikoaversion kann einer der gründe für illegale kopien sein
1.4. sampling
1.4.1. managing piracy
1.4.1.1. Counter to intuition, we show that losses due to piracy are more severe for products that don’t live up to their hype rather than for products that tend to be valued in the market, thus requiring a greater investment in deterrence for the former. Further, our analysis points out that sampling strategies are optimal only under narrowly defined conditions for vertically segmented digital experience products, unlike physical goods where sampling is always beneficial when valued attributes have been underestimated by consumers.
1.5. deterrent (law suits...)
1.5.1. carrot or stick
1.5.1.1. 1. Maßnahmen der RIAA nur für ein kleines Segment der Konsumenten effektiv, können für hOSL sogar gegenteilig wirken. Tatsächliche Möglichkeit zur Bekämpfung von Piraterie ist allerdings, auf legalen Websites einen Mehrwert zu bieten. Das Internet bietet also für die Musikindustrie große Chancen, da z.B. die Distributionskosten nahezu auf Null fallen und mit gestaffelten Preisen viel Konsumentenrente abgeschöpft werden könnte. 2. Die Studien wurden fast ausschließlich an College Studenten durchgeführt, was natürlich eine demografische Einseitigkeit darstellt. Auf der einen Seite sind sie zwar eine wichtige Zielgruppe der Musikindustrie und tendenziell besonders der Piraterie zugeneigt (also ein wichtiges Segment für eine solche Untersuchung), auf der anderen Seite lassen sich die Ergebnisse aber wahrscheinlich nicht auf andere Bevölkerungsgruppen, bzw. -schichten übertragen. 3. Überraschend war, dass die Peinlichkeit geschnappt zu werden anscheinend gar nicht vorhanden war. Vielmehr scheint es, als sei illegales Downloaden beim untersuchten Segment die soziale Norm. Damit in Einklang geben nur 5% der Generation Y an, illegales Downloaden sei falsch oder unethisch.
1.5.2. We found that individuals who share a substantial number of music files react to legal threats differently from those who share a lesser number of files. Importantly, our analysis indicates that even after these legal threats and the resulting lowered levels of file sharing, the availability of music files on these networks remains substantial. (impact of legal threats)
1.5.3. However, other measures will be less effective for reducing movie piracy, particularly if they focus on legal costs (i.e., the consumer’s fear of legal persecution). Such actions appear largely ineffective for limiting file sharing; we find no significant impact of legal costs on obtaining illegal copies in our PLS analysis, despite the intimidation studios have attempted to exert on file sharers in recent campaigns. In other words, the movie industry’s initial reaction to the threat of movie file sharing—suing its own customers—appears to be misguided. (consumer file sharing)
1.6. gründe für piraterie
1.6.1. Hennig-Thurau, Henning, and Sattler (2007) identify five factors that determine consumer file sharing of movies and find that, among others, the perceived degree of substitution, the original’s transaction costs, perceived moral and search costs, and consumers’ file- sharing knowledge influence behavior
1.6.1.1. Costs of the illegal copy. Because consumers usually acquire illegal copies without paying a fee, the costs of obtaining and/or watching an illegal movie copy mainly consist of transaction costs. These transaction costs comprise moral costs (e.g., ethical concerns about stealing copyrighted material; Holm 2003), legal costs (e.g., fear of sanctions; Chiang and Assane 2002), technical costs (e.g., potential file misspecifications or viruses that could harm the consumer’s computer), and search costs (e.g., time spent looking for an illegal copy) (Rochelandet and Le Guel 2005). Transaction costs reduce the attractiveness of the illegal copy compared with the original and should have a negative effect on obtaining and watching illegal movie copies.
1.6.2. musik als experience good, piracy als selfmade sampling
1.7. anreize
1.7.1. clement, consumer response
1.7.1.1. legale alternativen als "service interventions"
1.7.1.2. We find that service interventions reduce the extent of favorable attitudes toward illegal file sharing and weaken the relationship between attitude and intent, whereby favorable attitudes toward illegal file sharing do not necessarily translate into a stronger intent to engage in file sharing. However, the interventions also strengthen the relationship between perceived benefits and attitudes toward illegal file sharing, and reinforce the positive impact on intent to file share for those who had engaged in higher levels of file sharing behavior before the interventions.
1.7.1.3. Our results suggest that even with free service interventions, mental model changes aremodest (though favorable), and therefore, firms would need to provide effective alternatives to illegal files sharing in order to dampen such activities online.
1.7.1.4. Our study is based on a simple premise. People have mental models to help them determine and execute the appropriate behaviors in various situations they encounter in their lives. Our focus here is on mental models associated with illegal music file sharing, and specifically, in understanding whether and how the availability of legal download services can change mental models associated with illegal file sharing in a manner that leads to lower incidence of illegal file sharing.
1.7.1.5. Our concern in this study is not about mental models per se, but about how service interventions might change mental models. Specifically, we wish to explore whether the availability of a legal music alternative (a service intervention) has the potential to change the mental model that a group of target customers has about illegal file downloading.
2. effekte
2.1. web 2.0?
2.2. netzeffekte: siehe clement... netzeffekte u musik, wissen steigert nutzen, entscheidung über die zu “erforschende” musikrichtung häufig abhängig von der bezugsgruppe - carry-over effekte durch chartplatzierung und schnell nachgelegtes album, evtl. auch möglich durch verbreitung durch piraterie und somit steigender nutzen vom kauf eines albums
2.3. neteffekte zb bei softwarepiraterie sehr stark zu beobachten, weshalb es dort sogar besser sein kann, ein bestimmtes level von piraterie zu fördern. in musikindustrie evtl auch der fall, vor allem bei könstlern von indie labels und bezüglich des vermehrten absatzes von komplementärprodukten wie konzerten.
2.3.1. pirated for profit
2.4. This study offers a new perspective on the impact of piracy. Piracy is commonly considered to be detrimental to the software industry unless there exists strong network externality in the product markets (Conner and Rumelt 1991, Takeyama 1994, Shy and Tisse 1999) or unless it serves as a de facto marketing mechanism to attract new customers (Givon, Mahajan and Muller 1995, Prasad and Mahajan 2003, Haruvy, Mahajan and Prasad 2004, Chellappa and Shivendu 2003).
2.5. Different from these prior studies, we show that an important effect of piracy is its attraction of price sensitive consumers. By removing these consumers, piracy reduces competition among individual (how much anti-piracy)
3. gewinnoptimale strategie
3.1. bundle strategie bei alben
3.2. drm ja oder nein
3.3. lawsuits ja oder nein
3.4. gopal, bhattacharjee
3.4.1. In the new music market landscape, what is it that firms can do to enhance success? Our results emphasize that superstars and debut rank are impor- tant markers of success. Thus firms that do the best job in enlisting superstars and successfully utilizing prerelease marketing to impact debut rank are well- positioned to succeed in the new marketplace.
4. marktsituation
4.1. abspielgeräte
4.1.1. netzeffekte nutzen um abspielgeräte zu vertreiben (drm)? (clement)
4.2. business model
4.2.1. missachten von kundenwünschen, d.h. veraltetes geschäftsmodell (marketing myopia)
4.2.2. itunes als big player, seit 2010 auch komplett ohne drm, allerdings zu höheren preisen
4.2.3. umsatz der musikindustrie leidet daran, dass sie an einigen produkten nicht partizipieren (konzerte...)
4.2.4. While we cannot present a business model that will successfully move the music industry into the area of the Internet, we are confident that the current complaints will disappear once the thinking has moved from protecting the old ways to discovering and using the new ways. (when business models go bad)
4.2.5. The consequences of the Web so far have left the music industry rather helpless. The reaction to the new reality of music as data flowing freely through the available data channels has been to attempt to stop this flow through technical measures and legislation. The alternative, adaptation to the new world, so far has found amazingly little consideration. (when business models...)
4.2.6. Even if file sharing displaces sales, the weaker copyright regime need not undermine the incentives to produce new works if artists and entertainment companies can shift their earnings from selling music, games and movies to selling complements to these products. An interesting example is concerts.
4.2.7. DEEZER, spotify, last.fm, pandora: user erstellen eine playlist, dann tendieren sie dazu sie ein paarmal durchzuhören, wonach sie switchen zu radio. so entdecken sie neue musik!! (dmr2010)
4.3. sinken der umsatzzahlen
4.3.1. beweise dafür?
4.4. einfluss von filesharing auf umsatz
4.4.1. oberholzer-gee
4.4.1.1. kritik durch liebowitz
4.4.1.1.1. I have endeavored in this report to closely re-examine the portion of empirical evidence put forward by O/S that was amenable to such re-examination. It is probably something of an understatement to say that the O/S results did not hold up well under this reexamination. O/S performed four quasi experiments. They claimed that each experiment supports their overall conclusion that file-sharing is not harmful to record sales. Upon closer examination and replicating the tests where possible, I find that three of the experiments support the opposite conclusion—that filesharing harms sales—and that the fourth was based on a false premise and is thus not informative. O/S also report numerous statistics purporting to explain either why the sound recording sales decline is not unusual, not large, not universal or can be explained by some other factors. These factual claims, made with no citations or references, were either false, misleading, or incomplete.
4.4.1.2. Downloads have an effect on sales which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, our estimates are of moderate economic significance and are inconsistent with claims that file sharing can explain the decline in music sales during our study period.
4.4.2. gibt es einen positiven effekt von piraterie im spezialfall von musik?
4.4.2.1. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory pricing, and so raising barriers to entry. Our model is highly applicable to the software industry, where relatively high entry costs and the relatively (selective enforcement)
4.4.3. liebowitz, zentner, etc.
4.4.3.1. The results suggest that peer-to-peer usage reduces the probability of buying music by an average of 30%. Based on this estimate for the reduction in the probability of buying music, back of the envelope calculations indicate that without file sharing sales in 2002 would have been around 7.8 percent higher. (zentner)
4.4.4. rob, waldfogel
4.4.4.1. reduktion
4.5. marktteilnehmer
4.5.1. künstler
4.5.1.1. gopal, bhattacharjee, 2006
4.5.1.2. oberholzer-gee, strumpf 2010
4.5.1.2.1. However, in the industry with the largest purported impact – music – consumer access to recordings has vastly improved since the advent of file haring. Since 2000, the number of recordings produced has more than doubled. In our view, this makes it difficult to argue that weaker copyright protection has had a negative impact on artists’ incentives to be creative.
4.5.2. plattenfirmen
4.5.2.1. gopal, bhattacharjee etc.
4.5.2.1.1. our results indicated that minor label albums have experienced a significant beneficial shift in the post-TS period and are surviving longer than before. (survival analysis)
4.5.2.1.2. We found that debut rank had a highly significant negative impact on album survival, an impact that was even more pronounced in the post-TS period for albums debut- ing lower on the charts (i.e., less popular albums). Average survival time on the charts decreased by 42% in the post-TS period. However closer inspec- tion revealed that albums that debut at the top of charts did not suffer significantly shorter survival times. Rather, less popular albums had dramatically reduced survival times in the post-TS period. The superstar effect appeared to be alive and well, with albums by such performers surviving approximately 35% longer even after controlling for other variables. This superstar advantage remained unchanged in the post-TS period. Across both pre- and post-TS periods, albums promoted by major labels tended to survive longer than those promoted by minor labels. How- ever, our results indicated that minor label albums have experienced a significant beneficial shift in the post-TS period and are surviving longer than before. If anecdotal evidence (Spellman 2006, Green 2004) is correct in suggesting that minor labels have utilized file-sharing networks to popularize their albums, then the majors have an added incentive to fight file shar- ing. Finally, albums by female artists continue to have a survival advantage over those by solo male artists and groups.
4.5.2.1.3. The innovative approaches adopted by the minor labels might provide strategies for major labels to emulate. One approach that minor labels have been adept at is embracing the use of technologies to brand and reach out to potential cus- tomers. In this vein, it has been suggested that sharing through online networks might have beneficial sam- pling and word-of-mouth effects.
4.5.3. musikplattformen
4.5.3.1. download
4.5.3.2. stream
4.5.3.2.1. radio
4.5.3.2.2. wählbar (siehe rhapsody, spotify etc.)
4.5.4. consumer electronics
5. besonderheiten von musik
5.1. musik als hedonisches produkt (adler)
5.2. experience good
5.2.1. By definition consumers know the true fit of an experience good only after they have consumed it
5.3. grenznutzen nimmt nach erstmaligem konsum ab?
5.4. digital -> public good
6. argumentation
6.1. situation
6.1.1. massnahmen
6.1.1.1. wirkungsanalyse
6.1.1.1.1. empfehlung
6.2. 1. ziel des papers: die bisherigen erkenntnisse über konsumentenreaktionen und empfehlungen an die industrie bezüglich des einsatzes von anti-piraterie maßnahmen synthetisieren. dadurch soll die übergreifende frage beantworten, ob es für die musikindustrie überhaupt relevant ist, sich mit piraterie zu befassen
6.3. einleitung:
6.3.1. those perceived least wrong were "downloading of movies and music files from the internet for free" (generation y attitudes)